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




Walter P. Wells









# HINDU PHILOSOPHY

*POPULARLY EXPLAINED.*

## THE ORTHODOX SYSTEMS.

BY

RAM CHANDRA BOSE, A.M.,

OF LUCKNOW, INDIA,

*Author of "Brahmoism," etc.*

LAHORE, INDIA:

THE PUNJAB RELIGIOUS BOOK SOCIETY,

1884.

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## PREFACE.

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SOME of the papers embodied in this volume present the substance of lectures delivered in various places in India in furtherance of the work in which the author has been engaged for years. Two of them—those on the Sankhya Philosophy—appeared as articles in the *Calcutta Review*, and the paper on Yoga Philosophy in the *Indian Evangelical Review*; while the supplemental paper, written years ago, was published as an article in the *Methodist Quarterly*, then edited by Dr. D. D. Whedon. The paper on “Hindu and Christian Philosophy Contrasted” was delivered as a lecture at Key East, under the auspices of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy. All the papers embodied are based on standard translations of original works, and present the leading principles of the schools in the words of their celebrated founders and champions. There are a few works of recognized merit on Hindu Philosophy in the English language, barring the translations utilized in this volume; but there is not one which makes such a copious use of the original sources of information as the volume now presented to the public, or which is better adapted to give an insight into the contents of standard works on the six great systems of Hindu Philosophy, as well as to show the similarity that subsists between its broad principles and those which modern philosophers are prone to represent as original, the peculiar outgrowth of the

advanced thought of the nineteenth century. The writer's humility trusts that the book may be of use to those who, whether missionaries and clergymen or mere lovers of literature, wish to have a bird's-eye view of Hindu Philosophy without taking the trouble of going to the sources. The volume, if it be encouraged by the public here, will be followed by another of the same size on the Heterodox Systems of Hindu Philosophy.

RAM CHANDRA BOSE.

*July 28, 1884.*

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# HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

It is very interesting to trace a noble river, through hundreds of miles of fertile land dotted with beautiful cities, thriving towns, and romantic villages, to where its broad sea-like expanse dwindles into a small, brawling mountain stream. It ought to be, if it is not, much more interesting to trace a broad, expansive stream of philosophic thought, which has moulded and fashioned the inner life of a great though fallen people, and left its mark also on their outer life, to where its omnipotent influence is but faintly foreshadowed. India, as a country, presents an accumulation of differentiating marks, or such as are calculated to distinguish it from the other countries of the world. It has a unique configuration, unique features of beauty and grandeur, and a unique history. But the most remarkable thing one notices within its precincts is its universally adopted, all-embracing, all-comprehensive pantheism.

Pantheism in other lands is the monopoly of a few gifted but misguided minds, and its influence is scarcely felt outside of very narrow and narrowing circles. In India, however, it is co-extensive with social or national

life, being held both by the learned and the ignorant, the rich and the poor, the high and the low. The miracle Western scholars scarcely expect to see realized, or transferred from the domain of possibility into the domain of fact, is a great nation of pantheists ; and this miracle is presented in all its entirety in India ! Here pantheism of a thoroughly spiritual type is preached and advocated, not only in temples of piety and halls of learning, but in places of public resort, in streets and thoroughfares ; not only in the seclusion of cloisters and cells, but amid the din and bustle of hives of industry and marts of commerce.

And it is very interesting to note that the phraseology in which it is couched, the imagery by which it is illustrated, and the arguments by which its positions are fortified, are all as old as itself is, or the many-sided, hydra-headed religion of which it professes to be the essential part. The turns of expression, which are to-day bandied backward and forward by the champions of pantheism in India, were coined under the shade, so to speak, of a rich, sonorous, and remarkably flexible language, about two thousand five hundred years ago. The tropes and metaphors utilized to-day by our countrymen to set forth the essential features of their pantheistic belief were first pressed into such service about the time when the prophet Isaiah was denouncing with characteristic fervor the vices by which his beloved country, the vineyard of the Lord of Glory, was being ruined. And the varied lines of reasoning by which this dreamy system is now defended by them were first arrayed under its banner by their forefathers, long before the initiation of their present forms of worship. India appears a scene of mental immobility, both when the backward condition of its arts is taken into

consideration, and when the significant fact is realized that its rich literature has remained unimproved and unexpanded for ages untold.

Had the influence of our national pantheism been confined to our own country, and not felt anywhere else, still, universal and all-powerful as its sway has for ages been within its limits, an attempt to trace it to its original source would have appeared very desirable. But we have reason to believe that its influence has not been thus confined. The varied forms of pantheistic belief, which flourished in schools of philosophy, if not in thoroughfares and market-places, in Western countries in ancient times, have confessedly a dash of Orientalism about them ; and if not traceable to its direct influence, a common origin of all these phases of thought and of those associated with it must be sought in some Eastern region which brought speculative philosophy to the birth in some prehistoric age. Its influence, however, is most assuredly noticeable in the disquisitions, and even in the phraseology in which the idealistic and pantheistic speculations of modern times are embodied. Pantheism certainly appears in these days in a new garb, and in forms more apparently rational and really attractive than it did in days long since gone by, but the likeness of the ectypes of the day to the archetypes of ancient times is so obvious that their essential identity is one of those facts which cannot possibly be ignored. At all events, it may safely be assumed that Indian pantheism has, besides moulding and fashioning the varied phases of our national life, largely influenced the more advanced philosophic notions of the age. An attempt, therefore, to trace it through successive phases of development to its original sources is doubly important, even more so

than an attempt to trace the requirements of modern jurisprudence to the well-known code of Justinian.

Fortunately an attempt of this description is not likely to end in failure. Certain documents of unimpeachable integrity have come down to us from a remote antiquity, and in them we may discover the germs not only of the universally adopted pantheism of our country, but of the varied systems of philosophic thought, which it has either swallowed up and assimilated to its own nature, or overcome and thrown into the shade. These are the Upanishads, or philosophical treatises attached to the Vedas. Each of the four Vedas, on which the Hindu concentrates his present homage and retrospective veneration and builds up his hopes of prospective bliss, consists of three parts—the Mantra, the Brahmana, and the Upanishad. The hymns, prayers, and doxologies, which form its initial and certainly the most fascinating part, make up its Mantra division ; and the ceremonial directories, which have to be consulted when the oblations and sacrifices associated with the hymnology, are actually brought to the altar, constitute its Brahmana portion. The Upanishad or concluding portion embodies the philosophy by which the occult meaning of the hymnology and the ritual is inquired into, ascertained, and set forth. The word Upanishad, like many words of a doubtful origin, has been variously interpreted by Oriental scholars, and an array of fanciful etymologies has been presented in connection with it. But the meaning of the word is plain—viz., that which destroys the sense-bred ignorance, which the hymnology and the ritual it explains are fitted to nourish and mature.

Every Veda has its Mantras or hymns of prayer and praise, its Brahmanas or ceremonial directories or ritual

guide-books, and its Upanishads or philosophical treatises of an explanatory and discursive character. The number of the hymns may be fixed, if not with the strictest accuracy, at least with a close approximation to truth. A few of the hymns may have been lost, but the vast body has come down almost as it existed in primitive times. But the number of the supplementary treatises, by which their right use and occult meaning are indicated, cannot possibly be fixed, owing specially to Oriental proneness to exaggeration. Lists are preserved, such as may encourage the belief that the number of the Upanishads alone exceeded two hundred and thirty, but only a few of these are now extant ; and the complete disappearance of the rest cannot be satisfactorily explained except by representing their alleged numerical bulk and strength as apocryphal. Nor is it at all necessary to plunge ourselves into learned disquisitions for the purpose of arriving at an approximate conclusion with reference to the original number of these treatises, as the few commented on by Sankar Acharya, one of the acutest thinkers and most voluminous writers India ever saw, are represented by all parties as the most important ; and these are, properly speaking, the sources of Hindu Philosophy.

The eleven Upanishads commented upon by Sankar Acharya may be divided into two classes, the major and the minor ; the two larger Upanishads and the nine smaller ones. It is possible that two or three of the smaller of these treatises were extant before the appearance of the larger ones ; but the logical precision by which they are as a body characterized, together with their lucidness of arrangement and coherence of thought, speaking of course comparatively, leads us to assign to their composition a date posterior to that of

the more bulky and certainly the more important documents in an archæological point of view.

The two larger Upanishads are the Chhandogya and the Brihad Aranyaka, the former belonging to the Sama Veda, and the latter to the collection of the Yajur Veda, called Vajasaneyi or white ; and their composition is traced by general consent to a period prior to the appearance of Buddha on the stage of history. They have many legends in common, related almost in the same words ; and this fact, if not anything else or anything partaking of the nature of external evidence, may justify the presumption that one of them was written before the other. But the question, Which is the earlier of these two documents? cannot be solved any more than the length of the interval between the composition of the one and that of the other can be ascertained. The features of similarity in thought and expression noticeable, together with the want of system characteristic of both, tend to confirm the views of those learned scholars who represent them as contemporary documents based on sources of information now lost, or on traditions and legends current at the time when they were both composed by independent writers.

As it is our intention to analyze in this paper the contents of these two hoary documents, let us present the evidences of a high antiquity we have noticed in the course of a careful perusal, with pencil in hand, in consecutive order. The translations we shall utilize are that of the "Chhandogya," by Dr. Rajendra Lall Mitra, and that of "Brihad Aranyaka," by Dr. Roer.

And first of all let it be observed that the imagery presented is, together with the forms of expression, emphatically archaic. The truths presented are cer-

tainly of a recondite character, but the images pressed into service are of the simplest order. The fire produced by the attrition of two pieces of wood, the spokes issuing from the nave of a wheel, the athlete running a race, cows suckling their calves, leaves attached to the branches and the stocks, a bow strung, an arrow let fly, a flaming fire, a rolling car, a bellowing ox, a drop of water on a lotus leaf—such are the images which flit across our minds as we turn page after page of these ancient books. A favorite storehouse of figures is the beehive and the honey squeezed from it, which is now the best of gods, then the best of sacred writings, and anon the best of ceremonial observances. It is certainly not proper to lay great stress on this feature of these Upanishads, inasmuch as the polite literature of our country, its poetry and romance, does not seem to have gone very far beyond the archaic stage of development. But yet, as the speculations of its philosophic age were characterized by a remarkable stiffness of style, the frequency with which such simple images occur in these documents, together with the flexibility of their style, is an indubitable proof of great antiquity.

And this may be said also of the want of artistic finish manifested by the legends related, and the clumsy way in which these are arranged, and the truths inculcated are presented. Not to speak of the remarkable brevity and conciseness which characterized the productions of what might in India be called the age of philosophy, the minor Upanishads are ahead of the major in the terseness of their style, in the concatenated order in which their contents are presented, and in the absence from them of mythical stories, such as are of a puerile character.

Akin to this sort of evidence is that based on the

longevity of the persons referred to, and in that presupposed in the division of life into distinct periods presented in chap. iii., sec. 16, of the Chhandagaya Upanishad. Man is in this part represented as Yajna or sacrifice, and the different periods of his life are thus indicated. The first twenty-four years of his life, during which he is under the special protection of the Vashus or the fire-gods, are the matin sacrifice. The period between the twenty-fourth and the forty-fourth year of his life is the midday oblation ; and during these years his presiding deities are the Rudras or storm-gods. The afternoon sacrifice is the period intervening between the forty-fourth and the eighty-fourth year of his life, when he is under the special guidance of the Adityas or sun-gods. The closing period, which in the case of a devotee, Mahidasa, son of Itara, extended from the eighty-fourth to the one hundred and sixteen, may be represented as the evening sacrifice, though it is not characterized as such, and the deities protecting it are not named. It is, however, distinctly stated that the person who knows the significance of the first three periods of life will live for one hundred and sixteen years. All this betokens general longevity, which is an incontestable proof of great antiquity, though, so far as we are aware, no stress has been laid upon it by Oriental scholars.

The gods mentioned in these disquisitions are those of the Vedas, not those of any post-Vedic period. The productive and destructive energies of nature, which appear under various names to have monopolized the worship of our unsophisticated ancestors of simple Vedic times, are the divinities around which the legends, speculations, and reasonings of these venerable documents revolve. And their number is set forth



therein with the same indefiniteness which in the Rig Veda makes it impossible for us to fix it. In one of the many dialogues embodied, their number is given as no less than "three and three thousand." It, however, shrinks in the same dialogue into "three and three hundred," then into "thirty and three," then into "six," then into "three," and ultimately into "one." But, as in the Rig Veda, "thirty-three" is the number for which special partiality is shown when the spirit of philosophical generalization is held in abeyance for a moment; and they are the eight Vashus, or various forms of the Fire-god, the eleven Rudras or forms of the Storm-god, and the twelve Adityas or forms of the Sun-god, besides Indra and Prajapati, representing perhaps heaven and earth. The God Brahma appears in these treatises either as the quintessence of all essences, or as in the Rig Veda, not certainly as the first person of the Hindu Triad. The all but perfect identity of the pantheon herein disclosed with that of which glimpses are presented in the Vedas, particularly in the earliest of these venerable books, as also its dissimilarity to that set up in post-Vedic times, cannot but be regarded as an incontestable proof of great antiquity.

The ceremonies referred to in these disquisitions are emphatically Vedic ceremonies, not those which were initiated in post-Vedic times. The Aswamedha, or the sacrifice of the horse, the crowning sacrifice of the simple times pictured in the Vedas, is not only alluded to again and again, but graphically described, explained, and philosophized upon, specially in the opening section of the Brihad Aranyaka, in which the supreme greatness of the animal sacrificed, and its identity with Prajapati, the lord of creatures, are shown by

means of analogies and metaphors, the former far-fetched and the latter incongruous. The Somayajna, or the sacrifice of the Soma or moon-plant, which is prominently brought forward in all the Vedas, and which is the stock theme of one of them, the Sama Veda, is the subject of innumerable allusions and many disquisitions in these treatises. The Pasu-medha, or animal sacrifices of an inferior order, are also referred to, and the great sacrifice called Purush-medha, or the sacrifice of the Lord of creatures for the good of those who are now gods but were once men, is also alluded to. Indeed an attempt is obviously made in these books to merge the varieties of the sacrifices enumerated in the Vedas into the supreme sacrifice of the supreme Being for the supreme good of the universe, as well as to sublimate the Vedic pantheon into one pervasive spiritual substance.

The literature alluded to is, like the pantheon disclosed and the ritual embodied, Vedic. The first three Vedas, Rig, Yajur, and Sama, have numerous references made to them; and the last, Atharva, is also alluded to, though rarely. But not a single book extant in post-Vedic times is referred to. Exception may be taken to this statement, based on the two well-known passages in the two Upanishads, in which "Ithases and Purans" are mentioned along with the Vedas, and the branches of literature embodied in or closely associated with them. And certainly if these two generic names were made to include the books now comprehended by them, the objection would be both well-grounded and unanswerable. But these names had a meaning in primitive times very different indeed from what they bear now. The name "Ithases," which now includes the epic poems, comprehended in

the age of the Upanishads the legendary lore embodied in the Vedas ; while by the Purans were understood the varied cosmogonies and theogonies found in those venerable records, not the obscene literature and mythology from which the senseless forms of worship now prevalent in our country derive their sanction and sanctity.

And lastly, the crude, undeveloped and unsystematized form in which caste appears in these treatises is an irrefragable argument in favor of their high antiquity. The four original castes are mentioned distinctly and emphatically, not merely hinted at, as in the Rig Veda ; but they do not appear separated from one another by broad and well-defined lines of demarcation, or guarded each by a network of iron rules. On the contrary, the relative position of the orders, especially of the two higher ones, appears left in uncertainty rather than defined with precision. There are doubtless passages which clearly show that the Brahmins were rising, slowly but surely, up to the ascendancy they have for ages and centuries enjoyed ; but passages are not wanting fitted to show that they were often beaten by their rivals, the Kshetrias, in their attempt to scale the summit of sacerdotal power and authority. The opening section of chap. ii. of the Brihad Aranyaka presents a dialogue between a proud, self-complacent and self-sufficient Brahmin, by name Gargya, and a really learned and therefore humble Kshetria, Ajatasatru, the moral of which is the abandonment by the former of his ridiculous pretensions to knowledge and his enrolment as a pupil of the latter. Such a thing would have been an impossibility if the caste system had been matured, as it subsequently was in the age of Manu.

But there is a dialogue in the Chhandogya eminently fitted to show that in occult, divine knowledge the Kshetrya was most decidedly ahead of the Brahmin. A Brahmin lad goes to Jaivali, the king of Panchala, of course a Kshetrya, and has five test questions regarding the condition of the dead and ethereal regions put to him. Unable to answer them, he returns to his father and teacher chagrined, and solicits instruction on those points. The father confesses his ignorance and repairs to the court of the learned king for instruction. The king receives him hospitably, but feels afflicted when informed of his motive. However, after much hesitation, he expresses his wish to teach him in these significant words : " Since you have thus inquired, and inasmuch as no Brahmin ever knew it before, hence of all people in the world the Kshetryas alone have the right of imparting instruction on this subject."

The high antiquity of these documents having been established, it remains for us to analyze their contents. A word or two, however, on their style and the age they portray would be a fitting preface to such analysis. We have already had occasion to speak of the extravagances of diction by which these treatises are, along with the entire body of Sanscrit literature, characterized. Transitions of the harshest kind from one pronoun to another, from one figure of speech to another, from one train of thought to another, and from one line of reasoning to another, along with the elliptical nature of the sentences in general, throw an air of obscurity over many of the passages on which the main argument hinges ; while metaphors and allegories both incongruous and far-fetched add to the mystification. But the most repellent features of the disquisitions embodied are tiresome repetitions, phonetic analogies,

grotesque flights of the imagination, and inaccurate reasonings.

Examples of all these varieties of defects cannot be presented within the limits which we must prescribe to ourselves ; but the following two strings of figures, one culled from the Chhandogya and the other from the Brihad Aranyaka, are pre-eminently fitted to set forth the sort of extravagance we have to wade through while perusing these books. Of the great Universal soul it is said that " The heaven is the head, the sun is the eye, the wind is the breath, the sky is the trunk, the moon is the fundament, and the earth is the feet. The altar is his breast, the sacrificial grass constitutes the hair of his body, the household fire forms his heart, the Annoharyapachana fire forms his mind, Ahavarya fire his face." The exordium of the Brihad Aranyaka sets forth the greatness of the sacrificial horse in these words : " The sun is the eye ; the wind, the breath ; the fire, under the name Vaiswanara, the open mouth ; the year, the body of the sacrificial horse ; the heaven is the back ; the atmosphere, the belly ; the earth, the footstool (hoof) ; the quarters, the sides ; the seasons, the members ; the months, the half months, the joints ; day and night, the feet ; the constellation, the bones ; the sky, the muscles ; the half-digested food, the sand ; the rivers, arteries and veins ; the liver and spleen, the mountains ; the herbs and trees, the various kinds of hair. The sun as long as he rises, the forepart of the body ; the sun as long as he descends, the hind part of the body. The lightning is like yawning ; the shaking of the members is like the rolling of the thunder." Decency leads us to throw the veil over the concluding portion of this series of grotesque metaphors and similes.

The utter contempt for matters of fact, associated in

these treatises with the wildest flights of speculation, is not perhaps a defect confined to Oriental Philosophy, it being discoverable in the writings of philosophers who in reasoning never appear egregiously at variance with the approved rules of logic. But the facility with which day-dreams are presented herein as facts of philosophy, or science in general, is peculiarly Oriental. The arteries, for instance, "of the heart" are said in the Chhandogya to "exist in a brown ethereal fluid, yea, in a white, a blue, a yellow, a red ethereal fluid." They are in the other Upanishad divided into two classes, the good and the bad, and the number of the good ones given is 72,000 ! But we shall have to refer to this tendency to present dreams as established facts when we speak of the eschatology of these books ; and so we need not allow ourselves to be detained here by this feature of extravagance.

The age depicted in the Upanishads has justly been called an age of inquiry, of incipient rather than matured speculation. The gods worshipped, originally forces of nature, were many, and clothed with attributes by no means godlike ; the forms of devotion utilized were apparently puerile and meaningless ; and the ceremonies reduced to practice were both cumbersome and absurd. The mind naturally recoiled from the surroundings of a pantheon so unworthy, and the paraphernalia of a worship so sensuous and degrading, and the question was naturally raised, Have these forms of devotion and these oft-recurring ceremonies any meaning, or are they absurdities to be exploded or cast overboard ? The belief in the current creed and current forms of worship was too strong even in the most thoughtful minds to admit of a general leaning toward the latter of these alternatives ; and so the conviction

gained ground that there was some occult meaning in the system of faith and devotion so apparently at variance with both reason and common-sense. What is this occult meaning ? This was the question which philosophy proposed for discussion and solution. And no wonder that far-fetched analogies, fanciful etymologies, phonetic resemblances, incongruous reasonings, and extraordinary flights of the imagination were resorted to for the purpose of extracting a meaning out of what was really meaningless ! But the spirit of generalization was not pressed into service in vain, for in a very short time the gods and goddesses adored, the forms of worship resorted to, and the cumbrous ritual reduced to practice, were all unified into a primal substance spiritual on the whole, but spoken of at times as material or quasi-material. But an age of wavering faith cannot develop the spirit of unshackled speculation ; and so the disquisitions under notice are characterized by an unsteadiness, a vacillation, a flexibility, and an inconsistency fitted to render them enigmatical, inconclusive, and even puerile and absurd.

A word about the commentary of Sankar seems desirable here. That profound thinker, who flourished during the latter part of the seventh and the earlier part of the eighth century, falls evidently into the mistake into which modern philosophers fall when engaged in deciphering the contents of hoary documents, such as those under notice. He carries to the comparatively simple times of the Upanishads the well-conducted and abstruse controversies of an era of thought and speculation ten times more progressive. And therefore he may justly be accused of importing meaning into the text, rather than bringing meaning out of it, or rather of torturing out of the passages, plain or obscure, a sense

fitted to bolster up his own foregone conclusions. But his acute exegetic dissertations are of great use, if not in elucidating the contents of these treatises, at least in exploding a notion which is now gaining ground in and out of India, especially among people who have a theory to advocate. The notion is that the form of religion inculcated in the Upanishads is a pure and sublime theism. It may suit the convenience of the theorists of the day to see nothing but a rational system of theism in these venerable documents ; but it is important to note that the learned Pandits of Sankar Acharya's time saw in them forms of religion very different indeed from such a system. Some, with the great Sankar at their head, found pantheism in them, while those with whom that redoubtable controversialist was engaged in ceaseless discussion, saw in them nothing but the nihilism to which they had been brought by the atheistic speculations of Buddha. The position of the theorists, who represent the teaching of the Upanishads as thoroughly theistic, is similar to that of the transcendentalists who pretend to find pantheism in the teaching of our Lord, in spite of its obvious drift and the concurrent testimony of the Church from its foundation up to the present time.

Having disposed of the questions which naturally arise about these two hoary and venerable documents, let us endeavor to set forth what is in them. Their contents are of a miscellaneous nature, and though the main line of thought by which they may be unified savors of pantheism of a thoroughly spiritual type, the varied isms which flourished in Indian schools, over and above that, in subsequent times may be supported or upheld by them. The mistake into which some Orientalists have fallen is that of representing these books as



sources exclusively of that system of pantheism which was subsequently matured by the profound thinker and the versatile writer Vyas, and the great commentator Sankar himself. These books certainly present the germs of this system, which has swallowed up all its rivals and has maintained an undisputed sway over the Indian intellect for more than two millenniums. But it is to be observed that the rival orthodox systems with which it had to contend, and over which its victory was complete and glorious, also derive their phraseology, their principal outlines of thought, and their salient features of reasoning, together with the divine sanction to which they lay claim, from these treatises. They may therefore be justly represented as the primal sources not of this or that system of Indian philosophy, but of Indian philosophy in general, or Indian philosophy in all its orthodox branches at least. This appears from the cosmogonies embodied in these books, from their accounts of the Origin of Sin, and from their descriptions of the Universal Soul, the individuated Soul or Self, Elementary Substances, and such metaphysical ideas as are conveyed by the terms Space, Immensity, etc.

The cosmogonies embodied in these Upanishads are not merely fanciful, puerile, and absurd, but of a dubious significance, that is of a nature fitted to support nihilism and materialism, as well as pantheism. Take, for instance, the two following passages from the Chhandogya :

1. "The sun is described as Brahma—its description : Verily at first all this was non-existent ; that non-existence became existent, it developed—it became an egg ; it remained quiet for a period of one year ; it burst into two ; thence were formed two halves of gold and silver."

2. "Thereof the argentine half is the earth, and the golden half the heaven. The inner thick membrane (of the egg) became mountains, and the thin one cloudy fog ; the blood-vessels became rivers, and, lastly, what was born therefrom is the sun, Aditya" (chap. iii. sec. 19).

1. "Before, oh child, this was *sat* (being) one only without a second. Thereof verily others say : ' Before this was *asat* (non-being), one alone without a second ; from that non-being proceeds being. 2. He (the teacher) continued : But of a truth, oh child, how can this be ? How can being proceed from non-being ? Before, oh child, this was being, one without a second. 3. It willed, I shall multiply and be born ! It created heat. That heat willed ! I shall multiply and be born ! It created water" (chap. x. sec. 2).

The first of these passages traces creation to non-existence or nonentity, and the second leaves it uncertain whether being or non-being is to be held up as the Creator of the universe. The same spirit of vacillation is noticeable in the cosmogonies given in the other Upanishad, the Brihad Aranyaka, as is seen in the following passages :

"There was not anything here before : this was indeed enveloped by death, who is voracity ; for voracity is death. He created this mind desiring : may I have a soul. He went forth worshipping. From him when worshipping the waters were produced, etc." (chap. i. Second Brahmana).

"This was before soul, bearing the shape of a man. Looking around he beheld nothing but himself. He said first : ' This am I.' Hence the name of I was produced. Therefore even now a man, when called, says first, ' It is I,' and tells afterward any other name

which belongs to him. And because he as the first of all of them consumed by fire all the sins, therefore he is called Purush. . . . He did thus not feel delight. Therefore no body when alone feels delight. He was desirous of a second. He was in the same state as husband and wife are when in mutual embrace. He divided this self twofold. Hence were husband and wife produced. Therefore was this only a half of himself as a split pea is of the whole. Thus has Yajñanalkya declared it. This void is thus completed by woman. He approached her. Hence men were born. She verily reflected, How can he approach me whom he has produced from himself? Alas! I will conceal myself. Thus she became a cow, the other a bull. He approached her. Hence kine were born. The one became a mare and the other a stallion, the one a female ass, the other a male ass. . . . In this manner he created every living pair whatsoever down to the ants" (chap. i. Third Brahmana).

The first of these passages traces creation to nonentity called death, and according to Sankar it was eagerly seized by the nihilists of his day and held up, along with others of course, as a justification of their views. Sankar, the redoubtable champion of pantheism, enters of course into a series of very abstruse disquisitions to prove that the word death or voracity or non-existence in this and other passages of the sort means a spiritual substance, originally unseen and unknown, but developed or evolved in the course of time into the varied modes of existence we notice around and in us. But the nihilists of his day had their reasons, and these by no means weak, for adopting a different construction. The second passage seems at first sight fitted to bring us to a conclusion the very antipodes of that supported

by the first. But the embodied "soul" to which it traces creation is confessedly a medial not the original source. The discrepancies in the accounts of creation presented in these books may be easily reconciled. The cosmogony of the Vedas begins with an unconscious substance spoken of as It, coming in the course of ages to consciousness, and led by a perception of its solitariness to wish to be "many ;" and if such substance were posited as the groundwork of the accounts of creation presented in these two books, their apparent contrariety or inconsistency would disappear.

With reference to the origin of sin, both these Upanishads present one and the same account, almost in the same words. "Twofold indeed is the offspring of Prajapati (the Lord of Creation, elsewhere called Purush or Brahma), the gods and the demons. Therefore the gods are thus few in number, the demons many." The appositeness of the word "therefore" in this connection is seen in Sankar's Commentary, in which the numeric superiority of the demons is attributed, in of course a roundabout way, to the ascendancy of perception and sensation over thought and reflection. The gods and the demons evolved from the essence of the Creator "rivalled in these worlds," or contended with each other for ascendancy. The gods at first resorted to speech for help, but the demons defeated their object by vitiating speech, and making it a fountain of "improper words." Breath was then resorted to by the gods and contaminated by the demons, and made a source of "improper odors." The eye, the ear, and the mind were in this manner contaminated and made sources of "improper colors," "improper sounds," and "improper notions." The last party resorted to for help was life, and the demons in their

attempt to contaminate it were annihilated, "as a clod of earth by falling upon a rock is destroyed." The demons being annihilated, speech and other organs of the body were freed from the pollution brought on them by contact. This account sanctions the current notion of the Hindus that sin inheres in the body, and does not reach the life or soul.

The perfect identity of the Universal with the individual or individuated soul is set forth in many passages. A few selected at random are given below :

"This soul, which is neither this nor aught else, which is intangible, for it cannot be laid hold of ; not to be dissipated, for it cannot be dissipated ; without contact, for it cannot come into contact ; not limited, not subject to pain, nor to destruction—this fearless (soul) O Janaka, is obtained by thee" ("Brihad Aranyaka," chap. iv. Second Brahmana).

"This great unborn soul is the same which abides as the intelligent (soul) in all living creatures, the same which abides as ether in the heart ; in him it sleeps ; it is the subduer of all, the ruler of all, the sovereign lord of all ; it does not become greater by good works, nor less by evil works. It is the Ruler of all, the sovereign Lord of all beings, the Preserver of all beings, the Bridge, the Upholder of the world, so that they fall not to ruin" ("Brihad Aranyaka," chap. iv. Fourth Brahmana).

"He who dwelling in the seed is within the seed, whom the seed does not know, whose body is the seed, who from within rules the seed, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. Unseen, he sees ; unheard, he hears ; unminded, he minds ; unknown, he knows. There is none that sees but he, there is none that knows but he. He is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, im-

mortal. Whatever is different from him is perishable" ("Brihad Aranyaka," chap. iii. Seventh Brahmana).

"Then asked him Ushasta, the son of Chakra : 'Yajnanalkya,' said he, 'do explain to me that Brahma who is a witness and present, that soul which is within every (being).'" [He replied,] 'It is thy soul which is within every (being).' ("Brihad Aranyaka," chap. iii. Fourth Brahmana.)

"He became to every nature of every nature ; therefore to manifest the nature of him, Indra appears of manifold nature by his Mayas (illusions) ; for his hundred and ten senses are attached (to the body as horses to a car) ; it (the soul) is the senses ; it is ten ; it is many thousands, nay infinite ; it is Brahma who has not a Before, nor an After, nor a Beside, nor a Without. This is the soul, Brahma, the perceiver of all" ("Brihad Aranyaka," chap. ii. Fifth Brahmana).

"These rivers, my child, proceed from the East toward the West, thence from the ocean (they rise in the form of vapor, and dropping again they flow toward the South, and) merge into the ocean. Here, as they do not remember what they were. 2. Even so all these created beings, having proceeded from the truth, know not that they have issued therefrom. They therefore become of the form they had before, whether that be of a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a bear, a worm, an insect, a gnat, or a mosquito. 3. That particle which is the soul of all this is the Truth ; it is the Universal Soul. O Swetaketu, thou art that" ("Chhandogya," chap. vi. sec. 10).

Quotations might be multiplied almost endlessly ; but these are enough to show that according to the teaching of these Upanishads the Universal Soul is not merely identical with the individual soul called self, but

the life of all that really is ; and they may be brought forward in support of the views of those who see nothing but sublime idealism in them. But there are things said about the soul eminently fitted to militate against such a conclusion. For instance, the soul is said to have extension, as in the following passage : “ Verily the soul extends from below, the soul extends from above, the soul extends from behind, the soul extends from before, the soul extends from the South, the soul extends from the North—of a truth the soul is all this.”

Again, the soul is identified with Immensity, which is said to extend as it does, and to be “ all this ” as it is. It is, moreover, identified with space, speech, ether, alimant, some material substances and some metaphysical ideas. Consequently there is scarcely a system of philosophy, pantheistic, materialistic, and even nihilistic, which cannot find an array of evidences in support of its principles among the heterogeneous and conflicting affirmations and disquisitions of these hoary documents.

It is desirable before bringing this paper to a close to state what these two ancient books say about human duty and its consequences, especially in the life to come, or to give some idea of the practical religion and eschatology embodied in them. Let it be observed that these two books were written at a time when philosophy was the science of the All, not one branch of human knowledge, as in these days. Philosophy embraced religion, morality, psychology, medicine, physiology—in a word, mathematics, physics, metaphysics, and theology. Whatever the topic of inquiry might be, or of whatever character the question raised might be—mathematical, physical, psychological or metaphys-

ical—recourse must be had to philosophy for light, settlement, or solution. Called into existence in such an age, these philosophical treatises could not lay aside the great problem of human duty, and its proximate and ultimate results. The dissertations on this subject embodied in them are too important to be passed over, inasmuch as they have, along with the characteristic ideas on which they are based, moulded and fashioned the religious life of our country for ages untold. One short quotation on human duty will suffice.

“Threefold is the division of Duty. Sacrifice, Study, and Charity constitute the first ; Penance is the second, and Residence by a Brahmacharin exclusively in the house of a tutor is the third. All those who attend to these duties attain virtuous regions ; the believer in Brahma alone attains to immortality.”

The great commentator, Sankar, enters into an elaborate disquisition, in his own dialectic or argumentative style, to set forth the meaning of these verses. According to his comments there were, in those early times as there have been in all subsequent ages, four orders of devotees, those of the householder, the ascetic, the Brahmacharin, or the student of the Vedas, and Brahmasanstha or Paramahansa, one wholly devoted to Brahma. The duty of the householder was to offer sacrifices, or perform ceremonies diurnal, occasional, optional, and expiatory, to study the Vedas, and to bestow “alms according to his resources” on “parties not seeking for the same.” The ascetic fits himself by years of penance (*tapas*) in sequestered places for the acquisition of saving knowledge, or the knowledge embodied in the philosophical treatises attached to the Vedas. When thus fitted by self-inflicted mortification and the conscientious discharge of the duties of the



hermit, he becomes a Brahmacharin, or looks for an accredited teacher of Vedantic philosophy, and enrolls himself as his pupil. Years of study and meditation under his roof enable him to cast off the bondage of what Sankar calls "disjunctive knowledge," or knowledge which recognizes differences between "agents, actions, and objects," acquires "identifying knowledge," the knowledge the watchwords of which are : "The truth is verily one without a second," "All this is the divine soul," "All this is the Brahma"—and thus attains immortality. The highest bliss, that of absorption in the Deity, is reserved for those who have been liberated from ignorance by right knowledge, and who see their perfect identity with the Universal Soul. "This is his true nature, which is free from desire, sin (both sin and virtue), and fear. As in the embrace of a beloved wife one is unconscious of aught, from without and within, so embraced by the all-knowing soul, this Purush is unconscious of all, without or within. This is his (true) nature, where all desires are satisfied, where the (only) desire is for the soul, where there is no desire, where there is no grief." There is a verse, however, which is fitted to lead one to the conclusion that absorption in the Deity is reserved, not only for those freed from desire, sin, and fear, but for all who die. It runs thus : "When a man departs (this life) his speech merges into the mind ; the mind merges into life ; the life into heat, and the heat into the supreme Deity." This like so many other verses, speaks of speech, life, and mind as material substances or forces, in the same category with heat, and represents the supreme Deity as the ultimatum from which all things proceed, and into which all things melt. The vacillation noticed in the statements regarding the universal

and the individual soul is also noticeable in the dissertations on future life.

But what will become of the members of the other three orders of the pious and the godly, or of mankind in general ? To this all-important question a reply is furnished in the following passage :

1. " Of them (men so created) those who know this (origin of Purush) and those who worship God with faith and penance in a desert, repair after death to (the region of) light ; thence to (that of) the day, thence to (that of) the light half of the moon, thence to (that of) the six months during which the sun has a northern declination.

2. " Thence to (that of) the year ; thence to (that of) the sun ; thence to (that of) the moon ; and thence to (that of) the lightning ; thence an inhuman being takes them to (the region of) Brahma. This is the way to the gods.

3. " Now those villagers who accomplish their religious duties by the performance of sacrifices, by the dedication of tanks, wells, halting-places, etc., and by charity beyond the boundary of the altar, are borne, after death, to (the region of) darkness. From (the region of) darkness they proceed to (that of) the night ; from (that of) the night to (that of) the dark fortnight ; from the dark fortnight to (that of) the six months during which the sun has a southern declination ; from the six months of the winter solstice they attain not the year.

4. " (But) thence (they go) to (the region of) the Pitris (Fathers) ; from (the region of) the Pitris (they go) to the sky, and from the sky to the moon. That moon is the King Soma. They are the food of the gods. The gods do eat them.

5. "After remaining there for such time as the effects of their actions last, they return to the road to be prescribed, *i.e.*, thence to the sky, and from the sky to the wind ; after becoming wind they become smoke, and from the smoke the scattered cloud is formed.

6. "From the scattered cloud proceeds condensed or raining cloud, which rains. From that proceed rice, corn, annuals, trees, sesamum, lentils, and the like. Now verily it is difficult to descend therefrom. Those who eat rice and procreate, become manifold.

7. "Therefore he whose conduct is good quickly attains to some good existence, such as that of a Brahmana, a Kshetriya, Vaisya. Next, he who is viciously disposed soon assumes the form of some inferior creature, such as that of a dog, a hog, or a Chandala.

8. "Now, those who have not come to either of these two ways become small creatures of repeated birth. They are born, and they die. This is the third place or receptacle. This is the reason why the place (where men go to after death) filleth not. This is the reason why (this career) should be detested ; therefore is the verse :

9. "The robber of gold, the drunkard who drinks spirits, the defiler of his master's bed, and the murderer of a Brahmin are debased and filthy, and fifthly, so is he who associates with these four" ("Chhandogya," chap. v. sec. 10).

We present these long extracts for various reasons. It is in the first place an index of the stuff we have to wade through with a view to glean the few sporadic jewels of philosophic thought scattered among the contents of these books. It is one of the earliest detailed statements of the doctrine of transmigration to be met with within the compass of Sanscrit literature ;

and it sets forth the eschatology of the Upanishads in general, and of these two in particular. The assurance with which dreams are herein presented as facts is peculiarly Oriental, and may put to shame even the coolness with which modern philosophers and scientists evolve creation with all its glories out of substances and forms posited by them ! The various regions of heavenly bliss dreamt of are within reach of the person who knows himself, or the Universal Soul, which, though infinite, is found confined in a "minute vacuity" within "a lotus-like chamber" in his body, called Brahmapur or habitation of Brahma, insomuch that if he simply wishes to go into one of these, say the region of the Fathers, or the Mothers, or the Brothers, or the Friends, he is instantly translated thereto. The various heavens of which so much was made by the followers of Buddha, are indicated in the minor Upanishads with greater clearness than in these ; but the prominence they enjoy herein is enough to throw the imaginative Hindu into a perennial stream of feverish delight.

Some form of the doctrine of the Trinity, more or less imaginative, more or less corrupt, has been at the bottom of the varied systems of religion which have successively won and lost ascendancy in India, and even its philosophical vagaries have received their color and complexion from one species or another of triadism. These two treatises, partly legendary and partly philosophical, have their triadism, a triadism fitted to uphold the thorough-paced phenomenalism of the Vedantic school of subsequent times and the equally thorough-going nihilism of some classes of the Buddhists. Their triad consists of Nam (name), Rupa (form), and Karma (action) ; and from it the Buddhists derived not only the phraseology in which their philosophic speculations

are couched, but their god, the being or force by which, when one state of existence is wound up, another is forthwith called into existence, or by which when one soul is annihilated another is called into existence to take the consequences of its deeds, good or bad. We see nothing, says the philosopher of what may be called the Upanishad school, but name and form in the universe, setting aside human actions. Let an underlying material substance be posited, and we have the species of materialism which traces creation to self-evolving matter in the shape of atoms or a primordial form. Again, let an underlying spiritual substance, originally unconscious but coming up in time to consciousness, be assumed, and we have all the varied forms of pantheism to which homage has been paid both in and out of India. Once more, let an underlying nonentity be taken for granted, or let it be affirmed that there is no underlying substance beneath the name and form we cognize, and we have the nihilism with which pantheism had to wage a war of extermination in the age of Sankar Acharaya. But how is action, the third member of the triad of the Upanishads, to be disposed of? Simply by merging it in name and form, making it a material evolute in the first case, a phenomenon or mode of development in the second, and an absolute nonentity in the third. And in this manner the varied systems of philosophy or speculation which have flourished in our country, one after another in regular succession and sometimes simultaneously, may be traced to the statements and disquisitions embodied in the hoary documents we have taken the liberty to call the prime sources of Hindu Philosophy.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE SOURCES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED.

IN our inquiry and research relative to the sources of Hindu Philosophy we should neither ignore nor overlook the minor Upanishads, in which the crude germinal speculations, embodied in the Chhandogya and the Brihad Aranyaka, are carried forward to a pretty advanced stage of development. The more important of these philosophical treatises, those commented upon by the celebrated Sankar, are eight in number, barring the Swetaswata Upanishad, which cannot be properly represented as a source of Hindu Philosophy, and of which, therefore, a detailed notice will be taken at the proper time and in the proper place. These eight minor Upanishads are : One belonging to the Rig Veda, viz., Aitareya Upanishad ; one belonging to the Black Yajur Veda, viz., Taittiriya Upanishad ; one belonging to the White Yajur Veda, viz., Vajasaneyi-Sanhita, or Isa Upanishad ; one belonging to the Sama Veda, viz., Talavakara or Kena Upanishad ; and four belonging to the Atharva Veda, viz., Prasna, Katha, Mundaka, Mandukya Upanishads.

They seem to have been composed in different periods, ranging between the appearance of the major Upanishads and the regular organization of Indian schools of philosophy. The composition of the last four, in which pantheism appears in a form much more matured than that in which it is presented in the

others, must be ascribed to a later period. As a body of literature, all these treatises show a marked advance on the modes of thought and reasoning, if not on the habits of life, indicated in the two major Upanishads. They are written in a less extravagant style, and they are decidedly less burdened, not merely with incongruous metaphors and far-fetched allegories, but with such irrelevant matter as makes it impossible to see clearly what the earlier documents are in many places driving at. And they are almost, if not entirely, free from the legendary references, or rather the legends in which their predecessors abound ; while scarcely any trace is seen of the obscenity which makes some portions of the major Upanishads untranslatable and unrepresentable.

There is, moreover, more method in their arrangement, more appositeness in their forms of expression, more acuteness in their lines of thought, more cogency in their modes of reasoning, and more boldness in the spirit of speculation they set forth. Nor are they deficient in the attractiveness attached to dry, philosophical disquisitions by elevation of sentiment and sublimity of diction, as well as by poetic fervor. Their chief fault, however, is the obscurity thrown over their contents by what may be called brevity carried to excess, the brevity shown in short, elliptical sentences, easy to commit to memory, but hard to understand ; necessary indeed in an age when oral tradition was the only medium through which knowledge could be preserved and communicated, but not the less vexatious at a time when their meaning has to be ascertained with the help of commentaries ten times more ponderous and abstruse.

All these documents have been translated by Dr. Roer, whose introductory remarks and explanatory notes are of the most valuable type. His translations

are to be utilized in this paper, as his translation of the Brihad Aranyaka was in the last, along with Dr. Rajendra Lall Mitra's translation of the Chhandogya Upanishad. With reference to the style and teaching of the Upanishads in general, the following weighty observations of Professor Cowell are quoted by Major Jacob in his recently published translation of the Vedanta Sar : "The Upanishads are usually in the form of dialogue ; they are generally written in prose, with occasional snatches of verse, but sometimes they are in verse altogether. They have no system or method ; the authors are poets, who throw out their unconnected and often contradictory rhapsodies on the impulse of the moment, and have no thought of harmonizing to-day's feelings with those of yesterday or to-morrow. . . . Through them all runs an unmistakable spirit of pantheism, often in its most offensive form, as avowedly overriding all moral considerations ; and it is this which has produced the general impression that the religion of the Veda is monotheistic." These strictures are more thoroughly applicable to the major than to the minor Upanishads.

The very style of the minor Upanishads, their strength of expression and improved method of reasoning, and the boldness and consistency, comparatively speaking, of the conclusions they are fitted to uphold, conspire to prove their posteriority. Additional proofs are scarcely needed. A few, however, noticed by us in the course of a careful perusal of these ancient documents, may be presented in corroboration of the conclusion to which we are brought by the speculations they embody, and their style and diction, with reference to the time of their composition.

And first let us observe that Brahminism, which ap-



pears militant in the Chhandogya and Brihad Aranyaka, appears triumphant in these Upanishads. We do not see herein, as in the major Upanishads, the Kshetriya marching alongside of the Brahman through the highway of philosophical speculation, and even claiming pre-eminence in knowledge, especially of the esoteric meaning of the hymnology and ritual of the Vedas. The Brahmin is the all-in-all in these treatises, and the Kshetriya is scarcely mentioned. The Brahmin appears as a Doctor of Divinity in theological seminaries, an officiating Bishop at holy shrines, an honored Guest in convivial meetings, and a spiritual Guide to the most honored members of the inferior castes. Not only as a leader of devotees has he peculiar honors accorded to him ; but even as a devotee he claims special privileges. And woe be to the wretch who presumes to treat him as a guest without proper respect or with neglect. "A Brahmin guest enters the house like Vaiswanara (fire). For him (the good) make this peace offering. Take the water, O son of Vivaswat (the sun). Hope, expectation, meeting (with the good), friendly words, sacrifices, pious gifts, sons and cattle—all these loses the man of little sense in whose house a Brahmin dwells without taking food" ("Katha Upanishad," chap. i. sec. 1). In one of the earliest of these Upanishads, the Taittiriya, the pre-eminence of the Brahmins is set forth in words almost equally significant. The Brahmin evidently succeeded, during the time intervening between the appearance of the major and that of the minor Upanishads, in pushing back his rival, the Kshetriya, and raising himself to the height of glory from which he now calmly looks down on all outside the pale of his favored caste.

The fact that less stress is laid or less value set in

these treatises on the worldly advantages accruing from spiritual knowledge than in the major Upanishads, is a proof of their posteriority. The great teachers of the Vedic age, called Rishis, did not by any means live as ascetics, though they have had for ages the reputation of having done so. They lived in affluence and ease, amid the endearments and pleasures of domestic life, and they were evidently never tired of praying for wealth, property, houses, wives, offspring, kine, sheep, and instruments of husbandry. People were directed by special revelations to approach them with gifts and largesses ; and anathemas were hurled at the churlish wretch who refused to reward them with becoming munificence for their services. Traditions fitted to render professorships in theological seminaries or teacherships in private religious schools remunerative, as well as honorable, were prevalent when the major Upanishads were written, though the belief in ascetic retirement as a necessary preparation for the study of sacred philosophy, or the acquisition of the right knowledge of Brahma, was gaining ground slowly but surely.

The minor Upanishads show this belief in a very advanced stage of development, if not altogether triumphant. They set a very great value on ascetic renunciation, mortification, and penance ; and a proportionately small value on the secular advantages resulting from the position of one skilled or profoundly read in theological or Brahma science. These, however, are not altogether thrown into the shade, especially in the earlier of these treatises. One skilled in divine science is said in the Taittiriya Upanishad to have offered up this prayer, so well calculated to recall the simpler times of the Rig Veda : “ The prosperity (*sri*) which simply brings me clothes, increases

my cows, and prepares for me always food and drink, this prosperity, rich wool-clad flocks and other cattle, bring to me.' But these and such-like secular advantages are much more rarely spoken of than in the other treatises ; and the insignificant place they take in these is a proof of an advance of spiritual ideas, or proper appreciation of spiritual things, indicative, if not determinative, of their posteriority.

Akin to this is the proof given of the advanced stage of asceticism indicated in these treatises. Two of the technical terms, which were subsequently made the watchwords of various sects of ascetics, are met with herein, viz.; Dama, or subjugation of the senses, and Yoga, or concentration of the mind. These are referred to in several passages, and they are uniformly represented as essential to the acquisition of right knowledge. Their frequent occurrence in these documents, coupled with their entire absence from the major Upanishads, coupled moreover with the more artificial and repulsive forms of asceticism they are an index to, might justly be advanced as an additional proof of their posteriority.

The change indicated herein in the triad of the Vedas is also a proof in this direction not to be passed over. The triad of the Vedas consists of Agni (fire), representing things divine on the earth ; Vayu (air), representing those in the atmosphere, and Surya (sun), representing those in the heavens. The third member of this triumvirate or triad is dropped, and another substituted for it in the triad presented in the Talavakara or Kena Upanishad. Instead of Agni, Vayu, and Surya, we have Agni, Vayu, and Indra. Precedence in this remodelled triad is given to Indra, and the way in which he acquired it is indicated in a legend which

does not place the divinities concerned in a very favorable light. These gods were placed above all others by Brahma after a hard fight with the Asuras (demons) ; but being thus raised, they forgot their benefactor so far as to be induced to attribute their elevation to their own might. To humble them Brahma manifested himself to them in an extraordinary manner. " They did not know him (and asked each other) : Is this (being) worthy of adoration ?" They asked Agni, the first member of the triad, to make suitable inquiries and solve the perplexing question. He approaches the glorious apparition, and introduces himself as one who " can burn whatsoever there is on earth." He is told to burn a single blade of grass pointed out to him ; he fails, and returns to his companions humbled and dejected. Vayu then, at their request, approaches the manifested god and introduces himself as one who " can sweep away whatsoever there is on earth." He being told to sweep away a blade of grass, tries, fails, and returns humiliated. Indra then advances, continues wrapped up in contemplation, till a beautiful female, or, as Sankar explains it, Knowledge in the shape of a beautiful female, dispels his ignorance. His perseverance is rewarded, and he becomes the head of the triad. The object of this legend evidently is to show the excellence of right knowledge, which not merely ennobles and elevates men, but fixes the relative position even of the gods.

Again, the cosmogonies embodied in these Upanishads are an advance on those presented in the larger records, and an approach to that of the Vedantic school confessedly organized a long time after the era of incipient philosophical speculation depicted in these treatises. These cosmogonies, scattered among the contents of

these hoary records, but presented in a manner at times mystical but generally methodical, have as a rule for their starting point the Absolute Spirit called Brahma, a being described as "existence, knowledge, and infinity." But though united in their origin, the source of all being, the fountain-head of evolution, they present in the development of what may be called their main plot elements of discrepancy and discord, which, however, it is by no means difficult to reconcile.

Creation, according to some of these accounts, seems to have proceeded *immediately* from the Absolute Spirit in a stated order. Take, for instance, the following passage from the last chapter of the Taïttiriya : " From that soul (Brahma previously described 'as existence, knowledge, and infinity') verily sprang forth the ether, from the ether the air, from the air the fire, from the fire the waters, from the waters the earth, from the earth the annual herbs, and from the annual herbs food, from food seed, and from seed man, and man is verily the essence of food." Again : " All creatures which dwell on earth spring verily forth from food. Again they live by food, again at last they return to the same, for food is the oldest of all beings."

In the fifth chapter of the Katha the ubiquity of the human soul, identified with the Supreme Ruler, is thus described : " As Hansa (Aditya, sun) it dwells in the heavens; as Vasu (wind) it dwells in the atmosphere; as the invoker (of the gods) it dwells within the earth; as Soma (moon plant) in the water jar ; it dwells in man, it dwells in truth, it dwells in the ether, it is born in the waters (as aquatic animals), it is born in the earth (as rice, etc.), it is born in the sacrifice, it is born on the mountains (as the rivers, etc.), it is truth, it is the great one (infinite)."

These passages indisputably propound that theory of evolution, the starting-point of which is the Divine Essence, but there are others which place an intermediate link of gold between this self-evolving spiritual substance and the chain of creation. They speak of an inferior gold-colored Brahma springing out of the Supreme Brahma, the Manifested (Vyakata) out of the Unmanifested (Avyakta), the Known (Vijnata) out of the Unknown (Avijnata), and causing creation to evolve out of his substance in the order stated above. This omnific principle or Demiurgus is called by a variety of names—Brahma, the creator ; Indra, the King of the gods ; Prajapati, the lord of creatures ; Hiranyagarbha, the soul of creation, or the universal soul in contradistinction to the Supreme, Unmanifested, Unknown Spirit.

In the Aitareya, evidently the earliest of these treatises, a different order of creation is presented, and a regular theogony comes between its incipient and concluding processes, between the creation of the spheres—the sphere of waters “above the heavens,” the sphere of the sunbeams, the “atmosphere,” the sphere of death, the earth, and the sphere of waters “which are beneath it,” and the creation of man in whom the gods entered through the various openings of his body, not excluding its innumerable and imperceptible pores. The fanciful and grotesque character of this cosmogony and its advancement of what may at first sight be called an *ex-nihilo* theory of creation, stamps it as the production of an intermediate era, an age intervening between the appearance of the major and that of most of the minor Upanishads.

The cosmogonies presented in these books, indicating, as they do, a gradual progress from the ludicrous

fancies of the larger Upanishads toward what was subsequently elaborated in the Vedantic school, are an indisputable proof of their posteriority.

*Apropos* of our remarks on the evidential value of the cosmogonies embodied in these records, we may observe that the idea of creation springing out of matter and force, made so much of by the so-called advanced science of the day, is one of the oldest we come across in the world. It was found as a dominating principle in the oldest schools of Greek philosophy, and it was elaborated into a consistent system in India in the age immediately following that of the Upanishads. Nay, it is found in some of the declarations of the Upanishads themselves, standing on a background of an all-diffusive and self-evolving divine substance, or absolute existence, manifested or embodied in an omnific principle or personality. The Prasna Upanishad, which consists of answers to a series of philosophical questions propounded one after another by anxious inquirers, opens with a cosmogony which presents the dualism of an active and a passive principle, both springing from Prajapati, the inferior divinity through whom derived existence in its multifarious forms is to be traced to the Absolute and the Unconditioned. "Prajapati," it says, "was desirous of offspring. He performed austerity. Having performed austerity, he produced a couple, matter and life or fire or energy (with the intention) ; they shall in manifold ways produce offspring for me."

Another important question has to be raised and set at rest with reference to these cosmogonies. Do they imply a real or an illusory change in the substance of Brahma ? Does that substance actually become the elements to which material creation is traced ? Or is

it merely the substratum concealed beneath varieties of deceptive phenomena ? Now no one can study the Upanishads carefully without being induced to indorse the opinion expressed by authorities like Cowell, viz., that an actual change of substance, not merely an illusory transformation, is indicated in the cosmogonies of the Upanishads, though the illusion theory is in a few solitary passages alluded to. The writers were Parinamavadins or Vikarvadins, or those who insisted upon an actual metamorphosis of substance—not Mayavadins, or those who maintained an illusory change to uphold the doctrine of non-dualism in all its integrity. This subject will have to be enlarged upon when we treat of the Vedanta system ; and it need not be allowed to detain us here.

Let us adduce one more proof of the posteriority of these records, a proof insignificant indeed at first sight, but one better adapted in our humble opinion to produce conviction than many ostensibly more important. The proof is indicated in the well-known words of Jacob : “ Few and evil have the days of the years of my life been, and have not attained unto the days of the years of the life of my fathers.” The longevity indicated in the smaller Upanishads is by no means so marked as that shown in the larger, the length of life having come down from one hundred and forty in the latter to one hundred in the former. And less earnestness in religious matters stamps these records of a period when tricks, such as that set forth in the following sentence, were unhappily becoming common : (“ A sacrificer) who bestows (cows) which have drunk their water, eaten their grass, given their milk, and which are barren, goes verily to the worlds of unhappiness.” But the best proof decidedly of the posteriority of these



treatises is to be found, as has already been said, in the terseness of their style, in the method and logical precision by which they are, comparatively speaking, characterized, and in the progress of speculative acuteness and analytic thought shown in the disquisitions they embody. Their object is to teach the science of Brahma, the absolute spirit ; and its superiority to every other species of knowledge is shown by a disclosure of its inherent excellence, by the eulogy lavished on those devotees who make it the sole object of their search, and by the insight presented into its glorious consequences.

It is said to be " the foundation of all sciences," " the highest science," the " supreme path " to felicity, " the last object of man," and high-sounding adjectives, or adjectives of the most imposing kind, are pressed into service to set forth its excellence. It is, properly speaking, the only correct science, the knowledge derived through perception and inference being sheer ignorance. All persons in this world under the guidance of the senses are spoken of in terms by no means complimentary. " In the midst of ignorance, fools fancying themselves wise and learned go round and round, oppressed by misery as blind people led by a blind." The few who liberate themselves from the cobwebs of this sense-produced ignorance and eagerly run after right knowledge, are praised in extravagant terms.

The legend with which the Katha Upanishad opens is eminently fitted to show this. Nachiketas, being devoted by his exasperated father to Death (Yama), conciliates the monster by fasts and vigils, and is offered " three boons." With true filial piety he first solicits a change in his father's heart favorable to his hope of reconciliation to him, then requests some knowl-

edge about "the heavenly fire" or the fire by which heaven is gained, and lastly propounds a question in these words : "Some say the soul exists after the death of man, others say it does not exist. This I should like to know, instructed by thee. Such is the third of the boons." Death, unwilling to communicate the precious knowledge to him, asks him to choose other gifts, such as "sons and grandsons who may live a hundred years," "herds of cattle," "elephants," "gold and horses," "wealth and far-extending life." He, however, continues stubborn, although pleasures unattainable by man, such as may be brought to him by "the fair ones of heaven with their cars and musical instruments," are offered him. Death ultimately grants him the boon requested, with these words of encouragement : "One thing is what is good, another what is pleasant. Both having different objects chain man. Blessed is he who between them takes the good (alone), but he who chooses what is pleasant loses the last object of man." The results of this knowledge will have to be displayed after its object has been set forth ; and they need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that it is represented as that by virtue of which "all is manifested," "man is delivered from the mouth of death," and even the status of the gods is raised.

The excellency, moreover, of this science, the knowledge of Brahma, is set forth in the very difficult manner in which it is acquired. The path to it is not a path strewn with roses, but a path of thorns, the path of duty, renunciation, privation, study, meditation, and austerity in its most appalling forms ; and it is justly called "the sharp edge of a razor." One cannot group and carefully study the many passages and texts in which this path is indicated, without noticing much

confusion of thought, if not glaring contradiction ; but order can, we believe, be evolved out of the chaotic mass. There are passages in which performance of the duties of life, study of the Vedas under an accredited teacher, austerity and penance are represented as indispensable requisites for the attainment of supreme knowledge, and there are others in which these are spoken of in disparaging terms, and the mystic notion of a beatific or tranquil vision is prominently brought forward. And these two classes of texts are apparently at variance, but in reality there is no contradiction.

The utilization of the means is necessary to the attainment of the end ; and such exercises as worship, study, and penance are the prescribed means, and as such they should be earnestly resorted to ; but when this preliminary process has been completed, it should be entirely lost sight of, and nothing thought or even dreamt of but sublime contemplation leading to beatific vision, or rather a calm recognition of the real under the phenomenal, the permanent under the impermanent, the changeless under the fitful and the changeable.

The first thing the Brahma student must do is to perform the duties of life called inferior in contradistinction to those which bring him where the great object of his career is gained, and he becomes liberated from sense-bred ignorance. He must as a "householder" perform his duties "toward the gods and the forefathers" and all classes of people, not forgetting even "the beggars." He must conscientiously do the threefold work of "offering, reading of the Vedas, and liberality," and then "renounce the world" and "approach, sacred wood in his hand, a teacher who knows the Vedas and who is solely devoted to Brahma." But the question arises, Who is the accredited teacher to

whose guidance he must implicitly and unreservedly commit himself? To be able to answer this question an insight into the Hindu theory of apostolic succession is needed. The accredited teacher of the hour is the legitimate successor, through a bright line of inspired teachers, of him who first learned the science of Brahma from the Creator himself, the emergent Deity who stands as a connecting link between the unmanifested substance and the manifested forms in which it appears in creation. "Brahma, the Creator of the universe, the preserver of the world, was first produced among the gods. He taught the science of Brahma, the foundation of all sciences, to Atharvan, his eldest son. Atharvan revealed of old the science of Brahma, which Brahma had explained to him, to Angis; he explained it to Satyavaha of the family of Bharadnaja, who revealed the science traditionally obtained by the succession of teachers to Angiras" (*mundaka*). In this manner "the highest science"—in contradistinction to the "baser" which comprehends the Rig, the Yajur, the Sama, and the Atharvan Vedas, accentuation, ritual, grammar, glossary, prosody, and astronomy, the Vedas and the Vedangas—has come down, through oral tradition, to the teacher of the hour.

The necessity of resort to him is shown in almost innumerable passages, such as the following :

"A wonderful teacher is required. Of the soul is wonderful the speaker, ingenious the receiver, wonderful the knower, instructed by an ingenious teacher."

"Arise, awake, get to the teachers and attend."

But the Brahma student must separate himself from his teacher when thoroughly instructed, and have recourse to hermit solitude, restraint of the senses and

concentration of the mind before his object can be gained. He must remember that the occult knowledge he is in quest of cannot be acquired through the senses, or through instruction of any kind, or even through revelation. "The soul's nature is not placed in what is visible. None beholds it by the eye." "With regard to him (Brahma) the sun does not manifest, not the moon, not the stars." "The soul cannot be gained by the knowledge of the Veda, not by understanding its meaning, not by manifold science." "By the soul, which is chosen, it (the soul) can be gained."

Direct vision of the universal soul by the individual soul, calm rather than beatific, is the *summum bonum*, to which he is to rise, in consequence, not so much of the preparatory exercises he has gone through, as of ascetic self-mortification and serene contemplation. "It is not apprehended by the eye, not by speech, not by the other senses, not by devotion or rites ; but he, whose intellect is purified by the light of knowledge, beholds him, who is without parts, through mediation" (Mundaka).

The important questions discussed in these venerable records have reference to the nature of the Universal Soul, called Brahma, and his relation to the individual soul, and to the external world. They may be categorically stated thus : (1) What is Brahma ? (2) How is Brahma related to the human soul, mine or yours ? (3) How is Brahma related to what in ordinary human parlance is called the material world ? We cannot better dive into the philosophy of these treatises than by grouping the replies embodied in them to these important questions.

1. What is Brahma ? What do these books say regarding his nature ? The answer is embodied in the following passages :

"He who is the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, speech of speech, is verily the life of life, the eye of the eye. The wise, who have abandoned (those individual existences) when departing from this world become immortal. Him (the Supreme Brahma) does not approach the eye or speech or mind. We do not recognize (Brahma as anything perceptible, therefore) we do not know how to teach him (his nature to a disciple). It is even different from what is known (from the unmanifested universe ; if you then say it must be the unmanifested universe, no) it is also beyond what is known (to the senses, it is beyond the unmanifested universe). Thus we heard from the former teachers who explained it to us" ("Talavakara," sec. 1).

"Whoever has understood (the nature of Brahma), which is without sound, without touch, without form, which does not waste, which is without taste, which is eternal, without smell, without beginning, and without end, higher than the great one (intellect), which is firmly based, escapes from the mouth of death" ("Katha," sec. 3).

"Higher than the senses (and their objects) is the mind, more excellent than the mind the intellect ; above the intellect soars the great soul, more excellent than the great one is the unmanifested. But higher than the unmanifested is the soul which is all-pervading and without cause. Knowing this one gets liberated and gains immortality" ("Katha," sec. 6).

"Whoever, O beloved one, knows the indestructible (soul), on which (the being) whose nature is knowledge, and together with all the gods, the vital airs, and the elements are formed, gets omniscient, penetrates all" ("Prasna," sec. 4).

"He (Brahma) is verily luminous, without form, a

spirit, he is without and within ; without origin, without life, without mind, he is pure and greater than the great indestructible one. From this Brahma are produced life, mind, and all the organs, ether, air, light, the water (and), the earth, the support of all " (Second Mundaka).

" I am the spirit (mover) of the tree (viz., of the tree of the world which is to be cut down). (Thy) fame (rises) like the top of the mountain. I am purified in my root, as immortality is glorious in the nourisher (viz., the sun). I am brilliant wealth, I am intelligent, I am immortal, and without decay. (Or I am sprinkled with immortality)" ("Taittiriya," chap. i. sec. 10).

These passages present a confusion of nomenclature which must be cleared up before the prominent idea set forth can be grasped. Brahma is in many passages called the Unmanifested (Avyakta) ; but in one of these passages he is distinguished from and placed above the unmanifested, and in another the unmanifested from which he is distinguished is called the unmanifested universe. To set forth the distinction, we must ascertain what is meant by the manifested universe, and what by the unmanifested. By the manifested universe we are to understand the various objects of nature, the knowledge of which we derive through perception. The material, perceptible world, that of the existence of which we are assured by the varied impressions made upon the senses, or the sensations caused by it, is the manifested universe. The unmanifested universe is the world of tenuous substances, the world in modern phraseology of causes and forces, of the existence of which we are assured by inference, not perception. Beyond the world of shifting phenomena, beyond the world of imperceptible substances and

occult forces, is Brahma, "the foundation" of all we perceive, and of all we cannot perceive, but legitimately deduce from the coincidences, the successions, and the transmutations of the phenomena perceived.

Again, Brahma is in one of these passages called "the indestructible soul," on which all forms of life, all forms of organized and unorganized material and mental existence are "founded ;" while in another he is represented as "greater than the great indestructible one." Who is this being described as "greater than the great indestructible one"? Sankar's reply is, "Brahma in his unmanifested state." The phrase, however, is ambiguous, being applicable both to the being described "as greater than the great indestructible one," and the being described as "the indestructible one." The distinction set forth is perhaps that between the Absolute, Unmanifested Spirit, and the emanent or emergent Deity called Brahma, Prajapati, Hiranyagarbha or Virat ; or simply that between the human soul called "great" and the Supreme Spirit called "greater," because of its freedom from the bondage under which it groans.

It ought not to be forgotten that according to the later speculations of the Vedantic school, a portion of Brahma called the "The Fourth" always remains unconnected with the detached portion manifested in the phenomena of nature.

The last of these quotations presents a figure of speech with which our countrymen are familiar. The world is often in their sacred literature compared to "an eternal, holy fig-tree, whose root is upward and whose branches go downward," and the very sap which is the life thereof is Brahma, who may justly be called the *anima mundi*, the life of the world. This



image shows in what respect the Hindu theory of evolution differs from what is propounded in these days. It is a downward progression from spirit to matter, not an upward progression from matter to spirit.

It is further to be observed that these passages merely show the relative position of Brahma, or the position he occupies in the scale of being, and what he is not. They do not show what he is.

Brahma is, according to the philosophy of these records, illimitable, and therefore undeterminable and undefinable. The quibbles and puzzles, the riddles and enigmas, to which the modern doctrine of the Absolute and the Infinite has given rise, are found in these hoary records and disposed of beautifully. To define the infinite is tantamount to reducing the infinite to the category of the finite, and therefore all definitions given of the Supreme Brahma must be accepted with reservation. When, for instance, he is called a spirit, no line of demarcation between spirit and matter should be drawn, and no attempt made to limit him, either by assuming the existence of matter apart from him, or by positing various orders of spirits essentially different from him. He is, properly speaking, the all-absorbing existence, and no form of being can be conceived of as existing apart from him. Again, when he is said to be "without form," "without life," or "without mind," we are not to posit existences, such as that of "form" or "life" (mundane) or "mind" apart from him, and thereby reduce him to the category of the finite. He is, properly speaking, form, life, and mind, and no entity exists apart from him. Again, when he is represented as the creator or the foundation of the world, we are not to limit him by recognizing an essential, or any but mere nominal distinction between the creator

and the objects of creation. He is, to adopt the well-known phrase of Spinoza, the *natura naturans* ; and there is, properly speaking, no difference between him and the universe, which is *natura naturata*. He is therefore above the region of definitions and determinations ; and the only thing that can be predicated of him is existence, absolute and unconditioned. And this existence, moreover, ought not to be separated by a broad line of demarcation from non-existence, as the infinite must embrace all states, that of existence and that of non-existence. Such at least is the modern dictum !

Brahma is called Sacchitananda, which is, being interpreted, Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss. But when the meaning attached to either of the two terms, knowledge and bliss, in this connection is looked into, the triad resolves itself into a monad. To this technical phrase, made so much of in subsequent times, we shall return after we have shown the perfect identity of the universal with the individual soul and the material world.

2. What is the human soul, and what its relation to the universal spirit ? The following quotations will furnish a reply to this question :

“ The knowing (soul) is not born, nor does it die ; it was not produced from any one, nor was any produced from it ; unborn, eternal, without decay, ancient as it is, it is not slain, although *the body is slain*” (“ Katha,” sec. 2).

“ The perfect one (Purush) who, building desire after desire, is *awake in those that are asleep*, is called even pure, is called Brahma, is called even eternal. . . . As the one fire, when entering the world, becomes to every nature of every nature, *so the one soul being of*

*every nature to every nature is the internal soul of all being*" ("Katha" sec. 5).

"As from blazing fire in a thousand ways similar sparks proceed, so, O beloved, *are produced living souls of various kinds from the indestructible Brahma*, and they also return to him" (Second Mundaka, sec. 1).

"Within (the heart) which the arteries enter as the spokes the nave of the wheel, he (Brahma) moves, becoming manifold" (Second Mundaka, sec. 2).

"For this all (represented by 'Om') is Brahma, *this soul is Brahma*. This soul has four conditions—viz., waking, dreaming, profound sleep, and a state different from any of the former" (Mandukya).

The *italics* are our own. It is impossible to find words more adequate than these to set forth the perfect identity of the universal with the individual ego. The cosmogonies alluded to dwell, not merely on this identity, but on the method in which the Supreme Spirit entered the human body previously created, and animated it. Its dwelling-place within the body is "the ether of the heart," and it is incased within five sheaths. The outer sheath is called the essence of food (*annam*), which is also called Brahma, and is represented as an object of worship. The sheath immediately beneath this is called "vital air," and is said to be the embodied soul of the nutritious sheath, or the outer garb. Beneath the vital sheath there is the mental sheath or "the mind," which has the Yajur Veda for its head, the Rig for its right arm, and the Sama for its left. Beneath that lies that of knowledge, and beneath that is that of bliss, which covers the spirit dwelling in its "cavity" in the heart, the spirit which is at one and the same time greater than space and smaller than a grain of mustard seed. The body in

which it dwells is called the Brahmapura, or the town of Brama, and it is said to have eleven gates, the seven openings in the face, the navel, the two openings below, and the opening on the middle of the head. This last opening needs an explanation, it being, according to some of the Upanishads, the entrance through which the ingress and egress of the soul are effected. The explanation needed is offered in these two extracts, the first from the Taittiriya, and the second from the Aitariya.

“In the ether, abiding within the heart, is placed the Purush (soul), whose nature is knowledge—who is immortal, radiant like gold. The artery, Sushumna by name (the coronal artery), which springs forth from the upper part of the heart, and proceeds between the two arteries of the palate, and (within the piece of flesh) which like a breast is hanging down, then, after having made its way through the head and skull (terminates) where the root of the hair is distributed—this (artery) is the birthplace (road) of Brahma.”

“Making an opening, where the hairs (of the head) divide, he penetrated by that door. This is called the door of division. This is the door of rejoicing (because it is the road to the Supreme Brahma).”

There is also a passage in one of the Upanishads which distinctly affirms that when a man dies the Brahma, dwelling in the ether of his heart, goes out of his body through the coronal artery, or the artery which is said to terminate where the hairs of his head divide. The ether of the heart, whatever it may be, is generally represented as the dwelling-place of the Supreme Spirit, though at times Brahma is identified with it. The following text from the third Prasna is fitted in the first place to corroborate this assertion, and

in the second to show the ease with which physiological facts are manufactured and retailed : " For the ether (of the heart) is verily that soul (Brahma). There arise the one hundred and one principal arteries ; each of them is a hundred times divided ; 72,000 are the branches of every branch artery ; within them moves the circulating air." According to this calculation, the number of arteries in the human body is 727,210,201 ; and when these and the five vital airs, the circulating air, the equalizing air in the navel, which results in the digestion of food and its assimilation, the air of respiration, the ascending air, which rises up through the coronal artery, and the descending air, are all coolly manufactured, we need not be surprised at the physiological " consciousness," which in its anxiety to find a dwelling-place for the soul (which combines the opposite extremes of immensity and exiguity), posits a little ether in the heart !

It may, however, be said that all these physiological speculations on the constitution of the body, the entrance of Brahma into its inmost recess through an arterial pathway, and the varied sheaths or cases in which he lies enveloped, presuppose a distinction between the body and the indwelling spirit, and savor of dualism. But the distinction indicated is, according to the uniform teaching of these records, apparent rather than real, or if real, derived rather than original—a distinction, strictly speaking, modal. This will appear when we look into

3. The relation of the Supreme Spirit to the material world. It has already been shown that the cosmogonies embodied in these records develop the theory of evolution, which brings creation in all its diversified forms, matter organized and unorganized, and mind

with its thoughts, feelings, and volitions, out of an all-diffusive divine substance. Additional proof is scarcely needed. We shall content ourselves with one or two quotations under this head : " As the spider casts out and draws in (its web), as on the earth the annual herbs are produced, as from the living man the hairs of the body spring forth, so is produced the universe from the indestructible (Brahma)." " From him also were produced in many ways the gods, the Sadhyas (a kind of gods), men, quadrupeds, birds, and vital airs that go forward and descend, rice and barley, devotion, faith, truth, the duties of a Brahma student, and observance." Here is the theory of the consubstantiality of the material world with the Creator set forth with the greatest perspicuity and force.

Contradictory statements cannot but abound in treatises which confessedly present a few grains of philosophical thought amid a heap of irrelevant matter, and which, though comparatively speaking well written, bristle with extravagances of thought and expression, as well as with tiresome repetitions. But the line of thought which underlies the wild and grotesque speculations in which they abound is thoroughly pantheistic, opposed to dualism, opposed to the universally recognized distinction between the Creator and creation, and consequently between the soul and the body, mind and matter.

The solution, then, of the problems discussed in these treatises is that there is one divine being, Brahma, manifested in various forms or modes, both spiritual and material. This being is represented as Sat (Existence), Chit (Intelligence or Knowledge), and Ananda (Happiness). The following quotations will establish this :

"Whoever knows Brahma, who is existence, knowledge, and infinity, . . . enjoys all desires at one and the same time, together with the omniscient Brahma" ("Taittiriya," chap. ii.).

"The soul is to be perceived by (the notion of) existence, it is to be perceived by its true notion (that is to say) by both of them ; the true nature of soul becomes manifest when (first) it has been perceived by the notion of existence" ("Katha," chap. vi.).

"For he is the beholder, the toucher, the hearer, the smeller, the taster, the minder, the intelligent, the agent, the being whose nature is knowledge, the spirit (Purush). He is founded on the supreme indestructible soul (Fourth Prasna).

"They think the fourth him whose knowledge are not internal objects, nor external, nor both, who has not uniform knowledge, who is not intelligent and not unintelligent, who is invisible, imperceptible, unseizable, incapable of proof, beyond thought, not to be defined, whose only proof is the belief in the soul, in whom all the spheres have ceased, who is tranquil, blissful, and without duality" (Mandukya).

The third of these extracts speaks evidently of the individual soul, but its identity with the universal soul being established, the predicate knowledge reveals, not only its own nature, but that of the Supreme Spirit on which it is found. These and such like declarations we cannot collate without being led to grasp the characteristic idea embodied in the compound word *Sacchidananda*, formally applied to the Supreme Brahma, and made capital of in post-Vedic times. What is this idea ? When God is represented as Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss, have we not an idea as accurate, as well as lofty, as that presented in the Bible : God the

Father representing Existence, God the Son representing Knowledge, and God the Holy Spirit representing Bliss ? Our answer would be "Yes," if the terms knowledge and bliss were taken in the acceptation or sense attached to them when they are applied to God. But we have reason to conclude that they are not employed to mean what they ordinarily signify, either in the Upanishads or in the philosophical discussions carried on in ages subsequent to that of the Upanishads. The last of the above extracts, which represents Brahma as at one and the same time intelligent and unintelligent, shows that the word knowledge at least is used in this connection in a sense different from what, in common parlance, or even in schools of philosophy (barring of course those of our own country), it bears.

Properly speaking, God, according to the teaching of these books and the system of pantheism subsequently borrowed from them, is existence and nothing more, the pure Being of some schools of Greek philosophy, the unmanifested essence beneath manifested accidents, the only *noumenon* beneath shifting phenomena. Like many Greek philosophers, the authors of the Upanishads strove to find something permanent beneath the ceaseless mutations of natural phenomena. All nature appeared to them in a flux, earth melting into water, water into heat, heat into air, air into ether, and ether becoming earth by a process of solidification embracing the other elements in a reverse order. Nor did they see anything but ceaseless change in the varying moods of the mind, the shifting states of consciousness, thoughts, emotions, and volitions. The question naturally presented itself to their minds, Is there nothing permanent beneath this ceaseless flow of change, external and internal ? And they solved this vexed



question by positing a substance, absolute and unchangeable, behind the transmutations of the material and the changes of the mental world.

This existence, however, could not be an object of knowledge without implying distinctions fitted to mar its absoluteness ; nor could it be a subject of knowledge without giving birth to a similar contradiction. The knowledge, therefore, ascribed to this existence, is a knowledge without distinction of subject and object, and therefore essentially different from what we call knowledge. The same may be said of the predicate *bliss* as applied to this existence, it being happiness without such consciousness or feeling as may cripple the absoluteness of the absolute ! Besides, these three expressions are not used as predicates at all ; they form the trinitarian essence of the Supreme Brahma, not his attributes.

All, therefore, that is predicable of the God of the Upanishads is infinite, unconditioned, absolute existence, which again should not be separated by a sharp line of distinction from non-existence. This will explain the paradoxes in which the Upanishads abound ; such, for instance, as are set forth when God is said to be “ with knowledge and void of knowledge,” to “ rejoice and not rejoice.” Modern pantheism has made us familiar with such paradoxes as Ego-nonego, Subject-object, One-all, All-one ; but it will find itself distanced by those in which the Hindu mind loves to indulge when thinking and speaking of God, whom it loves to represent as “ with form and without form,” “ defined and undefinable,” “ a foundation and without a foundation,” as “ true and not true,” as one who “ moves” and “ does not move,” “ who is far and also near,” “ within this all,” and “ out of this all.” Some of

these contradictions are set forth in the following free metrical version of a well-known passage by Monier Williams :

“ The slayer thinks he slays ; the slain  
 Believes himself destroyed ; the thoughts of both  
 Are false, the soul survives, nor kills, nor dies ;  
 'Tis subtler than the smallest, greater than  
 The greatest, infinitely small, yet vast ;  
 Asleep, yet restless, moving everywhere  
 Among the bodies—ever bodiless—  
 Think not to grasp it by the reasoning mind,  
 The wicked ne'er can know it ; soul alone  
 Knows soul, to none but soul is soul revealed.”

The eschatology of the minor Upanishads is of a piece with that of the major, and an additional disquisition is not needed to set it forth. Suffice it to say that the two doctrines of the impeccability of the soul and its final absorption into the Deity are much more categorically stated in these treatises. Sin inheres in the body, and may pollute the internal organs, and specially the mind ; but it cannot possibly taint the pure spirit that abides in the ether of the heart, guarded by the fivefold sheath of bliss, knowledge, mind, vital air, and nutrition. And because incapable of being polluted by sin, the soul is impassible. “ As the one sun, the eye of the whole world, is not sullied by the defects of the eye or of external things, so the soul, as the inner soul of all beings, is not sullied by the unhappiness of the world, because it is also without it.”

The question, however may be asked, If the soul is as tranquil and blissful in the body as out of it, where lies the necessity of its liberation ? Why should a sensible man spend years in sequestered places amid mortifications and penances to insure the emancipation of that spirit which is so calm and imperturbable, if not happy

in the ordinary sense of the term, in bondage as out of it ? This question is not discussed properly in the Upanishads ; but its solution was attempted in subsequent times, when the theory of illusion was elaborated, and both bondage and liberation were represented as fictitious.

The individuated souls are represented in almost innumerable passages as taking the consequences of their actions in this life, or in the series of lives, which compose the long chain of transmigration, and they even drag the Supreme Spirit into the happiness and misery in which they are involved. “(The supreme and inferior souls) drinking the due reward of their works in this world, entered both the cave, the highest place of the supreme soul.” The soul must consume the fruits, good or bad, of its works, know itself, and then be liberated from sense-bred ignorance. “Whoever knows the origin, the entrance, the locality, and the fivefold power of life (soul) enjoys immortality ; whoever knows this enjoys immortality.”

The doctrine of absorption is set forth in the following passages :

“As the flowing, sea-going rivers, when they have reached the sea, are annihilated, as their names and forms perish, and only the name of sea remains, so the sixteen parts of the witness (soul) which are going to the soul (as the rivers to the sea) when they have reached the soul, are annihilated, their names and forms perish, and only the name of soul remains ; it is then without parts, it is immortal ” (“Prasna,” sec. 4).

“As the flowing rivers come to their end in the sea, losing name and form, so, liberated from name and form, proceeds the wise to the divine soul, which is greater than the great. Whoever knows this Supreme

Brahma, becomes even Brahma. In his family there will be none ignorant of Brahma ; he overcomes grief, he overcomes sin, he becomes immortal, liberated from the bonds of the cave (heart)" (" Mandaka," sec. 3).

The sixteen parts of the witness, soul, are the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the eleventh organ, the mind, and the five gross elements of which the body is composed, or perhaps the five vital airs. Some of the categories of the Sankya school are referred to in many parts of these books, and they may at first sight lead us to the conclusion that some of them at least were composed after its organization or development. But it is just as reasonable to conclude that the characteristic ideas of that school had existed, and been, to some extent, matured before the appearance of the Sankhya philosophy as an organized system.

Salvation is made dependent on knowledge of Brahma, and when this is attained in all its fulness a metamorphosis of the devotee takes place. He himself becomes Brahma, blissful, impassible, *above* the polluting touch of sin, for even when in this blessed condition he does commit gross sins, such as adultery and murder, he is left unpolluted, and therefore perfectly pure. Let us conclude with an extract from one of Professor Gough's scholarly papers on the Upanishads, originally published in the *Calcutta Review*, and since republished in the form of a book, presented by Major Jacob in the book already alluded to :

"The theosophist liberated from metempsychosis, but still in the body, is untouched by merit or demerit, absolved from all works, good and evil, unsoiled by sinful works, uninjured by what he has done and what he has left undone. Good works, like evil works, and like the God that recompenses them, belong to the un-

real, to the fictitious duality, the world of semblances. . . . Anandagiri : 'The theosophist, as long as he lives, may do good and evil as he chooses, and incur no stain, such is the efficiency of gnosis ?' And so in the Taittiriya Upanishad (ii. 9) we read : 'The thought afflicts not him ; what have I left undone ; what evil done ?' And in the Buhadaranyaka : 'Here the thief is no more a thief, the Chandala no more a Chandala, the Paulkasa no more a Paulkasa, the sacred mendicant no more a sacred mendicant : they are not followed by good works, they are not followed by evil works. For at last the sage has passed beyond all the sorrows of his heart.' Immoral inferences from this doctrine—the quietists of all ages have been taxed with immorality—are thus reargued by Nrisimhasaraswati : 'Some one may say, It will follow from this the theosophist may act as he chooses. That he can act as he pleases cannot be denied in the presence of texts of revelation, traditional texts, and arguments such as the following : 'Not by matricide, not by parricide.' 'He that does not identify not-self with self, whose inner faculty is unsullied though he slay these people, neither slays them, nor is slain. He that knows the truth is sullied neither by good actions nor by evil actions. In answer to all this we reply : True ; but as these texts are only eulogistic of the theosophist, it is not intended that he should thus act.' "

Does not this extract justify the assertion made by a great thinker that pantheism is pan-diabolism ? It will be shown, when Vedantism is treated of, that our recognition of all distinctions, moral or material, is according to the teaching of these records, and the great system evolved from it in subsequent times, illusory ; and the chief of those items of ignorance from the

trammels of which we have to free ourselves by right knowledge. What we call good and what we call evil, virtue and vice, holiness and sin, both emanate from the diffusive Spirit from which we have sprung along with the objects of creation around us, and into which we shall be merged along with them when the season of divine hibernation once more makes its appearance, to be followed in due course by fresh acts of development and reabsorption.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE AGE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

IN our analysis of the contents of the Upanishads, commented upon by Sankar, we purposely left out one as not entitled to a place among the Sources of Hindu Philosophy. This is the Swetaswatara Upanishad, a document which in bulk may justly be represented as an intermediate link between the major and the minor Upanishads, but which in chronological order leaves them all very far indeed behind it. The Swetaswatara is the most modern of the Upanishads, and its composition must be traced to a period posterior to the organization of the principal schools of Indian Philosophy, and therefore to the era when the incipient speculations embodied in these documents generally were systematized and matured into permanent and conflicting types of philosophic thought.

Unmistakable traces of its late origin are discoverable among its miscellaneous contents. The mythology, for instance, of which glimpses are presented in its pages, is not that either of the Vedic or of the Heroic age of Indian History ; but that spun out into grotesque forms when the spirit of sectarianism gave birth to numerous factions within the precincts of Hindu society. The well-known triad, Brahma, Vishnu, and Maheshwar, shrinks into what may be called the monad, Siva, who again is identified with the Supreme Brahma, the Source of all Being. This deity, Siva, and the energies

associated with him, each in the shape of a female divinity, are set forth as objects of worship rather than the gods and goddesses of the Vedic, or even of the Heroic age. Besides three of the six schools of Hindu Philosophy are referred to by name—viz., the Sankhya, the Yoga, and the Vedant — and references to the others, as well as citations from the minor Upanishads, are by no means few and far between.

But the object of the document itself sets forth, more than the traces of its late origin already referred to, its posteriority, or its composition in an age subsequent to that, not only of the major, but of the minor Upanishads. That object is similar to, if not identical with, that of the Bhagvada Gita—viz., to effect a reconciliation between the varied lines of philosophic thought represented by the varied schools, especially between the rank materialism of the Sankhya and the equally rank pantheism of the Vedantic system. Its composition, therefore, should be traced to the time when practical difficulties arose from the ceaseless struggles of the schools ; and when an attempt to obviate them by means of a compromise, a truce, if not a lasting peace, was peremptorily demanded. It must at the same time be admitted that internal evidence does not warrant the conclusion which sets forth the contemporaneity of the Upanishad under review with the Bhagvada Gita. The Krishna Cultus, which appears fully developed in the latter document, is not even referred to in the former ; while the differences noticeable in the modes of reconciliation proposed in the two documents presuppose an interval of several generations between the composition of the one and that of the other.

The Swetaswatara Upanishad, though not entitled to a place among the Sources of Hindu Philosophy, is a



very valuable document, presenting, as it does, a correct picture of what may emphatically be called the Age of Hindu Philosophy. It may be regarded as an index to the thoughts and struggles, the longings and yearnings of an era, which in intellectual activity and moral grandeur has scarcely been surpassed in the history of non-Christian lands, certainly never in the history of our own country. Let us give it prominence as indicating :

1. The knotty problems which exercised the acute and penetrating intellects of the great Schoolmen of Ancient India ;
2. The varieties of expedients to which recourse was had by these extraordinary thinkers for their solution ;
3. The temporal benefits to which they looked forward as the reward of their toil ;
4. The conclusions at which they arrived ;
5. The controversies to which these gave rise ; and
6. The compromises by which these conclusions were, when obviously at war with each other, reconciled.

In elucidating the contents of this Upanishad, we shall have to go over the whole ground of Hindu Philosophy, to repeat not a little of what we have already said, and to anticipate much of what we shall have to say, when we treat separately of each of the systems matured in the schools. But as an apology for such repetition and such anticipation we have to say that careful study of this venerable document is a very good preparation for an intelligent examination and appreciation of the great lines of thought enshrined in Hindu Philosophy, and also to some extent that of ancient Greece.

1. The problems which Hindu Philosophy strove to solve are indicated in the opening verses of this Upani-

shad : "The inquirers after Brahma converse (among themselves). What cause is Brahma ? Whence are we produced ? By whom do we live, and where do we (ultimately) abide ? By whom governed ? Do we walk after a rule in happiness and unhappiness, O ye knowers of Brahma ? Is time Brahma (as cause), or the own nature of the things, or the necessary consequences of work, or accident, or the elements, or nature (yone), or the soul ? This must be considered : It is not the union of them, because the soul remains ; the soul (individual soul) also is not powerful (to be the author of the creation (since there is (independent of it) a cause of happiness and unhappiness (viz., work))."

These are the Hindu versions of the problems of existence, and they indicate the path of inquiry fearlessly trodden by great thinkers in ancient India. Translated into modern phraseology, they are : What is the ultimate ground of existence in general ? What is the ground of our own existence ? By what power are we sustained in life, and where do we permanently abide after death—in conscious existence, or in an endless chain of atomic or molecular movements and changes ? Why are we guided by desire and aversion, a natural longing for pleasure and an instinctive shrinking from pain ? What inflexible law leads to the apportionment of the measure of pleasure we secure and the measure of pain we groan under ?

It is not necessary for us to repeat that these are the abstruse problems that have, from time immemorial, exercised, puzzled, and wasted some of the loftiest intellects the world has seen, and they are to-day as far from solution in the region of boasted philosophy as they were when the Upanishads, major and minor, were composed. In one and all the important centres

of ancient civilization, in India, in China, in Egypt, and in Greece, they were deeply meditated upon in solitudes ; earnestly discussed in schools frequently, and the agora and forum at times ; patiently elaborated into complicated though imposing theories ; and laboriously propagated in the shape of practical lessons among people too busily engaged to recognize the vapory character of the speculations to which they were inseparably linked. And in the most favored abodes of modern civilization these very problems are once more passing through a similar elaborative and transforming process in the mental laboratory of some of the greatest thinkers of the age. And it is a noteworthy fact that the results arrived at, or attained now, are not essentially different from those realized in the primitive age of which we wish to present a picture in this and the following papers. The word *failure* might justly be inscribed on the lofty banner raised by ancient philosophy ; and the same humiliating issue is what modern philosophy can legitimately boast of !

It is worthy of special notice that the civilized world seems to have been roused, at one and the same time, from the slumber of ages, to take these important problems into consideration. The age of Indian philosophy is not to be looked upon or represented as one of the ordinary periods of human history. It was indeed an extraordinary era, an era of giants both in the region of philosophic thought and in that of practical moral earnestness ; the age of Buddha, Zoroaster, Confucius, and Pythagoras ; the age which, as regards the greatness of the men whose speculations and deeds rendered it conspicuous, and the imposing nature, if not practical efficacy, of the theoretical results attained, has scarcely had its parallel in the history of the world. It saw the

lofty spirit of philosophic investigation roused from dormancy and called into vigorous play, not in one or two solitary localities, but in the most conspicuous centres of civilization ; and, barring the disclosures of revelation, the world has not been able to improve upon the solutions of the problems of existence then proposed, except in outward form and drapery. In philosophy the interval between the sixth or seventh century before the Christian era and the vaunted nineteenth century is almost *nil* !

We cannot look upon what may in one sense be called the universally developed mental activity of the period in question without being led instinctively to ascertain its cause. And the cause happily is not one of those which, the more we are dazzled by their effects, retire the more thoroughly from the narrow horizon of our intellectual vision. It stands out in bold relief from the history of the development of the human mind.

The problems of existence are among those which we are naturally and instinctively led to take into our serious consideration ; and they have from the beginning engaged the attention and exercised the brains of the thoughtful members of the human family, if not of mankind at large. In what may be called the twilight period of human history, solutions were proposed, such as failed to satisfy the world after it had made some progress in knowledge and thought. The energies of nature, originally represented as its creative and sustaining forces, gradually assumed gross and fetich forms ; and a host of gods and goddesses of limited potency and like passions with human beings, who wasted a great deal of their strength in fighting with one another, appeared on the stage and claimed human homage. Here the blazing sun-god, there the terrific

being concealed within the dark folds of the lowering clouds, and yonder the spirit of howling storms and sweeping whirlwinds appeared in tangible and what might be called stereotyped forms, clothed in the popular imagination with authority and power, such as made it necessary for men to secure their favor by prayer and supplication, and avert their wrath by bloody sacrifices. But as knowledge advanced these causes appeared utterly inadequate to minds freed from the trammels of popular prejudice, and thereby trained to think and judge for themselves.

Again, the multiplicity of the causes assigned could not but repel minds bent on discovering a unity beneath the complexity of natural phenomena, a something universal, permanent, and immutable beneath their ever-shifting phases. An endless variety of finite or limited forces, or an endless variety of local gods and goddesses of circumscribed power cannot be held by thinking men as fitted to constitute an omnific agency of boundless potency, and so some unity of being or principle supposed to be behind them became an object of anxious inquiry as soon as current forms of thought appeared unsatisfactory. An attempt to make the numerous heroes of popular mythology coalesce into a single Being of unerring wisdom and limitless power, or to weld the jarring forces of nature into one primordial force, was necessitated by a reaction against palpable grossness of conception.

But are there not solutions of these problems which may be called intuitive, or which are offered to our acceptance on the strength, either of the primary beliefs of humanity, or of that primeval revelation which we see imbedded in the varied religions of the world? The moment these solutions are accepted all difficulties

vanish into thin air, and the necessity of hatching theory after theory in dark solitudes is obviated. Such solutions were certainly within the reach of the philosophers, who allowed themselves to be puzzled and bewildered by speculations of a recondite character. But they were too simple to commend themselves to their ambitious minds ; and they were in consequence cast overboard along with those embodied in popular song or mythology. The explanations furnished by popular literature were too gross, and those offered by intuition were too simple to suit their taste, and therefore they allowed themselves with all conceivable eagerness to be entangled in the mazes of plausible error.

We have elsewhere shown that the rationalistic tendencies of the period under consideration might be traced to a reaction against ritualism. The age of philosophy in India was ushered in by the age of externalism pictured in the Brahmanas ; and this was most undoubtedly true of all the other centres of civilization, which felt the dominating influence of the spirit of philosophic inquiry so simultaneously roused in so many localities. The argument need not be reproduced here ; but a reference to the solutions of the problems of existence, which were looked upon as heretical in India, will not be deemed uncalled for.

The passage quoted above shows that an attempt was made to trace existence in its multifarious forms to Time, the Cronos of Greek mythology. Time has always been represented, by a bold figure of speech, as the beginner and the ender, the creator and destroyer of things. Forms of existence in a state of nonentity, or in an embryonic state are said to be in the womb of time ; when they make themselves manifest among the phenomena of life, they are its offspring ; and when

they finally disappear from the stage, their disappearance is traced to the sweeping action of its all-mowing scythe. But tropes and metaphors are, in course of time, or when the spirit of mythopœic invention is evoked by what Grote calls retrospective veneration, clothed with flesh, and become living realities. The fast-moving old man, with the hour-glass in one hand and scythe in the other, became in time the Ancient of Days ; and the threefold work of creation, preservation, and destruction of the world was attributed to him. Besides, how soothing is the thought that time will itself remedy the evils of time ! The soul is entangled by time in the meshes of mundane misery, but it need not despair ; time itself will destroy the net and bring the relief ! Is it a wonder that time was represented as the Creator of all things, and the incarcerator and emancipator of the soul ? This theory, however, was regarded as heretical by the learned in India when they halted between materialism and pantheism, and when therefore they could not brook the idea of a mythological phantom rising up to claim the honor conferred on a self-evolving material form or a self-developing spiritual substance.

Another of the heretical opinions condemned mercilessly, revolved around what was called "the own nature of things." Every form of existence has its vitality, the ground of its being concealed in itself ; and it is absurd, as well as useless, to look for its creator and preserver apart from it. The ground of man's existence is man himself ; he is the author and sustainer of his being, the tormentor of his own pure spirit, and ultimately its glorious liberator. Man has no business to look beyond himself, in the depths of his misery, for help, his own recuperative power being enough to

work out his deliverance in process of time. Manliness and independence cannot go further !

- Then comes in the god of Buddhism, Karma, for his share of condemnation. Karma, work, occupies a prominent place in Hindu Philosophy. It is the great incarcerator and tormentor of the passive soul. Its causes are desire and aversion, which lead men to practise virtue or vice, and thus become recipients of rewards or punishments. It sends them up to heaven or down to hell to take the consequences of their own actions ; brings them back into mundane existence or existence in corporeal frames to be once more tormented by fresh desires and fresh actions ; hurls them back to regions of reward and punishment ; and so on through long, long series of births and deaths, till its
- own power being consumed and itself annihilated, they are liberated from its thralldom, and lost, either in the material essence of nature to pass through an endless series of such experiences after lengthened periods of hibernation, or in the divine spiritual substance to be compelled by the imperious law of development to reappear, after long periods of quiescence, on the stage of history with similarly gloomy prospects before them ! But though conspicuous for its malignant activity, in Hindu Philosophy, it is at first sight neither the starting-point nor the terminus of creation. The Buddhists, however, tried to make it such ; and so they drew upon themselves the awful sentence of schism and heresy.

The Bible of the fool, the chapter of accidents, was not unknown to our ancestors of the age of Hindu Philosophy. Chance was represented as the creator and preserver of the world, and all talk of teleology, or the doctrine of final causes, was pronounced unmitigated nonsense. Do not some of our redoubtable champions



of science see their prototypes in ages which they are apt to mention with contempt as eras of ignorance and darkness ? Teleology, in the proper sense of the term, Hindu theologians of the most orthodox school were by no means averse to ; and chance appeared to them as absolutely nothing, and the idea of bringing an entity out of nonentity they could not possibly entertain for a moment ; and therefore this theory also received the brand of heresy.

The elements were by another class of heretics represented as the ultimate ground of existence. Who is not reminded by this of the tendency in modern philosophy to trace the universe to the evolution of what are called the ultimate powers of nature ? The ultimate powers, held up in these days as creative or self-evolving potencies, are very different indeed from what were represented as such in the primitive age of Indian philosophy. Then the earth, water, fire, and air, with the addition of ether in some quarters, were looked upon as simple, uncompounded substances ; and to the action, individual as well as collective, of these elements existence in its diversified forms of beauty and proportion was not very unnaturally traced. But to the philosophic mind of India, fond of subtle distinctions and averse to grossness of conception, these substances, though regarded as simple and uncompounded, appeared too gross to deserve the place assigned them as the productive causes of material and mental phenomena. And therefore those who represented them as the omnific powers of nature were regarded as a body of heretics fit to be burned alive !

Again Nature (Yoni) had also the honor, as it has always had, of being pointed out as the ultimate ground of existence. There is some doubt about the meaning

of the word *yonî* in this connection, but if it be taken as meaning *nature*, a broad line of demarcation ought to be drawn between it and Prakriti of the Sankhya school, generally translated *nature*. Prakriti is a principle of extreme tenuity, more spiritual than material, a sort of primordial, self-evolving essence or form ; but Yoni represents either all the phenomena of nature put together, or the aggregate of all its forces and powers. The theory which traces creation to Prakriti has always been held as orthodox ; while that which makes Yoni the ultimate ground of existence has always been reprobated as heterodox. In whatever sense the word nature is used in this connection, the speculation which evolves creation from it and thrusts the Creator, not merely into the background, but out of existence, cannot but appear fascinating to the materialists of the day !

And lastly, a species of egoism, not unknown in these days, was upheld in one of the numerous schools of heresy which flourished side by side with elaborate systems of orthodox philosophy. The soul, the individual in contradistinction to the universal soul, was represented as the ultimate ground of existence ; but the spirit of Hindu orthodoxy recoiled in horror from such representation. The soul or the ego, both universal and individual, is, according to its champions, perfectly quiescent, and cannot therefore be an efficient cause. To attribute to it the slightest degree of activity is to rob it of its happiness, which in their opinion is synonymous with the complete extinction of thought and desire, or of mental and spiritual activity.

All these principles form, according to Hindu Philosophy, a chain of second causes ; and if the series were to terminate in a proper top or head principle, nothing could be said against them. Such a principle is indi-

cated in this verse : " They, who followed abstract meditation (Dhyan) and concentration (Yoga) beheld (as the cause of the creation) the power (Sakti) of the divine soul concealed in its qualities, which alone superintends all these causes, of which time was the first, and soul (the individual soul) the last." This and the verses following set forth the attempt made in this treatise to reconcile materialism to pantheism.

2. The verse quoted in the paragraph indicates also the way in which solution of the great problems of life was sought ; and to it let us in the second place advert. It is scarcely worth our while to observe that the expedients resorted to in those primitive times are very different indeed from those utilized in these days. A well-filled library, a cushioned chair, reading, study, and meditation, prolonged till what is called the midnight oil is consumed—these, with perhaps a pipe concealed amid volumes of smoke, are the expedients resorted to in these days for such a purpose. But books were unknown, or, if not unknown, very rare in those days, and midnight oil was never consumed, except in religious and social festivities. The man of intellect, determined to set the problems of existence at rest, had to pass through a painful course of preparation. He had to prepare himself for his proper study by performing the ordinary duties of life as well as going the round of religious observances with punctilious care. He had then to place himself under the guidance of an accredited teacher, and spend years in listening to the Vedas chanted by him ; he had, moreover, to propitiate the teacher as well as the gods, by varied acts of self-sacrifice, and by services of a menial nature. And when by such sacrifices and such services he had obtained what in modern phraseology would be called a

pass-certificate, he had to look for a proper place where, wrapped up in intense meditation, he might seek unmolested the right solution of the problems of life.

The Swetaswatara Upanishad points out the sort of place he must select as his rendezvous in the tenth verse of the second chapter : " At a level place, free from pebbles and gravel, pleasant to the mind by its sounds, water, and bowers, not painful to the eye, and repairing to a cave, protected from the wind, let a person apply (his mind to God)." He must sit down, not

". . . wander where the Muses haunt  
Clear spring, or shady grove or sunny hill."

The necessity of his retiring to a sequestered spot, "pleasant to the mind by its sounds, water, and bowers," is obvious enough ; but why should the place selected be "free from pebble and gravel"? Because "bodily exercises" must be combined with those of the mind and the spirit ; and a level, smooth piece of ground was needed to render these practicable.

What was he to do in such a solitary place ? Let the following verses, quoted from the same chapter, furnish the reply :

"Keeping the upper part (the chest, the neck, and the head) erect, and equal to (the other parts of) the body, subduing within the heart the senses together with the mind, let the sense by the raft of Brahma (Om) cross over all the fearful torrents (of the world)." "Keeping down the senses, subduing his desires, and gently respiring by the nostrils, let the wise diligently attend to the mind as (the charioteer) to a car drawn by vicious horses."

In plain English, the man anxious to have the problems of life solved must, in a solitary place, strive by

varieties of bodily as well as mental exercises, to obtain a thorough mastery over his passions and appetites, and to subdue the restlessness or the vagrant tendency of the mind.

When he has succeeded in doing this preliminary work, he has to pass through various degrees of that concentration which is to culminate in the direct vision of God by his soul in itself, as well as in the varied objects of Nature. The premonitory symptoms are thus set forth : "These appearances precede the concentration by which the manifestation of Brahma is effected ; it (Brahma) assumes the form of frost, of smoke, of hot air, of wind, of fire, of fire-flies, of lightning, of crystal, and of the moon." The idea perhaps is that the inquirer first sees the Divinity somewhat veiled in the objects of Nature, and then in the fulness of His unclouded glory in his own spirit.

This vision indicates the last degree of concentration. "When absorbed in this concentration (the Yogi) sees by the true nature of his own self, which manifests like a light the true nature of Brahma, which is not born, eternal and free from all effects of Nature ; he gets released from all bonds. For he (the Yogi) is the god who is born before all the quarter, and intermediate quarters (Hiranyagarbha) ; he is indeed within the womb, he is born, he will be born ; in the shape of all he dwells in every creature." Words cannot more clearly set forth the perfect identity of the individual with the universal soul, or the fact that the Yogi's deliverance means in reality the emancipation of the Deity from the trammels of Nature.

The first degree of concentration is thus indicated : "When (in the Yogi's body) composed of earth, water, light, air, and ether, the fivefold qualities, which make

concentration, are manifest, then there is no disease or age or pain for him, who has obtained the body burning with the fire of concentration. When the body is light, and without disease, the mind without desire, the color is shining, sweet the voice, and pleasant the smell, when the excrements are few, they say the first degree of concentration is gained." The intermediate degrees between this and the stage associated with the direct vision of Brahma are not indicated in this treatise ; but we obtain an insight into their exalted character when we note that the very first landmark indicates a body free from " disease, age, or pain," and a mind " without desire."

But all this may justly be represented as a picture of the age of the Upanishads as well as of that of the systems or schools of philosophy, of the age of inquiry as well as that of mature thought and bold speculation. Is there nothing to differentiate the one from the other as regards the varieties of expedients resorted to with a view to a proper solution of the knotty problems of existence ? Our decided reply is, Not much. The problems were the same, and the means utilized to insure their solution were nearly the same. But there was a manifest difference between the two periods in the numbers of the persons by whom these problems were handled and these means utilized. In the preparatory period, or the age of inquiry, these were units scattered here and there, each pursuing his own line of investigation in solitary grandeur, and the whole presenting the appearance of an assemblage of inchoative particles rather than a regularly organized body. But in the age of philosophy, properly so called, these units developed into communities, and a series of sporadic and unconnected attempts at philosophic thought were sys-

tematized into well-organized schools. Another difference arose from the spirit of controversial wrangling, which was called into vigorous activity, when school was opposed to school, and system fought with system for triumph and ascendancy. In the simpler and purer times of the Upanishads, love of truth seems to have been the reigning principle ; but in those of the systems this amiable passion was all but annihilated by an irrepressible love of controversy. And when the spirit of wrangling had done its work and created dissensions and discords of a fearful type, concessions and compromises were resorted to, and hybrids in the region of philosophy, such as those we notice in the Swetaswātara Upanishad and the Bhagavada Gita, were called into being. It should, moreover, be borne in mind that motives of an earthly character played a more conspicuous part in the age of philosophy ; but these bring us to our next point.

3. The advantages these devout inquirers looked for, and for which they betook themselves to a life of singular austerity and penance, were partly secular and partly spiritual. The secular advantages were the extraordinary powers attained by complete self-control and intense meditation. These are, in the words of Roer, whose translation we have utilized, “ assumption of the smallest possible shape, of the greatest possible shape, of the heaviest form, of the lightest form, the power of obtaining everything, irresistible will, ruling of all; and independency of all.” Furnished with such powers, the devotee could dazzle the world by miraculous feats. He could make himself at times visible and at times invisible ; could move in the water as fishes and fly in the air as birds ; could remain buried under the earth for days and months and years ; could com-

mand a luscious fruit on the topmost branch of a giant tree to fall down on his outspread hands, or call into his clenched fist the diamond ring concealed beneath the stony floor of the darkest chamber of a castellated palace ; could make the strongest man weep as a child or fall prostrate upon the earth by the simple force of his indomitable will ; could bring the whole world under his irresistible sway in the twinkling of an eye, or hurl defiance at the powers that be with perfect impunity. And who can measure the influence he might exert over a superstitious people by such dazzling displays of superhuman power ? Nor were immensity, exiguity, gravity, levitation, irresistible will-power, dominating influence, and perfect independence the only powers by which he could dazzle the world into admiration and reverence. He could by intense meditation make himself omniscient, and work all the wonders connected with the powers known, in the phraseology of Mesmerism, as prevision, introvision, and retrovision. He could look back, as Buddha is reported to have done, to the varied stages of existence through which he had passed, before his migration into his present body, and report varieties of incidents connected with each. He could foretell future events with prophetic minuteness and particularity ; and read and make bare, so to speak, the inmost thoughts of his neighbors. How much awe and reverence might he not inspire by a display of such superhuman knowledge ! His toil did not go unrewarded even in this world.

But it must be observed that these powers, though prized, should be looked upon as merely the subsidiary advantages of his austere course of life. His main object was knowledge of Brahma and the liberation con-



sequent upon it. He looked upon himself as a slave to desire, which led him to acts, good and bad, and these to periods of rewards and punishment, and consequently through an almost endless chain of transmigrations. To deliver himself from the trammels of corporeal or conscious existence, not the acquisition of extraordinary powers, was the great object he had in view in forsaking the occupation and pleasures of the world, and making meditation the sole business of his life. He looked for liberation, and he believed that he could not reach the summit of his wishes except through what may be called the ladder of right knowledge. For this knowledge, therefore, he was willing to make all sacrifices, undergo all privations, practise all austerities, and go through, in a word, a long course of self-renunciation and self-mortification. How he could reach the goal he looked forward to is indicated in the following extract from the third chapter of the Swetaswatara Upanishad :

• “Those who know Brahma, who is greater than the universe, the great one, the infinite, who is concealed within all beings according to their bodies, the only pervader of the universe, the ruler become immortal.”

“I know that perfect, infinite spirit, who is like the sun after darkness. Thus knowing him, a person overcomes death, there is no other road for obtaining (liberation).”

Extraordinary influence in this world and emancipation from the fetters of existence were the motives which induced the devotee of these primitive times to exchange the comforts of domestic life for the privations of that of an anchorite. It was not, therefore, to gratify an idle curiosity of the mind, but to satisfy an intense and irrepressible longing of the heart, that he

betook himself to hermit solitude. Our modern philosophers lack his earnestness because they are led on by an intellectual rather than a moral impulse or force.

The following extract from Dr. Geikie's "Life of Christ" shows that the possibility of attaining superhuman knowledge and superhuman power by ascetic self-denial and concentrated meditation was recognized among the chosen people of God : "The grand aim of this amazing system of self-denial and ascetic endurance is told by Josephus in a brief sentence. 'Consecrated from childhood by many purifications, and familiar beyond thought with the Holy Books and the utterances of the prophets, they (the Essenes) claim to see into the future, and in truth there is scarcely an instance in which their prophecies have been found false.' The belief that they could attain direct communion with God by intense legal purification and mystic contemplation, and even pass, in the end, to such transcendental vision as would reveal to them the secrets of the future, was the supreme motive to endure a life of so much privation and self-denial. A similar course had been followed before their day as a means of preparation for divine visions and communion with high powers. "In those days," says Daniel, "I was mourning three full weeks. I ate no pleasant bread, neither came flesh nor wine in my mouth, neither did I anoint myself at all till three whole weeks were fulfilled. And on the four and twentieth day of the month, as I was by the side of the great river, which is Hiddekel, then I lifted up mine eyes, and looked, and behold a certain man clothed in linen, whose loins were girded with fine gold of Uphaz." In the same way Esdras prepared himself for his visions : "Go to the

flowery open, where there is no house," said the angel to him, "and eat only the herbs of the field ; taste no flesh and drink no wine, but eat herbs only, and pray unto the Highest continually ; then will I come and talk with thee." That the devotees in the promised land were not so wild in their expectations as their brethren in India is a proof of the decidedly better influence exerted over them by their sacred scriptures.

4. Now let us advert to the conclusions at which the inquirers arrived. These may be classed under two heads, materialism and pantheism, the two poles around which all speculations on the problems of existence have revolved from the beginning of days. The Sankhya philosophy was evidently the earliest outcome ; and it traced creation through a succession of evolutes and evolvent principles to a quasi-material, if not material form, called Prakriti. The Upanishads had recognized a principle called Unmanifested (Avyakta) behind the perceptible universe, and the manifested (Vyakta) deity, its reputed, and in some respects its real, creator. This unmanifested principle was identified by the Sankhya school with its Prakriti, and a process of evolution was disclosed fitted to connect it, through the media of substances of extreme tenuity, with the gross, material universe. But this solution was a little too atheistic to suit the irrepressible religious tendencies of the Hindu mind, and therefore a reaction in favor of pantheism was realized not long after its appearance and prevalence. The apparent, if not real, dualism of the Sankhya philosophy did therefore in time shrink into the monism of the Vedantic school. The ultimate ground of existence was declared to be, not a material or quasi-material form, primordial and self-evolving, but a divine substance or the Divinity acting under an

automatic impulse. Such were the boasted results of philosophic thought in India, and such have been the boasted results of philosophic thought wheresoever and whensoever it has been vigorously applied to the problems of existence both in ancient and modern times. And their unsatisfactory character is fitted to set forth, in an unmistakable manner, his inability to solve them by dint of thought and speculation. His business is to accept, with childlike simplicity, the solution placed within his reach by his subjective consciousness, as well as by objective revelation. And when he so far forgets himself as to shut his eye presumptuously to the dim light of the one source and the meridian lustre of the other, he cannot but get entangled in the mazes of grotesque fancies and ludicrous errors !

5. But these conclusions, antipodal as they are, could not but give rise to fierce controversies. The opposite schools of philosophy had themselves ranged under different standards, and fought with might and main for their respective shibboleths. The questions which were hotly debated in those days have lost much of their importance and exciting power ; the arguments which were plied with extraordinary skill and profundity have lost much of their appositeness and cogency ; and even the technical phrases bandied backward and forward have lost much of their significance. But the spirit of controversy, evoked when the jarring systems fought for victory and ascendancy, has not died out ; and racy anecdotes fitted to set forth its ardor and irrepressibility form a prominent and perhaps the most amusing element of table-talk in India. We are tempted to relate one of these to show what controversy means in India now, and what it must have meant when the champions of philosophy were arrayed

under hostile banners to fight to the death for their respective theories.

Two learned Pundits, who were bosom friends, sallied out of a place of learning and walked on, engaged in pleasant chit-chat. Unfortunately, they allowed themselves, in perhaps an unguarded moment, to be drawn into a philosophic controversy, and then the cheerful countenance, the bright smile, the musical voice, and the entertaining talk vanished into thin air. Their faces presented a gloomy aspect, their eyes flashed with animation, their voices became agitated and loud, and their attitude was that of men engaged in fierce contest. They went on adding fuel to the flame till they reached the lofty mound of a spacious tank. Here they came from words to blows, and a scuffle ensued, the consequence of which was, they moved to the edge, lost their footing, and fell down into the waters below. Thus cooled, they returned to their respective homes by different roads, ashamed perhaps of the controversial ardor they had allowed to get the better of their reason and sober sense !

Nor were these controversies merely intellectual contests. They received the greater portion of their ardor, their vehemence, their rancor, and their virulence from religion. The schools were schools of religion as well as philosophy, for philosophy was in those primitive times polymathy, the science of the All, the omnivorous science in which were included physiology, psychology, and theology. Again the schools were hopelessly at war with popular superstitions, and the champions of these, those who derived their position, wealth, and honor from them, could not but stand up against speculations so obviously subversive of them. So that there was what might be called a double contest in progress,

the schools at war with one another, and popular superstitions at war with them all. The materialistic schools hurled anathemas at the pantheistic, and the champions of the popular religion prayed down imprecations on both the classes of schools with perfect impartiality !

But this state of things could not last long. The very fierceness with which the spirit of wrangling operated brought on a reaction, and the result was a decay of earnestness in combination with a supple, vacillating spirit of compromise. No wonder ! A compromise was demanded commensurate to the requirements of the hot controversy that was raging. A double compromise was needed because a double controversy was raging. The schools must be reconciled with one another, and a reconciliation must be effected between them on one side, and the superstitions they despised on the other. This was by no means an easy task, but it was effected with an ingenuity which we cannot but commend. It is not at all difficult to show how, just as it was not at all difficult to show how the egg might be able to stand on the table, after the successful effort had been put forth.

The Sankhya philosophy, the philosophy around which all materialistic views revolved, traced creation through a succession of principles, productive and non-productive, to Prakriti. Its cosmogony was admitted, and its founder, Kapila, was praised and honored as a favored child of heaven, nay, even as an incarnation. "He who alone superintends every source of production, every form, and all the sources of production, who endowed his son, the Rishi Kapila, at the commencement of the creation with every kind of knowledge, and who looked at him when he was born." . . . The Vedantic system, the system around which all panthe-

istic notions revolved, presented a cosmogony which, in its broad features as well as in almost all its details, was a *fac-simile* of that of the Sankhya schools. The starting point, however, of the Vedantic cosmogony was Maya, not Prakriti. But if Maya could be made identical with Prakriti, and an all-comprehensive, all-diffusive divine substance posited behind it, the internecine warfare between the two jarring schools of thought might cease. And this was precisely the expedient resorted to. "Know delusion (Maya) as nature (Prakriti), him who is united with her as the great ruler (Maheswar) ; this whole world in truth is pervaded by (powers which are) his parts."

This verse of chap. iv. of the Upanishad under review not only sets forth the way in which rank materialism was reconciled to rank pantheism, but shows the manner in which transcendental philosophy was reconciled to grovelling superstition. The diffusive substance back of the demiurgic principle, Maya or Prakriti, was represented as no other than the third person of the Hindu Triad, Maheswar or Rudra. In the third chapter we have this prayer : " May Rudra, the Lord of the universe, the all-wise (Maharshi) who produced the gods and gave them majesty, and who created at first Hiranyagarhha, strengthen us with auspicious intellect !" The prayer is repeated in chap. iv. : " May Rudra, the Lord of the universe, the all-wise who produced the gods and gave them majesty, (and) who beheld the birth of Hiranyagarhha, strengthen us with auspicious intellect !" In these and such passages the triad is looked upon as a monad, concentrated, as it were, in the third person ; and therefore the creator is sometimes called Brahma, and sometimes Rudra ; and Hiranyagarhha is no other than Maya or Prakriti.

How ingeniously is peace restored. Rudra identified with the unmanifested divine substance is not merely the Creator, but the Preserver and Destroyer of the universe. In chap. iii. verse 2 we have these words : " For it is one Rudra only—(the knowers of Brahma) acknowledge not a second—who rules these worlds with his ruling powers, who dwells within every man, and who, having created all the worlds, (and being their) protector, gets wrathful at the time of the end (destroys them)." It must also be borne in mind that this august being cannot act except through an emanation called Sakti (energy), and to this power the varied names of Prakriti, Maya, and Hiranyagarbha are applied.

The chronological order in which the six systems of Indian Philosophy were developed cannot possibly be set forth ; and the age in which they flourished can be indicated only by means of shrewd guesses, not by means of well-founded and therefore thoroughly reliable calculations. The starting and the terminal links of the chain may, however, be fixed with almost indisputable accuracy. The varied systems of philosophic thought, to which the homage of the country has been paid at different times, if not simultaneously, and by which the peculiar phases of our national life have been moulded, have a clearly discernible vein of Sankhya speculation running through it ; and therefore the Sankhya system may justly be represented as the first outcome of systematized philosophy in India. And as these systems appear swallowed up, assimilated, and incorporated in Vedantism, it ought to be represented as the last link of the chain. The Sankhya system, therefore, ought to be treated of first in an attempt to trace the history of Indian Philosophy from the time when the work of its systematization was commenced to that when that



work was consummated. The Yoga Philosophy, which is its counterpart, must next claim attention. The two Logical or Analytical systems, the Nyaiyaika and Vaiseshika, should be disposed of before the two Vedic systems are sifted and analyzed. Such a treatment of this many-sided theme appears to be the best fitted to do it justice, though arguments may be advanced, especially by people disposed to carp at it as against any conceivable thing, from a plenum to a vacuum.

These six systems—called orthodox—are thus specified :

1. Sankhya, founded by Kapila.
2. Yoga, founded by Patanjali.
3. Nyaiyaika, founded by Gautama or Gotama.
4. Vaiseshika, founded by Kanada.
5. The Purva Mimansa, founded by Jaimini.
6. The Uttra Mimansa or Vedanta, founded by Badarayana or Vyas.

They will be treated of in the following papers, one after another, in the order in which they appear in this enumeration.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDU THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

THE Sankhya Philosophy and its counterpart, the Yoga, have lately been invested with a peculiar interest in the writings and peripatetic discourses of the champions of Theosophy in India. The speculations formulated in the one, and developed in a series of practical rules of the most stringent type in the other, have been placed above the most improved science of the day ; and results are anticipated, compared with which those by which the comforts and conveniences of life are being multiplied are as trifles. It is proposed in this paper to show, by a careful analysis of the contents of one of the two original documents from which our knowledge of the Sankhya Philosophy is derived, how far the glowing eulogy bestowed upon it by Indian theosophists is well merited.

The founder of the Sankhya, the first of the six schools of Indian Philosophy, was Kapila, one of the great thinkers whose speculations in the region of pure thought have not merely left an indelible mark in the literature of our country, but exercised a mighty influence on our national life. Nothing certain or reliable is known about this great man ; and he must therefore be held up as a mythic rather than a historical character. The traditions current about him are such as are manufactured, in an age of superstition, by what Grote

calls the retrospective veneration of a few devoted followers, and accepted as invested with peculiar sacredness, if not as positively and indisputably unexceptionable, by the unthinking masses. He is said by some champions of his school to have been one of the seven great sons of Brahma, who cut a figure in the theogonies of the Purans ; while by others he is held up as an incarnation of Vishnu himself. Others, again, led by the etymology of the word Kapila, which means a *tawny brown color*, as well as *fire*, look up to him as the great Vedic god, Agni himself, in a human form. He is, moreover, said to have been a descendant of the celebrated Indian lawgiver, Manu, to have lived in retirement as a recluse, to have successfully controlled his appetites and passions, and to have been invested on that account with various kinds of supernatural powers. But if he is identified, as he has been, with the irascible sage in the Ramayana, who destroyed the sixty thousand sons of King Sagara of Ayodhya (Oudh) in a fit of rage, consequent on their impudence in accusing him of the great crime of having stolen their father's sacrificial horse, the complete self-control he is said to have attained becomes problematical !

Various other stories are told about him of a piece with these ; and the best thing the inquirer can do is to be content with the bare fact that Kapila was a Brahmin and the founder of the school of philosophy the speculations of which may be found as an underlying vein of thought in the most advanced of the systems elaborated in ancient India. Nor are we in possession of the writings of this great sage, the works ascribed to him—viz., the Sankhya-Pravachana, or Sankhya-Aphorisms and the Tattwa Samasa, or compendium of principles—being decidedly more modern. The former,

translated by Dr. Ballantyne years ago, is not even mentioned by Sankara Acharya, the great Vedantist commentator, who lived in the latter part of the seventh and the earlier part of the eighth century ; and it is not even referred to in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, a philosophical treatise evidently composed in the fourteenth century. The Sankhya-Pravachana, however, is a standard document of the Sankhya school ; and in our attempts to expound the principles of the philosophy associated with this school we cannot but give it a prominent place. We shall, therefore, present a synopsis of the contents of this work before proceeding to an examination, in another paper, of those of a treatise which is decidedly more ancient—viz., the Sankhya Karika, or exposition of the Sankhya Philosophy, recently translated by Mr. Davies, of the Royal Asiatic Society. Another treatise, also recently translated, we shall refer to, the treatise already named, the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, or review of the different systems of Hindu Philosophy, a work of very great importance, which the student of our national philosophy will do well to master with a view to an intimate acquaintance with the lines of thought and reasoning embodied in it.

The Sankhya-Pravachana consists of six books and five hundred and twenty-six Sutras or Aphorisms. The first four books present the principles of Kapila's philosophy, without, it must be confessed, much regard to the advantage of a perspicuous or luminous arrangement, but with considerable acuteness and force. The fifth book grapples with and refutes some of the objections to his system current, if not in his age, at least in subsequent times ; and the sixth, being a recapitulation of the principles enunciated in the first four, bears to

the whole the same relation which the book of Deuteronomy bears to the Pentateuch. Several commentaries fitted to elucidate the contents of this hoary document, and demanded peremptorily by its studied brevity and sententiousness, exist ; and a recourse to them is absolutely needed to clear up its obscure passages and make its many legendary and other references intelligible. But great caution must be exercised in their use to avoid the common fault of transferring the traditions and associations among which the commentators were brought up, to the age when the passages elucidated were penned. The best of these commentaries is Sankhya-Pravachana Bhashya, by Vijnana Bhikshu, who seems to have been an ardent admirer and a redoubtable champion of the system, at a time when it was attacked by certain phases of pantheistic and nihilistic thought, as well as by persons who derived their inspiration from prevalent forms of theistic belief. The Sankhya Aphorisms, together with valuable portions of this commentary, were translated into English by Dr. Ballantyne, whose accuracy as an interpreter or expounder of Hindu Philosophy has been generally acknowledged by Sanscrit scholars. These translations are to be utilized in the following synopsis of the contents of this memorable work.

The grand object of this philosophy is set forth in the very first of the five hundred and twenty-six Aphorisms of which the book consists : " Well, the complete cessation of pain, (which is) of three kinds, is the complete end (*summum bonum*) of man." The three kinds of pain are particularized, not so much by the author of the book as by his commentators. Pain " natural and intrinsic," or pain arising from bodily and mental infirmities and weaknesses, is comprehended in the first



class ; and that "natural and extrinsic," or pain arising from such external causes as "cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts," is included in the second class. The third class comprehends, according to the commentator Vachaspati Misra, pains proceeding from the influence of planetary bodies, or from the malice of impure spirits, such as Yackshases, Rakshases, etc. The subjection of the soul to this threefold pain, or to pain in its threefold aspect, is its bondage, and liberation from it should be, if it is not, the sole object of earthly and even heavenly existence. The object of Sankhya and every other system of Indian Philosophy is to show how this consummation is to be brought about, or how the final emancipation of the soul from the bondage of pain in its threefold aspect is to be effected.

The diagnosis of a disease is the first step toward its cure ; and, therefore, an attempt is made to set forth the cause of this universal bondage before the sources of emancipation are pointed out. The disquisition on this cause is worthy of a detailed notice, inasmuch as it points to the varied antagonistic forces with which the system had to contend in its advanced, if not in its incipient stages of development.

The great Napoleon developed a principle of universal applicability when, immediately after his coronation, he said : "A new dynasty must be baptized with blood." A new school of philosophy, as well as a new empire or a new dynasty, has to pass through a season of almost ceaseless struggle for life ; and it is not established till it has proved its right to live according to a law now said to be universally operative, the law of the survival of the fittest. And it cannot but be very interesting to notice the phalanx of antagonistic forces through which it has, in its inception and development, to force

its way to maturity, renown, and far-extending and triumphant influence, if not to universal ascendancy. But this cannot be done in the case of the system of philosophy under review, inasmuch as we are not in possession of documents fitted to throw light on its early development. But we can indicate the varied hostile theories with which it had to contend when the Sankhya-Pravachana was composed.

What, then, is the cause of the universally admitted bondage of the soul, or its subjection to the varied kinds of pain, the complete cessation of which is the object of philosophy or right knowledge? Various parties come forward with varied answers, which are plausible enough at first sight, but which, when properly weighed in the balance of reason, are found wanting. The ordinary thinker, or one not far advanced in philosophy, comes forward and points to *time* and *place* as the cause, jointly and separately, of the bondage of the soul. But his theory is very easily exploded, as, both *time* and *place* being associated with all souls, those which are in bondage and those which are beatified, if they were the obnoxious cause, release or liberation would be an impossibility. But liberation is a fact, and souls released exist free from all pain, and beatified. *Time* and *place*, therefore, cannot be the cause we are in quest of. The metaphysician steps forward and affirms that the bondage of the soul arises from its being conditioned and therefore necessarily defective. The reply to this is plain. The premises are incorrect, and therefore the conclusion is faulty. The soul is absolute and unconditioned; a position established both by Scripture and common-sense. But this reply elicits the rejoinder, "If the soul is absolute and unconditioned, why talk of its bondage and subse-

quent liberation ?” It is not at all difficult to dispose of this demurrer. Forms of expression, conventional, though not scientifically accurate, cannot be very well avoided. When the bondage of the soul and its liberation are talked of, the real meaning is not hidden, though some homage is paid to usage. The body, with its internal organ, the mind, is really in pain, the soul’s bondage is only reflectional, as the red color in a crystal vase containing a China rose.

The metaphysician retires, giving place to the priest or the champion of current orthodoxy, who holds up works as the cause of the bondage of the soul. But works cannot weave a net for that to which they do not appertain. Works belong to the mind, and their influence, good or bad, does not and cannot extend to the soul, to which they do not in the slightest degree appertain. The Vedantin, or the pantheist of the Vedantic school, then comes forward, and with an air of triumph insists upon Avidya, or ignorance, as the cause of this bondage. But ignorance, look upon it as you will, or from whatever standpoint it may please you to do so, cannot cause bondage. Ignorance, according to the Vedantins, is unreal ; and that which is merely a phantom cannot be the cause of that which, like bondage, is a reality. If, however, it is affirmed that ignorance is real and not phantom-like, the very foundation of monism, or exclusive belief in or affirmation of one entity, is shaken. But suppose ignorance is represented as both real and unreal, what then ? Such a reconciliation of opposites, such a naked paradox, is almost unthinkable, and cannot be accepted by any but “children and madmen.” Such a thing, moreover, which at one and the same time is both real and unreal, is not included in the six all-embracing catego-



ries of the Vaiseshikas—viz., substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inhesion. How, then, can its existence be admitted ?

The idealist then advances and affirms that, as nothing but thought exists, bondage is unreal and dreamy. But here, again, the premises are not correct. Our intuition of the external world proves its reality as decidedly as our intuitive knowledge of thought proves its reality. If intuition is to be set aside as fallacious or unreliable in the one case, it ought to be cast overboard in the other also. The believer in momentary existences, or he who believes that existence, instead of being a continuous, connected chain, consists of distinct and separate parts, each leaping into momentary existence only to be replaced immediately by its successor, steps forward or walks into the arena with his theory, which, but for the fact that nothing is too absurd in the region of metaphysics or speculative science, might be looked upon as too odd to be entertained by sensible men even for a moment. He affirms that the bondage of the soul is occasioned by the influence of external objects of momentary duration. He, however, does not clearly see that external objects, being locally separate from the soul, cannot weave a net of bondage for it, and that things ephemeral, which make their appearance one after another only to die, cannot have a permanent effect, as the bondage of the soul confessedly is. And the last gentleman whose opinions are weighed and found wanting is the nihilist, who maintains that, as nothing exists but an eternal and unutterable void, bondage is supposititious, a myth, or a non-entity. This gentleman has directed against him the very weapons by which his brother champion, the idealist, is chased out of the arena.

Some of these opponents are regarded as brethren with mistaken notions, but the opprobrious epithet of heretic is applied to the rest, especially to those who uphold nihilism in one form or another.

The varied theories of the bondage of the soul which Kapila's system had to combat and overcome indicate the forms of thought and belief current in what might emphatically be called the Age of Indian Philosophy, and in times immediately subsequent to it. There was the tendency to reduce all forms of existence to space and time, or to merge the sensuous objects of nature into the supersensuous forms of thought. There were the theories of the absolute and the relative, the unconditioned and the conditioned, propounded, matured, held as life, and fought for, as well as forms of thought arising from current superstition. There was, moreover, the transcendental type of monism which, originating in pure Vedantic times, was being gradually fitted, by an inflexible and uncompromising logic, for that ascendancy which it has enjoyed in our country for ages untold. There was idealism ready to affirm the existence of nothing but pure thought, side by side with nihilism proclaiming an interminable and absolute void under diversified forms of fictitious and deceptive existence. And finally there was the strange and paradoxical theory of an endless chain of unconnected existences, an infinite concatenation of finite links without anything like an interdependence or correlation of parts. Do not our modern philosophers find some of their most favorite whims anticipated in these forms of thought ?

It is desirable to state here that Kapila's system, though thrown into the shade by the ascendant star of Vedantism, has maintained its influence, in spite of

these forms of thought, so far as to give rise to the saying, quoted by Monier Williams in his excellent treatise, "Indian Wisdom"—viz., "there is no knowledge like Sankhya, and no power like Yoga." Let it not, moreover, be forgotten that the ascendancy of the Vedanta has been secured and maintained by an assimilative process—that is, in consequence of its adoption and assimilation to itself of some of the characteristic ideas of the Sankhya philosophy. The Sankhya philosophy would exist in Vedantism in a noticeable form even if its existence as a separate system were utterly extinguished or thrown beyond the confines of possibility.

The question must once more be raised, "What is the cause of the universally admitted bondage of the soul?" Two Aphorisms in Book I. are calculated to bring us to the conclusion arrived at by the commentator Vijnana Bhikshu, who lived and flourished about three hundred years ago—viz., that "the immediate cause of the bondage of the soul is the conjunction of Prakriti and of the soul." But the commentator is of course aware, as all students of Sankhya philosophy are, that the real cause lies beyond this conjunction, which, as Prakriti and soul are both pervasive and fitted to attract each other by inherent laws, is inevitable, and from which, therefore, there is no exemption even for beatified souls. The true cause of the bondage of the soul is "non-discrimination." The soul is really different from Prakriti and its products—viz., intelligence, egoism, mind, etc. ; but it is led by non-discrimination to identify itself with them. Hence its bondage !

But the problem is not solved here. Another question arises. If the earth stands upon the elephant,

what does the elephant stand upon ? If non-discrimination is the cause of the bondage of the soul, what is the cause of non-discrimination ? Some persons may be prone to maintain that merit or demerit is the cause of non-discrimination. But merit or demerit, desert, good or bad, springs from non-discrimination ; and therefore we must posit one non-discrimination to explain another ; and there will in consequence be a *regressus ad infinitum*. But suppose we have recourse to the theory of spontaneity and affirm that non-discrimination comes naturally and spontaneously into being, will not such a hypothesis be enough ? No ; for in that case there can be no guarantee that liberated souls shall be freed from its molestation. Non-discrimination is really "beginningless." But that which is beginningless is really everlasting or endless, and therefore the emancipation of the soul, consequent on the annihilation of non-discrimination, is an impossibility. It is not, however, beginningless, indivisible, and endless in the sense in which the soul is ; but it is beginningless "like an onflow (which may be stopped)." Nor is this to be wondered at, considering the fact that the beginningless, antecedent nonentity of a jar terminates as soon as it is made. Non-discrimination, though without beginning, is happily annihilable ; and the question how it may be annihilated is, properly speaking, the burden of the book under review.

But before pointing out the means prescribed for bringing about this happy consummation, the annihilation of non-discrimination and the liberation of the soul under its bondage, let us ascertain what is said in these Aphorisms about the soul, and what about Prakriti, or, in other words, let us look into the psychology and physiology of this ancient document.

Let us, in the first place, group a number of its declarations about the soul (Purush) :

“ But not without the conjunction thereof (*i.e.* of Prakriti) is there the connection of that (*i.e.* of pain) with that (*viz.*, the soul), which is now essentially a pure and free intelligence” (Book I. Aph. 19).

“ Because this is impossible for what is inactive (or, in other words, without motion, as the soul is, because all-pervading and therefore incapable of changing its place)” (Book I. Aph. 49).

“ Soul is something else than body, etc. Because that which is combined (and is therefore discernible) is for the sake of some other (not discernible)” (Book I. Aph. 139-140).

“ And (the soul is not material) because of its superintendence (over Prakriti). And (the soul is not material) because of its being an experience” (Book I. Aph. 142-143).

“ From the several allotment of births, a multiplicity of souls (is to be inferred)” (Book I. Aph. 149).

“ It (soul) is altogether free, (but seemingly) multi-form (or different in appearance from a free thing) through a delusive resemblance of being bound. It (soul) is a witness through its sense-organs (which quit it on liberation). The nature of soul is constant freedom. And finally (the nature of the soul is) indifference (to pain and pleasure alike). Its (soul's) fancy of being an agent is from the proximity of intelligence” (Book I. Aph. 160-164).

“ It cannot be of its own nature, (that is to say) meditation cannot belong to soul essentially, because of the immobility of the soul ” (Book II. Aph. 44).

“ Bondage and liberation do not belong naturally to

soul (and would not even appear to be) but for non-discrimination" (Book III. Aph. 71).

"Soul is, for there is no proof that it is not. This (soul) is different from the body, etc., because of heterogeneousness (or complete difference between the two)" (Book VI. Aph. 102).

"The plurality of soul is proved by the distribution (announced by the Veda itself in such texts as whose understand this, these are immortal, while others experience sorrow" (Book V. Aph. 45).

These texts are fitted to prove that, according to the Sankhya system, souls are multitudinous, immaterial, uncompounded, undiscernible, all-pervading, immobile, and inactive. They are uncreate and essentially intelligence and freedom. They superintend or guide the evolutions of Prakriti, and experience pleasure and pain, but in a unique sense.

As regards the origin of souls, the theory of creationism cannot but be discarded in a system which is essentially atheistic, and which at the same time cannot homologate so incongruous an idea as that of a pure spirit emanating from impure matter or from non-entity. Its great principle, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, is emphatically stated in Aphorism 78 of the very first Book: "A thing is not made out of nothing (that is to say, it is not possible that out of nothing—*i.e.* out of a nonentity—a thing should be made, *i.e.* an entity should arise."

The theory of what in theological parlance or phraseology is called traducianism, or that of souls propagating souls by the laws of generation, is also repulsive to a system which looks upon the absence of all desire and all activity, voluntary if not automatic, as essential to

their perfect freedom from misery. And, therefore, the remaining theory of the pre-existence of souls, maintained by so many philosophers of so many different schools in ancient times and in the church by no less a man than Origen, is the only theory that can be propounded in consistence with the principles of the Sankhya school. Souls are, therefore, represented as increate ; but it is to be observed that the glory of being so does not belong to them exclusively.

Again, they are said to be multitudinous, or rather innumerable, to avoid another difficulty. The object of creation or rather evolution being to effect the liberation of souls from the power or influence of non-discrimination, these must be numerous or innumerable to prevent the premature collapse or cessation of omnific work. The greater the number of souls, the longer is the process which first enslaves them one after another, and then effects their liberation singly, not *en masse*. The idea of the diffusiveness of souls is but a corollary deducible from their numerousness. It ought not to be forgotten that the Hindu philosopher, like his brother philosophers of other ancient schools, had at best but gross ideas of spiritual substances, and was therefore prone to confound them with material substances of a tenuous nature, such as ether, etc. Souls could not therefore be, according to him, multitudinous without being all-diffusive and all-pervasive. But is not each soul in itself, or apart from the congeries or mass of souls, diffusive and pervasive ? To some extent it is ; but perhaps not all-diffusive and all-pervasive ; though all that is said of souls and Prakriti may lead one to the conclusion that they overlap and interpenetrate one another, and are, moreover, overlapped and interpenetrated by Prakriti. The predications with reference

either to the soul or Prakriti are by no means marked by perfect consistency and harmony.

Activity, as has already been indicated, can on no account be attributed to souls, it being invariably associated with pain and misery through desire and aversion. Souls, therefore, are passionless and perfectly quiescent. But intelligence is certainly ascribed to souls—they are said to be intelligence itself. It may be said that intelligence and perfect quiescence cannot coexist, and that, souls being subjects of knowledge, they must pass through various states of consciousness, such as sensations, intellections, emotions, and volitions ; especially as omniscience, implying unchangeable thought and feeling, is not ascribed to them. But intelligence in this case, as in that of the Supreme Spirit of the Upanishads, is tantamount to non-intelligence, inasmuch as it makes or implies no distinction between self and not-self, subject and object. The Hindu philosopher is prone to look upon the pure spirit as a material entity of extreme tenuity, and he speaks of its intelligence as he speaks of the color of a colored substance, as a material attribute inherent rather than accidental. According to him, the intelligence of the soul is its golden color, its transparency, its luminousness. Its inherence in the soul can no more be the cause of intellectual, emotional, and volitional activity than the color of a colored substance, say the rosy hue of a rose, can be the cause of any display of activity on its part. Nor must it be forgotten that intelligence in the proper sense of the term is, according to this system, a product of Prakriti, the root-principle of nature, not an attribute or predicate of the soul.

The soul's essence is not merely intelligence, but freedom. Then why talk of its bondage, a thing which,



as contradictory to its nature, cannot exist in it without annihilating it. Here the Sankhya philosopher seems to falter for a moment, but gets rid of the difficulty with an ingenuity which may be commended. The soul's bondage is reflectional, not real. Its proximate cause is contact with Prakriti, the root-principle of nature, called the *anmūlam mūlam*, the rootless root, or, in modern phraseology, the cause uncaused. This principle attracts the soul just as loadstone attracts iron ; or it is attracted by the soul which is represented as thoroughly immobile.

In this description, however, our philosopher loses the balance of his logic and gets entangled between the horns of a dilemma. If he maintains that the soul is attracted by Prakriti into juxtaposition with itself, the doctrine of its immobility is neutralized ; while if the conjunction of the two is attributed to the attractive power of the soul, its complete passivity or quiescence is made problematical. The Sankhya philosopher gets out of the horns by ascribing to the soul some kind of automatic influence or attractive power. Voluntary activity is most emphatically thrown out of the circle of the soul's predicates ; but some irresistible influence or virtue emanates from it in the same manner in which some mysterious influence is exerted automatically by the loadstone over a piece of iron. But our philosopher does not see that there is absolutely no necessity of his positing an attractive force either in the soul or in Prakriti to account for their conjunction. Both the substances are, in his opinion, all-pervasive ; and therefore their conjunction is inevitable. But here a fresh difficulty of an appalling nature makes its appearance. If Prakriti and souls are so universally diffusive that their union, or rather interpenetration, is inevitable,

why are not souls simultaneously brought into bondage, and where are the beatified souls lodged ?

Leaving this difficulty unremoved, as the Sankhya philosopher leaves it, let us advert to the lamentable fruits of the inevitable contact of souls with Prakriti. From it proceed all the troubles of the mind (*manas*), which is a product of Prakriti, and therefore no portion of the soul ; and its sufferings are only reflected in the luminous and quiescent soul, and in this reflection consists its fictitious bondage. The soul is, therefore, in a very loose sense called an experiencer ; and all that can properly be predicated of it is that the ephemeral pleasures and pains brought upon the mind by its own malignant activity are reflected in its tranquil substance. In a sense still looser, as we shall see, the soul is called the ruler of Prakriti, and the witness and regulator of its evolutions.

But does not the Sankhya philosopher assume the reality of the bondage of the soul in his argument with the Vedanta and other philosophers of the phenomenal school ? But by the bondage of the soul he means in reality the bondage of the mind ; but as the mind is only a material evolute, its bondage cannot be real, at least in a spiritual sense. This is one of the glaring inconsistencies into which our philosopher is betrayed in spite of his logical acumen and philosophic penetration.

The existence of a soul distinct or different from the innumerable souls posited by Sankhya philosophy, bearing relation to them as that which the creator bears to the creature, or the ruler to the subject, or the benefactor to the dependent, or even the superior to the inferior, is peremptorily denied. But is something like realism maintained in the Aphorisms ascribed to Kapila, such as may justify our looking upon multi-

tudinous souls as modifications of one primal soul, their generic head? Such an idea is not discoverable in them, though it might have been, and perhaps was, originated in his school in subsequent times. The idea appears in Vijnana Bhikshu's commentary in a connection, however, which makes it difficult to ascertain whether the primal soul spoken of is the generic soul, the pattern and exemplar of all, or whether it is nothing less than the pervasive, all-embracing Spirit of God Himself.

In the Sankhya Aphorisms are posited two, and only two, entities, souls which are neither evolutes nor evolvent, and Prakriti, the evolvent root-principle of nature, and therefore not an evolute. Is there not a third entity spoken of as eternal in the sense of having existed throughout past eternity, but not everlasting in the sense of being inherently fitted to exist throughout future eternity? Is not non-discrimination represented as having existed throughout past eternity, though terminable, or rather destined to pass into non-existence and continue therein for an almost incalculable cycle of ages? Is non-discrimination real or non-real? If real, the dualism assumed vanishes into thin air, or gives place to triadism. If unreal, how can it hold in bondage realities like living souls? Are we to look upon it as the Vedantins look upon their Ignorance or Nescience, or Maya, as both real and unreal? But such contraries cannot meet in an entity; such union in one substance is unthinkable. The very argument which the Sankhya philosopher sets in battle array against the Vedantic notion of the soul being held in bondage by ignorance, may be marshalled in all its entirety against his favorite non-discrimination. But this he does not pause to consider.

Now let us see what the Aphorisms say of the second entity, Prakriti, the self-evolvent principle, to which creation, or existence, in all its proteus-like forms, is to be traced, as well as the temporary bondage and ultimate emancipation of souls. The word Prakriti, we may mention, by the way, has been, as a rule, translated "nature," but by no means with accuracy. It may be rendered, in deference to the scientific phraseology of the day, "the primordial form;" but the better word is "the self-evolving principle," the root of nature, called *anmulam mulam*, the rootless root.

The passages to be extracted in illustration of the nature of Prakriti are these :

"Prakriti is the state of equipoise of goodness (*sattwa*), passion (*rajas*), and darkness (*tamas*)" (Book I. Aph. 61).

"Since the root has no root, the root (of all) is rootless (that is to say, there is no other cause of Prakriti, because there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*, if we were to suppose another cause, which by parity of reasoning would require another cause, and so on, without end). Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at some one point, and so it is merely a name (that we give to the point in question) when we speak of the root of things under the name of Prakriti. Alike in respect of Prakriti and of both (Soul and Prakriti, is the argument for the uncreated existence)" (Book I. Aph. 67-69).

"Her (Prakriti's) imperceptibility arises from her subtlety. (Prakriti) exists because her existence is gathered from beholding of productions (which have these qualities)" (Book I. Aph. 109-110).

"Though she be unintelligent, yet Prakriti acts—as is the case with milk (that is to say, as milk, without reference to man's efforts, quite of itself changes into

the form of curd). Or, as is the case with acts (or on-goings), for we see them, of time, etc. (the spontaneous action of Prakriti is proved from what is seen). The action of time, for instance, takes place quite spontaneously in the shape of one season's now departing and another's coming on—let the behavior of Prakriti also be thus—for the supposition conforms to observed facts. But still a senseless Prakriti would never energize, or would energize in a wrong way, less because of there being (in her case) no such communing as, "This is my means of producing experience," etc. To this he replies, From her own nature she acts, not from thought—just as a servant (that is to say, as in the case of an excellent servant, naturally, merely from habit, the appointed and necessary service of the master is engaged in, and not with a view to his own enjoyment, just so does Prakriti energize from habit alone). Or, from attraction by deserts which have been from eternity" (Book III. Aph. 59-63).

Here we bring our string of quotations from the text—as well as from the commentary—to a close, and emphasize the points made. Prakriti is eternal, imperceptible, indiscrete, unintelligent, and ever active, except when in a state of equipoise. It resembles the soul in eternal duration, imperceptibility, and undiscernibility, but differs from it in activity or energy of self-evolution, not in its want of intelligence, as the intelligence of the soul, being destitute of the elements of self-consciousness and world-consciousness, is equivalent to non-intelligence.

Here a couple of questions ought to be raised and disposed of.

The first is, If Prakriti is imperceptible, how are we to be sure of its existence? To be able to answer this

question it is necessary to look into the laws of evidence which are recognized in the Sankhya school. The champions of this school admit only three kinds of proof—viz., perception (*Prataksha*), inference (*Anuman*), and testimony (*Sabda*); and they discard comparison (*upamana*), which the Logical schools add to the list, as well as the two others admitted in the Vedic schools. The objects of the external world make their existence known to us through the medium of perception, or the impressions made upon the senses by them. But they are, each of them, discernible, and consequently destructible. Their discernibility, or divisibility, proves that they are not eternal, and that, therefore, they cannot be the ground of their own existence. The law of inference leads the mind to look for the cause of their existence or manifestation apart from them; and the ultimate ground at which we arrive, when we trace the different lines of causation to their converging point, is *Prakriti*. Its existence, therefore, is proved by inference based on perception.

Again, it is plain that these objects, evolved from *Prakriti*, do not exist for themselves. Or, in other words, *Prakriti* does not evolve for its own advantage. With its varieties of evolutes, it exists for something else, as “axes for cutting,” or “houses” for the benefit of those who dwell in them. For whom, or for what does *Prakriti* evolve, or do the evolutes of *Prakriti* exist? For souls, certainly. The laws of inference, then, not merely establish the existence of *Prakriti*, but that of souls also. And as *Prakriti*, like the soul, is indiscernible, it is uncreate and eternal. In this piece of reasoning the doctrine of final causes is recognized as in the preceding are the doctrines of efficient and material causes.

Now comes the second question, How can Prakriti be called discerptible, seeing that it consists of the three qualities (*gunas*), goodness, passion, and darkness, held in equipoise ?

What are these *gunas* or qualities ? Are they elementary substances of extreme tenuity, or are they mere predicates or attributes of substances ? If they are qualities or attributes, in the ordinary sense of the term, of substances, their inherence in Prakriti does not militate against its indiscerptibility. If, however, they are elementary substances, their union in Prakriti establishes its complex nature and its consequent discerptibility. Their nature should, therefore, be thoroughly looked into before the claim of indiscerptibility advanced in favor of Prakriti can be adjudicated upon.

The word *guna*, generally translated "quality," means a cord, and the three *gunas* of the Sankhya school are the three cords by which the soul, or rather Prakriti itself, is fettered. They are *sattwa*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. The word *sattwa* means purity and goodness, and the *sattwa guna* is that which enlightens, soothes, purifies, causes virtue, and communicates pleasure and happiness. It prevails in ethereal regions, and causes the enlightenment, happiness, and joy characteristic of those seats of purity and goodness. In the world it predominates in fire, and that is the reason why flame tapers toward the sky, and sparks fly upward. When it abounds in man he becomes virtuous and happy ; and to its preponderance must be ascribed the acknowledged happiness of superior orders of beings, such as Prajapatis, Indras, Pitris, Gandharvas, Gods, and Demigods. The word *rajas* means passion, energy, and activity ; and the characteristics of the *rajas-guna* are variability, activity, vehemence, and restlessness.

It is accompanied by vice and misery, and when it prevails in man he becomes a child of error and wretchedness. It abounds in the atmosphere, and accounts for its fitful and erratic movements. And lastly, the word *tamas* means stolidity and darkness ; and the *tamaguna* is that which produces sorrow, dulness, stupidity, and inaction. It predominates in earth and water, and accounts for their downward tendency ; and when it abounds in man it makes him sorrowful, stupid, lazy, and immobile.

The three qualities abound respectively in upper, mundane, and nether creations. " Aloft (above the world of mortals) it (the creation) abounds in, the quality of) purity. Beneath (that is to say, under the world of mortals) (the creation) abounds in darkness. In this midst, (that is, in the world of mortals, the creation) abounds in passion" (Book III. Aph. 48-50).

But it is to be observed that they are, as a rule, if not invariably, found mixed in varied proportions, never almost dissevered or separated one from another. In the highest ethereal regions, as in superior orders of beings and the very best of men, purity abounds ; but it is not altogether dissociated from its troublesome companions, inasmuch as these exist, albeit in very small proportions, along with it. And in the lowest infernal regions, as in demons and evil spirits, as well as the worst of men, some degree of purity, however inconsiderable, is found in conjunction with the preponderant passion and darkness. This fact explains or shows the distinction there is between these qualities, or rather material attributes, and the substances in which they are found mixed in varied proportions. They are almost inseparable in reality, though separable in thought. They are a material trinity in unity,



and unity in trinity. They are held in equipoise only in Prakriti in its quiescent state, and their union in it in equal proportions cannot militate against the theory of its eternity and indiscerptibility. They are, moreover, ubiquitous, existing in all the productions or modifications of Prakriti, in all the regions of space, in endlessly varied proportions. And they are, in their joint capacity as well as singly, an evil ; they being the cause of that bondage of the mind which is reflected in the soul, and from the reflection of which it has to be liberated.

Prakriti, in its Trinitarian essence, is the great omnific principle, and it energizes spontaneously, as milk coagulates into curd when let alone. Though destitute of intelligence, and acting from a simple automatic impulse, it never errs, as "an excellent servant" anticipates and obeys the commands of his master "from habit." The order of creation is presented in Aph. 61 of Book I. : "From Prakriti (proceeds) intelligence (Buddhi), from intelligence egoizer, or I-maker (Ahankara), from egoizer the five subtle elements (Tanmatras), and both sets (internal and external) of organs (Indriya), and from the subtle elements the gross elements (Sthul bhuta)." Intelligence, the first product, or evolute, of self-evolving Prakriti, is called great (Mahat), because it is a principle of "superlative purity," and occupies in creation the same place which the Prime Minister occupies in a well-organized government. It gives birth to egoizer, which is the cause of the distinction we make between self and not-self, a distinction fictitious rather than real, and one which proves to us a source of vexation and trouble. Then come the five tenuous elements, imperceptible to man, but perceptible to superior beings, or even to man

when his natural powers are indefinitely enlarged by meditation—viz., sound, touch, color, taste or sapidity, and smell. These seven principles are evolutes of Prakriti, and evolvent ; and to their omnific activity, or prolific energy, creation in its multifarious aspects is to be traced. Then there are sixteen other principles, which are evolutes or productions, not evolvents or producers—viz., the five gross elements, earth, fire, water, air, ether ; the five organs of knowledge (Gyan-indriyani), the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin ; the five organs of action (Karma indriyani), the hands, the feet, the larynx or the organ of speech, the orifice, and the generative organ ; and the mind (Manas), called the eleventh organ, the real cause of the bondage under which it itself groans, and from the reflection of which the soul has to be freed.

The existence of these twenty-four *tattwas*, or categories, is proved by perception and inference, which last is a process of demonstration rising from what is perceptible to what is imperceptible. For instance, the gross elements, earth, fire, water, air, are perceptible to mortals ; and their existence is proved by the simple testimony of the senses. But they do not explain their own existence, and therefore we are led by the laws of reasoning to the tenuous principles, the subtle rudiments from which they proceed, and by which their existence is accounted for. But these subtle elements, imperceptible to men in general, though perceptible to superior beings, or even men endowed with powers of perception keener and more expanded than human beings ordinarily possess, are only modifications of the I-maker, which again is a modification of intelligence, the first-born of Prakriti increate. Again, the mind, the eleventh organ, is another modification of the

I-maker, and its existence is proved by that of the perceptible organs of knowledge and action.

The existence of the twenty-fifth category, the soul, which is neither an evolute nor an evolvent, is proved by the creative energy of Prakriti, which energizes, not for its own advantage, but for that of an entity apart from itself. This is emphatically stated in such verses as these : " From Brahma down to a post for its (soul's) sake is creation till there be discrimination (between soul and Prakriti), on which its liberation ensues." " Prakriti's creation is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous, for she is not the experiencer, just like a cart's carrying saffron for the sake of its master."

But why not carry the arguments from inference a step farther, and recognize a Lord (Iswara) behind the varied manifestations of Prakriti, as the ultimate ground of existence ? There are insuperable obstacles in the way. A Lord cannot possibly be the creator of the universe. If he exists, he must either be free or bound. If free, he cannot have a desire to create prevalent enough to determine his will, or lead to volition and action. It is an established maxim of Hindu Philosophy that a desire leading irresistibly to action, good or bad, is bondage. Such a desire on the part of God cannot but militate against His assumed freedom. If, however, He is bound, how could He possibly create ? The supposition, therefore, of a Lord behind the veil of shifting phenomena is both irrational and useless.

How thoroughly the atheistic speculations of our vaunted age of progress were anticipated in times which may be called prehistoric, in India and other countries ! The scientists and philosophers of the day now and then betray a little weakness, to which their

prototypes of ancient times were utter strangers. Given matter and the laws immanent in it, they have no difficulty whatever in explaining the wonders of creation, or solving the knotty problems of existence. But they manifest a little hesitation when they have to settle the question, "How came matter to be, and how and by whom were its laws impressed upon it?" Their hesitation, however, is momentary, as they shake it off by assuming the eternity of matter, and the eternal inherence of its laws, as well as by upholding the principle, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. But our redoubtable philosophers of ancient times presented a braver front, and did not hesitate for a moment in affirming with oracular assurance the eternity of matter ; and their dictum, as has already been said, runs thus : "A thing is not made out of nothing." And even when they admitted the existence of a God, their principle that an impure thing, such as matter in their opinion is, cannot possibly emanate from, or be created by, a pure Being, made it impossible for them to represent such a Being as its Creator. God or no God, matter, according to their teaching, is eternal, along with the laws inherent in it.

But the way in which our philosophers dispose of the argument based on testimony, which is one of the three kinds of proof admitted in his school, is worthy of consideration. By testimony they understand, not only what is ordinarily included in that term, but a great deal more, even the teachings of revelation, and those of devotees and adepts, who by virtue of intense meditation have obtained, and may obtain, the power of recalling to their minds the varied events which occurred to them in several, if not all, of their past lives, and that of discovering and bringing to light occult

truths, or truths hidden among the arcana of nature. But revelation distinctly affirms the existence of a Lord. How is this to be accounted for? Is revelation to be discarded as a tissue of Old Wives' Fables? Our time-serving philosophers did not allow themselves to be ostensibly carried thus far by their scepticism. They got rid of the difficulty by resorting to orbits of shuffling criticism, not unknown to modern sceptics. ("The Scriptural texts which make mention of 'the Lord' are) either glorifications of the liberated souls or homages to the recognized (deities of the Hindu Pantheon)." And, besides, "There is Scripture for this (world's) being the production of Prakriti (not of a Lord)."

It may be mentioned here that, even when Hindu Philosophy allows the existence of a god, it makes him so quiescent and inactive that creation cannot possibly be attributed to him. We cannot ascribe creation to him without making him subject to passion, the second of the three qualities from which he must be free, and therefore representing him as actually held in bondage. Nor can he be the governor of the universe without being "selfish" and "liable to grief." In Book V. we have these Aphorisms :

Aph. 3. "(If a Lord were governor, then) having intended his own benefit, his government (would be selfish) as is the case (with ordinary governors) in the world."

"(He must then be) just like a worldly lord (and) otherwise (than you desire that we should conceive of him); for if we agree that the Lord is also benefited, he also must be something mundane—just like a worldly lord—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief."

And besides the supposition of a Lord is useless. He cannot create, cannot govern, cannot judge, cannot reward or punish—the last prerogative, viz., that of bestowing rewards and inflicting punishments being a prerogative of works, not of God. In Aph. 2 of this Book, we have these words: “Not from its (the world’s) being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of the fruit, for it is by works (that is, by merit and demerit) that this is accomplished—by works alone which are indispensable—and if we do make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, he cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works.”

If there is no Lord, the question arises, Why believe in a revelation at all? The proper answer to this question brings forward a theory which in absurdity has not its parallel even in the history of wild speculation. The Sankhya philosopher does not hold, like the Mimamsakas and the Vedantins, the eternity of the Vedas. The forty-fifth Aphorism of the Fifth Book of the work under review runs thus: “The Veda is not from eternity, for there is Scripture for its being a production.” If not eternal, it must have been written either by God or by some gifted man. It could not possibly have been written, or vouchsafed through verbal communication, or in any other way, by God, for the Sankhya Philosophy does not recognize His existence. Nor could it have been written by a gifted man: such a man must be either liberated or in bondage. If liberated, he could not have a prevailing desire leading to its composition; and if in bondage, he could not but have lacked “the power” needed to bring about so glorious a result.

The Vedas, therefore, could not have proceeded either from God or from man, nor are they eternal.

How then is the mystery involved in their existence to be unravelled? Here is the explanation: "The Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed of themselves from the self-existent, through the force of fate, unperceived by thought." To explain this statement of the commentator, Vijnana Bhikshu, two questions have to be raised. Who is the self-existent from whom the Vedas are said to have emanated as an expiration? The self-existent must either be Prakriti itself, or some evolute of Prakriti, there being nothing knowable or within the reach of proof behind it, and the soul being incapable of sending these venerated books out even as an efflation. The Sankhya philosophers speak of an emergent deity, whom they call Brahma when he creates, Vishnu when he preserves, and Siva or Mahadeva when he destroys. This emergent deity is the first evolute of Prakriti, intelligence, called Mahat, the Great One; not, however, personal intelligence, but something like general intelligence, the intelligence of which personal intelligence, mine or thine, is only a form. This great one, the first-born of Prakriti in create, is the unconscious author of the Vedas, because they emanate from him as an expiration.

When do they emanate? Here we have to unfold the doctrine of metempsychosis, which underlies all the philosophical speculations of ancient India; which even those bold spirits who, like Kapila and Buddha, cast aside all faith in God, personal, if not impersonal, did not dare abandon. Prakriti creates one world after another in endless succession, to meet the exigencies of human desert, or to afford scope for the consumption of the fruits of work. One world is evolved after another to reward or punish the accumulated work of those which precede, and to furnish cause, by its own accu-

culated work added to the tremendous load it inherits, for the existence of those which succeed. Every renovated world, with its shifting panorama of moral actions and moral deserts, is thus connected with an endless chain of antecedent, and an equally endless chain of consequent stages of existence. Each of these gradually unfolded stages of existence or works vanishes, when its appointed service is over, only to see another springing up, and continuing its great work of rewarding virtue and punishing vice. At each of these renovations of the world, the Vedas issue out of the emergent deity, called intelligence in the original Sūtras, and the self-existent, or Brahma, in subsequent times, as an effluence.

In conclusion, let us ascertain what the work under review says of liberation, the great object and scope of all the speculations embodied in its pages. Prakṛiti creates or energizes, to liberate the soul from the bondage of non-discrimination, or misapprehension, or misconception. How is this effected? Not by worship, for worship takes for granted what is not admitted, the existence of a creative and controlling being behind the veil of natural phenomena; not by sacrifices, because these, as they inflict pain upon the victims, cannot but occasion pain to those by whom they are offered, by the law of retribution; not by rites and ceremonies of a bloodless character, because whatever efficacy they may have is of a transient, not a permanent, nature. These all are certainly praised in various parts of Scripture. The sacrifice of the horse is said to give the offerer power to conquer all worlds, expiate sin, overcome death, and attain immortality. The juice of the soma, the moon plant (*Asclepias acida*), is said to have conferred victory, triumph, "effulgence," and



“deathless being” on Indra himself, and the subordinate gods and goddesses of the Indian Parnassus. But it is to be borne in mind that the benefits conferred by bloody and bloodless rites are evanescent, and that even the gods perish at every dissolution of the world, or at the consummation of every single stage of existence. “Many thousands of Indras and other gods have passed away in successive periods, overcome by time ; for time is hard to overcome.” Freedom from the galling yoke of transmigration, from an almost interminable chain of births and deaths, religious observances cannot possibly secure.

Such freedom is the result of right knowledge or discrimination, which is obtained by meditation. “From knowledge (acquired during mundane existence) comes salvation (soul’s chief end)” (Book III. Aph. 23). Knowledge alone, dissociated from, not in conjunction with, works, is the fountain of liberation, as the verse following the one quoted assures us, “Since this (*viz.*, knowledge) is the precise cause of liberation, there is neither association (of anything else with it, *e.g.* good works) nor alternativeness (*e.g.* of good works in its stead).” This knowledge is attained by meditation, on the nature and efficacy of which the following verses give information :

“Meditation is the cause of the removal of desire (that affection of the mind by objects which is a hinderer of knowledge). It (meditation, from the effectuation of which, and not from merely communing upon it) knowledge arises, is perfected by the repelling of the modifications (of the mind which ought to be obstructed from all thoughts of anything). This meditation is perfected by restraint, postures, and one’s duties. Restraint (of the breath) is by means of expulsion and

retention. Steady and (promoting) ease is a (suitable) posture, (such as the crossing of the arms). One's duty is the performance of the actions prescribed for one's religious order'' (Book III. Aph. 30-35).

The subject of meditation and its varied appliances belongs, properly speaking, to Yoga philosophy, the counterpart, not only of the Sankhya system, but in some respects of every system of philosophy propounded in India, not excluding almost all of those systems which, like Buddhism and its offshoots, are branded heterodox. Meditation, not in its incipient stages, but when perfected by years of close attention, and rigid conformity to its almost endless varieties of stringent rules, begets right knowledge, which dispels non-discrimination, and brings on emancipation. The essence of the knowledge begotten by meditation is the distinction between the soul and non-soul, the passive, quiescent, immobile spirit and the ever-active, plastic, formative Prakriti. When this distinction is clearly apprehended by the mind, the soul is set free from the bondage of its desires and aversions, its good and bad deeds, and their woeful consequences in an almost endless chain of transmigrations.

The soul is, of course, in a very loose sense said to be set free, its bondage and liberation being nominal, not real — reflections and shadows, not realities. The bondage and liberation spoken of throughout this book are in reality the bondage and liberation of Prakriti, which, first of all, weaves a net for its own entanglement by a process of evolution, and ultimately effects its own emancipation by a process of meditation. And to this mischievous activity it is impelled by passion (*rajas*), the second of the three qualities which form its Trinitarian essence.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY, OR THE HINDU THEORY OF EVOLUTION CONTINUED.

AN exposition of the principles of the Sankhya system must be incomplete without some reference to a treatise decidedly earlier than the one already examined—we mean the Sankhya-Karica, or exposition of the Sankhya, by Iswara Krishna. That this document is more ancient than the Sankhya Pravachana, or the Sankhya Sutras, falsely ascribed to Kapila, is proved both by internal and external evidence. The speculations embodied in the Sankhya Pravachana about the emergent Deity, who appears as Creator under the name of Brahma, as Preserver under that of Vishnu, and as Destroyer under that of Mahadeva, are sufficient to trace its composition to the age when an attempt was made to reconcile philosophy with current superstitions; and they would be enough, even if other proofs were wanting, to establish its posteriority. The book, however, abounds with references to the varied systems of philosophy which are known to have flourished in times posterior to the age of Kapila, who in one important sense may be called the father of Hindu Philosophy. Such references, both direct and oblique, are scarcely met with in the Sankhya-Karica, which, moreover, does not indicate any advance on the part of Philosophy toward a reconciliation between the transcendental speculations of the schools and the grovelling beliefs of the masses.

The Sankhya-Karica consists of seventy-two *slokas*, or distichs, each, as a rule, bearing upon a distinct topic. As specimens of conciseness of style, condensation of thought, and closeness of reasoning, these distichs are worthy of all praise ; though they are free, comparatively speaking, from the tinge of controversialism by which the later work is distinguished. The book has been very recently translated by Mr. John Davies, whose elucidatory notes and extracts from standard commentaries are helps without which it is impossible for the ordinary reader to master its contents. Of his translation we shall avail ourselves in our attempt to present a synopsis of its contents.

Regarding the author of the Sankhya-Karica, very little is known beyond what is indicated in the last three of its distichs. These we deem it desirable to transcribe :

“ This supreme purifying doctrine, the Sage (Kapila) compassionately imparted to Asuri ; Asuri taught it to Panchasikha, by whom it was extensively made known.

“ Handed down by disciples in succession, it has been compendiously written in Arya metre by the noble-minded Iswara Krishna, having fully learned the demonstrated truth.

“ The subjects treated in seventy distichs are those of the complete science, containing sixty topics, excluding illustrative tales, and omitting also controversial questions.

“ Thus is completed the book of the Sankhya (Philosophy) uttered by the venerable, the great-minded, and divine Kapila.

‘ May prosperity attend it ! ’ ”

In accordance with the plan referred to, if not dis-

tinently laid down in the last paper, we shall present a synopsis of the contents of this book, allude cursorily to an expository argument in the dissertation on this Philosophy in the Sarva Darsana Sangraha, and conclude with a few general observations on the doctrines and principles of the system under review.

And first, in accordance with our arrangement, we shall inquire into what the book says about the soul and Prakriti, the two entities admitted as existent in the Sankhya school. But before we do so a preliminary observation is desirable.

The speculations embodied in Sankhya-Karica begin exactly where those of Sankhya Pravachana begin, that is, with the admission of the three kinds of pain begetting a longing for liberation, such as cannot possibly be satisfied by "the visible means," such as earthly pleasures, medicine, etc., or by "the revealed means," such as prayers, sacrifices, and other religious observances. The first two distichs set forth in a condensed form the object and scope of Sankhya Philosophy, as well as the universally admitted fact on which it is based :

"From the injurious effects of the threefold kinds of pain (arises) a desire to know the means of removing it (pain). If from the visible (means of removing it) this desire should seem to be superfluous, it is not so, for these are neither absolutely complete nor abiding.

"The revealed (means) are like the visible (*i.e.* inefficient), for they are connected with impurity, destruction, and excess. A contrary method is better, and this consists in a discriminative knowledge of the manifested (forms of matter), the unmanifested (Prakriti or primeval matter), and the knowing (soul)."

Mr. Davies shows how religious observances are,

according to Kapila, accompanied with "impurity, destruction, excess, or inequality." The Vedic system which is an embodiment of what the text calls "revealed means," is imperfect and inefficient, because it is inseparably linked to bloody sacrifices, which cannot but result in impurity ; because the reward it promises is temporary happiness, not the liberation implied in the soul's emancipation from all material influences ; and, lastly, because it gives some persons, for instance, the rich, who can offer bloody sacrifices more easily than the poor, an undue advantage over others.

Now let us group some of the passages in which the antithesis between the soul and Prakriti is set forth :

3. "Prakriti, the root (of material forms) is not produced. The great one (Mahat, Buddhi or Intellect) and the rest (which spring from it) are seven (substances) producing and produced. Sixteen are productions (only). Soul is neither producing nor produced."

11. "The manifested (*Vyakta*) has the three modes (*guna*). It is indiscriminating, objective, generic, irrational, and productive. So also is Pradhan (Prakriti). Soul in these respects ; as in those (previously mentioned), is the reverse."

15. "From the finite nature of specific objects ; from the homogeneous nature (of genera and species) ; from the active energy of evolution (the constant progressive development of finite forms) ; from the separateness of cause and effect ; and from the undividedness (or the real unity) of the whole universe."

16. "(It is proved that) there is a primary cause, the unmanifested (*Avyakta*) which acts (or develops itself) by three modes ; by blending and modification, like water, from the difference of the receptacle or seat of the modes as they are variously distributed."

17. "Because an assemblage (of things) is for the sake of another ; because the opposite of the three modes and the rest (their modifications) must exist ; because there must be a superintending power ; because there must be a nature that enjoys, and because of (the existence of) active exertion for the sake of abstraction or isolation (from material contact) ; therefore soul exists."

18. "From the separate allotment of birth, death, and the organs ; from the diversity of occupations at the same time ; and also from the different conditions (or modifications) of the three modes ; it is proved that there is a plurality of souls."

19. "And from that contrariety (of soul) it is concluded that the witnessing soul is isolated, neutral, perceptive, and inactive by nature."

20. "It is thus, from this union, that the unintelligent body (the *linga*) appears to be intelligent, and from the activity of the modes, the stranger (the soul) appears to be an agent."

These distichs set forth the contrast between *Prakriti* and soul as well as the varied kinds of proof by which their existence is demonstrated. *Prakriti* is the root of the perceptible and inferrable universe, that is, the universe of which the grosser objects are perceived, and the subtler inferred from those perceived. *Prakriti* is the unmanifested (*Avyakta*) developing itself, in consequence of an immanent law of cyclic evolution, into the manifested (*Vyakta*) ; and it unfolds itself in forms which may be classed in genera and in species. *Prakriti* is objective, irrational, unfitted to discriminate one thing from another, and productive or evolvent. The soul is the very antipodes, in all these respects of *Prakriti*. It is in its essence isolated from the universe

of material objects, the entity which always continues unmanifested, is subjective, rational, fitted to discern the differences subsisting between things which differ, non-productive, and inactive. Its rationality and discriminativeness are, however, problematical, as we shall show by and by. Suffice it to say here that the two entities are so decidedly opposed to one another that, in order to produce either of them, we have only to divest the other of its peculiar attributes and clothe it with those which are their contrasts or opposites.

In one important respect the antithesis between Prakriti and soul is marked. Prakriti has the three *gunas*, or qualities, or modes, while the soul is entirely free from their presence or influence. Let us see what the Karica says about these constitutive elements of Prakriti :

12. "The modes have a joyous, grievous, and stupefying nature. They serve for manifestation, activity, and restraint : they naturally subdue and support each other, produce each other, consort together, and take each other's condition.

13. "' Goodness ' (Sattwa) is considered as light (or subtle) and enlightening (or manifesting) ; ' passion ' or ' foulness ' (Rajas) as exerting and mobile ; ' darkness ' (Tamas) as heavy or enveloping (or obstructive). This action for the gaining of an end is like that of a lamp."

14. "In the higher world the quality (or mode) called ' goodness ' prevails ; below, the creation abounds in ' darkness ; ' in the midst foulness or passion abounds. Brahma and the rest (of the gods) and a stock form the limits."

The *gunas*, it is to be observed, cannot, properly speaking, be called moral dispositions, such as good-



ness, activity, and indolence are. They may be represented as producers of our moral dispositions, the material essence of which both our intellectual and moral affections are modifications or evolutes. Matter, according to this system, may be defined as a double-faced entity ; and it is presented in the universe in a variety of forms more or less gross, more or less subtle and tenuous. To its grosser forms we give the name of material objects ; while its subtler invisible forms we characterize as intellectual affections and moral dispositions. But the sharp line of demarcation that we draw between matter and mind has no foundation in truth, though held up as obviously just by the factitious rules of our dictionaries and grammars !

Another point of difference, or rather contrariety, between Prakriti and Purush, or soul, hinges on the unity of the one and multitude of the other. Prakriti is one indivisible substance, appearing in endless varieties of forms under the influence of the quality called "passion," which leads it irresistibly to pass through a fixed process of evolution. Souls are, however, innumerable. How is this to be proved ? Before it is possible to answer this question satisfactorily it is necessary to inquire, How is the existence of Prakriti itself, or that of Purush, or soul, to be proved ?

Here we must notice that only three sources of knowledge, or kinds of proof, are admitted in this treatise, as in the Sankhya Pravachana. In distich 4 we have these stated : " Perception, inference, and fit testimony are the threefold (kinds of) accepted proof, because in them every mode of proof is fully contained. The complete determination, or perfect knowledge, of what is to be determined is by proof." And in distich 6, the province, so to speak, of each of these

lines of evidence is indicated : "The knowledge of formal or generic existence is by perception ; of things beyond the senses by inference ; that which cannot be determined by this (method) and cannot be perceived must be determined by fitting means."

The argument brought forward to prove the existence and multitude of souls is the same presented as that in the Sankhya Pravachana with some new features added.

We are assured of the existence of the objects of nature by perception. But these objects are finite or conditioned, and they cannot but lead us to look for the ground of their existence apart from themselves. They are, moreover, classed in genera and species, and they consequently lead the mind toward an original or primary genus. The process of evolution noticeable in their production suggests an evolving principle ; while the chain of second causes they point to leads us to a recognition of a precedent first cause. And, lastly, the unity of the universe indicates the operation in its production of a principle, originally indiscerptible and indiscrete, though susceptible of modification, such as renders it now multiform, divisible, and divided. Inference, therefore, rising from a series of effects to the primal cause, establishes the existence of Prakriti, "which develops itself by the three modes," blended into varieties of forms, as "simple water coming from the clouds is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent in the nature of the juice of the cocoanut-palm, *bel-karanja*, and wood-apple."

But the vast assemblage of things into which Prakriti has developed cannot exist for nothing ; and it therefore suggests the presence, somewhere, of one fitted to own and enjoy it, as a well-furnished house necessarily

carries with it the idea of a person dwelling in it. Besides, this assemblage of inanimate things needs the supervision and regulating power of an intelligent ruler ; while the rush toward emancipation made by Prakriti in some of its subtler forms leads the mind by a transition, natural and easy, to the recognition of a being enthralled, and therefore in need of deliverance. The existence of the soul is therefore established ! The argument, however, is a naked fallacy, inasmuch as the soul, being perfectly inert and quiescent, is, properly speaking, neither an enjoyer nor a ruler, while its enthrallment is a fiction, rather than reality.

Various facts are mentioned as tending to prove the multitude or plurality of souls. The varied accidents of birth and death form a series of indisputable facts fitted to set forth their multitudinousness. If souls were one, not many, the birth and death of one person would synchronize with the birth and death of all other persons ; or if there were only one soul, all human beings would come into the world and go out of it at one and the same time. But the fact is that they come in at different times and go out at different times ; and the endless diversity in their hours of ingress and egress is a proof that souls are multitudinous, not one. Again, if souls were one, the organs of perception and intellection attached to them would not present the variety of aspects which is their most noticeable aspect. In one man, for instance, the sense of hearing or sight is ten times acuter than in another ; and in many the sense itself does not exist at all. Why these differences ? Owing certainly to the deserts of souls, to the merits or demerits accumulated by them severally in former states of existence. But if souls were one, and the deserts the same, the organs would present a uniform

aspect, the sense of sight or hearing would be acute or dull in all human beings, and defects and imperfections would be equally, not unequally, distributed. And, lastly, all mankind would in that case be equally affected by the modes or qualities. The fact, however, is that there is an endless variety of ways in which human beings are affected by them. Some are peculiarly susceptible to the quality of goodness, and become good almost instinctively ; while others are enslaved, as it were, by the evil qualities almost from their birth. The reasoning here is fallacious, as it ascribes to the soul some responsibility, which in reality belongs to Prakriti !

One important question ought to be raised and disposed of before we proceed to a detailed treatment of the products or evolutes of Prakriti. If those dispositions which are characterized as moral are foreign to the soul, wherein do they inhere ? The Sankhya Philosopher is penetrating enough to see that such dispositions as goodness, passion, or indolence cannot inhere in or form portions of our gross bodies. Nor can they inhere in or form elements of the soul without leading it to some kind of action inconsistent with the hypothesis of its perfect quiescence. A habitation for these dispositions is therefore a desideratum in the system. The Sankhya philosopher meets the want by positing a subtle body between the perfectly quiescent soul and the gross, perceptible, and tangible body. This is called the *linga-sarir*, and it migrates with the soul from one gross body to another, and is dissolved only when its perfect emancipation is effected by intense meditation. The following distichs speak of this subtle body :

39. " Subtle (bodies), those which are born of father

and mother, with the gross forms of existence, are the threefold species (of bodies). Of these the subtle are permanent ; those which are born of father and mother perish.

40. " The subtle (body) *linga*, formed primevally, unconfined, permanent, composed of intellect and the rest, down to the subtle elements, migrates, never enjoys, and is endowed with dispositions (Bhavas).

41. " As a painting does not stand without a support or receptacle, nor a shadow without a stake, etc., so the *linga* does not exist unsupported without specific elements.

42. " Formed for the sake of the soul, the *linga*, by the connection of means and their results and by union with the predominant Prakriti, plays its part like a dramatic actor."

All material objects are in these verses divided into three classes, subtle bodies, gross bodies, or those which are born of father and mother, and various forms of unorganized matter. The subtle body or *linga-sarir* is composed of the three primal evolutes of Prakriti, intellect or intelligence, egoism and Manas, or mind, and the rudimental elements (the Tanmatras) ; and it is, therefore, like these, imperceptible. It is more permanent than our gross bodies, is unconfined because it migrates from one gross body to another with the soul, and is endowed with moral dispositions, though incapable of enjoyment, which is the prerogative of the soul, supposititious rather than real. It, however, enthralls the soul, which must cast aside this tenuous garment, as well as its series of grosser bodies, before its liberation or final separation from all material conditions is effected.

It is time to advert to the productions or evolutes

of Prakriti. These are set forth in the following distichs :

22. "From Prakriti issues the great principle (Mahat, Intellect), and from this the ego, or consciousness, from this (consciousness) the whole assemblage of the sixteen (principles or entities), and from five of the sixteen the five gross elements.

23. "Intellect is the distinguishing principle (Adhy-  
avasya). Virtue, knowledge, freedom from passion  
and power denote it when affected by (the mode)  
'goodness;' when affected by 'darkness' it is the  
reverse of these.

24. "Egoism is self-consciousness. From this pro-  
ceeds a double creation (sarga, emanation), the series  
of the eleven (principles) and the five (subtle) ele-  
ments.

25. "From consciousness, modified (by 'goodness'),  
proceed the eleven good principles; from this origin of  
being as darkness come the subtle elements. Both  
emanations are caused by the foul or active mode.

26. "The eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and  
the skin are termed the organs of intellect (Buddhi);  
the voice, the hands, the feet, (the organs of) excretion  
and generation are called the organs of action.

27. "The Manas (mind) in this respect has the  
nature of both (classes). It is formative (or determina-  
tive) and a sense-organ, from having cognate functions  
(with the organs). It is multifarious, from the specific  
modifications of the modes and the diversity of exter-  
nal things."

These evolutes with the root evolvent, Prakriti and the  
soul, which is neither an evolvent nor an evolute, form  
the twenty-five *tattwas*, or categories of the Sankhya  
Philosophy. For the sake of easy reference we give

them below in the order in which they are presented in Mr. Davies' excellent book :

1. Prakriti, or primordial, self-evolving matter.
2. Ahankara, the egoizer or consciousness.
3. Tanmatras, or subtle elements, five in number, sound tangibleness or touch, odor or smell, visibility or form, and sapidity or taste.
5. The five gross elements, (Mahabhuta) viz., ether from the subtle element sound, air from touch, earth from odor, fire from sight or visibility, and water from taste or sapidity.
6. The five senses, the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin (Gyan-Indryani, or organs of knowledge).
7. The organs of action (Karma-Indryani), the voice, the hands, the feet, (the organs of) excretion and generation.
8. Manas, or mind, which receives and works into proper shapes the impressions made upon the senses, and which is regarded as one of the three internal organs, the other two being intelligence and consciousness.
9. The soul (Atman or Purush), which is an entity distinct from Prakriti.

Among the evolutes of Prakriti, the organs are divided into internal and external, and the elements into subtle and gross.

The internal organs are the intellect or intelligence, consciousness or egoizer, and the mind or the thinking principle. They are the gate-keepers of the soul, while the external organs, the five organs of knowledge and the five organs of action, are the gates. The external objects of nature send their impressions through five especially of these gates to the mind, which works

them into appropriate forms or ideas, and communicates them to consciousness, by which they are individualized and conveyed to the intellect, which forms general concepts, such as are reflected in the soul, which is erroneously said to be the cognative principle. This is Mr. Davies' view of the functions of these internal organs, but the commentators whom he consults present a very different and a much more confused notion of their varied operations. Vachaspati speaks of the mind thus : " It gives form in a collective manner to that which is perceived by an organ of sense, and says, ' this is a thing,' ' this is compounded and that is not so ' ; and it discriminates or defines a thing by its specific and unspecific nature." And Gaudapada says : " As a person going along a road sees an object at a distance and is in doubt whether it be a post or a man ; he then observes some characteristic mark upon it, or a bird perched there, and, doubt being thus dissipated by the reflection of the mind, the understanding (Buddhi, or intellect) discriminates that it is a post ; and then egoism interposes for the sake of certainty, as ' verily, or (I am certain) it is a post.' In this way the functions of intellect, egoism, and mind, and the eye are (successively) fulfilled."

The functions of the internal organs are not categorically stated in the Sankhya-Karica and the Sankhya Pravachana ; and modern commentators mislead when they speak of them in the phraseology current in modern schools of philosophy. Let us turn from what is at least speculation to what is distinctly stated about them. Intellect under the influence of " goodness" is distinguished by virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and supernatural power ; but it is disfigured under the influence of " darkness" by vice, ignorance, passionate-



ness, and weakness. The emancipation of the soul is ultimately effected by it, when it clearly sees the distinction between soul and non-soul, the ego and the non-ego. Virtue and vice, therefore, as well as knowledge and ignorance, are material conditions, not moral dispositions and intellectual states in the proper sense of these terms.

Intelligence, however, retires from the scene as soon as its great offspring egoism, or self-consciousness, makes its appearance. The work of creation is effected by this principle. Under the control of "goodness," it evolves out of its own substance the eleven organs, which are all good, viz., the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, and the eleventh organ, or the mind, which, though one of the last of creations, takes rank with the first, and its own producer, consciousness. Under the control of "darkness" it creates the subtle elements, and through them the gross elements, which in varieties of combinations are found in the objects of nature. Consciousness evolves out of its own substance the entire creation ; and if consciousness were not a material product, an evolute of the assumed primordial material form, the Sankhya system might appropriately be characterized as a beautiful scheme of idealistic philosophy.

The Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha presents in its disquisition on Sankhya Philosophy the categories of the system in these words : " Now the Sastra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent only, that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent, and that which is neither."

Regarding the bondage and liberation of souls we have these utterances :

44. "By virtue an ascent to a higher region is obtained, by vice a descent into a lower region. Deliverance is gained by knowledge, and bondage by the contrary.

45. "By the absence (or destruction) of passion there is dissolution of Prakriti (or the power of Prakriti is destroyed). Transmigration is from disorderly passion. By power we gain destruction of obstacles, and the reverse by the contrary."

The cause of the bondage of the soul is ignorance, not vice ; and its liberation is effected by knowledge, not virtue. This is one of those principles of Hindu philosophy which are common to all the systems, many of those called heterodox not excepted. According to these, virtue is a source of bondage as well as vice. Virtue, as has already been said, proceeds from desire for happiness and aversion to pain, which are in themselves wrong principles of action. Virtue results only in the prolongation of the chain of transmigration, its upshot being the translation of the soul into one of those ethereal regions which rise in an ascending scale, one above another, from this world, for the purpose of temporary enjoyment of the fruits of its good works, and its return in a bodily shape to this world, when these are in the course of slow-circling ages consumed. Permanent liberation of the soul, or its relegation to its original state of non-contact with matter, virtue cannot effect. That is the fruit of knowledge, knowledge of the categories of the Sankhya system—or rather of the difference between soul and non-soul !

Gaudapada, one of the great commentators, without whose help it is impossible to undersand the book under review, thus speaks of knowledge in general : "Knowledge is of two kinds, external and internal.

The former includes knowledge of the Vedas, and the six branches of knowledge connected with them—recitation, ritual, grammar, interpretation of words, prosody and astronomy ; also of the Purans, and of knowledge, theology, and law. Internal knowledge is the knowledge of Prakriti and soul, or the discrimination that “ this is Prakriti,” the equipoised condition of the modes, and “ this is soul,” devoid of the modes, permanent and intelligent. By external knowledge worldly distinction or admiration is obtained ; by internal knowledge, liberation, that is from the bondage of matter.” And in another place the same commentator says : “ He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may enter, and whether he wore braided hair, or top-knot only, or be shaven, he is free ; of this there is no doubt.”

But, after all, the bondage and liberation of the soul are mere fictions. It is Prakriti that is in reality bound and liberated, the soul being essentially free and incapable of bondage ; nor is transmigration, the perennial source of misery from which deliverance is to be earnestly desired, a cause of trouble to the pure spirit. Distich 62 of the Book runs thus : “ Wherefore not any soul is bound, or is liberated, or migrates. It is Prakriti, which has many receptacles (or bodily forms of being) which is bound, or is liberated, or migrates. Again, in verse 3 we have the words : “ Prakriti by herself binds herself by seven forms, she causes deliverance for the benefit of soul by one form.” Prakriti is said to be “ generous” and “ modest.” She is generous, because all the trouble that she unconsciously takes in evolving creation out of its substance is for the benefit of the soul, not its own. But as she is after all the incarcerator and liberator of the soul,

her belauded generosity is problematical. She is moreover called modest, because she retires as soon as she has exhibited herself to the soul. "As a dancer, having exhibited herself on the stage, ceases to dance, so does Prakriti cease (to produce) when she has made herself manifest to soul" (59). "Nothing is more modest than Prakriti ; that is my judgment. Saying, 'I have been seen ;' she does not expose herself again to the view of the soul" (61). But the fact remains indisputable, that she creates or evolves only to be seen ; and a girl who takes a world of trouble only to be seen, cannot appropriately be called modest, even though she has the good sense to retire as soon as she is seen.

If bondage and liberation really belong to Prakriti, why ascribe them at all to the soul ? Let the commentator Vachaspati answer this question : "These circumstances are ascribed to and affect the soul, as the superior, in the same manner that victory and defeat are attributed to and relate to a king, though actually occurring in his generals ; for they are his servants, and the gain or loss is his, not theirs." This is, however, a string of words without meaning. The soul is in reality nor king, nor master, nor gainer, nor loser ; nor does it, properly speaking, see. Prakriti in all its modifications is only reflected in the tranquil, immobile and luminous soul, which, as it is destitute of volition and vitality, cannot possibly recognize what is fitted to make it miserable or happy.

To show in what respect the Sankhya system is different from the forms of thought subsequently developed, let us refer for a moment to a discussion embodied in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha. The author, after having stated the categories of the system and

grouped them under the heads evolvent only, evolutes and evolvent, evolutes only, and non-evolvent and non-evolute, thus raises the discussion alluded to :

“ Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the nature of cause and effect. The Saugatas (Buddhists) maintain that the existent is produced from non-existent ; the Naiyayika, etc., that the (as yet) non-existent is produced from the existent ; the Vedantins that all effects are an illusory emanation from the existent, and not themselves really existent ; while the Sankhyas hold that the existent is produced from the existent.”

It is not our intention to follow the author through the varied steps of his argument ; our object being simply to show that, while Buddhism, the source of the heterodox systems, maintains a species of rank nihilism, the orthodox systems were based on the assumption of a primordial substance, either material or spiritual, and they were all evolved from the teaching of the Upanishads. Dr. Mullens, in his well-known treatise on Hindu Philosophy, has fallen into the mistake of holding up these venerable documents as the sources of Hindu Pantheism, not that of Hindu Philosophy in all its phases of development from nihilism. And men more profoundly versed in Hindu philosophy than the late doctor have shown a strong tendency to a similar, or rather identical, mistake. But one cannot study the Upanishads in connection with the systems of philosophy which have flourished in India in different periods of its history, without being led to connect the former with the latter, the Upanishads with the systems, as cause and effect.

It is not denied that the prevalent line of philosophic thought in the Upanishads is pantheistic. Their great motto, one without a second, is the battle-cry of Indian

and European, indigenous and foreign, pantheistic forms of speculation. The cosmogonies presented in them, the description given of man's nature and of the world itself, and the theory of salvation developed, manifest a stronger leaning, so to speak, toward pantheism than toward any other form of speculative thought. But there are lines of reasoning and forms of expression in these records eminently fitted to uphold forms of thought other than those which are properly called pantheistic. The four well-known expressions, Sat and Asat, Vyakta and Avyakta, which play so conspicuous a part in the cosmogonies of the Upanishads, are certainly susceptible of nihilistic and materialistic, as well as pantheistic interpretation, and they have in consequence been bandied backward and forward by almost all the jarring schools of Indian philosophy.

In one verse especially, quoted in a former paper, creation is distinctly said to have flowed out of Asat, non-being and non-existent ; and in several passages the Avyakta, unmanifested, is represented as the ground of the Vyakta or manifested aspects of nature, and these passages may obviously be construed so as to uphold any form of thought ranging between absolute nihilism and absolute pantheism. The Buddhists, or some classes of Buddhists, have evolved from them their idea of an eternal void of non-being, developing into innumerable forms of existence, more illusory than real. The Sankhya school has derived from them its notion of Prakriti, unmanifested in its undeveloped form, but manifesting itself in various imperceptible and perceptible shapes, in consequence of the mischievous activity of one of its three essential elements. And the Vedantic thinker has elaborated these very utter-

ances into his theory of illusory existence, concealing the real under the phenomenal, the one pure being under various types of non-being. The Upanishads, therefore, have given rise to the various lines of speculation by which the intellect of the country, by no means deficient in acuteness and depth, has been exercised and moulded for centuries and ages untold.

The main principles of the Sankhya Philosophy have been set forth in this and the preceding paper, in the words mainly of the books which may be represented as its standard and authoritative documents. A simple, unvarnished statement of these is enough to show that the glowing eulogy of which it has been made the favored subject in some quarters is entirely misplaced and fulsome. The system is a heap of nonsense, dreamy in its character, self-contradictory in its statements, and immoral in its principles and tendencies. This will appear in the sequel. Meanwhile we raise the question, How is the system to be characterized? With what system of philosophic thought is it to be compared?

It has been called, apparently with propriety, a system of dualism, because it postulates the existence of two entities, the passive soul and the active Prakriti. But the description it gives of the soul tends to make it an entity of no consequence whatever, in fact, a non-entity. The soul is without volition, without intelligence in the proper sense of the term, without sensibility—a lump of passivity and quiescence. It is impossible to divine what use is subserved by its existence, or why its existence is posited. It thinks not, feels not, sees not, handles not. It plays no part whatever in the varied work of creation, preservation and destruction; and it is only falsely called a spectator and

enjoyer of experience. It may therefore be appropriately thrown out of calculation entirely.

The system, then, is rank materialism, and differs from the materialism of the day in its arrangement rather than in its principle. Modern materialism cannot ignore the established facts and conclusions of science, and consequently the theory of evolution it brings forward goes up in an ascending scale from the elements, the ultimate powers of nature, to their varied combinations, from inorganic to organized matter, from the lower to the higher types of life, from molecular motion to thought, feeling, and volition. But the founder of the Sankhya school was a stranger to that insight into the mysteries of creation which a schoolboy in these days may justly boast of ; and he, in consequence, propounded a theory of evolution which comes down in a descending scale, or rather moves fitfully or irregularly. But the two classes of systems agree in representing intelligence, consciousness, and mind with all its affections, apprehension, sensibility, volition, etc. as modifications of matter. The difference is that, in accordance with one of these two sets of systems, thought is evolved from gross matter ; while in accordance with the other gross matter is evolved from thought. Or, to express the same idea in a different form, gross matter is sublimated into thought according to the one set, while thought degenerates into gross matter according to the other.

The two classes of systems also agree in another respect. They make hair-splitting distinctions between matter in its essence and matter in its grossness, between matter subtle and matter gross. The Sankhya system discriminates between, as has already been shown, a subtle body and a gross body, a body which



migrates with the soul from one tenement of clay to another, and does not dissolve till its final emancipation from corporeal thralldom, and a body which is decomposed soon after death. Nor does the discrimination stop here. A distinction is made between the senses and the powers inherent in them, between the sense, for instance, of sight and the unseen power of sight inherent in the organ ; the sense of hearing and the power of hearing inherent in the organ ; and so on. Again, a distinction is made between subtle and gross elements, between the elements perceptible to us and those the existence of which is proved by inference, and which are perceptible to beings endowed with powers of sensation and intellection more enlarged than ours. Materialism of the modern school is obliged to make such subtle distinctions, as without them it is impossible to place the functions of the mind in the same category with the functions of the body.

A tendency has been growing up, especially since the publication of the well-known treatise, the "Unseen Universe," to laugh at the idea of a vacuum, and fill the interminable regions of space, which were looked upon as a boundless void in former times, with a material, or quasi-material, luminiferous fluid of extreme tenuity ; as well as to posit a sort of invisible material organization or casement for the soul beneath the body, which is obviously decomposed after death. Many even of those persons who believe in the instinctively recognized dualism in man are prone to believe in the existence of a tenuous, subtle body between the immaterial soul and the gross material body, a sort of intermediate, permanent substance which death cannot affect, and of which the soul never gets rid. These advanced thinkers will rejoice, or be mortified, to find

that their new-fangled theory was anticipated in India about five centuries before the birth of Christ. The existence of an all-pervading substance, material or quasi-material, consisting of three qualities, held in equipoise, was assumed by Kapila long before such words as "nebulous matter" or "star-dust" were coined. And the idea of a *linga-sarir*, or tenuous body in contradistinction to, though intimately connected with, the *sthul-sarir*, or gross body, is developed both in the treatise under review in this discourse and that taken notice of in the former.

This idea is somewhat differently stated and further expanded in the Sankhya Sutras. The second Aphorism of Book III. runs thus : "Therefrom (*i.e.* from the twenty-three principles there is the organization of) the body (or pair of bodies, the gross and the subtle)." The gross body (*sthul-sarir*) consists of the gross elements, or rather the grossest of the gross elements, the earth ; and it is propagated by generation. It is incapable of experiencing pleasure or pain, and it is perishable, and does actually perish. For purposes of fruition it is of no use to the soul, or rather Prakriti, as it cannot effect its liberation by consuming the fruits of its merit or demerit. For such purposes another body of subtler elements, of greater permanence, and of capacities more expanded, must be posited. This is the subtle body created at the commencement of the creation or *annus magnus*, or at every renovation of creation, not propagated by generation, consisting of seventeen principles, the eleven organs, the five rudiments, and the organ of consciousness, the egoizer. It migrates from body to body, and disappears only when the fruits of merit or demerit on the part of its associate, the soul, or rather the mind, are consumed, and

beatification is realized. This body is sentient, but it is incapable of pleasure or pain, except in association with the gross body, which is its counterpart, and the existence of which is essential to the performance of its functions. This body, moreover, has a case or sheath, and that is called *anusthani-sarir*, a sort of intermediate link between the impalpable, subtle, and the palpable, gross body. Are not our modern philosophers beaten hollow by their prototypes of ancient times ?

The Sankhya philosopher cannot properly be said to indicate the process of evolution. He states the material categories, the formative principles, but does not show how they combine or re-combine, integrate, disintegrate, and reintegrate ; or by what process they develop into the innumerable forms of beauty and proportion we see around us. But if he were asked to indicate this process, he would very likely adopt the language of Herbert Spencer, and affirm that the progress of creation was from homogeneity to heterogeneity, by a series of differentiations gradually effected. Nor would he in the slightest degree object to apply this law to social and moral development, as well as to that which is material. The truth is, his school, as that of Herbert Spencer, recognizes no real difference between material and moral conditions ; and therefore the attempts made by some Orientalists to identify his system with the idealism of Bishop Berkeley is futile indeed. He certainly does represent consciousness as the originator of material creation ; and if by consciousness he understood what is now meant by it, as a rule, he might be held up as an idealist of the first water. But consciousness according to him is a material organ or principle, not intellectual power, and in the work of evolution it performs, if work it can be

called at all, its own substance, not anything extraneous, is utilized.

The comparison instituted between the Sankhya system and that propounded by Pythagoras of Samos, about the time when it was itself elaborated in India, is juster. If the existing fragments of the work of Philolaus, who was a contemporary of Socrates, be regarded as correct exponents of the Pythagorean philosophy, the two systems may be represented, with some degree of justice, as similar, in many, if not all, respects. The system, which traces the wonders of creation through monadic and geometrical magnitudes to the principles of numbers, limiting and illimitation, may be placed in juxtaposition with one which performs the same feat under the auspices of a trinitarian, material essence called Prakriti, or Maha (Great) Prakriti. But, barring the speculative wildness characteristic of both the systems, there are two points of similarity or contact to which prominence ought to be given. The Pythagorean, like the Sankhya system, is based on the doctrine of metempsychosis, and it represents the soul as enchained to the body, in which, as it is material, it recognizes an inherent and irremovable depravity. Add to this the fact that the outcome of these two systems is one and the same process, the systematic mortification of the body by ascetic penance with a view to complete emancipation of the soul from its bondage.

The Indian system, however, is "racy of the soil," and almost all the principal vocables, which figure in the two systems, are used in it in a sense different from that which is attached to them by its rival. When the Indian system speaks of the bondage and liberation of the soul, it simply means the bondage and liberation of

Prakriti and its products down to the gross body, and the grossest of elements ; and it represents the extinction of conscious life, consequent on the extinction of desire as the *summum bonum*, to be attained by a species of mortification and penance before which the most self-torturing Greek philosopher would have stood aghast.

But the emancipation of Prakriti cannot be permanent, as it is fated to energize after long periods of quiescence. Creation emanates from it, and is ultimately absorbed in it, to be once more forced out and forced in. And, as Prakriti is never to get rid of its creative fits, it is fated to entangle and disentangle itself throughout eternity. Nor can the emancipation of the soul be called permanent, inasmuch as, in accordance with the principles of this philosophy, it is neither bound nor liberated. The innumerable contradictions which the system betrays in expression, if not in enunciation of principle, and which the reader must have noticed in this brief sketch, proceed mainly, if not entirely, from the fact that such a thing as the soul, without life, energy, or activity, mental, emotional or volitional, and without material properties, is uselessly placed in juxtaposition with an active and plastic material principle, which, through the vicious activity of one of its elements, evolves and gets entangled, and which laboriously procures its own emancipation by a series of self-inflicted tortures of the most appalling nature !

The Sankhya system is called Nirishwar, or godless, in contradistinction to the Yoga Philosophy, which is called Seishwar, or with God. But yet it is an offshoot of a system of superstition and the fountain of another. It is an intermediate link between the nature-

worship of Vedic times and the polytheistic worship of those of the Purans. The elemental gods of the Rig Veda were, by a process of generalization not certainly unnatural, unified by the spirit of philosophic inquiry into a living, diffusive, and creative essence ; and this, in process of time, became the active, formative principle of the Sankhya school, its Prakriti, or Pradhan. But such a principle, too subtle to be grasped by the common mind, could not possibly make the system popular among the masses, or could not transfer it from academic groves to the thoroughfare and the market. It had therefore to be materialized or embalmed in a tangible, cognizable material form ; and the transformation was effected without much difficulty. The trinitarian material essence was merged into the triad of Hindu Mythology, Prakriti identified with Brahma under the influence of the quality, goodness, into Vishnu under that of passion, and into Mahadeva under that of darkness. But other transformations followed. The passionless, inactive, and dead soul, uselessly posited by Sankhya Philosophy, ultimately became the fountain-head, so to speak, of an almost unbounded pantheon of male gods, who are all more or less dronish ; while the active Prakriti became, under the name of Sakti or Brahmi, the mother of the almost innumerable female deities with whom these male gods are consorted. And thus, in process of time, the recondite speculations of Kapila were incorporated with the popular religion of the Hindus, and a system of rank Atheism culminated in a system of rank polytheism.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE YOGA PHILOSOPHY, OR HINDU ASCETICISM.

THE Yoga Philosophy is the counterpart of the Sankhya system, and it begins where the other ends. The conclusion to which the Sankhya system brings us is that the emancipation of the soul is effected by right knowledge, or knowledge of the essential distinction between the ego and the non-ego, the soul and the non-soul. But a formal enunciation of this principle would be not merely useless, but positively tantalizing, if the means of attaining such knowledge were not indicated. The question therefore is one of paramount importance, How is right knowledge or knowledge of the essential distinction between soul and non-soul to be obtained ? The Sankhya Philosophy raises the question, but refers to the Yoga Philosophy for its solution ; and therefore the first form of philosophic thought is incomplete without the second. ✓

But the Yoga Philosophy may properly be represented as the counterpart, not only of the Sankhya system, but of almost every other system of Indian philosophy, theistic, atheistic, and pantheistic. Almost every system of Indian philosophy makes salvation dependent on right knowledge, and represents right knowledge as attainable only by such ascetic exercises as are prescribed in the Yoga Shastra. The exercises may not be exactly the same in all the systems, but the variations are so slight that we are justified in holding ✓

out this philosophy as the counterpart, not only of the scheme with which it is consorted, but of every other form of philosophic thought which flourished in ancient India, or which has flourished in India, both ancient and modern, leaving out of course those which are thoroughly Epicurean in their practical development. The Yoga system does not deserve the name of philosophy, it being an art rather than a science. The science of the soul and the mind, as well as of the powers known and unknown of nature, is embodied in the standard works of the Sankhya School, but the varieties of bodily and mental exercises by which that science is utilized or practically developed are enumerated and described in the great treatise on Yoga Philosophy to be taken notice of ; but it ought not to be forgotten that the Yoga Philosophy properly so called is the art by which the teaching, not only of the Sankhya school, but of every other prominent school of Hindu Philosophy, is reduced to practice. It is the art of asceticism, without which salvation is not attainable according to the approved maxims, not of one or two, but of all the prominent schools of Indian thought, from Buddhistic nihilism up to Vedantic pantheism. Its importance therefore cannot be overrated, though its claim to be recognized as a scheme of philosophic thought may justly be questioned.

In its character of universality, in the importance it enjoys in every prominent system of Hindu Philosophy, it has a parallel only in the essential or distinctive portion of the Nyaya philosophy, viz., logic. The logic of the Nyaiyaika philosophy runs like a thread of gold through one and all the dissertations on Hindu thought extant in the Sanskrit language. Its forms of expression and modes of reasoning are so thoroughly



intertwined with the original Shastras and the commentaries by which they are elucidated, that it is impossible for a student of Hindu Philosophy to make any progress whatever in his favorite task without intimate acquaintance with them. Now, as Indian logic is in some respects an indispensable feature of the theoretic developments of Hindu Philosophy, the stringent rules of the asceticism represented by the Yoga School form an essential and inseparable feature of its practical developments.

The reputed founder of the Yoga school was Patanjali, regarding whom almost nothing is known, barring the fact that he was a man of a versatile genius, and distinguished both as a philologist and as a philosopher. The book ascribed to him, the Yoga Shastra, consists of four chapters and 194 aphorisms, the contents of which are thus analyzed in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha :

“ This school follows the so-called Yoga Sastra promulgated by Patanjali, and consisting of four chapters which also bears the name of the ‘ Sankhya Pravachana,’ or detailed explanation of the Sankhya. In the first chapter thereof the venerable Patanjali, having in the opening aphorism—‘ Now is the exposition of concentration (Yoga)’—announced his commencement of the Shastra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of his subject : ‘ Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle ;’ and then he expounds at length the nature of Meditation (Samadhi).

“ In the second chapter, in the series of aphorisms commencing, ‘ The practical part of concentration is modification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme,’ he expounds the practical part of Yoga proper

to him whose mind is not yet thoroughly abstracted, viz., the five external subservients or means, 'forbearance' and the rest.

"In the third chapter, in the series commencing, 'Attention is the fastening of the mind on some spot,' he expounds three internal subservients, attention, contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name of 'subjugation' (Sanyana), and also the various superhuman powers which are their subordinate fruit.

"In the fourth chapter, in the series commencing, 'Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, mortification, and meditation,' he expounds the highest end, Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called perfections (Siddhis)."

Two of the four chapters of the Yoga Shastra were translated into English by Dr. J. R. Ballantyne, some years ago ; while the first of these two has recently been translated in the learned Professor Kunte's well-known serial, "Saddarsana Chintanika," to which special reference will have to be made in a separate paper. But the whole book has been translated, also recently, by our illustrious countryman, Babu Rajendra Lala Mitra, LL.D., C.I.E., who has done so much to popularize the knowledge enshrined in the sacred literature of the country. His translation, of which the last instalment has just been issued, is prefaced by a scholarly dissertation on Hindu Philosophy in general, and Yoga Philosophy in particular, and is, moreover, accompanied with a complete translation of the celebrated commentary of Bhoj Rajah, and his own valuable notes. Of this work of his we shall avail ourselves freely in our treatment of the subject as we did of his translation of the Chandogya Upanishad in a former paper.

The fact that an enlightened king, like Bhoj, who is said to have flourished in the latter part of the tenth and the earlier part of the eleventh century, considered it his duty to comment upon the Aphorisms of Patanjali, is a proof of the importance attached to them, or rather to the asceticism embodied in them in all ages and by all classes of the people of India. His remarks on commentaries in general and his own in particular are worthy of notice :

“ All commentaries are the perverters of the meaning of their authors ; they avoid those parts that are most difficult to understand by saying that the meaning there is obvious ; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound words where the meaning is plain ; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali, for the edification of intelligent persons” (p. 2).

The general accuracy of this exordium is unchallenged, though the claim of perfect freedom from the defects pointed out advanced in favor of Bhoj Rajah's own commentary may be disallowed. It may also be affirmed in justification of these defects that the commentaries cannot but partake of the confusedness, obscurity, and mystification stamped on the originals.

The portion of the Yoga Shastra which may justly be called philosophical, may be disposed of in a few words. Dr. Rajendra Lala Mitra enters into a superfluous argument in his scholarly introduction, to prove that the Yoga system was elaborated subsequently to the organization of the Sankhya school. The fact that

the former completes the latter is enough to sustain this conclusion. Were an additional reason needed, the fact that the Yoga Shastra accepts the twenty-five categories of the Sankhya system without attempting a formal description or even enumeration, might be insisted upon. The Yoga Shastra, however, adds another category—viz., God, whose existence is declared unproven and undemonstrable in the Sankhya system. Here are the verses in which God is spoken of : “ Or by devotion to God. God is a particular soul, which is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts, and desires. In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity. He is the instructor of even all early ones ; for he is not defined by time. His indicator is the Pranava ” (Book I. 23-27).

These verses point to an entity in addition to the two entities, the existence of which is postulated in the Sankhya system ; and they may in one sense be said to convert the “ dualism ” of Kapila into a sort of “ trialism. ” It is to be observed that God as described in these extracts is obviously different from the soul or souls posited by him. He is not merely intelligence, as the soul is, but unlimited intelligence ; omniscient, not parviscient. He is the instructor of all the great teachers of ancient times, even of Kapila and his great teacher Maheshwara or Sayambhu, and He is said to be untouched by the afflictions—viz., ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of life, by works, good and bad, and by deserts and desires, or the antecedents and consequents of works. The soul, on the contrary, is represented as limited in its being, circumscribed in its knowledge, and held in bondage by ignorance, the first of the afflictions and the source of the other four. God therefore is a new entity, and His introduction

into the sacred circle divests the system of its dualistic, and invests it with a trialistic, character.

Such doubtless appears to be the truth at first sight ; but a closer examination brings us to the conclusion that the addition does not, in the slightest degree, interfere with the essentially monistic character of the Sankhya system. The entity brought in to satisfy a popular clamor or to humor current superstition, is as thoroughly a nonentity as the soul is. There is in reality no difference whatever between God and the soul, the Paramatma and the Jivatma, as brought out in this scheme of philosophic thought. God, like the soul, is perfectly quiescent and inactive. He does not create, does not preserve, does not destroy—these important functions being all discharged by Prakriti, the active principle which exists independently of Him and over the evolutions of which He has only a nominal rather than a real control. It may be said that the soul is bound, while God is untouched by the afflictions. But it has been shown that the soul is bound nominally, not really. Prakriti, through the mischievous activity of one of its evolutes, viz., the mind, is bound, passes through varieties of self-inflicted tortures, and is finally liberated ; and its bondage, self-inflicted tortures, and liberation are only reflected in the soul in consequence of the proximity of the one to the other. But it may be said that God is free even from this reflectional bondage. How can He be ? Is He not all-pervasive, all-diffusive, as Prakriti is ? If so, how can contact, such as that to which the troubles of the soul are attributable, be avoided ?

There is, after all, no difference whatever between the soul, as posited and described by Kapila, and the God whose existence is postulated by Patanjali. The

soul is a useless entity, a nonentity rather than an entity, devoid of moral qualities as well as of natural properties, devoid therefore of all of those phenomena by which alone existence can manifest itself. The being called God, posited by the Yoga school, is precisely of this description.

It is instructive to note how the theistic conclusion was arrived at by the champions of the Yoga Philosophy. It was by an exoteric rather than by an esoteric process that they were brought to a recognition or assumption of an entity in addition to the two posited by Kapila and his followers.

In this respect the Yoga philosophers occupied a platform the very antipodes of that occupied by Fichte and the Fichtean. These, like the Sankhya philosophers, concentrated their attention first upon the soul, called by them the individual ego. But, unlike the Sankhya philosopher, they proceeded a step farther. From the individual ego they were brought by a process of subjective reasoning to a recognition of the Universal Ego, that of which the Ego within is a mode or manifestation. But the Yoga philosopher was not evidently brought to such recognition by a process of esoteric reasoning. In his case the supposition of a God was simply a contrivance or stratagem resorted to for the purpose of meeting a popular demand rather than a necessity of the reasoning mind.

A system of rank atheism could not be popular even in countries like Greece, where the sensuous was allowed admittedly to prevail over the intellectual life. Far less could it prevail in a country where the reverse of this process was noticeable—that is, where the intellectual was allowed to swallow up the sensuous and æsthetic natures of man.

Besides, it was not possible to make the Yoga Shastra popular among the masses, or even among sensible men, without the entity added by it. Could sensible Hindus be persuaded to go through an extraordinary process of mortification and penance without a divine command behind, and a divine ideal before them? They must be assured that a command of the Almighty, rather than a mere dictum of philosophy, was upon them; and they must be assured that the grand prospect before them was no other than extinction of being, along with all its misery, in God, before they could be induced to exchange the comforts of domestic life for the privations and tortures of the life of an anchorite. The hypothesis of a God was therefore essential to the success of the system, not only among the masses, but among thinking men of all classes, and such a hypothesis was in process of time resorted to.

It may, however, be said that the extraordinary powers, represented as attainable by intense meditation, might be enough to make the system popular, even apart from the supposition of a God attached to but not incorporated with it. That the hope of the ultimate acquisition of such powers was a potent inducement to many of those who actually did resort to hermit solitude and self-inflicted mortification, cannot be denied; but this hope could be sustained amid trials of a disheartening character, only by the hypothesis to which recourse was had in the Yoga school.

But the God assumed was after all a mere nonentity, a magnificent nothing. How, it may be asked, could such an assumption promote the object of the framers of the scheme? How! The framers of the scheme could legitimately calculate upon popular inability to reason, to analyze, and to comprehend. A phantom

was enough to conciliate the masses ; while the thinking classes might gradually be persuaded to prefer a perfectly quiescent God to one moved by a desire to create and ready to create, for the purpose of supplying a felt want. Why, the history of the world points to more miracles wrought by chimeras, phantoms, and shams, than by facts and realities of a stubborn character ; and Patanjali could not be ignorant of human life !

This opinion, formed long before the publication of the fourth part of Dr. Mitra's translation and his Introduction, is confirmed by the following extract from the latter :

“ Still the coincidence of a number of names of a given period is one which in Indian history cannot be easily set aside as purely accidental. Confining, however, one's attention to the text-books only, no one who has read them carefully can fail to perceive that Patanjali has contented himself by taking a theistic appendage of no direct utility to a positively atheistic model, without in any way blending the two ideas into one homogeneity or consistency. Hence it is that the Hindus call it *Sesvara Sankhya*, or *Sankhya cum deo*, as opposed to the former, which is *Nireswara Sankhya*, or *Sankhya sine deo*” (p. xxii.).

It is time to set forth the great object of the Yoga Philosophy ; and with a view to do this it is necessary to inquire into the meaning of the word *yoga*. The word is derived from the root *yuj*, which means “ joining ;” and it has therefore been explained by Yajñavalkya as the “ conjunction of the individual with the supreme soul.” To this meaning two exceptions have been taken by Madhavacharjya, and the author of the *Sarva-darsana-sangraha*. The first is the impossibility



of the conjunction suggested according to the approved rules of Indian logic, which maintain that two eternal and infinite substances cannot possibly be conjoined. The second is the present identity of the individual and universal soul according to the pantheistic principles of the Vedantic school.

These objections are brought forward to gratify a propensity to pugnaciousness rather than to remove obstacles to the attainment of truth. For neither the dictum of Indian logic on which the first is based, nor the principle of pantheistic philosophy which upholds the second, is recognized in the Yoga Shastra. The word *yoga* is used to mean both the end proposed by Yoga Philosophy and the means used according to its teaching to compass it. The end proposed is the union of the individual with the universal spirit ; and the means indicated are varieties of exercises, culminating in *samadhi* or concentration. But Yajnavalkya cannot but admit that though this is the present meaning of *yoga*, the word had a very different meaning in Patanjali's time ; for he himself says in his commentary on the Yoga Shastra :

“Yoga means *samadhi*, concentration, in the sense of the union of the subject and object—thought with thought itself.”

The first two aphorisms of Patanjali's great work thus set forth the objects of Yoga Philosophy :

“Now the exposition of Yoga is to be made. Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.”

The word translated “the thinking principle” is *chitta*, which certainly means the mind, the principle in us which receives impressions from the external world through the senses, and passes in consequence

through an almost endless series of transformations and changes.

The Sanskrit word for these mutations or modifications is *vritti*, translated "functions" in the text. These words, along with the word *yoga*, play an important part in this philosophy, and they must therefore be thoroughly understood. The following verses show what is meant by "functions" or *vritti* :

"The functions are fivefold, and they are either painful or not painful. The functions of the thinking principle are right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory. Right notions are perception, inference, and testimony. Misconception is incorrect notion, or a notion which abides in a form which is not that of its object. Fancy is a notion founded on knowledge conveyed by words, but of which there is no object corresponding in reality. Sleep is that function of the thinking principle which has for its object the conception of nothing. Memory is the not letting go of an object that has been recognized " (chap. i. 5-11).

These five functions of the mind or of the thinking principle are the sources of its unutterable changeableness and restlessness. Right notions of the objects around us, obtained through the sources of correct knowledge, admitted in the Sankhya school, viz., perception, inference, and testimony ; wrong notions arising from errors, such as we commit when we mistake a rope for a serpent, or from doubt realized when we cannot decide whether the object we see is a man or a cow ; phantasms of things which have no existence apart from a heated brain ; dreams of all kinds, from those distinguished by some degree of reasonableness or propriety down to those marred by the greatest wildness and incoherence ; and the innumerable clusters of

ideas and associations recalled or revived by memory—all these form the ever-shifting elements of our mental existence, and they produce in us a restlessness similar to that by which they themselves are characterized.

Here it ought to be noted that one of the universally admitted maxims of Hindu Philosophy is that the mind assumes the form of what it perceives ; and therefore it necessarily becomes, really not figuratively, a tree, a tank, an animal, a sweet mango, a musical pipe, an odoriferous flower, or a hard stone ; not only so, it is changed into the grotesque forms and shapes conjured up by fancy either when we are awake or when we are asleep, or into the ideas, equally subjective, exhumed by memory from the vaults of its own mausoleum. Who can form an adequate idea of its volatility, its fickleness, its restlessness ? Who can number the varieties of mutations and transformations through which it passes in the course of the day, not to say a year, a decade, or the course of a long life ? To destroy this fickleness, this changeableness, this restlessness, to lead the mind to wade, so to speak, through these innumerable transformations to its original state of serene repose—such is the object proposed by the Yoga Philosophy. The idea of union with God is a later graft.

How can this be effected ? How are the modifications of the mind to be suppressed, and how is it to be brought back to its primitive state of quiescence and repose ? To this question the proper reply is given in the twelfth aphorism of the first chapter : “ The suppression of these functions is effected by Exercise and Dispassion.” These two expressions or vocables make up what is called Yoga, which consists of several members or parts. But before we refer to them it is desirable to point out the obstructions which hinder our

progress through ascetic exercises to the goal of Yoga Philosophy. These are enumerated in Aphorism 30 (Book I.): "Disease, languor, doubt, carelessness, idleness, worldly-mindedness, mistaken notions, unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and instability therein ; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles" (p. 38).

Bodily ailments incapacitating the mind for close thinking, intellectual lassitude and indolence, doubt as to the feasibility and utility of meditation, careless or slipshod methods of procedure, earthly ambition, illusion, such as that which leads to a bit of mother-of-pearl being mistaken for silver, inability to attain to a particular stage of contemplation, or to continue steady in it when attained—these are hindrances to Yoga ; and they are accompanied with, as the next aphorism assures us, "pain, distress, trembling, inspiration, and expiration"—that is, pain in the threefold form referred to in the Sankhya Philosophy ; shaking of the body interfering with its proper posture, and irregular breathing. These can be avoided only by long-continued and persevering exercise.

But not only are these interruptions or hindrances to meditation to be overcome, but efforts should be put forward to annihilate the great causes of our bondage. These are called "afflictions," and they are described in the following aphorisms : "Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the five afflictions. Ignorance is the field of those which follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted, or simple. Ignorance is the assumption of that which is non-eternal, impure, painful, and non-soul—to be eternal, pure, joyous, and soul. Egoism is the identifying of the power that sees with the power of seeing.

Desire is dwelling on pleasure. Aversion is dwelling on pain. Tenacity of life is an attachment to the body, which relates to the residua of one's former life, even on the part of the wise. These, the subtle ones, should be avoided by an adverse course" (chap. ii. 3-9).

Five causes of our bondage are stated ; and the first of these, viz., ignorance, is declared to be the source of the rest. Ignorance, therefore, is, according to this, as to every other system of Hindu Philosophy, the ultimate cause of that bondage from which deliverance is to be ardently desired. Ignorance of what ? Not of God and His attributes ; nor of the teaching in His revelation ; but of the essential and everlasting difference between soul and non-soul. The characteristics of the soul are in marked antithesis to the properties and qualities of matter and its evolutes. The soul is eternal, pure, and joyous ; while matter, in at least its present forms, is non-eternal, impure, and painful. But we are laboring under the hallucination that the soul is impure and miserable, while the fact is that impurity and pain belong to matter, and cannot possibly appertain to soul. And the consequence of this ignorance is that we wish to see the connection of the pure spirit with impure and painful matter, perpetuated rather than dissolved.

But how does ignorance bring us to a conclusion so wretched ? The different stages of its operation are indicated. Ignorance begets egoism, by which the seer is identified with the seeing faculty, the enjoyer is confounded with the instrument of enjoyment, or the soul is declared to be nothing more or less than one of its own material organs. The soul is the enjoyer, and the enjoyment is communicated to it through the internal

organ, intelligence or mind, which is an evolute of Prakriti, and therefore a material form, though of the subtlest kind and imperceptible. But this form, though merely an instrument of enjoyment, is inflated with an idea of its own importance, and says, "I enjoy." Its ignorance of its own nature and position among the admitted categories of the system is the cause of its egoism. But, properly speaking, as it has been so often said, the charge of ignorance or egoism cannot be legitimately brought against it. It is in reality the enjoyer, and its enjoyment is simply reflected in the tranquil spirit, as the serene evening sky with its rosy light is reflected upon the surface of a calm sheet of water. The mistake does not rest therefore with the internal organ, but with the philosopher, who, after having extinguished all individuality on the part of the human spirit, allows himself to be led by his instincts to attribute some sort of responsibility to it.

From egoism proceed a longing for pleasure and a recoil from pain ; and these instincts give birth to tenacity of life, or an aversion to that dissolution of the connection of the soul with material organs, on which true emancipation hinges. How ? Men instinctively desire happiness, and perform good works to secure it. But good works are fructescent, and they necessarily lead to their translation to regions of happiness, whence, as soon as the fruits of their good works are consumed, they have to come back in renewed bodies. Or, if they are bent on present enjoyment and secure it by bad works, they are sent into regions of punishment, whence, the fruits of their evil deeds being consumed, they also come back in fresh bodies. The chain of transmigration is, therefore, necessarily lengthened by works, which, whether good or bad, proceed from our

instinctive and fatuous desire for happiness and our equally instinctive and foolish aversion to pain. An additional reason is given for our shrinking from death in the expression, "The residua of one's former life." What are the residua of a former life? There are varieties of such, but those referred to here are our own recollections of the pains experienced in consequence of death in former lives; and these cannot but lead us to shrink from even a temporary dissolution of the material conditions by which the soul is enchained.

These products of ignorance are found in various states in various individuals. In some they are "dormant," or in a state of hibernation, from which they are sure to come out with renewed vigor to torment us and drive us to works, fruits, births, deaths, repeated in all but endless chains. In some they are "intercepted," or their development is checked by the undue preponderance of one of them, such as the prevalence of egoism decided enough to check the manifestation of desire, aversion, and tenacity of life. In some they have been weakened by the preliminary operations of Yoga; while in some they have their full play, and are therefore called "simple."

But in one case all the afflictions may justly be represented as the "residua" of former lives. To understand this let attention be called to the following aphorisms:

"The residua of works have affliction for their root, and are felt either in this manifested birth or in the unmanifested one. The root existing, the deserts are kind, age and experience. They have joy or suffering for their fruit according as their cause is virtue or vice. To the discriminating all are verily painful, because of the adversity of the actions of the three qualities, and

of the pains of sequence, anxiety, and residua" (chap. ii. 12-15).

The afflictions—ignorance, etc.—are to be held accountable not merely for the works performed by us in this life, but for those we have performed in all the transmigrations through which we have passed. The remains, so to speak, of these works, we carry with us, and their consequences we take in "kind," or in rank, either in society or in the scale of being ; in "age" or in longevity or its reverse ; and lastly, in "experience," or in the delectation of pleasure, or the endurance of pain. Nor are their consequences or fruits, except in rare cases, consumed in this life, they being displayed in that which is to come, and which, therefore, is yet unmanifested. If they have been effectuated by virtue, their present and future consequence must be joy ; while if they have been caused by vice, their present and future consequence is and will be sorrow. The discriminating, however, look upon all the consequences, joyful or sorrowful, as evils to be deprecated for four different reasons. In the first place, the three cosmic qualities to which virtue, vice, and activity benevolent or malevolent, are to be ascribed, are, when their equipoise in Prakriti is once interrupted, in antagonism to one another ; and their frequent contests cannot but lead to disorder and misery. Pleasure, in the second place, is invariably followed by pain, "by the law of sequence." It is, moreover, accompanied with a great deal of anxiety, arising mainly from our consciousness of its evanescent character. And, lastly, all our actions and feelings leave behind them impressions, which revive the sensations of pleasure and pain within us, leaving aside the consequences, which it is absolutely impossible for us to evade or avert.



Now, we come to the means or accessories of Yoga. ✓  
 These are—first, Yama, restraint ; second, Niyama, obligation ; third, Asana, posture ; fourth, Prána yama, regulation or restraint of the breath ; fifth, Pratyáhára, abstraction ; sixth, Dhárana, devotion ; seventh, Dhyana, contemplation ; eighth, Samádhi, meditation.

The following are the aphorisms in which these are set forth with their characteristics :

“ On the decay of impurity, through the practice of the accessories of the Yoga, there is illumination of the understanding till discriminative knowledge results. Restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, abstraction, devotion, contemplation, and meditation are the eight accessories. Restraint includes abstinence from slaughter, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and avarice. The obligations are purification, contentment, penance, study, and devotion to the Lord : Posture is that which is firm and pleasant. On its being accomplished, the regulation of breath, which is interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration. Abstraction is the assumption by the senses of the original nature of the thinking principle, from want of application to their respective objects” (chap. ii. 18-54, 114).

“ Steadfastness or devotion is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place. Contemplation is unison there of the understanding. When that contemplation, existing as if without its own identity, enlightens solely one object, it is meditation” (chap. iii. 1-3).

These eight means of Yoga are called its members as well as its accessories. The first five the outer, and the last three the inner members ; and they indicate the varied stages, incipient as well as advanced, of that

laborious and painful exercise which terminates in the extinction of the thinking principle. It being necessary to draw particular attention to them, they are set forth one after another, in the order in which they appear in the above extracts, with elucidating comments :

1. Restraint is the first step in all schemes of reformation, meaning, as it does, abstinence from gross sins and sinful dispositions. The word "slaughter" as used in the aphorism bearing upon it has a twofold meaning. It means religious sacrifice as well as murder. The Yoga Philosophy is as thoroughly opposed to the doctrine of sacrifice as Buddhism ; and it brings forward *veracity* as a substitute for the bloody rites enjoined in the Vedas, while it promises "jewels from all sides" to him "who is confirmed in abstinence from theft," and represents attainment of vigor as inseparably associated with "continence." It prohibits avarice not only in the sense in which the word is ordinarily used, but in a sense unknown perhaps to all but students of Hindu Philosophy. The avaricious longing for fresh bodies and fresh births, of which we are supposed to be conscious, is condemned, as well as cupidity in the ordinary sense of the term. The first step of Yoga is renunciation of sin in act, word, and even thought. So far it is worthy of commendation.

2. The second step is the cultivation of right dispositions within us by a strict conformity to the commandments and ordinances of religion. A careful study of the Vedas, certain prescribed austerities and devotion to the Lord are fitted to purify the soul from all its base desires, and breed contentment in it. There would be no objection to this statement, if by "devotion to the Lord" were meant something more than muttering mechanically the two words Pranava and Om, which

are represented as His symbols. It is affirmed that the frequent repetition of these symbols, or of some select verses from the Vedas, such as the Gayatri, leads to God-vision. Through muttering results *vision*, as explained by Bhoj Rajah, of the desiderated deity. But God-vision according to this philosophy is tantamount to nothing-vision—the God posited being a nonentity !

3. Here begin those bodily exercises which do not profit. The varieties of postures recommended and detailed for the attainment of firmness of mind and cheerfulness of disposition are too numerous to be taken notice of here. Vasistha, Yajnavalkya, and other sages of the Vedic and Post-Vedic age fixed their number at 84, stating that these had been prescribed and described by Siva, the Father of Indian Yogis. Gorakshanátha, a Yogi of a later date, disgusted with their paucity, swelled their number to 84,000,000. Of this number, however, ten are considered as the more important, and three or four of these last we shall indicate in the words of the learned translator.

(a) “ *Padmasana*. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right thigh ; the hands should be crossed, and the two great toes should be firmly held thereby ; the chin should be bent down on the chest ; and in this posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called *Padmāsana* (lotus-posture), and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases.”

(b) “ Put the right ankle on the left side of the chest, and similarly the left ankle on the right side, and the posture will be *Gomukha*, or of the shape of a cow’s mouth.”

(c) “ Having assumed the fowl posture, should the two hands be placed on the sides of the neck, it would

make the posture like that of the tortoise upset ; it is called tortoise-upset posture."

The fowl posture is thus described : "Having established the lotus posture, if the hand be passed between the thigh and the knees and placed on the earth so as to lift the body aloft, it will produce the fowl seat."

(d) " Hold the great toes with the hands, and draw them to the ears as in drawing a bowstring, and this is called the bow posture" (p. 104).

The translator concludes his description of the principal varieties of postures recommended with these words :

" Treating of a system of philosophy, Patanjali has not thought proper to enter into details regarding age, sex, caste, food, dwelling, etc., as bearing upon Yoga ; but other works supply information about them to a considerable extent. A few notes derived therefrom may not be unfitly added here. The first question that would arise would be, Who are fit to perform the Yoga ? On this subject the " Hatha dipika" fixes no limit. It says, " By the practice of Yoga, every one may attain perfection, whether he be youthful, or old, or very old, or diseased or decrepid." The next point is the selection of a proper place. " A small monastery, a dwelling not larger than a cube of six feet, situated in an out-of-the-way place, where there is no danger, within a circuit of a bow, of hail, fire, and water, in a country abounding in food, and free from danger of wars and the like, where religion prevails in a thriving kingdom," is the most appropriate. The cell, or *mathika*, should have a small door and no window ; it should be free from holes, cavities, inequalities, high steps, and low descents. It should be smeared with cow-dung, devoid of dirt, not infested by vermin, with

a terrace in front, a good well, and the whole surrounded by a wall. Dwelling in such a place, avoiding all anxieties, the Yogi should follow the path pointed out by his teachers in the exercise of the Yoga. He should avoid all excess of food, violent exertions, and vain disputations. His food should consist of wheat, *sáli* rice, barley, *shasti* rice (or that which matures in six days), the *syama* and the *nivára* grains, milk, clarified butter, coarse or candied sugar, butter, honey, ginger, *palval*, fruits, five kinds of greens, mung pulse, and water," and all soothing sweet things in a moderate quantity, avoiding flesh-meat, and too much salt, acids, and all stale, putrid, decomposed, or acrid substances. The quantity of food taken should be such as to leave one fourth of his appetite unappeased" (p. 110).

When the adept is able to assume any posture he wishes to appear in, he is unaffected "by the pairs," *i.e.* by the extremes of cold and heat, light and darkness, storm and lull, etc. Neither is he tormented by hunger and thirst. In a word, he becomes impassible; and his steadiness of posture no contingency can shake for a moment. ▸

4. Regulation of breath is an important member of Yoga, and the process consists of expiration, inspiration, and retention of breath, according to fixed rules. To give an insight into these, let us present an extract from the translator's notes (p. 43) on the subject: "The time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to retention the longest. A Vaishnava in his ordinary daily prayer repeats the *Vija-mantra* (containing specific mystic syllables) once while expiring, seven times while inspiring, and twenty times while retaining. A Shakta repeats the mantra 16 times while inspiring, 64 times while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These

periods are frequently modified. The details vary according to each particular form of meditation and the capacity of the performer. As a rule it may be said that the longer the retention, the more proficient is the Yogi. The usual mode of performing the Pránáyama is, after assuming the posture prescribed, to place the ring finger of the right hand on the left nostril, pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close the two nostrils with the ring finger and the thumb, and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the next operation, and in the third act the first form is required. This constitutes the Pranayama, and it may be repeated after short intervals, according to choice, for hours. The Hatha-dipika philosophizes on this by saying, "By the motion of the breath, the thinking principle moves. When that motion is stopped, it becomes motionless, and the Yogi becomes firm as the trunk of a tree ; therefore the breath should be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the body, so long it is called living. Death is the exit of the breath, therefore it should be stopped."

5. Abstraction of the senses is effected by their withdrawal from the objects toward which they are attracted almost irresistibly, and by their concentration on the thinking principle. The senses cannot be extinguished so long as the body of which they are inseparable organs continues ; but their natural tendency may not merely be counteracted, but completely neutralized. Their natural tendency is to go outward toward the varieties of tempting objects in which the world abounds ; and when they have their full play left unrestrained, they prove sources of ceaseless change

to the mind, and through it to the other internal organs and the soul. Their natural action must therefore be, not only restrained and circumscribed, but completely paralyzed, or rather annihilated, and an action to which they are naturally averse substituted in its place. In other words, their outward and objective action must give place to action purely inward and subjective. The mind must draw them in as a tortoise draws its limbs within its shell; and when thus fixed upon the soul itself they cease to be sources of restlessness and trouble.

This consummation is the first great step attained in meditation; and the complete subjugation or abstraction of the soul ushers us into the inner temple of Yoga. The three remaining members are said to be "more intimate" than those already described, and they are therefore separated from the others and made to constitute a class by themselves. One result of this classification is, that the number *five* plays an important part in Yoga Philosophy, as the perfect number seven does in Hebrew literature. We have, for instance, *five* functions or modifications—right-notion, misconception, purity, sleep, and memory; *five* afflictions—ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of life; *five* forbearances—slaughter, theft, falsehood, incontinence, and avarice; *five* obligations—purification, contentment, penance, study, and devotion to the Lord; *five* subsidiary means—restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, and abstraction of the senses. To these may be added the *five* recognized sources of perfections (*siddhis*), viz., birth, works, incantations, austerity, and *samadhi*.

6. The sixth step in this exercise is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place. In the earlier

stages of meditation, the mind is not fitted for concentration on its great theme of contemplation, viz., the soul. It must therefore be fixed on an external object, either through the eye or without the help of any of the senses. That external object may be the tip of the nose or the navel-wheel or a plexus of nerves in the belly, or the crown of the head or the sky or ether. When the thinking principle has acquired by such exercise the power of concentration, it may easily be transferred from an external to an internal object, from the objective non-self to the subjective self.

7. *Dhyan*, or contemplation, is the concentration of the thinking principle, not on an external object like the tip of the nose, or the crown of the head, but on its proper object of thought. *Dhyan* is not the finishing stroke of the Yoga, because it is not accompanied with the obliteration of all distinction between the thinking principle, the object of thought, and thought itself. The state of perfect unconsciousness, which is the goal before the Yogi, is only a step ahead.

8. *Samadhi*, or concentration, is the final stage in which the thinking principle loses its separate identity and becomes merged in the object of thought and thought itself ; or rather in which the thinking principle is extinguished along with thought, and the object of thought remains in its original state of solitude. This state is called *kaivalya*, translated "abstraction" by Mr. Davies, and "isolation" by Dr. Mitra. It is indicated in the following extracts from Book IV. :

"For the knower of the difference between soul and non-soul, there is a cessation of the idea of self in the thinking principle. Then the thinking principle is turned toward discriminative knowledge, and bowed down by the weight of commencing isolation."



“On the completion of the series there is produced the meditation called the ‘Cloud of Virtue,’ even in the case of the non-aspirant, from the appearance of constant discrimination. Thence follows the cessation of afflictions and works. Then the knowable becomes small from the infiniteness of the knowledge free from all coverings and impurities. Thereupon takes place the termination of the succession of the modifications of the qualities which have accomplished their ends.”

“Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of the purpose of the soul, or it is the abidance of the thinking power in its own nature.”

The process is plain. The devotee first recognizes the fact that his self is different from the thinking principle, and thus attains this discriminative knowledge. Then a shower of virtues or rewards falls upon him unsolicited, in spite of his aspirations being completely withdrawn from them. Then the afflictions and works disappear, and the objects of knowledge appear insignificant before its vastness and infinitude. Then the cosmic *gunas* or qualities with all their modifications abandon the soul forever, or retire leaving the soul in its original state of quiescence and repose. Here is emancipation, the soul's liberation from the trammels of Prakriti till a fresh renovation of the world, if not forever.

It is to be noted here that Patanjali does not teach the doctrine of the soul's absorption into the deity. On this important point let us hear what the learned translator says :

“Professor Weber in his ‘History of Indian Literature’ (pp. 238–39) has entirely misrepresented the case. He says : ‘One very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine, and one which was more and more exclusively devel-

oped as time went on, is the Yoga practice—that is, the outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and the like, whereby the absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained.’ To those who have attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory. Indeed it is difficult to conceive how so well read a scholar as the learned professor could have formed this opinion unless we believe that he has not read the Yoga, and has borrowed his theory from the Bhagavat Gita and Puranic and Tantric modifications of Yoga. Patanjali, like Kapila, rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does not pry into the how and the where the soul resides after the separation” (p. 209).

Patanjali’s God being a phantom conjured up to satisfy a popular clamor rather than to meet a necessity of his philosophy, he is simply laid aside, as all phantoms deserve to be in the work of liberation as in that of creation and entanglement of Prakriti in its own meshes, and it must not be forgotten that the so-called emancipation of the soul is in reality liberation of Prakriti in the shape of the thinking principle from troubles of its own creation.

But this highest consummation, this *summum bonum*, is preceded by certain earthly advantages to the Yoga ; and to these some reference must be made. They are indicated in the following aphorisms :

“The knowledge of the past and the future is acquired by *sanyama* over the threefold modification. A confused comprehension of word, meaning, and knowledge arises from indiscriminate understanding. By Sanyama with due discrimination is acquired an understanding of the cry of all creatures. A knowl-

edge of former existence by making the residua apparent. With reference to cognition, a knowledge of another's thinking principle" (Book III. 16-19).

"From *Sanyama* with reference to the shape of the body, the power of vision being diminished and the correlation of light and sight being severed, there is disappearance. Works are deliberate and non-deliberate, and by *Sanyama* about them a knowledge of final end, or by portents. In powers, the powers of the elephant and the like. From contemplation of the light of the extremely luminous disposition, a knowledge is acquired of the subtile, the intercepted, and the remote. From *Sanyama* in the sun, a knowledge of regions" (III. 21-26). "In the coronal light, vision of perfected ones" (III. 32).

These extracts are enough to show that all sorts of extraordinary powers are derivable from the application of the last three members of *Yoga*, called *Sanyama* in their joint capacity, to varieties of objects perceptible and imperceptible—(a) knowledge of the past and the future, of all sciences, of another's mental states, of one's own adventures in past times, and the coming rewards or punishments predestined on account of them and of present works ; (b) ability to comprehend all inarticulate and indistinct sounds, even the cries of inferior animals, which, be it observed, have souls as well as men, and speak intelligibly ; (c) enlarged powers of vision such as to enable a man to see heavenly intelligences, things subtile, such as ether, and concealed beneath the earth, such as the contents of mines, and such things as the elixir of life, found on the other side of the mountain of *Meru* ; (d) physical powers, such as those of the lion, the behemoth—nay, much more expanded, even the powers that may enable

us literally to remove mountains and dry up seas ; (e) the power of intercepting the light between one's own body and the eyesight of all classes of spectators, and thereby rendering one's self either partially or wholly invisible ; (f) power, in a word, to assume all shapes, walk on the water, fly in the air, remain buried under the earth for months and years, and then come up as the dead are expected to do on the day of judgment, or remain buried in the earth as a pillar of stone till a mound is thrown up around the body of the entranced devotee by ants, and nests are built by birds in his tangled and clotted hairs. The varied powers attainable are classed under eight heads. And these are indicated by Bhoj Rajah in the following order :

1. " Attenuation (*anima*), the attainment of the form of atoms—molecularity.

2. " Levity (*laghima*), attainment of lightness, like that of floss or cotton.

3. " Ponderosity (*garima*), attainment of great weight.

4. " Illimitability (*mahima*), attainment of greatness, or the power of touching the moon or the like with the tip of one's finger.

5. " Irresistible will (*prakamya*), non-fructification of one's desires.

6. " Supremacy (*isita*), highest authority over the body and internal organs.

7. " Subjection (*vasita*), prevailing everywhere, that is, the elements, being subservient to him, do not disobey his behests.

8. " Fulfilment of desires (*kamavasayitva*), accomplishing one's desires everywhere—that is, in whatever object a desire is found, the Yogi becomes accomplished in that, or brings it to fruition by attaining it " (p. 158).

These perfections are not the products exclusively of *samadhi*; other causes are mentioned in the first aphorism of the fourth or last chapter of the book under review as co-operating with it in their production. The aphorism runs thus : "The perfections are produced by birth, herbs, incantations, austerity, or *samadhi*." Actions performed in former lives must have their fruits, and if they are unfavorable to the acquisition of supernatural powers, they interfere with their attainment in spite of the admitted efficacy of concentration. And therefore merit acquired in past lives must co-operate with Yoga in the generation of these marvelous powers of the body and mind. Nor must such things as herbs, amulets, and incantations be despised, they being fitted as well to offer facilities for the acquisition of these powers as to remove obstacles or hindrances to the realization of the conditions on which their attainment is based. And as to austerity, nothing can be more meritorious than that to which the great sages of the Vedic age, like Viswamitra, owed that greatness and glory which subsequent writers have unanimously represented as even more than divine.

It is, however, to be observed that these powers are after all the subordinate fruits of *samadhi* or concentration. They are accompaniments of the lower, not of the higher kind of meditation. Meditation is said to be with seed (*savija*) or seedless (*nirvija*) ; that is, with distinct recognition of subject and object alive, and such recognition dead. Meditation with seed is the stage where the mind gets rid of all modifications produced by external objects, but retains a distinct recognition of self or its self-consciousness. The extraordinary powers enumerated are the gorgeous ap-

pendage of this stage ; and there is therefore some degree of selfishness connected with it. But when the mind passes to the higher stage and loses its recognition of self or becomes unconscious, these powers are cast aside as old garments, and complete absorption into the object of thought is realized, and the soul is saved from material conditions.

But a great trial awaits the devotee before the final emancipation of his soul is realized. This is indicated in aphorism 51 of Book III. : " Avoidance should be made of association with, and encouragement of, celestial temptations, from apprehension of evil recurring." The holy gods become jealous of the man who, by penance and meditation, acquires extraordinary powers and brings himself to the borders of complete emancipation. No wonder ! Mortals have at times, if not very frequently, made themselves terrors and scourges to the gods themselves by means of extraordinary powers attained by austerity and meditation, and their deliverance is deprecated in heaven. And, therefore, the gods most naturally throw obstacles in the way of the devotee about to be beatified, by inducing their king, Indra, to send down courtesans from his court, and they make use of their charms and blandishments to induce him to swerve from the path of meditation. And when *they* fail, ghosts and hobgoblins, growling tigers and hissing snakes are let loose with the same object. But when the devotee succeeds in frustrating all " celestial " attempts to cajole or frighten him out of his chosen path, he is beatified, and his face becomes radiant with celestial glory, and the sweet smile of conscious deliverance plays upon his lips ; such at least was the case with the great Buddha under the Bo-tree at Gya, though the temptations thrown in his way

proceeded from the malice of Mara, not from the jealousy of the gods !

Such is Yoga Philosophy, if philosophy a series of practical rules, having for their object the complete extinction of mental activity, can properly be called. Contradictory statements are sure to be met in our exposition of its maxims, as the system itself veers about, now assuming the existence of God, and then converting Him into a mere phantom or a useless appendage ; now making the soul the object of thought, and then making thought feed upon itself ; now representing salvation as the extinction of happiness as well as pain ; and then representing the " saved " man as happy beyond description ! The system, however, can be thoroughly understood only when we divest ourselves of all our metaphysical ideas, and look, according to the known principles of the Sankhya Philosophy, upon the so-called internal organs, intelligence, self-consciousness, and mind as material evolutes essentially unconnected with the soul ; and the complete extinction of all these subtle productions of matter as necessary to its salvation from both the happiness and the misery reflected in it on account of their existence and proximity to it. The process by which such extinction is brought about is, not the skeleton merely, but the body and soul of this philosophy.

The Yoga Philosophy has been compared to mesmerism and spiritualism by philosophic thinkers, as well as by the charlatans who, under the banner of so-called Theosophy, are trying to revive its lost prestige in India. But it has very little in common with mesmerism, as it does not uphold that belief in animal magnetism which its founder, Franz Mesmer, propagated ; and that faith in magnetic somnambulism by which one

of his followers infused new life into it, when his theory was condemned by a conclave of professional men. Varieties of bodily exercises, rather than magnetization of chosen "subjects" by passes of hand, were the approved weapons of the Yoga philosopher, and self-control rather than control over others his main aim. Some of the powers said to have been acquired by him, such as introvision, prevision, and retrovision, resemble those which are said to be realized under what is technically called *clairvoyance*; but while these played only a secondary part in Yoga Philosophy, they are the very soul of mesmerism.

And as to Spiritism, there is one aphorism in Patanjali's work, the verse in which the power of seeing subtle evolutes of matter and spirits is represented as attainable, that alone has the remotest reference to it. The idea of *séances* and communication with the disembodied spirits of the great men of the world, dead and gone, may be represented as an innovation upon the system, not, however, as one of its original elements. Nor did an investigation into the occult powers of nature originally constitute any portion of the Yogi's business; his aim being, not the acquisition of general knowledge, but that of the knowledge of the essential distinction between soul and non-soul.

It may, however, be admitted that truths, somewhat like those of Mesmerism and Spiritism, were superadded to the system before it was many years old; and the Yogi appears, in consequence, as a juggler and necromancer in Sanscrit poetry and drama. The system deteriorated early; and its success in a lower sense and failure in a higher are exhibited in India today. The power of self-torture the Yogi evinces now, as he did in days gone by, is miraculous indeed.



Monier Williams in his "Indian Wisdom" thus groups the forms of self-torture resorted to :

"We read of some who acquire the power of remaining under water for a space of time quite incredible ; of others who bury themselves up to the neck in the ground or even below it, leaving only a little hole through which to breathe ; of others who keep their fists clenched for years till the nails grow through the back of their hands ; of others who hold one or both arms aloft till they become immovably fixed in that position and withered to the bone ; of others who roll their bodies for thousands of miles to some place of pilgrimage ; of others who sleep on beds of iron spikes . . . others have been known to chain themselves for life to trees ; others, again, to pass their lives, heavily chained, in iron cages. Lastly, the extent to which some Indian ascetics will carry fasting, far exceeds anything ever heard of in Europe, as may be understood by a reference to the rules of the lunar penance (*chandrāyana*) given by Manu. This penance is a kind of fast, which consists in diminishing the consumption of food every day by one mouthful for the waning half of the lunar month, beginning with fifteen mouthfuls at the full moon, until the quantity is reduced to nothing at the new moon, and then increasing it in like manner during the fortnight of the moon's increase" (pp. 105-106).

But the Yogis, as a body, are for various reasons despised, rather than honored, except perhaps among the most ignorant and superstitious. They, in the first place, associate varied acts of self-indulgence of a culpable nature with the varieties of tortures they inflict upon themselves. They make use of intoxicating drugs, so as to be always in a state of partial insensi-

bility ; and they never scruple to allow themselves to be implicated in nefarious and libidinous intrigues. They are, in the matter of self-control, the very antipodes of what they are expected to be, being as a rule avaricious, irascible, quarrelsome, and turbulent. And lastly, they never hesitate to resort to varieties of low tricks for the purpose of imposing on the credulity of those by whom, but for them, they would be held in contempt. Their attitude proves to a demonstration that bodily tortures are not necessarily accompanied with spiritual renovation, even when inflicted by the devotee upon his own self, with the most pious of motives. It also shows that those missionaries who advise native preachers to live as they do, do not place before them very exalted models of character or types of self-sacrifice !

But why do they not give up those bodily tortures which are trying to flesh and blood ? Because they believe that they are, in spite of their freaks of temper and aberrations of conduct, acquiring extra merit by their chosen course of mortification and penance. The idea that sin and virtue can on no account be united is foreign to Hindu theology ; and external observances of the most exacting stamp are eagerly resorted to in our country by persons who never dream of giving up their favorite sins as fitted, not merely to make an atonement for these, but to secure a store of supererogatory merit in spite of them ! Can moral turpitude go further ?

We cannot conclude without an opportune reference to the farce played by the New Dispensationists under color of the Yoga system. They call themselves devotees of Yoga, entertain the public with a new species of dance, and practise some species of sacred jugglery

within the walls of a splendid house, and amid comforts spurned by the ancient Yogi as antagonistic to the main object of his life. But they are utter strangers to the sacrifices, privations, mortifications, and penances as enjoined in the Yoga Sastra ; while as busybodies, engaged in getting up sensational demonstrations for the purpose of maintaining their sinking prestige, they never dream of betaking themselves to that intense meditation without which their loudly talked of " God-vision " is unattainable, even according to books which might be represented as a series of improvements upon that Sastra. All this, and something more, may be said of the self-constituted Theosophist, who, while talking aloud of Yoga as the best of sciences, never scruple to live after the fashion of the world, and thereby set forth the contrast between what they say and what they do !

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE NAYAYA SYSTEM, OR THE HINDU LOGIC.

THE two systems of philosophy, the Sankhya and Yoga, are synthetic, the process adopted by them being that of an evolution from a primordial, diffusive substance, through material forms of a tenuous, imperceptible character, into that complicated framework of nature, the varied portions of which make suitable impressions on the senses. But the two systems we have to deal with in this and the succeeding paper—viz., the Nyaiyaika and Vaiseshika—are analytic, as their adopted method indicates a descent from complexity to unity, not an ascent from the uniform to the multi-form, the one to the many. They begin with classification ; place the objects of nature, both imperceptible and perceptible, under fixed categories ; state the principles by which the cognition of the latter by the mind is regulated, and the existence of the former is demonstrated ; show how the soul is enslaved and distressed by them ; proceed to the very source of its bitter bondage, and the ultimate cause of creation ; and, finally, point out the way in which its emancipation is insured and effected. They therefore embrace a variety of subjects, and can only be called Logical in the most ancient and comprehensive sense of the term. The philosophy of these schools is what was understood in ancient times by the now rarely used term, POLYMATHY, including, as it does, Logic, Physiology, Psy-

chology, and Theology. It includes what is embraced in the tripartite classification of the Hegelian system, in which the Science of Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of the Spirit are all embodied.

We shall in this paper confine ourselves to a portion of the all-comprehensive philosophy of the Nyaiyaika and Vaiseshika schools, the portion embodying its Logic and Physiology, and reserve our exposition of its Psychology and Theology for a separate paper. Our desire is to present the salient features of this huge and all-comprehensive system in the modes of reasoning, the forms of expression, and, as far as possible, in the very words in which these are set forth in its standard works.

A word about the founders of these two schools of Philosophy, and the original and standard documents in which their principles are unfolded, ought to precede our analysis of the system in question. The founder of the Nyaiyaika school was Gotama or Gautama, and the founder of the Vaiseshika school was Kanada. These two persons are mythical heroes, like Kapila and Patanjali, the founders respectively of the Sankhya and Yoga systems. Scarcely anything reliable is known regarding them besides the undisputed fact that they founded respectively the schools of thought with which their names are inseparably associated.

Gautama is said in a sacred legend to have been born in Northern India in the beginning of the Treta Yuga, or the second of the four great eras into which the history of the world is divided by Hindu chronologists, and to have married Ahalya, the daughter of Brahma himself. But though thus highly connected, his family life was by no means happy, inasmuch as his wife,

albeit a goddess herself, was seduced by Indra, the king of heaven, and ultimately changed into a rock for her infidelity to the solemn vows of matrimony. Her divine seducer and lover was also punished, but in a manner over which decency compels us to draw the veil. Scarcely any reliable report, good or scandalous, has come down to us about Kanada ; but he appears to have been the more austere devotee and the greater thinker. On the whole, the two philosophers agreed with each other, though their differences on minor points have been noticed in the exegetic disquisitions by which their writings have been elucidated by eminent commentators.

The original works of these schools are the Sutas or Aphorisms ascribed to Gautama, called the Nyaya Sutas, and those traced to Kanada, called the Vaise-shika Sutas. These, like all the Aphorisms of all the schools of the ancient philosophy of our country, are elliptical, enigmatical, and obscure ; and they would, but for the triple set of commentaries by which they have been made to some extent clear, be positively unintelligible.

Gautama's work, the Nyaya Sutas, consists of five books, each of which is divided into two Lessons. The miscellaneous nature of its contents is set forth in the following conspectus presented in the " Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha :—"

" The principle that final bliss, *i.e.* the absolute abolition of pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth (though in a certain sense universally accepted), is established in a special sense as a particular tenet of the Nyaya school, as is declared by the author of the Aphorisms in the words, ' Proof, that which is to be proved, etc.—from knowledge of the truth as to these

things, there is the attainment of final bliss.' This is the first aphorism of the Nyaya Sastra. Now the Nyaya Sastra consists of five books, and each book contains two 'daily portions.' In the first daily portion of the first book the venerable Gautama discusses the definitions of nine categories, beginning with 'proof,' and in the second of those of the remaining seven beginning with 'discussion.' In the first daily portion of the second book he examines 'doubt,' discusses the four kinds of 'proof,' and refutes the suggested objections to their being instruments of right knowledge ; and in the second he says that 'presumption,' etc. are really included in the four kinds of proof already given (and therefore need not be added by the Mimansakas as separate ones). In the first daily portion of the third book he examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects ; in the second, 'intelligence' (Buddhi) and 'mind' (Manas). In the first daily portion of the fourth book he examines 'volition' (Pravritti), the 'faults,' 'transmigration,' 'fruits' (of actions), 'pain,' and 'final liberation ;' in the second he investigates the truth as to the causes of the 'faults,' and also 'wholes' and 'parts.' In the first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds of 'futility' (Jati), and in the second the various kinds of 'occasions for rebuke' (Nigrahastama or 'unfitness to be argued with')."

Four of the five books were edited and translated by Dr. Ballantyne, with portions of one of the standard modern commentaries. These, with a Compendium of Indian Logic, called "Tarka Sangraha," edited and translated by the same scholar with his own comments, and the larger book, called "Bhasa Parichheda," with its commentary, "Sidhanta Muktavali," both partially

edited and translated by him, and fully by Dr. Roer, are the standard works on the system of logic to be unfolded in these pages. Our remarks on the Vaiseshika Sutras, edited and translated in a masterly manner by Professor Gough, are reserved for our next paper, though our determination to lay this great work under contribution in this is freely expressed. The system of Indian Logic belongs in its main features to both these schools, and therefore a discrimination between them is hardly desirable in an attempt to set forth its principles.

It cannot be asserted too often that the peculiar phraseology of Indian Logic and its approved modes of reasoning run like threads of gold through all the dissertations on Hindu Philosophy extant, insomuch that the latter cannot be understood unless the former are thoroughly mastered. A careful study of *foreign* logic is by no means a proper preparation for a study of *indigenous* philosophy. A person may be a perfect master of Aristotelian logic and the varied systems to which it has given birth in Europe ; but such mastery, though acquired after years of toil, will not in the slightest degree help him through the tangled webs of logomachy and sophistry, as also of correct reasoning, which stand out in bold relief from the pages of standard works on Hindu Philosophy. To be able to bring this enterprise to a successful issue, he must master the high-sounding terminology and the cumbrous modes of reasoning by which the Indian Logical System is differentiated from all other rival schemes. Of this fact he will be convinced the moment he takes up a book like the "Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha," opens it at random, and begins the arduous task of understanding what is set before him on the page on which his attention is con-



centrated. Treatises like Sankar's commentaries on the Upanishads or the Brahma Sutras, or the innumerable other commentaries piled up in the way of the student of Hindu Philosophy, cannot possibly be understood, not to say mastered, without an intimate acquaintance with the peculiarities of the Logic, from which they derive their most prominent, as well as repellant, features.

Indian Logic is, to adopt a word current in mediæval schools, a *trivium*, or a complex system of grammar, logic, and rhetoric. The following quotations from the "Tarka Sangraha" will show that even the most ordinary principles of grammar are not forgotten in a standard treatise on logic :

"The cause of a sentence's being significant (is the presence of) mutual correspondence, compatibility, and juxtaposition (of words).

"Mutual correspondence means the reverse of a disposition to indicate any other than the intended connection of one word with another. Compatibility consists in (a word's) not rendering futile the sense (of the sentence). Juxtaposition consists in the enunciation of the words without a (long) pause between each.

"A collection of words devoid of mutual correspondence, etc., is no valid sentence—for example, 'Cow, horse, man, elephant' gives no information, the words having no reference to one another.

"The expression, 'He should irrigate with fire,' is no valid sentence, for there is no compatibility (between fire and irrigation).

"The words, 'Bring—the—cow,' not pronounced close together, but with an interval of some three hours between each, constitute no valid sentence from the absence of (the requisite) closeness of juxtaposition."

These extracts are not presented as instances of defectiveness in the system, it being a well-known fact that a little grammar must always be associated with logic, especially in its classification of propositions and its statement of the terms of which each distinct proposition, positive or negative, universal or particular, consists. The very second essay of Aristotle's "Organon" is an essay on philology rather than logic, treating as it does of what he represents as the component parts of discourses, such as propositions and sentences. It must be confessed that in its classification of propositions or presentation of the peculiarities of sentences, Indian Logic is poorer than the system of Aristotle.

In rhetoric it is perhaps richer. Rhetoric cannot be dissociated from logic, inasmuch as the efficacy of a logically conducted argument is often enhanced by happy turns of expression, attractive illustrations, and eloquent appeals to feeling. Indian Logic has not erred in enlisting on its side a few of the well-known rules of grammar, and a few of the imposing embellishments of rhetoric, as will be made manifest by and by.

Indian Logic, like every other system of logic, treats of the objects of knowledge and the laws of thought, and its approved mode or method of discussion is indicated by three words : (1) Enunciation (Uddesa), (2) Definition (Lakshana), and (3) Investigation (Pariksha). Enunciation is the formal statement of the subject to be discussed ; Definition is a statement of the differentia by which it is discriminated from all other subjects, whether cognate or otherwise ; and Investigation is an examination into and an analysis of these differentiating properties.

The subjects discussed in the Nyaya Sastra are six-

teen in number, and they are categorically stated in the first aphorism of the book. They are :

1. Pramana, or Proof or Instrument of Right Notion or Knowledge.
2. Prameya, or Objects of Right Notion or Knowledge.
3. Sansaya, or Doubt about the Point to be Discussed.
4. Prayajana, or Motive for Discussing it.
5. Drishtanta, or Familiar Example.
6. Siddhanta, or a Determinate Case or Tenet.
7. Avayava, or the Syllogism.
8. Tarka, or Refutation.
9. Nirnaya, or Ascertainment.
10. Vada, or Controversy.
11. Jalpa, or Wrangling.
12. Vitanda, or Cavilling.
13. Hetwabhasa, or Fallacies.
14. Chhala, or Frauds or Quibbling Artifices.
15. Jati, or Futile Replies.
16. Nirghastana, or Conclusion by pointing out the objector's "unfitness to be argued with."



1. The first subject treated of is "Proof," in accordance with the maxim given in the "Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha," in these words : "To know the thing to be measured, you must first know the measure." The Nyaiyaikas admit four kinds of proof or instruments of right knowledge, the three admitted in the Sankhya school and one more. These are : (a) Perception, (b) Inference, (c) Testimony, (d) Comparison.

a. The importance of Perception as an instrument of knowledge need not be enlarged upon at a time when a tendency is manifested by a class of philosophers to a recognition of the evidence furnished by it as the only

conclusive evidence available to us. It is, however, desirable to show the process involved in every distinct act of perception, according to the principles of this school. Cognition is the result, not of an external object only, not even of the conjunction of an external object with a sense-organ, but of "contiguity of soul, organ, and object." "That," says Kanada, "is an invalid argument (which affirms that sensible cognition is an attribute either of the body or of the senses)." The cognitive faculty is then transferred from the material body and from the senses, both external and internal, to the soul ; and in this a marked deviation from the principles of the Sankhya school is realized.

It is distinctly affirmed that "consciousness" does not inhere in the body or in the external senses, or in the inner sensory or mind ; and that the process of elaboration by which the raw materials of sensation are worked up into appropriate ideas is not their work. The soul, then, according to the theory of perception propounded in this school, is not an unconscious recipient of reflected impressions, but a conscious, percipient principle, and an active framer of ideas. This is a great improvement on the Sankhya philosophy, which, by positing an unconscious, inactive, perfectly quiescent soul, has laid itself open to the charge of propagating rank materialism. But it will be shown by and by that the analytical schools are not thoroughly consistent either in their representations of God, the universal, or in their descriptions of the individual soul.

The peculiarity of the theory of perception propounded in schools of Hindu Philosophy in general is set forth when it is stated that the object of perception is identical with the subject of right notion. The percipient faculty literally becomes the object perceived. For in-

stance, when a jar is perceived, the percipient mind or soul assumes the form of the jar; and therefore the idea, which is formed in the mind or into which the mind is changed—viz., the subject of right notion—is not different from the external object perceived. According to the Vedantic school, when an object is perceived an effluence comes out of the percipient soul and assumes the form of that object, and all difference between the subjective idea and the objective reality is annihilated.

6. Inference is represented, by no less a logician than John Stuart Mill, as “not only valid,” but “the foundation” of both induction and deduction, or syllogism. Our great Indian logicians make as much of it as he does, though they do not seem disposed to sympathize with him in his avowed contempt for the syllogistic or deductive process of reasoning. Inference, according to them, is of three kinds, as perception is of six, the instruments of the latter being the five external and one internal organ. “In the Nyaya Aphorisms,” says a modern commentator, “it is taught that inference is of three kinds—from the antecedent, from the subsequent, and that which is drawn generally. That which is from antecedence (or progressive inference) has for its mark a cause, or an invariable sequence. That which is from subsequence (or regressive inference) has an effect for its mark, or the incompatibility of other causes. That which is general has for its mark something distinct from cause and effect, or is from concomitance and incompatibility.” The same commentator elsewhere says : “Inference is threefold, as produced by illation from only positive conditions ; from only negative conditions, and from both positive and negative conditions. For example : This is a proposition,

inasmuch as it is knowable, etc., is an illation only from positive conditions ; earth differs from other substances inasmuch as it is possessed of odors, etc., is an illation from only negative conditions ; the mountain is fiery inasmuch as it smokes, etc., is an illation from both positive and negative conditions.”

In plainer terms, we have here set forth inference *a priori*, or inference from cause to effect ; inference *a posteriori*, or inference from effect to cause ; and inference by analogy, as our inference that mango-trees are generally blossoming from the sight of one blossoming mango-tree. These three classes are subdivided into various smaller ones, of which no notice need be taken in a brief synopsis like what is attempted in this paper.

The ingenuity of Indian logicians is displayed in what is said about inferential cognition in the first aphorism of the Second Daily Lesson of the Ninth Book of the Vaiseshika Sutras : “ Inferential cognition is that one thing is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, repugnant to, or coinherent in, another.” This is thus explained by another commentator : “ Inference results from a mark, which is an effect, as the inference of fire, etc. from smoke, light, etc. ; also from a mark which is in a cause, as where a deaf man infers a sound from a particular conjunction of a drum with the drumstick. . . . This single connection, then, characterized as the relation of cause and effect, has been stated in two ways. Inference from a conjunct object is such as inference of the organ of touch from observation of an animal body. Inference from a repugnant object is such as inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes, etc., from observation of an excited snake. Inference from a coinherent object is such as the inference of fire connected with water from the heat of the water.”

c. Testimony, as an instrument of knowledge, is twofold, divine, and human. The "Tarka Sangraha" thus sets forth the difference : "Speech is of two kinds, Sacred (*vaidika*) and Temporal or Profane (*laukika*). The former, being uttered by God, is all authoritative ; but the latter, only if uttered by one who deserves confidence, is authoritative, otherwise it is not so." Here not only is revelation admitted, but its perpetuation through the instrumentality of a succession of prophets and seers.

The existence of objects not generally perceptible, such as the soul, space, time, etc., is proved both by inference and revelation. We say "not generally perceptible," because it is possible, according to Hindu Philosophy, to have our faculties of perception so far expanded as to make it competent to us to perceive those realities which are generally represented as imperceptible. The eleventh aphorism of the First Daily Lesson of the Ninth Book of the Vaiseshika Sutras runs thus : "Perception of the soul (results) from a particular conjunction between the soul and the internal organ in the soul." On these words we have these comments : "Ascetics are of two kinds, those who have meditated on the internal organ and are called united, and those who have not meditated on the internal organ and are called disunited. Of these the united, having reverently fixed on the object to be presented to it, are engaged in meditation ; and in them cognition of the soul, whether of their own or of that of others, is produced. Perception of the soul is that cognition wherein the soul is the percept or object of presentation."

d. Comparison as a source of right notion is thus set forth in the "Tarka Sangraha" : "Comparison

(*upamana*) is the cause of an inference from similarity (*upamiti*). Such an inference consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and the thing so named. The recollection of the purport of a statement of resemblance is a step involved in the process. For example, a person not knowing what is meant by the word *gavaya* (*Bos gavæus*) having heard from some inhabitant of the forest that a *gavaya* is like a cow, goes to the forest. Remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow. Then this inference from similarity arises (in his mind) that this is what is meant by the word *gavaya*." There is, after all, not much difference between comparison, as enunciated in this extract, and the third kind of inference already alluded to, inference from analogy ; and hence the Sankhya philosophers are right in limiting the number of the instruments of right knowledge to three.

Here it is desirable to observe that, in one respect, the analytical schools concur thoroughly with the synthetic. Both the classes of schools are arrayed against the doctrine of innate ideas, and thus far they may be patronized by the champions of materialism in these days. There are no such things, according to them, as *a priori* truths, those represented as such being generalizations of experience. With reference to axioms and intuitions, the primary beliefs of humanity, scientific or moral, their champions might, with an air of triumph, reiterate the words of Mill : " They are only a class, the most universal class, of inductions from experience, the easiest and simplest generalizations of the facts furnished by the senses and the consciousness." They would only add to these facts a new class of facts, regarding things unseen and eternal furnished by revelation ; while their view of the contents of



human consciousness would appear ridiculously defective to a champion, not only of idealism, but of empiricism also, in these days.

It remains to be added, under this head, that Gautama in his Second Book proves that the additional means of right knowledge assumed by the Mimansakas—viz., Rumor, Conjecture, Probability, and Non-existence—are superfluous. Rumor is included in testimony or “verbal evidence,” while the rest may very well be merged in inference. He also states and refutes some of the objections raised against the instruments of knowledge he himself points out, as that there may be a conjunction of an organ of sense with an object without leading to perception as in sleep, and inference may be wrong, owing to the disjunction of a sign from the thing signified. But the objection against such testimony as is embodied in the Veda indicates the prevalence of scepticism. “That (the Veda) is no instrument of right knowledge, because of its faults of untruth, self-destructiveness, and tautology.” Its promises had not been fulfilled in the case of well-known devotees; its inconsistencies and contradictions had been pointed out as inconsistent with its assumed authoritativeness, and its prolixity had passed into a proverb! A feeble attempt is made to rebut these objections. The non-fulfilment of promise complained of results from unknown faults perpetrated in a past life, or from some defect in the fulfilment of conditions on the part of a devotee. The charge of inconsistency is repelled by an assertion of the obvious truth that different classes of instructions are demanded by the exigencies of different times. And the tautology pointed out results from the necessity of “re-inculcation,” especially in matters of religion.

2. Prameya, or Objects of Right Knowledge, are presented in Aphorism IX. of the First Book of Gautama's Sutras : "Soul, body, sense, sense-object, understanding or intelligence, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, retribution, pain and emancipation—such are the objects concerning which it is desirable that we should have right notions."

Let us pass over for the present the objects of knowledge reserved for the next paper—viz., soul, intelligence, etc.—and confine our attention to what is said about the body, its organs of sense, and the objects of sense around it.

a. The body is, according to Gautama, "the site of muscular action, of the organs (of sense), and of the sentiments (of pleasure or pain experienced by the soul)." Kanada has the following utterances in the Second Daily Lesson of the Fourth Book : "The body is not composed of the five elements, for the conjunction of things perceptible and imperceptible is imperceptible." "The body is not composed of three elements, because there is not manifested another quality." "Of these, body is twofold, uterine and non-uterine."

The body is represented by some philosophers as consisting of five elements—viz., odor, moisture, heat, breath, and ether ; by others as consisting of four of these. But the body cannot be such a compound, inasmuch as it is visible, while the component elements are not. Again, the opinion that it consists of three of these elements—viz., odor, moisture, and heat—is not admissible, as a union of heterogeneous substances is impossible. Bodies are of various kinds besides the earthy—viz., aqueous, igneous, and aerial—seen in the spheres respectively of Varuna, the sun, and the air. These are not visible to ordinary mortals, but they can

be seen by those ascetics who have had their visual organ almost indefinitely expanded by dint of austerity and meditation.

All classes of bodies are either uterine or non-uterine, the former class including the varieties known as the viviparous and the oviparous ; and the latter bodies ungenerated, such as those of some classes of gods and goddesses ; bodies generated in filth, such as worms, maggots, and other vermin ; and vegetative bodies, such as those of trees and plants. The body, of whatever kind it may be, not even barring trees and plants, which, according to Hindu notions, suffer pain and are but human beings—nay, gods and goddesses in embryo—is the seat of activity and the site of sensation and of the soul's enjoyment or suffering.

b. "The organs of sense," says Gautama—"viz., smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing—are what apprehend the qualities of the elements and of things formed of these" (Book I. Sec. 3, Aph. 12). To these must be added the internal organ, mind, which communicates with the external world through them, as its servitors.

Aphorism 14 of this section thus sets forth the objects of the senses : "Their objects are the qualities of the elements and of things formed of these—meaning the qualities odor, savor, color, tangibility, and sound." These are divided into seven categories by Kanada ; and these categories are substance, attribute, action, generality, particularity, and inhesion. According to the established method of Hindu logicians, these ought to be particularized under this head, but we shall confine ourselves here to the first of the seven, viz., substance.

Under the generic name "substance" are specified earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul, and

the internal organ. Setting aside for the time being the metaphysical ideas and entities called substances by a misnomer, it is desirable to set forth what is said about the five so-called elements.

“Earth,” says Kanada, “is possessed of color, taste, smell, and touch” (Book II. Lesson First, Aph. 1). Odor, however, is its distinguishing property. It is eternal in its original form of atoms, but transient in its present aggregate or complex shape. It has, of course, the attributes common to most substances—number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, placidity, velocity, elasticity.

Aphorism 2 of the same section thus speaks of water : “Water is possessed of color, taste, and touch, and is fluid and viscid.” Its distinguishing property is taste according to some, coolness or clamminess according to others. It is also eternal as atoms and transient as aggregates. Bodies made only of water or aqueous bodies are seen in the realm of Varuna. Odor when perceived in water proceeds from some earthy particles dissolved in it, and is therefore adscititious.

Aphorism 3 of the same runs thus : “Light has color and touch. Its peculiar characteristic is color, and its work is to illumine other substances.” These are, however, seen, not on account of luminous rays falling upon and emitted by them, but on account of the visual ray which issues out of the eye and makes them transparent. Light is also eternal as atoms and non-eternal as aggregates. Light and heat are inseparably associated ; and the united substance is said to be of four kinds—terrestrial light, or that of which the fuel is earthy ; celestial, or that of which the fuel is watery, as lightning, meteoric lights, etc. ; alvine or stomachic,

of which the fuel is both earthy and watery, and which digests both food and drink ; and mineral, or that which is found in mines, as gold, which is simply light solidified. Luminous bodies are to be found in the realm of the sun.

Aphorism 4 represents air as "possessed of touch." It also is eternal as atoms and non-eternal as aggregates. Aerial aggregates are of four kinds—organized aerial bodies and evil spirits inhabiting the atmosphere ; the organ of touch, which is air spread over the cuticle, or an aerial integument ; mind, or unorganized air ; and breath and other vital airs.

In aphorism 5 we have these words : "These (qualities) do not exist in ether." Ether is, unlike other elements, infinite and eternal, and is the substance of which the auditory organ is composed. It is posited, as Dr. Ballantyne says in his comments on "Tarka Sangraha," to account for sound, which is perceptible on account of a peculiar virtue in the ether of the ear, and which, where this peculiar virtue does not exist, as in the ether of the ear of a deaf man, cannot possibly be perceived.

3. The first section of the Second Book of Gautama's Aphorisms embodies a disquisition on the subject of Doubt, and four aphorisms (17-20) of the Second Daily Lesson of the Second Book of the Vaisesika Sutras treat of the same subject. According to Gautama, doubt arises "from the consideration of characters common (to more than one) or several (such as cannot really belong to one and the same thing)," and "from the concentration of (mutually exclusive) characters under the aspect of an attributive." Doubt also arises from "conflict of opinion" and "from unsteadiness (in the recognition of criteria as present or absent)." The five sources

of doubt set forth in these obscure words may be thus put in plain English. Doubt arises in the first place from the possession by two distinct objects of a common attribute, such as tallness, which may lead us to doubt whether a particular tall object indistinctly seen is a man or a post. In the second place, the two objects seen may resemble in one respect and differ in another, and a doubt may be generated in the mind by both the similarity and the difference. That doubt, in the third place, arises from a conflict of opinion is plain enough. Again, doubt arises, in the words of the commentator, from "unsteadiness in the recognition (of some mark which, if we could make sure of it, would determine the object to be so and so) or unsteadiness in the non-recognition (of some mark which, were we sure of its absence, would determine the object to be *not* so and so)."

According to Kanada, doubt arises "from perception of a general, non-perception of a particular, and remembrance of particularity;" also from "knowledge and want of knowledge." These five sources of doubt—viz., perception of a general or common property, non-perception of a special or specific property, memory of an attribute seen at a past time but not in the present moment, knowledge of the varieties of opinion held on a particular subject, and partial ignorance—are almost identical with those pointed out by Gautama. Our philosophers did not fail to see that absolute knowledge or absolute ignorance precludes doubt, it being a state of hesitancy generated by two propositions, neither of which has a preponderance of evidence in its favor. The well-known affirmation of Herbert Spencer, "Force is unknowable," involves, therefore, a flagrant contradiction in terms, an item of certain knowledge,

its unknowableness, being authoritatively stated regarding a thing not known. In other words, the attitude of absolute knowledge and absolute ignorance is assumed where that of dubiousness alone would be justifiable !

4. The motive for discussing a particular subject ought to be definitively stated in every properly conducted argument, as without its timely disclosure the importance of the controversy may be underrated. Motive is defined by Gautama to be "that thing which, when placed before us, causes us to act."

5. A familiar example is then brought forward, and regarding it we have these words in Aphorism 25, Sec. iv., Book I. : "In regard to (some fact respecting) what thing both the ordinary man and the acute investigator entertain a sameness of opinion, that (thing) is called a 'familiar case' (of the fact in question)." In plain English an ordinary example, which may appear admissible to both the parties engaged in discussion, ought to be adopted for use in the course of the controversy in preference to other illustrations. The example generally selected in the case of fire and smoke is "the culinary hearth."

6. "A tenet," says Gautama, "is that, the steadfastness of the acceptance of which rests on a treatise (of might and authority)." Tenets are divided into four classes—"Dogma of all the Schools," "Dogma peculiar to some one or more Schools," "A Hypothetical Dogma," or one implied in a particular declaration. What is meant under this head is simply a statement of a single or of a series of truths, constituting what is called common ground.

7. Then comes the syllogism, which is more complex than that of Aristotle, being, as Monier Williams says,

a compound of the enthymeme and the syllogism. Says Gautama : "The members (of a syllogism) are (1) the Proposition, (2) the Reason, (3) the Example, (4) the Application, and (5) the Conclusion." The following examples are generally brought forward to illustrate the five-membered syllogism of Hindu Logic :

1. The hill is fiery, . . . . . *Pratijna*, or Proposition.
2. For it smokes, . . . . . *Hetu*, or Reason.
3. Whatever smokes is fiery, as a culinary hearth, . . . . . *Udaharan*, or Example.
4. This hill is smoking, . . . . . *Upanaya*, or Application.
5. Therefore it is fiery, . . . . . *Nigamana*, or Conclusion.

*Example Second.*

1. Sound is non-eternal, . . . . . Proposition.
2. Because it is produced, . . . . . Reason.
3. Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as pots, . . . . . Example.
4. Sound is produced, . . . . . Application.
5. Therefore it is non-eternal, . . . . . Conclusion.

Here a peculiarity of Indian Logic ought to be set forth. There are three terms which must be thoroughly understood before arguments couched in the cumbrous phraseology and method of Indian Logic can be comprehended or intelligently followed. The first of these terms is *Vyapati*, which means invariable concomitance or pervasion. The second is *Vyapaka* or the pervader, or invariably pervading attribute, and the third is *Vyapya*, or invariably pervaded. An ordinary example, capitalized so often in Hindu Logic, will illustrate the significance of these technical terms : "Wherever there is smoke there is fire." Here the invariable connection between smoke and fire is *Vyapati*, or invariable concomitance or pervasion ; smoke is *Vyapya*, or invariably pervaded, and fire the pervader, or *Vyapaka*.



Translated into Aristotelian phraseology, Vyapati is the connection between the two terms in the major premiss ; Vyapaka is the major term ; and Vyapya, or smoke, is the middle term.

It ought here to be mentioned that no regular classification of syllogisms, such as that of Aristotle, who divides them into apodictic, dialectic, and sophistic, is attempted in standard works on Indian Logic ; but the syllogism is made neither too much of, as in the Aristotelian system, nor too little of, as in that of Mill.

8. Refutation or Confutation, is thus set forth in the opening aphorism of Sec. 7, Book I. of Gautama's Sūtras: "Confutation, (which is intended) for the ascertaining of the truth in regard to anything, the truth in regard to which is not thoroughly discerned, is reasoning from the presence of the reason (which would not be present if that which is to be established were not present)." That is, when a disputant admits the premisses, but refuses to accept the conclusion legitimately deduced therefrom, a new method of refutation, *reductio ad absurdum*, must be resorted to.

9. "Ascertainment," we are told in the following aphorism, "is the determination of a matter by dealing with both sides of the question after having been in doubt." It is the settlement of the question by setting forth the legitimacy of the conclusion deduced and the absurdity of the opposite one. The argument ought to conclude here, but the Hindu love of wrangling renders some additional steps necessary, and therefore we have

10. A fresh controversy or discussion, regarding which we have these words in the opening aphorism of Sec. 8: "Discussion is the undertaking (by two parties respectively) of the one side and of the other in regard to what (conclusion) has been arrived at by

means of the five-membered (process of demonstration already explained ; this discussion) consisting in the defending (of the proposition) by proofs (on the part of the one disputant), and the assailing it by objections (on the part of the other), the discussion being conducted on both sides without discordance in respect of the tenets (or principles on which the conclusion is to depend).” This simply implies another fight *pro* and *con* over the conclusion arrived at by such a tedious process.

11. Wrangling, therefore, is not out of place: “ Wrangling, consisting in the defence or attack (of a proposition) by means of ‘frauds,’ ‘futilities,’ and ‘what calls for nothing save an indignant rebuke,’ is what takes place after the procedure aforesaid (that is to say, after a fair course of argumentation)—supposing this to have failed to bring the disputants to an agreement.” Frauds are of three kinds—fraud “in respect of a term,” “in respect of a genus,” and “in respect of a trope.” The first species of fraud is knowingly attaching to a term employed a sense different from what it is intended to convey ; the second is knowingly deducing a fallacy from the similarity subsisting between two objects mentioned ; and the third is conscious misconstruction of figurative language. Futilities result from attempts made to confound invariable concomitance with a bare outward resemblance, and that which calls for an indignant reproof is “stupidity,” assumed or real.

12. Then comes cavilling. “This (viz., wrangling), when devoid of (any attempt made for) the establishing of the opposite side of the question, is cavilling.”

13. Fallacies are divided into five classes : (1) “Erratic,” (2) “contradictory,” (3) “equally available on both sides,” (4) “in the same case with what is to

be proved," and (5) the "mistimed." The "Tarka Sangraha," under the head of fallacies, has these words : "The five that merely present the appearance of a reason are : (1) that which goes astray, (2) that which would prove the contradictory, (3) that than which there is a stronger argument on the other side, (4) the inconclusive, and (5) the futile. In the Vaisesika Sutras we have one example given illustrative of all the fallacies : "Because this has horns, therefore it is a horse." On this we have these comments : "Where a hare or the like is the subject, and the being a horse is that which is to be proved, and the notion of having horns the argument, in such a case there exist all the five fallacies."

It is very difficult indeed to make this manifest, but not impossible. The hare has horns, therefore it is a horse. But it has no horns, and therefore the conclusion is derived from a major premiss which is erroneous,—viz., whatever has horns is a horse—and a minor premiss equally erroneous. Again, granting that the hare has horns, the conclusion deduced is the converse of what is deducible. Supposing, again, the horse has horns, the premises may prove that the subject is a horse or not a horse. Again, the premises and the conclusion are in the same predicament, the one needing proof as well as the other. And lastly, the whole argument is mistimed, as our senses prove that both the hare and the horse have no horns.

But examples more apposite than this ought to be adduced. The example of the first given in "Tarka Sangraha" is this : "The mountain is fiery because the existence of the mountain is capable of proof." Here the major premiss—whatever may be proved existent is fiery—is an error. Of the second the example

given is : "Sound is eternal because it is created." Here the premises support the very opposite conclusion. Of the third : "Sound is eternal because it is audible." Its audibility may be brought forward with equal cogency to prove its non-eternity. Of the fourth : "The sky-lotus is fragrant because the nature of a lotus resides in it." Here the nature of a lotus is assumed to be invariably associated with fragrance. And lastly, the fallacy called mistimed or futile is thus illustrated : "For example : suppose one argues that fire does not contain heat because it is factitious, the argument is mistimed, if we have already ascertained, by the superior evidence of the senses, that fire (granting it to be factitious) *does* contain heat."

Nothing sets forth the crudeness of Hindu Logic more than its disquisitions on the subject of Fallacy, the few instances given being almost all reducible to the irregular fallacy *non causa pro causæ*.

14, 15, and 16. Quibbling artifices, or frauds, or futile objections have already been taken notice of, and it is not necessary to refer to them here, excepting for the purpose of showing that their separate specification in the text is an example of tautology. The conclusion brings the discussion to a close by showing the opponent's stupidity, and his inability in consequence to carry on the argumentation any further, as well as by upholding the proposition originally stated.

Dr. Ballantyne, always prone to whitewash Hindu learning, offers a very ingenious explanation of this cumbrous process of reasoning. He affirms that this style of reasoning combines all the advantages of a logical process with those of what may be called a rhetorical flourish. The objector is first of all led through the varied steps of a well-conducted argument, beginning

with the proofs admitted, and rising up to a direct demonstration in the form of a lucidly stated syllogism, and an indirect demonstration fitted to reduce any conclusion but the right one to an absurdity. He is then allowed, if found stubborn, to plunge afresh into controversy, get entangled in wrangling, resort to cavilling, make use of naked fallacies, stoop to frauds and futilities, and ultimately have himself "voted a nuisance" amid the plaudits of a large body of spectators.

But whatever the advantage of the process may be in a public discussion, conducted in a large hall under the nose of innumerable spectators, it is, as a method of arriving at truth, both prolix and cumbrous. Nevertheless the Pandits are so decidedly attached to it that they look upon a simpler mode of argumentation as one which it is beneath their dignity to have recourse to. And if these incarnations of pedantry are to be influenced at all in favor of a body of truth other than what they are apt to look upon as worthy of acceptance, the varied steps of this tedious and awkward process must be utilized, and, if possible, they voted nuisances in the presence of people thoroughly versed in their habits of thought and modes of reasoning. And it is because missionaries as a body cannot use this weapon with any degree of dexterity, and the few who can will not wield it, that their influence over the learned in Hindustan has hitherto been almost *nil*.

We shall now refer to the subject of Cause and its varieties as set forth in Indian Logic. The definition given of cause in the "Tarka Sangraha" is simple, and on the whole unexceptionable: "That which invariably precedes an effect, that cannot else be, is a cause." An effect is defined as "that of which there was antecedent non-existence." The different kinds of

causes are thus set forth : " Cause is of three kinds, according to the distinction of intimate, non-intimate, and instrumental. That from which an intimately relative effect arises is an intimate cause, as threads are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own color, etc. Where this intimate relation exists, that cause, which is associated in one and the same object with such effect or cause, is non-intimate. Thus the conjunction of threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and the color of the threads that of the color of the cloth. The cause which is distinct from both of these is the instrumental cause, as the weaver's brush, loom, etc., are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that only which is not a universally concurrent cause or condition (of all effects, as God, time, place, etc. are) is called the instrumental cause."

Dr. Ballantyne shows that we have here the four kinds of causes described in Aristotle's logic—material, efficient, formal, and final. The intimate cause, which in the case of a piece of cloth is the threads of which it is composed, corresponds evidently to his material cause. The non-intimate cause, which is the conjunction of the threads into a particular shape, is the formal cause. The piece of cloth itself is the final cause, if by this expression we understand what seems to have been understood by Aristotle himself—viz., the effect in its completeness, not the use to which it is subservient. The instrumental cause, properly so called, is by Aristotle included in his definition of efficient cause ; and if we merge his efficient cause in the instrumental, we have all the varieties of causes he enumerates treated of in the "Tarka Sangraha."

Professor Gough, in his elaborate translation of the Vaiseshika Sutras, makes use of expressions different

from these in his presentation of the view of causes entertained in Indian schools of philosophy. Instead of Ballantyne's terms, "intimate," "non-intimate," and "instrumental," he makes use of the terms "coinherent," "non-coinherent," and "efficient." Let us present a few of the many examples scattered in the aphorisms and commentaries he translates to show that the Hindu notion of an efficient cause is very peculiar. Before doing so let us give the definition of an efficient cause presented in the "Tarka Sangraha :—" "An efficient cause not common to other causes is called a special cause."

In the First Daily Lesson of Book VIII. the subject of cognition is treated of, and its causes are thus set forth : "The causes of knowledge were stated in the aphorism, that which is produced by contiguity of soul, sense-organ, and object is other than those. The soul, then, is the cause, is the coinherent or material cause of cognition ; conjunction of the soul and internal sense is the non-coinherent cause ; apposition of the object is the occasional or efficient cause." Here it should be remembered that, according to an established maxim of Hindu Philosophy, the soul is literally changed into the object perceived, and that a line of distinction is scarcely drawn between instrumental and efficient causes. The soul is the matter of cognition, its conjunction with the internal sense gives it a definitive form, and the object placed before it is the instrumental cause.

Take another example. Aphorism 17 of the First Daily Lesson of Book V. runs thus : "The first action of the arrow is from impulse, the next is from self-reproduction caused by that action, and in like manner the next and the next." On this we have

these comments : " The first action in an arrow when discharged is produced by a bowstring drawn by human volition. In this case the impulse is the non-coinherent cause ; the arrow is the coinherent cause, volition and gravity are the efficient causes. By this first action self-reproduction, termed velocity, is produced in the same substance." Here there is evidently a confusion of ideas according to modern notions, though efficiency is traced to its proper source, if volition and gravity are not caused by some extraneous power and influence. But both these are in reality effects, and efficiency is traced to some mysterious power called Destiny.

Aphorism 15 of this very section runs thus : " The movement of the gem and the approach of the needle are caused by destiny." The commentator thus elucidates the passage : " By the term gem are intended vessels made of gold, etc., and filled with water. To such a vessel magicians apply incantations for the recovery of stolen property. The tradition of the ancients is that the vessel is set on the ground, and some other person lays his hand upon it. The vessel accompanied with the hand, in consequence of the efficiency of incantation, turns toward the spot where the stolen property has been deposited. The reason of the movement of such a vessel is not a particular volition, but the efficient cause of the merit of the former possessor or the demerit of the thief. The non-coinherent cause is the conjunction of such a vessel with soul possessing such destiny (or results of actions done in previous states of existence), and the coinherent cause is such a vessel. In like manner destiny is also the cause of the attraction toward a loadstone which takes place in needles or metallic rods when in proximity to the mag-



net." All efficiency, whether apparently inherent in volition or really immanent in the forces of nature, is traced to merit or demerit, or to Work, (Karma) the god not only of the Buddhists but of Hindu philosophers in general.

Apropos of the subject of causes, it is desirable to mention that our Indian logicians display a good deal of acuteness and ingenuity in their classifications, as well as considerable breadth of view in their generalizations. We have not only three kinds of causes enumerated, but several subordinate ones not only coinherent, but con-coinherent and con-con-coinherent causes, as will be seen in the following extracts from the "Tarka Sangraha :—" "The relative proximity of the sense and its object, which is the cause of perception, is of six kinds : (1) conjunction, (2) intimate union with that which is in conjunction, (3) intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, (4) intimate union, (5) intimate union with that which is intimately united, (6) and the connection which arises from the relation between that which qualifies and the thing qualified. For example : when a jar is perceived by the eye, there is (between the sense and the object) the proximity of conjunction. In the perception of the color of the jar there is the proximity of intimate union with that which is in conjunction, because color is intimately united with the jar, which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the perception of the fact that color generally is present, there is the proximity of intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, because the generic property of being colored is inherent in the particular color which is intimately united with the jar which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the percep-

tion of sound by the organ of hearing, there is the proximity of intimate union, because the organ of hearing consists of the ether which resides in the cavity of the ear, and sound is a quality of ether ; and there is intimate union between quality and that of which it is a quality. In the perception of the nature of sound (in a given sound of which we are cognizant) the proximity is that of intimate union with what is intimately united, because the nature of sound is inherent in sound, which is intimately united with the organ of hearing. In the perception of non-existence the proximity is dependent on the relation between a distinctive quality and that which is so distinguished, because when the ground is (perceived to be) possessed of the non-existence of a jar, the non-existence of a jar distinguishes the ground which is in conjunction with the organ of vision."

The system of logic, into which we have striven to present an insight through the media of quotations and extracts from standard works, displays a good deal of acuteness ; but as a method of arriving at truth it has failed. It has fostered, not the science of dialectics properly so called, but what is justly called "the pseudo-dialectical science of dispute," or Eristic ; and its result has been scepticism rather than recognition, spread, and preponderance of truth. It may be compared to that lore of the Sophists of ancient Greece, which led to individualism, pantheism, and nihilism, to Stoic pride and Epicurean libertinism. It is, however, a favorite study with the learned Pandits of India, and the ascendancy in their minds of its phraseology and modes of reasoning make them inaccessible to truth conveyed in a simpler manner. And the only way in which their minds can be influenced in favor of truth

unknown and unpalatable to them is, as has already been said, a skilful use of the weapons borrowed from this armory. The preachers of the Gospel in this country have, as a rule, neglected them either on account of their ignorance of or distaste for the style of reasoning in vogue ; but such neglect cannot be justified ; and when such neglect is the inevitable sequence of an accumulation of non-missionary work, the presence in our systems of this heterogeneous element cannot be condemned in terms too strong !

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY, OR THE HINDU ATOMIC THEORY.

WE presented in our last paper several extracts from the Vaiseshika Sutras, the Sutras ascribed to Kanada, the reputed and doubtless real founder of the Vaiseshika school, and embodied in ten books, each of which is divided into two Daily Lessons, like each of the books of the Nyaya Sastra. But we have yet to present, according to our practice, a conspectus of the contents of the Vaiseshika Sastra in the words of the "Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha :"

"In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he (Kanada) describes all the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first *ahinka* (daily lesson) he defines those which possess 'genus' (*jati*) ; in the second, 'genus' (or generality) itself, and 'particularity.' In the similarly divided second book he discusses 'substance,' giving in the first *ahinka* the characteristics of the five elements, and in the second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third book he defines the soul and the internal sense—the former in the first *ahinka*, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he discusses the body and its adjuncts—the latter in the first *ahinka*, and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates action ; in the first *ahinka* he considers action as connected with the body, in the second as belonging to the mind.

In the seventh book he discusses quality and intimate relation ; in the first *ahinka* he considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the eighth book he examines 'indeterminate' and 'determinate' perception and means of proof."

The author of the "Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha" falls into an unaccountable mistake as to the contents of the ninth and tenth books. Professor Cowel, who is the translator of the paper on Vaiseshika Philosophy in the book, thus speaks of their contents : "The ninth book treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact, etc., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the qualities of the soul, and the three causes." It may be added that the contents of each of these books are of such a miscellaneous nature that it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign it its distinctive character ; and consequently the classification given above may justly be called in question.

The object of the work is one, though its contents are varied and multiform. That object is set forth in its first two aphorisms : "Now, then, we will explain (what) merit (is). Merit is that from which (results) attainment of elevation and of the highest good." The first result of merit acquired in a former state of existence, or in a series of former states of existence, is the acquisition of "elevation" or knowledge of the truth, or the true distinction between soul and non-soul ; and the ultimate result is "the highest good," the *summum bonum*, which is cessation of pain. One of the celebrated commentators, in commenting upon these aphorisms, says : "The attainment of paradise by merit is with visible means, while the attainment of

liberation is by means of knowledge of the truth ; consequently there is a distinction."

The Vaiseshika Aphorisms, though a unity as regards their object, are a complexity as regards the variety of subjects treated of. The lore they present is of the most miscellaneous nature, consisting as it does of dissertations on logic, physics, psychology, metaphysical inquiries about the ultimate ground of existence, and practical directions as to the best mode of insuring liberation from the chains of transmigration. No one can study the book without concluding that the modern theory of the co-ordination of the sciences was not unknown in ancient times in our country, and that an approach at least was made to Comte's vaunted "hierarchical classification."

There is doubtless some beauty or attractiveness in the thought that all the knowledge which we may acquire by investigating into the facts and mysteries of nature, as well as by prying into the realities of the moral world, has a reflex bearing on the advancement of the soul, and its final emancipation. But the practical influence emanating from such an idea is demoralizing, inasmuch as it leads to a concentration of one's gaze, while engaged in prosecuting a course of liberal study, upon one's own self, rather than upon some object or being apart from self. But whether fitted to exalt or calculated to degrade, the conception is the root-principle of Hindu Philosophy ; and it is not a matter of wonder that a knowledge of the categories of the Vaiseshika system, the categories which set forth the distinction between the ego and the non-ego, should be represented as a stepping-stone to complete salvation.

These categories, six in number, though, according to

some champions of the school, seven, have already been enumerated : (1) substance, (2) attribute, (3) action, (4) generality, (5) particularity, and (6) inhesion. With the exception of the first, the categories may be identified with Aristotle's predicables—viz., genus, species, difference, property, and accident. What the Vaise-shika Sutras say with reference to these categories ought now to be indicated in order.

1. The word *substance* is used in a philosophical rather than in its ordinary acceptance, as a substrate of attributes or qualities, and therefore we have under this head not only earth, water, light, air, ether, but time, space, soul, and the internal organ, or the mind. Of these the physical entities have already been taken notice of, and the others will be treated of by and by.

2. The attributes assumed originally were seventeen—viz., color, taste, smell, touch, numbers, extensions, individuality, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, intellections, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and volitions. To these seven were subsequently added gravity, fluidity, viscosity, self-restitution, merit, demerit, and sound.

3. Actions are "throwing upward, throwing downward, contracting, expanding, and going."

4 and 5. Generality and particularity are what constitute genus and species. Existence is represented as the *summum genus*, and it includes the first three of the categories—substance, attribute, and action—while the subaltern genera are substantiality (*dravyatya*), the genus of quality or qualitateness (*gunatya*), and the genus of action (*karmatya*).

*Particularity* may in one sense be said to indicate the difference between the summum and subaltern genera, as well as between genera and species. But

the word *particularity* (*visesh*), from which the school derives its name Vaiseshika, indicates the peculiarity by which such substances as ether, time, space, the atomic minds, and the varied kinds of atoms, of which earth, water, air, and fire are composed, are discriminated from others. It is, therefore, "the ultimate difference" between simple and compound substances. It corresponds in some respects to the technical word *differentia* or *differentiæ*.

6. Inhesion or intimate relation is the relation in which the series of relations pointed out by the Vaiseshika doctrine of causality terminates when traced backward. Colebrooke thus explains this in his essay on the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika philosophy: "For the relation of cause and effect, and for distinguishing different sorts of cause connection (*sambodha*) or relation, in general, must be considered. It is twofold : simple conjunction (*sanyoga*) and aggregation, or intimate or constant relation (*samanaya*) ; the latter being the connection of things, whereof one, so long as they coexist, continues united with the other—for example : parts and that which is composed of them, as yarn and cloth ; for so long as the yarn subsists the cloth remains. Here the connection of the yarn and cloth is intimate relation ; but that of the loom is simple conjunction. Intimate relation or inhesion is, in Aristotelian phraseology, the material cause, and inseparable from the effect as long as it continues what it is.

To set forth the order of the categories, let us present an extract from the "Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha": "If you ask, 'What is the reason for this definite order of categories?' we answer as follows : Since 'substance' is the chief, as being the substratum of all the categories, we enounce this first ; next, 'quality,' since it



resides in its generic character in all substances (though different substances have different qualities); then 'action,' as it agrees with 'substance' and 'quality' in possessing 'generality;' then 'generality,' as residing in these; then 'particularity,' inasmuch as it possesses 'intimate relation;' and lastly, intimate relation itself; such is the principle of arrangement."

To these categories originally assumed, one was subsequently added, viz., non-existence, which may be represented as a peculiar feature of Indian Logic. Non-existence is of four kinds—*antecedent*, *subsequent*, *reciprocal*, and *absolute*.

Antecedent non-existence is thus set forth in the first aphorism of the First Daily Lesson of Book IX: "(An effect) is antecedently non-existent, inasmuch as there is non-existence of assertion of actions and qualities." Let this be read in conjunction with these comments: "Antecedently, that is, before the production of an effect, an effect or product, such as a water-pot or piece of cloth, is non-existent; that is, non-existent by self-determined negation during that time. The reason assigned is the absence of predication of actions and qualities. If the effect, the water-pot, etc., were existent during that time, it would be affirmed to possess actions and qualities, as in the case of a water-pot already produced, such affirmations are made as that the water-pot is at rest, or in motion, or seen to be colored. There is no such assertion antecedent to its production. It is, therefore, inferred that it is during that time non-existent."

Subsequent non-existence is simply destruction. Aphorism 2 runs thus: "The existent (becomes) non-existent." "It is proved," says the commentator, "by perception and inference that an existent product,

such as a water-pot, after the operation of a hammer, etc., which destroys it, is now non-existent, in like manner as it is proved by perception and inference that an effect is, previous to the operation of its cause, non-existent."

Aphorism 4 sets forth reciprocal non-existence in these words: "The existent also is non-existent." "For," says the commentator, "there are such cognitions as that a horse is not identical with a cow, a cow is non-existent as a horse, a piece of cloth is non-existent as a water-pot, a cow is not a horse, a horse is not a cow. There appears then in such a cognition the fact that a cow possesses reciprocal non-existence with a horse, a water-pot is reciprocally non-existent with a piece of cloth; and this reciprocal non-existence is otherwise designated absence of identity."

Absolute non-existence is set forth in Aphorism 5: "Whatever else, moreover, than these is non-existent is (absolutely) non-existent." Absolute non-existence is that of which the three other kinds of non-existence cannot be predicated—antecedent, emergent or subsequent, and reciprocal—which never was existent, and never will be, and which does not exist now. An example often adduced in Hindu Logic, viz., "hare's horn," may be brought forward in illustration of this species of non-existence.

The logical schools may justly be characterized as atomic, as the cosmology they teach traces creation through successive stages of development to primordial atoms of various kinds and properties. It is time to set forth the atomic theory of these schools. Let the following aphorisms be considered and weighed:

"The common property of substance and quality is that they originate things of the same class" (Book II.

Lesson I. Aph. 9). The commentator has these words in explanation : " Terrene atoms originate a terrene aggregate of two atoms ; blue color and the like in an atom produce blue color and the like in an aggregate of two atoms."

" The eternal is existent and uncaused " (Book IV. Lesson I. Aph. 1).

" The effect thereof is the mark of its existence" (Book IV. Lesson I. Aph. 2).

" The supposition that atoms are non-eternal is nescience" (Book IV. Lesson I. Aph. 5).

" The qualities have been stated. Also the color, taste, smell, and touch of the earth, etc., inasmuch as substances are non-eternal. By this is declared their eternity in things eternal " (Book VII. Lesson I. Aph. 1-3).

" In the non-eternal (extension) is non-eternal. In the eternal it is eternal. Atomic extension is eternal " (Book VII. Lesson I. Aph. 18-20).

In these aphorisms the theory appears in a germinal form, and it seems to have been matured in subsequent times by the champions of these schools. Atoms are the ultimate particles of matter, indivisible and eternal. They are divided into four classes, according to the four elements recognized in ancient times—terrene, aqueous, aerial, and igneous. The terrene atoms have, as the earth which they compose, color, taste, smell, and touch. The aqueous atoms have, as water, color, taste, and touch ; the aerial, as air, color and touch, and the igneous color only. The atoms cohere or agglutinate, not in consequence of the power of God, not in consequence of an inherent efficacy, but owing to an extraneous plastic influence or force.

What is that influence or force ? A modern com-

mentator has these words on an aphorism already quoted : " It is to be inferred that destiny is the cause of the motion of pieces of grass attracted by amber, of the upward flaming of fire, of the horizontal motion of wind, and of the action of primordial atoms." The same commentator says elsewhere : " The universal pervasion of the soul is proved, inasmuch as conjunction with soul influenced by destiny is the cause of action in the atoms at the time of creation."

Atoms are made to act or set in motion by destiny or the accumulated work of past states of existence, together with the merit and demerit attached thereto. And when set in motion by this mysterious and irresistible force, the principle, like attracts like, is realized, and atoms of one and the same class cohere. Two of them form a compound atom, and three a tertiary atom, which is visible like a mote in a sunbeam. And in this way, by a process of integration, disintegration, and reintegration, the universe is evolved out of these ultimate particles.

The atomic theory, propounded in ancient Greece by Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera, is in some respects essentially different from that of our Logical schools. The motive power in it is derived, through gravitation, from chance, not from the efficacy of accumulated merit and demerit, called destiny. The atoms posited by these philosophers are of different kinds, differing in size, form, and weight. The higher ones being heavier than the lower ones descend, causing the latter to ascend ; and thus horizontal motion is generated. And this motion produces lateral motion by means of percussion, the particles in their constant ascent and descent striking and causing one another to move laterally. In this way arose their rotary motion,

which resulted in their conglomeration into the huge masses of matter called worlds. The earth, when small in bulk and weight, was in motion, but it came to a state of rest when increased in volume and gravity. From its moisture arose organized beings, while souls were formed of those nice, smooth, and round atoms which are the constituent elements of fire. Such atoms are diffused over the whole body, and exercise particular functions in its particular organs, generating thought in the brain, anger in the heart, desire in the liver, and so on. We inhale soul-atoms and exhale them, and we live so long as this process of respiration lasts.

This statement makes the main difference between the two systems manifest. While the one system makes atoms the source of existence in all its forms, physical and spiritual, the other looks upon the process which evolves pure spirits out of the ultimate particles of impure matter as thoroughly absurd. Hindu Philosophy, in all its orthodox branches at least, affirms the eternal existence and incorruptible purity of the soul, as well as the eternity and impurity of matter. The antithesis between matter and mind has nowhere such prominence given it as in our national schools ; and whatever scheme of thought is calculated to confound these two irreconcilable entities is thrown aside as un-Hindu, unreasonable, and absurd. The atomic system of ancient Greece presents such confusion, and all attempt to assimilate it to what was elaborated in ancient India must be pronounced futile. Besides, work as a primal force has a methodical way of operating, and must not be confounded with chance, the inscrutable and unintelligent force behind the varied movements and combinations of varieties of atoms assumed in the Greek school referred to.

We pass on now to the metaphysical ideas, time and space, represented by Kant as subjective forms of thought rather than objective realities. They are called substances because either of them is a substratum of certain qualities or attributes. The qualities of the one are priority, posteriority, and simultaneity, and those of the other are proximity and remoteness, both included in the quality "extensions." Here are the aphorisms that speak of time and space :

"The notions of posteriority in relation to posteriority, of simultaneity, of slowness and quickness, are marks of the existence of time. Its substantiality and eternity are explained by air. Its unity is explained by existence" (Book II. Daily Lesson II. Aph. 6-8).

"The mark appertaining to space is that whence the knowledge arises that one thing is remote and not remote from another. The substantiality and eternity (of space) are explained by air. Its unity (is explained) by existence. Its diversity is (caused to be conceived) by the difference of its effects. (Space is regarded as) east because of a past, future, or present conjunction of the sun. So likewise (space is regarded as) south, west, and north" (Book II. Daily Lesson II. Aph. 10-15).

The meaning of these extracts is plain. Time is a substance, because it is the substrate of certain attributes or predicates. It is eternal as air, or the primary aerial atom, and it is one as the *summum genus* existence is one. Its marks have already been pointed out.

Space also is, for similar reasons, a substance eternal and one ; but it appears diverse on account of its accidental conjunction with other objects. "One man," says a commentator, "has the practical assurance that this is the east because the conjunction of the sun in the orient first took place yesterday. Another has the

notion of the east from observing that the conjunction of the sun in the orient will first take place to-morrow. Another has the notion of the east from observing that there is a present conjunction of the sun now taking place in that quarter." "In like manner the practical assurance of the south arises from past, future, or present conjunction of the sun with the mountains, etc., in the southern quarter. So also the notion of west and north may be analogously accounted."

From the metaphysical entities we pass on to what is called the internal organ or the inner sensory, *manas*, the mind. Let us, according to our usual course, present in a group the aphorisms bearing on the subject, and deduce proper conclusions from them. These, however, may be prefaced by a quotation from the first book of Gautama's Sūtras : "The characteristic of the mind is this, that there does not arise (in a single soul) more than one cognition at once." The Vaisesika Sūtras bearing on the subject are these :

"Existence and non-existence of knowledge on contact of the soul with the objects of sense are the mark of the existence of an internal organ. Its substantiality and eternity are explained by air. Because of non-simultaneity of volitions and non-simultaneity of cognitions it is one (in each body)" (Book III. Lesson II. Aph. 1-3).

"The upward flaming of fire, the sideward blowing of wind, and the first action of atoms and of the internal organ are caused by destiny. The action of the internal organ is explained by the action of the hand. Pleasure and pain result from contact of soul, sense, mind, and object. Absence of action in the internal sensory reposing in the soul ; non-existence of pain in the body—this is union. The egress and ingress (of

internal sensories from and into bodies), conjunctions with things eaten and drunk, conjunctions with other effects—all these things are caused by destiny” (Book V. Lesson II. Aph. 13-17).

“In consequence of the non-existence of that (universal pervasion), the internal organ is absolutely small” (Book VII. Lesson I. Aph. 23).

To these extracts one from the paper on Vaiseshika Philosophy in the “Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha” ought to be added with a view to a comprehensive presentation of the idea of the mind as enounced in the Logical schools :

“The general terms *atmatya* and *manastya* are the respective definitions of soul (*atman*) and mind (*manas*). The general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found existing, with intimate relation, in that which is without form (*amurta*). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an atom, but (unlike other atoms) not the intimate cause of any substance.” In these extracts a view of the mind is presented such as may justly be represented as somewhat ambiguous. At first sight the mind appears to be nothing more or less than a material organ of communication between the soul and the bodily senses. It is merely an organ of sensation and intellection to the soul. The external world makes, by its endless varieties of objects, suitable impressions upon the bodily senses ; and these impressions, called the raw materials of sensation, are one after another communicated to the soul for cognition by the mind. It is material, being small as an atom. Its atomic character is set forth by the fact that it can let in only one idea at a time. It has a form (*murta*),



and therefore differs from time, space, and ether, which are *amurta*, or without form. It is not infinite like ether, for had it been so it would have made simultaneity or cotemporaneity of cognitions and volitions on the part of the soul a possibility. It is, like the soul, multitudinous, its plurality being proved by the fact that everybody in the world has a particular mind attached to it. It moves to and fro, gets into and comes out of bodies ; but all its movements are caused and regulated by the mysterious, unseen power called destiny. It is in reality the internal sensory, as Professor Gough calls it, a material organ of communication attached to the soul, and forming a sort of intermediate post-office between the governor within and the external senses, its servitors.

This view of the mind appears at first sight to be a great advance on that of the Sankhya school. By the Sankhya philosopher the mind is called the internal sense, the eleventh organ, a material evolute ; but it is not according to his views an unconscious, inactive instrument of communication between the soul and the external world. On the contrary, it is the only active principle in man ; it receives the impressions made upon the senses, elaborates them into ideas, arranges and classifies them, deduces general conclusions from them, wills and acts, and desists from willing and acting according as it is moved by preponderant and non-preponderant motives. In a word, it performs all those functions which are ascribed by general consent to the soul, or to the mind as the soul itself, not as one of its organs. The soul, again, is merely a passive, unconscious, luminous substance, in which the sensations and ideas elaborated by the mind are simply reflected.

But here in the Logical schools the order seems reversed. The mind is the passive, unconscious sub-

stance of atomic size and shape, and the soul is the active principle in man. The mind is caused to find its own level among its internal organs, while the soul has its ceaseless activity restored to it, along with its percipient, elaborative, volitionating power. Thus far an improvement seems to have been realized.

But these schools waver, and there are aphorisms in their standard works which indicate a tendency to return to the Sankhya view, which, be it observed, is in perfect accord with the most approved principles of Hindu Philosophy in general. The aphorism, for instance, already quoted : "Absence of action in the internal sensory reposing in the soul, non-existence of pain in the body—this is union." The meaning of these words is elucidated in these comments : "When the internal sensory abides in the soul alone . . . there results the non-commencement or non-production of the action of the internal sensory. The sensory then becomes immovable. In this state there is non-existence of pain in the body—that is, pain is not produced in relation to the body. This is called the conjunction or union with soul of the internal organ excluded from all things external."

Here the internal organ is represented as active, and its action is a source of pain, and therefore a stumbling-block or an obstacle all but insuperable in the way of emancipation. Its activity, moreover, is the result of its outward move toward the objects of external nature or the organs of sense. And the cessation of its activity can be realized only when this outward tendency is superseded by an inclination inward, or, in plainer terms, when it is withdrawn from the objects of sense, and made to repose, calm and imperturbable, in the soul.

The "sixfold union" by which this change in the mischievous outward tendency of the mind is brought about is set forth in these comments : " Sitting, checking the vital airs, abstraction, suspension of the faculties, meditation, and contemplation—these are the six elements of union." Here the course recommended for the suppression of the mischievous activity of the mind, and the insurance of its ultimate repose in the soul, is nearly the same detailed in Patanjali's treatise on Yoga Philosophy. We notice, therefore, in the Nyaya and Vaisesika Sutras a sort of oscillation between the views which ascribed perfect quiescence to the soul and mischievous activity to the mind, and those which reverse the order of the synthetic schools, and make the soul active and the mind passive.

This vacillation, by no means unaccountable, will be still more manifest when the aphorisms on the soul are presented and thoroughly examined. Here are these aphorisms :

" The universal cognition of the objects of sense is an argument for (the existence of) another object than the objects of sense" (Book III. Lesson I. Aph. 2).

The aphorism embodies an argument in favor of the existence of souls drawn out in the succeeding aphorisms. It is very plain and forcible to the Hindu mind. The objects of sense have no consciousness and percipient faculty, and therefore cannot cognize themselves. Nor can the senses, which are also without consciousness and percipient faculty, cognize them. The mind being in the same predicament—a material organ—cannot be the author of cognition. But the objects of sense are cognized and made the bases of appropriate ideas, general concepts, or judgments both simple and complex ; and as the cognitive and elaborative faculty

does not reside in them, nor in the instruments through which they are perceived, something must be assumed as its substratum or as in possession of it. That something is the conscious soul.

The marks of the existence of the soul are thus set forth :

“ The ascending and descending vital airs, the opening and closing of the eyes, lips, motions of the internal organ, affections of the other organs, pleasure, pain, desire and aversion, and volition, are marks of the existence of the soul ” (Book III. Lesson II. Aph. 4).

This continues the argument presented in the aphorism commented on above. Not only is the existence of the soul proved by “ the existence or non-existence of knowledge,” by science and nescience, but by the physical conditions of life, such as the horizontal and circular motions of the vital airs within, by the impressions made upon the organs of sense, by the activity of the internal sensory, by the qualities of pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and lastly by volition. Are all movements within the body voluntary ? If so, they certainly indicate the presence of a volitionating principle, or the soul. But some of the movements of which we are conscious, such as the action of the lungs, are in reality automatic rather than voluntary. How can these demonstrate the existence of the soul ? Here the well-known argument of the Sankhya school is utilized. Even action, which is called automatic, from which the principle of volition is absent, is not objectless. What can be the object of the varieties of physical movements within us ? Certainly the gratification of the soul. They, therefore, ought to be brought forward as fitted to prove the existence of the soul. All this may be predicated of the motions of the internal organs, which

also have for their object the gratification of the soul. And as to pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, they certainly indicate the existence of the soul, as they cannot possibly be properties of inanimate matter. And lastly, what can prove the existence of soul better than volition ?

To this argument an exception may be taken. In the case of a simple judgment, such as, This is Yajna Datta, nothing is perceived beyond the conjunction of an organ of sense and an object ; why should it be regarded as an indication of the existence of some principle behind the perceptible contact? Besides, even if we grant that desire and aversion, cognition and volition are indicative of a substratum in which they inhere, why should we look upon that substratum as the soul, not as something else ? It may therefore be concluded that nothing short of revelation can prove the existence of an imperceptible entity like the soul. To this the proper reply is couched in Aphorism 9 of Lesson II. of Book III. :

“Existence of the soul being the *conditio sine qua non* of the use of the word I is not evidenced only by revelation.”

Again, in Aphorism 18 we have these words :

“The knowledge of the ego, being individually established, like sound, as a *conditio sine qua non*, neither too narrowly nor too widely affirmed, by its predominant and sensible attributes, does not depend upon revelation.”

These aphorisms indicate a fresh item of deviation from the Sankhya and Yoga schools. Egoism or consciousness is represented in these schools as an entity distinct from the soul, which appears more like an unconscious lump of luminous matter than a spiritual

principle. But in the Logical schools egoism is identified with the soul. Its predominant and sensible attributes are pleasure, pain, etc., and these prove its existence as decidedly as sound proves the existence of ether ; inasmuch as these attributes are not applicable to the body as the quality sound is not applicable to earth, water, air, or fire. It may, however, be said that we do speak of the body being pained or of the body moving or acting. But these expressions are tropical or figurative, and they should not be taken in a literal sense. The plurality of souls is maintained in these, as well as in the synthetic schools. The following quotations are enough to prove this :

“ Activity and inactivity observed in one’s own soul are the mark of the existence of other souls ” (Book III. Lesson I. Aph. 19).

“ Because of its circumstances, soul is manifold ” (Book III. Lesson II. Aph. 20).

It is not at all hard to explain the first of these aphorisms. Activity and inactivity are generated by desire and aversion, a natural longing for pleasure, and an instinctive recoil from pain. Of this fact our consciousness assures us, as well as the testimony of credible or trustworthy witnesses. But of all the activity and inactivity noticed in the world, we are not the centre. The largest quantity by far must needs be traced to other individuals—our companions, fellow-citizens, and fellow-men. Activity and inactivity in their case indicate what they indicate in ours—viz., desire and aversion. But these are properties or affections of the soul, and consequently activity and inactivity in the case of our fellow-men indicate the existence in them of souls similar to ours.

But the plurality of souls is proved by another line of

reasoning. Our circumstances vary. Some among us are rich, some poor ; some are respectable, some mean ; some are happy, and some miserable. This variety in our circumstances is an indisputable evidence of the plurality of souls.

These lines of proof, though shabbily stated in the Sutras, may be adopted by a modern psychologist. But there is one which may be described as "racy of the soil." The existence of souls in general may be proved, as has already been affirmed, by direct perception. Devotees have had their vision so far extended, by dint of austerity and meditation, that they have been able to see human souls—their own soul and the souls of others—just as we see the visible objects of nature around us. As a rule, souls are said to be imperceptible. The second aphorism of the First Lesson of Book VIII. sets forth its imperceptibility along with that of the internal organ : "Therein the soul and the internal organ are imperceptible." As an imperceptible object, it is placed in the same category with ether, time, space, air, and atoms. But cognition of the soul is the result of a particular condition, which is set forth in Aphorism 11 of the Second Daily Lesson of Book VIII. : "Perception of the soul (results) from a particular conjunction between the soul and the internal organ in the soul." The meaning is clear. When the internal organ, having withdrawn itself from the external objects of sense, as the tortoise draws its limbs within its shell, merges itself in the soul, that which is invisible becomes visible ; souls are seen, while the material creation vanishes out of sight, except in its atomic forms.

Gautama, in Book I. Sec. 3, speaks of the soul in these words : "Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and knowledge are the sign of the soul."

Let us now present in one focus all that is predicated of the soul in these and other aphorisms of the standard works of these two schools of Hindu Philosophy.

The soul is an eternal, imperceptible, active principle, not a passive substance endowed with the cognitive faculty and volitionating power. It is, therefore, the source of cognition, knowledge, emotion, every species of noticeable activity, and every species of voluntary abstinence from activity. Its characteristic features are volition, desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, and knowledge, both in its incipient and matured states. It communicates with the external world through the internal organ, the mind, and the external organs of sense, hearing, seeing, taste, smell, and touch. It has no innate or supersensuous ideas. Thus far, barring the representation of the mind as an internal organ, not as another name for the soul itself, the description may in all its entirety be adopted by those philosophers of the sensational school who do not look upon it, as John Stuart Mill does, as simply "a permanent possibility of sensation," and therefore inferentially identical with or not different from matter itself.

The view presented of the soul may at first sight seem correct and consistent. But while studying Hindu Philosophy we must never lose sight of the proverb, "Everything that glitters is not gold." According to its approved maxims, the properties or affections enunciated are adventitious, not essential. Desire and aversion are defects of which the soul must get rid before emancipation can possibly be realized. Again, desire and aversion are generated in the soul through the cognitive faculty by the objects of the external world. The cognitive faculty is, therefore, a mischievous principle, and must also be annihilated. Once more, desire



and aversion lead the soul to activity or inactivity through volition, which is, therefore, a mischievous power to be suppressed or eradicated. The soul simply goes back to its original condition of perfect quiescence when its emancipation from the bondage of ignorance is realized. A state of happy inactivity or blissful passivity is its starting-point and goal, and whatever is calculated to bring it out of such state is an accident to be deprecated, and ruthlessly eradicated when realized.

This point will have to be enlarged on before the sequel. Meanwhile it is desirable to raise a question of paramount importance—viz., Do the Sutras speak of a Universal Soul of an unlimited power, and do they represent Him as the creator of the world, the source of all knowledge and bliss? The aphorisms in which God is spoken of in the Vaisesika Sutras are very few in number, and are by no means of an unambiguous nature. The first of these runs thus :

“ Authoritativeness belongs to revelation because it is a declaration of that” (Book I. Lesson I. Aph. 3).

On this verse a modern commentator has the following remarks :

“ The word *Tat* (that) signifies God, though He has not been previously mentioned, it being inferred from His being universally known, just as in the aphorism of Gautama, ‘ That is unauthoritative, being vitiated by falsity, self-contradictoriness, and repetition.’ By the word ‘ that ’ the Veda is signified, though not previously mentioned. Accordingly an authoritativeness belongs to revelation—the Veda—because it was declared by Him—revealed by God.”

Another aphorism bearing on the subject runs thus :

“ But word and work are the mark of those beings

who are distinguished from ourselves" (Book I. Lesson II. Aph. 18).

An ancient commentator thus explains these ambiguous words :

"The word 'but' implies the exclusion of the marks of touch, etc. A word is a name, a work an effect, such as the earth, etc. Both of these are a mark of the existence of God and the great sages who are more excellent than ourselves."

The modern commentator referred to thus comments upon these words :

"The word 'but' expresses a division of the sections, and implies that the section treating of the Deity is now commenced. A word is a name, such as air, a boar, barley, a reed, and the like ; a work is an effect, as the earth, a blade of grass, etc. These are both marks inferring the existence of God and the great sages, who are distinguished from ourselves, who are able to produce this and that effect, and are possessed of omniscience and omnipotence."

The reader must not suppose that "the section treating of the Deity" is of average length and breadth ; it only consists of the aphorism quoted above and the following :

"Because words and works are known by perception to be produced."

The ancient commentator thus explains these words :

"As when the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, and others are objects of perception to a father and others, the names Chaitra, Maitra are given, so the giving of names to a water-pot, a piece of cloth, etc., is dependent on the will of God. Whatever word God wills to be the name of anything is applicable to it, in the same manner that every herb that is touched by the edge of

an ichneumon's teeth is an antidote to the venom of a snake. Therefore a name of this kind is a mark inferential of those beings which are distinguished from ourselves and others."

These aphorisms and these comments make it evident that the argument resorted to or brought forward by the ancient logicians of India is that based on design in nature or the teleological argument. They sometimes did bring forward explicit statements, culled from revelation, in support of the fundamental doctrine of all religion, the existence of God ; but even when this was done, the point on which the greatest stress was laid was not so much the testimony itself as the marks of design in the testimony, as the following passage from the "*Kusumanjali*," a work on Logic recently translated by Professor Cornell, will show :

"An omniscient and indestructible Being is to be proved from the existence of effects, from the combination of atoms, from the support of the earth in the sky, from traditional arts, from belief in revelation, from the Veda, from its sentences, and from particular members."

In this extract, design in the construction of the sentences of the Veda, and the clauses of which they are composed, is insisted on, as well as the bare testimony embodied in revelation. What a gap between the teleological argument, as it was unfolded in those days, when the best example of design available was a jar or a water-pot, and the same argument as it is presented in these days of steam-engines, locomotives, and telegraphic wires ! A modern audience might laugh if an orator prone to enlarge upon the art of giving names, or constructing sentences, or weaving cloths, or making jars as an indisputable proof of the existence of God ;

but it must not be forgotten that the absurdity of the theory of evolution, as propounded by those who do not believe in design, has often been set forth in our day by the hypothesis of an accidental agglomeration of letters into words, words into sentences, sentences into the beauty and pathos, the truth and depth of Shakespeare. Our ancient philosophers had evidently no idea either of the ontological or of the moral argument in favor of the existence of God.

It may seem strange that a multitude of sages, "more excellent than ourselves," are associated with God in the aphorisms of Kanada quoted above, in the work and word which demonstrate His and their existence. It is explicitly declared that the objects of nature and the names given to many of them are proofs of the existence, not only of God, but of other spiritual beings imperceptible to our gross percipient faculties. Who are these? Men raised to the position of the gods by austerity and meditation, or angelic beings who have always stood nearer to God than man? Perhaps both these classes of glorious beings are referred to, though the word "sages" used by the commentator is more applicable to human adepts than to ethereal intelligences. They are represented as co-sharers, both in His attributes and in His works, with God. They are expressly said to be "possessed of omniscience and omnipotence."

But it is to be observed that this representation, paradoxical though at first sight it may appear, is in perfect keeping with the approved principles of Hindu Philosophy. One of these is that a person literally becomes that which he makes the subject of long-continued and intense meditation. He can transform himself into an atom by meditating intensely upon an atom, or

the diffusive ether by making that all-pervasive substance the subject of concentrated, self-oblivious contemplation. By a similar process he can even change himself into God. "I will be God by meditating upon God"—such is the sublime aspiration of many a devotee in India. And if the God believed in were something more than a mere nonentity, such aspiration would be higher than the highest ever cherished by a human being. But neither God nor the human soul is anything better than a nonentity, according to Hindu Philosophy; and therefore this aspiration, at first sight so high, resolves itself into a desire to pass from troublesome existence into troubleless non-existence!

In these verses God is certainly represented as the Creator of the universe. In the paper on the Nyaya Philosophy in the "Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha" there is an elaborate argument presented to prove that He is such. The objections against the notion of attributing creation to Him are by no means few or of a contemptible order, according to Hindu Philosophy. God, you say, is the Creator of the universe. Very well; the question rises, What could lead Him to create? His own advantage or that of His creatures? Not certainly His advantage, because as the Absolute Being He needed nothing, and can need nothing to complete His perfection. Did He, then, create to make His creatures happy? If so, He must have miserably failed, for His creatures are far from happy—are very miserable indeed. This objection may be easily rebutted. God's determination to create proceeded from "compassion," or a wish to make His creatures happy. But these have by their own works made themselves miserable.

There is, however, an insuperable objection to the

idea of God bringing Himself to a determination to create. God cannot create without being moved by a desire to do so. Hence creation on the part of God implies on His part a desire, and a preponderant desire, or a desire leading to a volition and an action. Now a desire, according to Hindu Philosophy, is an evil and a source of bondage, however good it may be. How can that which is admittedly a source of misery be evinced by a Being described as eternally free from all pain as well as pleasure? The Hindu philosopher shows no little vacillation here, and escapes the horns of a formidable dilemma by supposing a force behind the Deity as the ultimate source of creation. That force is in these Sūtras called Destiny.

We have already had occasion to dwell upon the many forms in which this mysterious primal force manifests itself. It is, properly speaking, the source of all material movements in creation. In commenting upon a verse already quoted, one of the commentators says : " It is to be inferred that Destiny is the cause of the motion of pieces of glass attracted by amber, of the upward flaming of fire, of the horizontal motion of wind, and of the action of primordial atoms in creation." It is also the source of desire and aversion to which every species of activity, other than material, is traceable. Let the following aphorisms prove this :

" From pleasure arises desire. And also through that being ingrained. And also through destiny" (Book V. Lesson II. Aph. 10-12).

From pleasure arises desire, and that is traceable to Destiny. Destiny, therefore, generates and controls all material movements, and all our thoughts, feelings, and volitions. And Destiny originally caused the atoms to combine, integrate and disintegrate, and de-

velop into the varied objects of creation. Destiny, then, is the ultimate ground of existence in its multifarious forms. Or if God were represented as the creative principle or power, the representation would not be correct unless He were held up as a sort of demi-urgic link between the creation and the Creator. God could not create without being moved by a desire to do so. But all desires proceed from Destiny, to which, therefore, His desire to create must be traced. Destiny, therefore, is the Creator, whether creation is traced to it through God or through atoms !

But why are two plans of creation set forth—the one tracing it through a God, and the other directly through innumerable atoms to Destiny ? Because perhaps the philosophers of these schools oscillated between their own and the popular notion of creation ; or perhaps they tried to conciliate popular sentiment by an introduction into their scheme of some elements of belief, without which it was sure to fall flat on the public. And lastly, we may suppose that they identified Destiny with God. The second of these hypotheses appears to us correct. The logicians posited a perfectly inactive and quiescent God more to humor popular prejudices than to serve any recognized purpose of their essentially atheistic scheme of philosophy.

But what is Destiny, the *Adrishta*, Unseen Force behind the phenomena of nature and evolutions of Providence ? To settle this question we must examine what is said about desire and aversion, and merit and demerit.

Gautama describes the passions, or desire and aversion, as having “ this characteristic, that they actuate,” or cause actions. Kanada defines desire as a longing for pleasure and aversion, as a recoil from pain. They

both lead to activity, and therefore they are both mischievous. We have already quoted the aphorism : "From pleasure arises desire." The following comments on these words are worthy of consideration :

"Desire or wish arises from pleasure generated by attachment to garlands, sandal-wood, women, and other objects of sense, or in the pleasures of those successive kinds, or in the means of those pleasures. It is also to be considered that aversion arises from pain begotten by snakes, thorns, etc. ; in these pains or in the means of these pains. Desire, aversion, and infatuation, in virtue of being incentives to activity, are called defects. Accordingly the aphorism of Gautama, Defects have for their characteristic incitement to activity."

Here the thing to be noted is, that pleasure and pain are antecedent to desire and aversion, which again lead to action, and that to bondage. The definitions given of pleasure and pain are of the crudest type. What a gap between them and Sir William Hamilton's definition of pleasure as unimpeded energy, and of pain as impeded energy ! How gross, again, are the ideas of pleasure and pain presented ! The exquisite enjoyments and the exquisite sufferings arising from the intellectual and moral nature of man are almost entirely thrown out of calculation !

Let us now advert to the subject of merit and demerit. In Aph. 3 of the Second Lesson of Book V. we have these words : "The duty of the four periods of religious life (has been declared). Fidelities and infidelities are the causes of merit and demerit." This is a very important aphorism, inasmuch as it traces merit and demerit, not only to external acts, such as the duties performed by a Brahmin passing through the



four stages of studentship, householdership, hermitship, and mendicancy, but to states of the heart or internal dispositions. In the aphorism following, infidelity is said to be "a deficiency of faith," and fidelity "non-deficiency."

In aphorisms 14 and 15 of the same book and section we have these words : "Activity in merit and demerit has for its antecedents desire and aversion. By these are conjunction and disjunction."

The ancient commentator explains the last few words thus :

"Existence in a future state is now declared to be the occasion of merit and demerit. By these—by merit and demerit—conjunction—that is, birth—is caused. By conjunction is here intended connection with non-previous pains of bodily organs. Disjunction is the disjunction of body and the internal sensory, characterized as death. The meaning is, therefore, that this transitory world, a series of births and deaths, otherwise termed existence in a future state, is caused by merit and demerit."

We shall only quote another aphorism from Book IX. : "The knowledge of inspired sages and perfect vision result from merit."

The ideas presented in these extracts may be thus grouped : Our present life is the result of merit and demerit accumulated in past lives. We are adding constantly to this accumulated load by our conduct in this life, our dispositions and acts. We acquire transcendent knowledge and miraculous powers by such meditation as is a result of merit, and our final emancipation is also connected therewith. From these statements it is plain that what is called Destiny is identical with merit and demerit, or with work, the

source of merit and demerit. Work, then, rather than God, is the creator of the universe, our creator and incarcerator ; and it also ultimately leads to our emancipation through the medium of that meditation by which it is itself annihilated ! Here, again, is the impersonal God of Buddhism !

And lastly we come to what Gautama calls the chief end of man, Emancipation. In Book V. Lesson II. Aph. 18, we have this set forth : " Where there is non-existence of this (that is, of Destiny), there is non-existence of conjunction, and non-existence of manifestation, emancipation."

Destiny or work is the cause of that all but endless chain of births and deaths under which we groan. But when its fruits are consumed and it itself is annihilated, in the case of a spirit raised through successive stages of exalted existence to the summit of concentration, its conjunction with material conditions disappears, along with its manifestation in a bodily form, and its final liberation is realized.

The means are indicated in this aphorism : " Emancipation is declared as dependent on the actions of the soul " (Book VI. Lesson II. Aph. 16).

These words are thus explained : " This it is which is separation of body and soul. When there exist the actions of the soul, emancipation ensues. The actions of the soul are as follows : Hearing, meditation, the practice of devotion, abstraction, a sitting posture, restraining the vital airs, acquisition of quietism, and self-subjugation, the presentation of one's own and others' souls, knowledge of merit and demerit previously acquired by fruition, and emancipation characterized as removal of pain, consequent on the cessation of birth, resulting from the cessation of activity, in consequence

of the non-production of further merit and demerit, by overcoming the mist of defects characterized as desire and aversion. Of these, the primary act of soul is knowledge of the real nature of the six categories."

The concatenation ending in emancipation is elsewhere set forth in these comments : "Therefore the practical application of this introductory section of two aphorisms is that persons desirous of emancipation are concerned in the non-existence of birth for the sake of non-existence of pain ; in the non-existence of activity for the sake of non-existence of birth ; in the non-existence of faults for the sake of non-existence of activity ; in the cessation of false knowledge for the sake of non-existence of faults ; and in forming a mental presentation of the soul for the sake of cessation of false knowledge."

The links to be successively destroyed are false knowledge, faults, or desire and aversion, activity, pain, birth ; and the means of destruction is right knowledge of the soul and its difference from non-soul, which right knowledge is attained by work and the meditation which destroys work ! And when mundane existence is rolled up as a scroll, we have the permanent entities, God, Soul, Mind, Atoms, left—all immobile and inactive except when operated upon by Destiny. How came Destiny to exist before the beginning of the chain of conjunction and disjunction, births and deaths, to which it gave birth ; or how, when destroyed by a process of self-destruction, it reappears, Phoenix-like, at every renovation of creative work—these mysteries are left unsolved. The only reply attempted is, The process is eternal !

Pandit Nehemiah Goreh praises the system in his well-known book on Hindu Philosophy for its recogni-

tion of God as the Creator of the universe. It is impossible to say how the truth has escaped his calm and philosophical intellect, that God, according to it, has nothing to do with our creation, our incarceration, and our salvation. He is simply a superfluous entity, introduced for conventional or utilitarian purposes, and therefore perfectly dispensable, along with the soul, and perhaps the mind. Destiny and atoms, matter and force, are in reality the ground of existence. The apparent trialism of these schools dwindles, when properly interpreted, into the materialistic monism of the Sankhya system !

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE PURVA MIMANSA, OR HINDU RITUALISM.

THE schools directly and ostensibly associated with the Veda next claim attention—viz., the Purva and the Uttara Mimansa. The words *Purva* and *Uttara* mean “prior” and “posterior,” “antecedent” and “subsequent ;” and in connection with the word *Mimansa* the ideas they express are a prior and a posterior decision. There is a little ambiguity attached to the expressions at first sight, and it has plunged such great thinkers as Dr. Ritter into error. Is the idea of antecedence or subsequence in time conveyed by these words in this connection ? Or are the predicates applicable to something lying beyond the confines of chronology ? Some writers of eminence have fallen into the mistake of attaching to them the ideas of priority and posteriority in time ; and Dr. Ritter occupies the foremost place among them. According to them, the *Uttara* Mimansa school, or what is oftener called the Vedantic school, was founded after the *Purva* Mimansa school had been organized ; and this circumstance sets forth the significance of the appellatives in question. But this notion is not obviously tenable, as in the Sutras ascribed to Jaimini, the acknowledged founder of the Purva Mimansa or the prior school, the name of Badarayana, the founder of the later school, is distinctly mentioned as an authority. In Book I. Sec. 1, Aph. 5, we have these words :

“ But the natural connection of a word with its sense is (the instrument of) the knowledge thereof (*i.e.* of Duty), and the intimation (of Scripture, which is) unerring, though given in respect of something imperceptible. This (according to our opinion, as well as that) of Badarayana (the author of Vedanta Aphorisms) is the evidence (by means of which we recognize Duty), for it has no respect (to any other evidence, such as that of sense).”

This express mention of the founder of the later school as an authority, co-ordinate, if not supraordinate, in one of the opening Sutras of the standard document of the prior school, militates against the principle of interpretation, to which the mistake alluded to is attributable. The ideas of priority and posteriority in time must be set aside altogether. These epithets refer to the well-known divisions of the Veda, to the prior and posterior portions of that venerable work, rather than to two successive divisions of time.

In the first of this series of papers, the three main divisions of the Rig and other Vedas were pointed out. A fresh reference to them is needed to explain these two important terms. The three principal divisions of each of the Vedas are : (1) Mantra, or Hymns ; (2) Brahmana, or Ritualistic Directory; and (3) Upanishad, or Underlying Philosophy. The hymnology and the ritual form the prior portion, while the philosophy in which these two elements terminate constitutes the later portion. The Purva Mimamsa philosophizes on the earlier portion of the Veda, or the portion embracing the Mantra and the Brahmana; and the Uttara Mimamsa treats of the later portion, or that embracing the Upanishad. The former school is, properly speaking, called the Mimamsa, and the latter the Vedanta.

The schools are also called the Exoteric and the Esoteric.

It is to be observed that, though in one sense they may justly be said to have appeared contemporaneously, the Vedantic school was not matured and perfected till the rival form of thought had nearly, if not entirely, lost its prestige and dominating influence. The Vedantic school may therefore be called the Uttara Mimansa, both in a chronological as well as in the sense of its philosophy being confined to the concluding portion of the Veda.

The founder of the Mimansa school was Jaimini, who is more than once named in the Sutras ascribed to him, but regarding whom little or nothing is known besides the fact of his having founded one of the six great schools of Hindu Philosophy, and expounded its principles, after the orthodox fashion, in a series of aphorisms. The number of aphorisms ascribed to him is no less than 2652, and they are classified into 915 *Adhikarans*, or topical sections, and these again are grouped into sixty chapters, which form twelve books, each consisting of four chapters, besides the third, sixth, and tenth, each of which has twice as many, or eight chapters.

This mass of aphorisms would be thoroughly unintelligible but for the glosses and scholias extant, or within reach of the plodding student. The ancient commentator, whose great commentary has been revised by subsequent scholiasts, was Sabara Swami Bhatta, and his great work is called after him, "Sabara-Bhashya." The greatest of the subsequent annotators was Kummāṛilla Swami Bhatta, who is one of the great leaders of the memorable crusade, the issue of which was the almost complete banishment of Buddhism from the

country of its birth. Of this great man Colebrooke speaks thus :

“Kumarilla Bhatta figures greatly in the traditional religious history of India. He was predecessor of Sankar Acharya, and equally rigid in maintaining the orthodox faith against heretics who reject the authority of the Vedas. He is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of Buddha, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy. He does indeed take every occasion of controverting the authority and doctrine of Sakya or Buddha, as well as Arhat or Jina, together with obscurer heretics, Bodhyana and Umsaka ; and he denies them any consideration, even when they do concur upon any point with the Vedas. The age of Kumarilla, anterior to Sankar, and corresponding with the period of the persecution of the Bandhas, goes back to an antiquity of much more than a thousand years.”

Another annotator of note ought to be named, as, from references in the “Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha,” he appears to have led one great division of the Miman-sakas, a division forming a sort of opposition to Kumarilla Bhatta. His name is Pravakara, and he might have been a contemporary of his opponent, Kumarilla.

We give, as usual, the synopsis of the contents of Jaimini's great work, as presented in the paper entitled “Jaimini Darsana” in the “Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha :”

“An objector may here ask, Are you not continually repeating that merit (Dharma) comes from the practice of duty (Dharma); but how is duty to be defined or proved? Listen attentively to my answer. A reply to this question has been given in the older Mimansa by the holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mimansa consists



of twelve books. In the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections of words which are severally meant by the terms 'injunction' (*vidhi*), 'explanatory passage' (*arthavada*), 'hymn' (*mantra*), 'tradition' (*smṛiti*), and 'name' (*nam*). In the second, certain subsidiary discussions (as *e.g.* on *Apurva*) relating to the difference of various rites, refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of performance (as in 'constant' and 'voluntary' offerings). In the third *sruti*, 'sign,' or 'sense of the passage' (*linga*), 'context' (*vakya*), etc., and their respective weight when in apparent opposition to one another, the ceremonies called *pratipatti-karmani*; things mentioned incidentally, things accessory to several main objects, as *prayajas*, etc., and the duties of the sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the *juhu* being made of the *butea-prondosa*, and the dice-playing, etc., which form subordinate parts of the *vajasruya* sacrifice. In the fifth, the relative order of different passages of *sruti*, etc., the order of different parts of a sacrifice (as the seventeen animals at the *vajapeya*), the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of words of *sruti*, order of mention, etc., in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitute for enjoined materials, supplies for the lost and injured offerings, expiatory rites, the *sattara* offerings, things proper to be given, and the different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vedantic texts, and then as inferred by 'name' or 'sign.' In the eighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or ob-

scurely expressed 'sign,' or by the predominant 'sign,' and cases where no transference takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (*uha*), the adaptation of *samans* and *mantras*, and collateral questions connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where the non-performance of the primary rite involves the 'preclusion' and non-performance of dependent rites, and of occasions where the rites are precluded, because other rites produce their special result; discussions connected with the *graha* offerings, certain *samans*, and various other things, and a discussion on different kinds of negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the fuller discussion of *tantra* (where several acts are combined into one). In the twelfth, a discussion on *prasanga* (where the rite is performed for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference); *tantra*, cumulation of concurrent rites, and option."

From the foregoing conspectus it is evident that very little of what is properly called philosophy is found in this mass of aphorisms. The problems of existence are not here even referred to. The soul, its nature, the relation in which it stands to the non-ego or to the infinite, the source of its bondage, and its emancipation—subjects discussed with no little logical acumen and philosophical insight in the other schools—are simply thrust into the background. And practical directions as to the sacred books to be invested with canonical authority, the rites and ceremonies to be performed with punctilious care, the varieties of sacrifices to be offered, the mystical syllables and words to be repeated, the hymns to be chanted, and the incantations to be muttered, are made to occupy the prominent posi-

tion which in the other philosophical works of the orthodox schools is assigned to dissertations on the abstruse problems of life.

There is philosophy, however, in the method in which the disquisitions embodied in this work, on a variety of non-philosophical topics, are presented. The logical acumen shown is deserving of all praise, though the conviction forces itself on the mind that a great deal of close and accurate reasoning is wasted on what might justly be characterized as trash. As a repertory of truth or a magazine of philosophic thought, the book is exceedingly worthless ; but as a picture of an age of ritualistic fervor, brought on by a reaction against speculations of the wildest sort, it is not without value. And therefore we are inclined, on the whole, to sympathize in what Max Müller says of it in a private note published in the serial to be referred to : "To me these Mimansaka discussions are extremely attractive, and for accuracy of reasoning they have no equal anywhere." As a specimen of the way in which its discussions are conducted, we are tempted to transcribe the section in which its approved doctrine—that the connection between a word and its sense is eternal—is set forth, with the reasons *pro* and *con*.

But before we yield to the temptation we must say something on the translations which are to be utilized in our exposition of the maxims of the Mimansa school. Of the great work of this school a very small fragment was translated by Dr. Ballantyne, with the accuracy characteristic of all the versions made by that distinguished Orientalist. But a much larger portion has been translated by our learned countryman, Pundit Moreswar Kunte, B.A. and M.D., in his serial named *Saddarsana-Chintanika*, a magazine started in 1877,

and edited up to date with an amount of ability and erudition worthy of all praise. The work has been of the greatest value to Oriental scholars as far as it has gone, and it is to be hoped that the learned author will live to finish it. He has translated more than a moiety of the Sūtras associated with the Mīmāṃsā school, a considerable portion of the Vedānta Sūtras, and a fragment of the Yoga Sūtras ; and the work before him is more formidable by far in bulk, if not in importance, than what he has so patiently and persistently accomplished. When the serial is completed it will present complete translations of the standard *original* works of the orthodox schools, with copious notes and comments, which, barring the one-sided theory they are evidently intended to bolster up, will be looked upon as very valuable indeed. From the second number of this series we quote the arguments in favor of the doctrine alluded to, the arguments for and against :

“5. Therefore the connection between a word and its sense is eternal. The knowledge of this eternal connection is a precept. Such a precept is never erroneous. (But) when the sense is unknown, then there is an error. Therefore, according to Badaśayana, a precept is authoritative, (as) other knowledge is not needed.

“6. Some (state) that a word is an action. It appears when pronounced. (This is a statement in opposition.)

“7. The sound of a word vanishes the moment it is pronounced, therefore it is transitory. (Second statement of an opponent.)

“8. The verb to make is used in relation to a sound ; therefore it is transitory. (Third statement of an opponent.)

"9. Different animals simultaneously hear the same sound ; therefore it is transitory. (Fourth statement of an opponent.)

"10. A word has an original form and a modified form ; therefore it is transitory. (Fifth statement of an opponent.)

"11. By many making a sound, its increase (is seen). (Sixth statement of an opponent.)"

Thus are the arguments against the theory of the eternity of the connection between a word and its sense methodically or categorically stated. The replies are attached as pendants to these :

"12. On this subject there is a parity of reasoning, therefore a word is not eternal." The reasoning of the opponent himself—viz., a word appears when pronounced—is enough to prove its non-transitoriness, because it presupposes the latent existence of a word previous to its utterance. Mr. Kunte thus explains what is meant by "parity of reasoning": "An example will illustrate this logical contrivance. 'Well,' says Jaimini to his opponent, 'you say a word appears when pronounced ; your statement implies that a word exists latent before its appearance. Well, its latent existence is not against me. Your statement shows that this is not against you.' This is a case of parity of reasoning."

"13. When not an object (of sensuous) perception, even an existing substance is not cognized." The transitoriness of a word is proved because its sound is not perceived after it is uttered. This argument, however, will prove the non-existence of several things which are not perceived, but which nevertheless are proved to be existent, such as ether, etc.

"14. That which exists is cognized (only) after (its)

application." Sound is said to be made or employed or applied when it is heard, but it exists before it is heard, and its non-perception, except when employed, is no argument against its eternity.

"15. Because sound is simultaneous (and universal) like the sun." As the sun is one and universal, sound is one and universal ; hence the fact noticed by the opponent—viz., that it is simultaneously heard by different animals.

"16. The change of a letter is its non-modification." Here the opponent's statement, that a word has a modified form, is emphatically denied. The original form is in reality not changed when, in consequence of certain slight changes of letter, it appears in so-called modified forms.

"17. A word is augmented in proportion as sound is augmented." Sound, according to Hindu Philosophy, is produced by vibrations in the air generating vibrations in the ether in the cavity of the ear. The quantity of ether in the ear stirred up varies in volume, but in all such apparent modifications it remains unaltered.

The objections having been refuted, the reasons for maintaining the doctrine in question are categorically stated. They are: (1) the impossibility of our grasping the meaning conveyed by words, after they have been uttered, but for the eternity of sound ; (2) the simultaneity of the recognition of sound by various parties in different places ; (3) the non-applicability of the predicate number to sound—the word "go," for instance, ten times repeated being simply the word "go ;" (4) the indestructibility of sound or the absence of a cause fitted to destroy it ; (5) the fact that sound is not a modification of air, and therefore an effect ; and

(6) lastly, express declarations in the Scripture affirming the eternity of sound.

This is the precise though somewhat cumbrous way in which the argument in favor of the eternity of sound, or eternity of the connection between a word and its meaning, is presented. Let it be observed that this is by no means the method of conducting arguments approved of in this school in all its entirety. That method has five distinct parts : the first, the enunciation of the subject ; the second, the statement of a doubt arising from it ; the third, the formal advancement of the objections that may be started, together with their refutation in a consecutive order ; the fourth, the declaration of the demonstrated conclusion ; and the fifth, its connection and relevancy set forth. The paper in "Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha" on the Mimansa of Jaimini or the Jaimini Darsana, brings forward an example in illustration of this complicated style of carrying on debates. But as a rule it is simplified, and the mode of argumentation utilized is that shown in the quotations already presented in support of the strange doctrine of the eternity of sound.

Before proceeding further it is proper to remark that the Mimansa doctrine of the eternity of sound is essentially different from the doctrine of permanence of sound maintained by modern scientists. An impression made upon the atmosphere by a sound may last forever. The ripples occasioned may go round and round throughout eternity, or as long at least as the atmosphere lasts; and after millions or billions of ages some gifted angel may, after carefully tracing the vibrations to their source, get at the original sound by which they are occasioned and perpetuated. A sound once made lives in the atmosphere in vibrations and

convolutions forever, according to established laws of nature ; but such a statement is very different from the one which represents sound as without beginning and without end, and as having, moreover, a meaning which usage did not originate and which usage cannot change. And it is to us a matter of surprise that an intelligent man like Dr. Ballantyne should have been prone to confound the ancient Hindu and modern scientific theory, and go so far as to represent them as one and the same !

Let us now advert to the various kinds of proof admitted in this school. They are six : (1) Perception, (2) Inference, (3) Comparison, (4) Testimony, (5) Presumption, and (6) Privation. Perception is thus defined in Book I. Aph. 4 of the treatise under consideration :

“ Sensuous perception is the knowledge produced by the senses coming in contact with the soul.”

This is Mr. Kunte's translation. That of Dr. Ballantyne is somewhat different, and it runs thus : “ When a man's organs of sense are rightly applied to something extant, that birth of knowledge (which then takes place) is Perception.”

Perhaps both the versions are more or less accurate. According to the Nyaya and Vaisesika Sutras, perception results from a twofold conjunction—conjunction of a sense-organ with an external object on one side, and the indwelling soul on the other. The ancient scholiast referred to thus defines four of the other sources of knowledge or means of proof :

“ On sight of one member of a known association, the consequent apprehension of the other part which is not actually proximate is (*anuman*) Inference. The association must be such as had been before directly perceived, or had become known by analogy.



“Comparison (*upamana*) is knowledge arising from resemblance more or less strong. It is apprehension of the likeness which a thing presently seen bears to one before observed ; and likeness or similitude is concomitancy of associates or attributes with one object, which were associated with one another.

“Presumption (*arthapath*) is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another, which is seen, heard, or proven.

“Knowledge of a thing which is not proximate (or subject to perception), derived through understood sound—that is, through words, the acceptance whereof is known—is (*sastras*) ordinance or revelation. It is (*śabda*) or verval communication.”

All classes of the Mimansakas accept these five means of proof or sources of knowledge ; but those under the guidance of Kumarilla Bhatta add another kind of proof to this list—viz., Privation. This may be explained by a simple illustration. The presence of an effect indicates the presence of its cause, as the presence of a jar indicates the presence of clay. The absence of an effect similarly indicates the absence of its cause, and hence the conclusion—*no jar, no clay*. This is Privation (*Abhab*).

Colebrooke shows how these various kinds of proof are held by various schools of Indian Philosophy, in a passage which ought to be quoted :

“The Charvakas, as noticed in the first part of this essay, recognize but one—viz., Perception. The followers of Kanada and those of Sugata (Buddha) acknowledge two—Perception and Inference. The Sankhyas recognize three, including Affirmation (or Revelation). The Naiyayikas or followers of Gautama count

four—viz., the foregoing, together with Comparison. The Prabhakarars (or the Mimansakas under the guidance of Prabhakara) admit five (adding Presumption). And the rest of the Mimansakas enumerate six (adding Privation). It does not appear that a greater number has been alleged by any sect of Indian Philosophy.”

The statement that Kanada’s followers, or philosophers of the Vaiseshika school, hold only two of these proofs is not quite correct, though their tendency to merge the others in the two accepted by the Baudhas may be admitted.

The Mimansa Sutras may justly be said to embody an encyclopædia of exegesis ; and almost all the problems they attempt to solve are hermeneutical and philological rather than philosophical. Here are some of them stated by Mr. Kunte in his number for June, 1877 : “ What is the principal sentence ? a subordinate sentence ? an indirect subordinate sentence ? or a reason or a causative statement ? Whether subversion of the synthetical order of words is advisable or not ? What are the difficulties in the way of dividing a sentence ? The solution of these develops the system of exegetics.”

To what books are the canons of interpretation developed in this system applied ? To the Vedas, in the first place. The authoritativeness of these venerable documents was upheld in the teeth of the objections raised by a school of rationalists, if not several such schools, which had sprung up as a standing protest against the dogmatism maintained by the champions of orthodoxy. It is curious to note that the objections raised by rationalism against the authoritativeness of the Vedas, or their canonicity, are very nearly the same which are advanced to-day against every book

professing to be a revelation directly or miraculously vouchsafed by God. The principles needed for our guidance in life were, it was affirmed with emphasis, implanted in the human mind, and an examination or analysis, subjective rather than objective, was enough to bring them to light. Such being the case, where was the necessity of an objective revelation granted in a supernatural way? Again, the Vedas might be proved antagonistic to those moral principles regarding the accuracy or acceptability of which no sane man had ever or could ever doubt. The Vedas, moreover, were rendered useless by the air of mysteriousness thrown over many of their parts, and the mysteries coming out in bold relief from their pages. This last objection is stated in the following aphorism: “(The Vedas are to no purpose) because it is impossible to know the sense (of some Vaidika texts).”

It was also affirmed that the Vedas were full of contradictions as well as mystification, as appears from these aphorisms: “(The Vedas are to no purpose) because there are in them contradictory statements on the subject.” “(At the time of learning under a preceptor, as prescribed by sacred canons), the sense of the texts (in this connection) is never taught, and therefore (the Vedas are to no purpose).”

These objections—objections based on intuition, inconsistency with the inner laws of our being, the presence of mysteries, obscurity of language, and self-contradictoriness—are the stock-in-trade of our modern rationalists, as they appear to have been of their prototypes in bygone days. But some of the objections against the canonical authority of the Vedas, brought forward by the rationalists of ancient India, were peculiarly Indian. Here, for instance, is one: “(The

Vedas are to no purpose) because objects incapable of knowing are described (as performing sacrifices). Mr. Kunte thus explains this aphorism in his notes :

“ An illustration will explain the Sutra : ‘ Oh vegetable ! save him ! ’ This text occurs in the Taithriya Sanhita (1. 2. 1). ‘ Being learned, oh stones ! listen ! ’ ” This text occurs in the Taithriya Sanhita (1. 3. 13). The opponent asks, How can stones listen, and how can they be learned ? ” There were also objections raised of a purely grammatical type. These varieties of objections were advanced with an earnestness fitted to show that Jaimini, in defending the great citadel of Hindu orthodoxy and propping up its moribund rites and ceremonies, had by no means an easy task to perform.

But the canons of criticism developed in his Sutras are applied not only to the Vedas, but also to the vast body of literature which had gathered around these sacred records. The Vedas of course have the precedence, but other documents are regarded as authoritative, though not equally so. This appears from the opening aphorisms of the third chapter of Book I. :

“ All duty originates in the Vedas ; therefore what is not to be found in the Vedas is not to be accepted. (First statement of an opponent.)

“ No (though whatever is not to be found in the Vedas is not to be accepted, yet) from their author (of the Vedas and Smritis) being common, it is to be inferred that what is not in the Vedas is to be accepted. (Final statement.)

“ For when that which is established by testimony (sabda or sruti) is opposed to that which is not so established (as asabda or smriti), the latter is not to be recognized. (And) when the two are not opposed, inference (smriti) is to be recognized.”

The word *śruti* means that which is heard, and represents revelation. The Vedas alone form the *śruti*; and as authoritative records they are placed above all other books or documents. The word *smṛiti* means that which is remembered, and is applied to the body of tradition that in the course of time gathered around these venerable records. This body of tradition is authoritative, but its authoritativeness is subject to one limitation. Its authoritativeness must be disallowed where there is within its compass a statement inconsistent with the spirit or even the letter of what was contradistinguished from it as the revelation heard from the lips of the Supreme Spirit. Barring such statements, and those in which "a worldly motive is patent," the tradition is to be received as of co-ordinate authority with the Vedas.

In one of the aphorisms quoted above, the authoritativeness of *smṛiti* or tradition is affirmed, because the author of the Vedas is also its author. But, properly speaking, the Vedas have no author, and they are therefore declared to be eternal. The eternity of the Vedas is one of the peculiar doctrines of this school, and is connected with its doctrine of the eternity of sound, as a corollary is connected with the proposition from which it is legitimately deduced. It is set forth in the verses immediately following those in which the theory of which it is a counterpart is propounded. We quote these from Dr. Ballantyne's Fragment :

"And the Vedas some declare to be something recent, (because) there are the names of men (in them.)

"Because of our seeing uneternal persons (mentioned in the Vedas).

"But there has been declared (already) the priority of sound (to any point of time).

“The name, (derived from that of some mortal, was given to this or that section of the Veda) because of his reading it.

“But the terms in the text (which seem to be names of men) are common to other objects, and do not designate men.”

These aphorisms affirm the eternity of the Vedas, and refute one or two of the arguments advanced against the doctrine by the champions or followers of the Logical schools. Certain names are found at the heads of certain sections of these records, such as Kathaka, Karma, etc. ; and their appearance in such connection indicates human authorship, and consequently militates against this peculiar doctrine. Again, there are sentences in the Vedas in which mortals, or “persons to whom belonged birth and death,” express some wish or breathe some prayer—such as “Babara, the son of Pravahini, desired,” and “Kusuruhinda, the son of Uddulaki, desired.” These sentences could not possibly have been penned before these persons were born. These objections are rebutted in a very ingenious way. The persons named at the heads of certain sections are the readers, not the authors, of these sections, while the mortals named or represented as desiring are everlasting things, not human beings subject to the law of birth and death. Let us quote the passage in which this piece of exegetical finesse appears : “Although there is the name ‘babara’ or ‘Pravahini’ (in the Veda), yet in the text, the word Pravahini or the like is *common*—that is, is expressive also of some other thing (than it may appear at first sight to denote). For example, (in the word Pravahini), the prefix *Pra* implies ‘excess,’ the word *vah* signifies ‘motion,’ the final *i* represents ‘the agent,’ and thus

the word signifies mind *which moves very fast*, and this is without beginning ; and (moreover) the word ' Babara ' is a word imitative of the sound of the mind, so that there is not even a smell of inconsistency."

Is not this precisely the way in which mythological heroes are being converted into natural forces and objects by a class of critics in modern Europe ? Here an extract from an article which appeared in the *Hindu Patriot* years ago may be presented : " The Mimansa is by far the most important in connection with the religion of the Hindus. Its object is to reconcile the *rituals* of Hindu worship and the legends of the Purans with philosophy ; and the success with which the reconciliation has been effected by Jaimini is worthy of the highest praise. To quote an instance from the writings of the Mimansists : ' European writers have for a long time, and very justly, condemned the Hindu Sastras for having attributed to Brahma the odious charge of a disgusting incest. The Mimansists show that the whole of it is a mere myth. Brahma is but another name for Prajapati or the sun, and the dawn, which precedes sunrise, is poetically and very aptly described as a fair maiden born of the sun. Therefore, as the sun follows the dawn, it is in poetry described as chasing the maiden ; and since the dawn merges in the sun as soon as the latter has risen above the horizon, the allegory is complete. Other myths have been treated in the same way, and it is no ordinary praise to say that the Indian gymnosophists, some two thousand years ago, adopted a line of philosophical argumentation which would not be unworthy of the greatest German scholars of the present day.' "

We are certainly disposed to give our ancient philosophers credit for originating a specious method of ex-

plaining away the obscenities associated with the Hindu faith, and the more so as it is our intention in this treatise to show that the most ingenious speculations and theories of the day were anticipated in the ancient world in India and in other advanced countries. But it ought always to be borne in mind that it is one thing to explain away the obnoxious features of a book or creed, and another to explain them. Nor must it be forgotten that, after all such features have been explained away as are likely to bend under such handy modes of interpretation, an immense residuum of obscenity and filth remains, which no amount of exegetic skill and finesse can clear away. The gain therefore is very little indeed. Besides, what shall we say of the prurient imagination which delighted to clothe ordinary natural phenomena in various putrid shapes of vice, and thereby corrupt the minds and morals of a nation ?

In the paper on the *Mimansa* in the “*Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha*,” an elaborate argument is presented in support of the eternity of the Vedas ; and in it, as in almost all arguments in Hindu books, we notice a great deal of acuteness in combination with much puerility and sheer nonsense. One of the arguments brought forward by the *Mimansakas* in favor of the doctrine in question is thus expressed : “ But (asks the *Mimansaka*) how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal *Parameswara*, or God, who has no palate and no organ of speech, and who therefore cannot have pronounced the letters ? ” “ This objection (answers the *Naiyayika*) is not happy, because, though *Parameswara* is by nature incorporeal, he can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favor of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive.”



The argument on which the eternity of the Vedas is made to hinge is a marvel of futility and inconclusiveness. Let us here present an extract from the "Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha" as illustrative of it, and the way in which it was met by the followers of the Nyaya system : " Well, be it so (say the followers of the Nyaya) ; but how can the Vedas be said to be underrived from any personal author, when there is no evidence to establish this ? Would you maintain that they have no personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case with the soul ? This argument is weak, because the alleged characteristics (unbroken tradition, etc.) are not proved ; for those who hold the human tradition of the Vedas maintain that the line of tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the universe. And again, what is meant by this assertion that the author is not remembered ? Is it (a) that no author is believed, or (b) that no author is remembered ? The first alternative cannot be accepted, since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma—viz., is it meant (a) that no author of the Veda is remembered by some person, or (b) by any person whatever ? The former supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would apply to such an isolated stanza as " He who is religious and has overcome pride and anger," etc. And the latter supposition is inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a personal author, for we argue as follows : " The sentences of

the Veda must have originated from a personal author, since they have the character of sentences like those of Kalidasa and other writers. And again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent person, since, while they possess authority, they have at the same time the character of sentences like those of Manu and other sages."

There is one reasoning in these lines which will appear dark to a reader not versed in the philosophical literature of India—the reasoning with pointed reference to the stanza quoted. The meaning is that the author of that stanza, though not generally known, might have been known to some person. The argument that it is necessary to be omniscient in order to prove a universal negative, such as no person ever remembered the author of any of the books of the Veda, shows a measure of penetration scarcely appreciated in the present age, when it has been made familiar by many a philosophical writer.

Is the body of tradition called *smṛiti* also eternal like the Vedas? The aphorism quoted above—that which ascribes the Vedas and the *smṛitis* to a "common" authorship—would seem at first sight to justify an affirmative reply. The *smṛiti*, however, is by universal consent attributed to human authorship, to holy sages deeply read in the Vedas. It consists, properly speaking, of three parts: the first, in which Vedic truths and precepts are found epitomized and classified; the second, in which matter supplementary and elucidatory is embodied; and the third, in which statements occur either in direct contravention of some truth or precept revealed, or apparently fitted to set forth the selfishness or cupidity of the writers. The first part is of course to be accepted in all its entirety, in conse-

quence of its perfect harmony with revelation ; and the second part on the supposition that it would be corroborated if the entire revelation assumed eternally existent were within reach ; but the third part is to be rejected without ceremony.

Then there are other books which may be accepted as authoritative only so far as they agree with Scripture and reason—viz., the Kalpa-Sutra and the Grihya-Grantha, etc. They are, however, not to be considered as parts of revelation, and they must be placed far below the Vedas and the *smritis* in authority and importance. But as they are the productions of men conversant in the Vedic literature, they may and should be consulted, and treated moreover with some degree of reverence.

Established usages, customs, and institutions should not be despised in our attempts to ascertain our duty. These are of two kinds—universal and local. The latter, or festivals merely local, “such as the Holoka (Huli), or the spring festival in the East, the worship of local tutelary deities hereditarily by families in the South, the racing of oxen on the full moon of Jyeshthitha in the North, and the adoration of tribes of deities in the West,” are not to be regarded as of much consequence.

The great object of the Mimansa Philosophy is the knowledge or ascertainment of duty, its watchword being “Duty-inquisitiveness” in contradistinction to “Brahma-inquisitiveness,” the watchword of the Vedanta school. The very first aphorism of the book under review makes this manifest : “Next, therefore, (O student that hast attained thus far), a desire to know Duty (Dharma) (is to be entertained by thee).” To ascertain this, to know our duty, we have to consult these sources of information, the Vedas, the *smriti*, the

Kalpa-Sutras, etc., and the established customs and institutions of a universal stamp, not merely of local importance. These sources of knowledge ought to be consulted as pointing to duty rather than to a Being from whom duty derives its sancity and authority or imperativeness. The Mimansakas as a rule thrust God into the background, and some of them even go so far as to deny His existence. Pandit Nehemiah Nilkanta Goreh, in his very able treatise, "A Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems," thus summarizes the principles of this school :

"It is not the design of the Mimansa, as it is of the other systems, to consider bondage, and emancipation, and soul, and what is not soul, but simply to treat of the precepts of the Veda, and of its cultus ; and I do not purpose examining it as touching these heads. Its points, which are here specially deserving of mention, are as follows : First, it repudiates the idea of a God, and, in the second place, it contends that the Veda was originated by no one, but has always existed. The injunctions, inhibitions, and good and evil fruits of works rehearsed in it, are held indeed to be true. But the accounts of the divinities given in the Veda are reputed to be false, and are written solely for the purpose of magnifying works. With regard to this matter, the surprising notions about to be noted are proposed. It is recorded in the Veda that Elysium is obtained by sacrifice. And a sacrificial observance consists in offering in fire, clarified butter, flesh, etc., to Indra, Varuna, Agni, and other divinities, with the recitation and reiteration of hymns of praise from the Veda, and laudation of the exploits and virtues of the aforesaid divinities. Now, the Mimansakas assert that Indra and those other divinities have no existence whatever,

and that the prowess ascribed to them is entirely fictitious. Nevertheless, there is such a wonderful potency in the falling of offerings into the fire, in their name, after the manner prescribed in the Veda, in uttering the syllables of the songs that hymn them, as to insure attainment of celestial abodes.”

The learned Pandit does not quote a single text from the Mimansa Sutas in support of his summary, and specially in support of his assertion that the Mimansakas “repudiate the idea of a God.” In a foot-note he gives his reason in these words : “To name one Mimansaka, Parthasarathi Misra, in the first chapter of the Sastra Dipika, labors at length to upset the arguments adducible to prove the existence of Deity.” And with reference to his assertion that the gods mentioned in the Vedas, Indra, Varuna, etc., are regarded as myths rather than real persons, he quotes the following verse from a manuscript called Bhatta-Dipika : “Therefore it is not by any means to be acknowledged that a god is an embodied form, and so forth ; but he is to be regarded as a mere verbal expression of the Veda. As for the thing signified by that expression, it is held to be, according to the expression, some sentient being or unsentient object—not endowed, however, with a figure, etc., *i.e.* purely notional. But in devotion and so forth, mere meditation on him, in picturing to one’s self the unreal as real, is to be observed. Such is the gist of the doctrine of Jaimini here considered. But, by the very repetition of this blasphemy, my tongue contracts defilement—from which the remembrance of Hari is the only safeguard.”

The atheistic feature of the Mimansa as it now exists in its fully developed form is certainly not inconsistent with its original principles, and it perhaps grew out of

them when they were pushed to their legitimate consequences. It was not brought into bold relief, and perhaps not definitely apprehended at the time of Jaimini, whose Sūtras simply throw God and the Vedic pantheon of gods and goddesses into the background. The worshipper, according to these, does not need either him or them to stir up devotion within him, or to pave his way to the speedy realization of his object. His attention is withdrawn from them, and concentrated on the work he has to do, and he is assured that that work has an inherent potency, and will bear its fruits, good or bad, in its own time. Whether this innate tendency is dependent on an economy unalterably established by God, or whether it is entirely independent of the power, will, or the decrees of God—these questions the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* do not meet in the face or attempt to solve. But their tone is in favor of the position that work derives its efficacy, its mysterious power, from itself, rather than from a Being or force apart from it, and that it would bear fruit even if God and the array of beings called gods and goddesses did not exist, or existed as mere ciphers rather than living, working agents. There is therefore no use of looking up to them or making them objects of contemplation, and asking them to hear our prayers and answer them. Let them live, if they live at all, behind the veil, and let us perform conscientiously the work which will bear its own fruits, whether they exist or not.

This mysterious power is called *Apurva*. Colebrooke makes the following observations on it : “ The subject which most engages attention throughout the *Mīmāṃsā*, recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet the consequence does not immediately ensue. A virtue

mean time subsists unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to bring about at a distant period, or in another world, the relative effect."

It is to be observed that this mysterious potency is acknowledged in almost all schools of Indian Philosophy, and it is the characteristic feature of Buddhism, to which the Mimansa is favorable in some respects and hostile in others. Like it, the Mimansa throws God and His worship into the background, and renders His existence superfluous by maintaining the efficacy of work, if not its creative power. And like it, the Mimansa seems to maintain the eternity of the world, or its successive evolutions and involutions in cycles, beginningless and endless. But while Buddhism declares a war of extermination against the doctrine of sacrifice, the Mimansa gives the greatest prominence to it—upholds, enjoins, and exalts it in varieties of ways, through varieties of express declarations, and by the varieties of laudations of which it is made the favored theme. Sacrifice, in short, is the duty enjoined in the Mimansa, and paradise is the end proposed.

A sacrifice, according to the Mimansa, is a thing or animal voluntarily and cheerfully offered. Sacrifices are, therefore, of two kinds—bloodless and bloody. The sacrifices connected with the soma-plant (*asclepias acida*) and the exhilarating juice expressed out of it, being more or less like simple libations of wine, are examples of bloodless sacrifice, as also simple oblations called *ishtis*, and burnt-offerings called *homa*, consisting of *ghi* or clarified butter, and other things thrown into a fire raked up into a flame. The bloody sacrifices of the Vedic Age, such as the *asma-medha*, the horse-sacrifice; the *pasu-medha*, or the sacrifice of smaller

animals, goats, sheep, etc.; the *nar-bali*, or human sacrifices, had received a check from the spread of Buddhism, and were less common in the age of the • Mimansa. According to its teaching, while all these are helps, paradise is secured by the model sacrifice, called *Jyotistoma*, which is a permanent sacrifice, and the complicated ceremony connected with which must be performed by a Hindu at least once in his lifetime. With reference to this sacrifice, let us present two extracts from Mr. Kunte's serial (No. for October, 1877) : "Jyotistoma is a big model sacrifice. Agnistoma, Atyagnistoma, Ukthya, Sodeshi, Atiratra, Aptiryama, and Vajapaya—these are the seven big sacrifices or *sansthas*. They are modifications of Jyotistoma, the model sacrifice."

"The Vaidikacharjya observes : 'It must not be stated that the seven sacrifices and the Jyotistoma are not all model sacrifices. Only the Jyotistoma sacrifice is the model sacrifice, and the seven sacrifices are its modifications.' Baudhacharjya, you will ask, why such a distinction should be made ? Listen, then, to what I have to say. The Jyotistoma sacrifice is a permanent and obligatory sacrifice, and is distinguished from occasional or optional sacrifices. Every Arya must in his lifetime perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice. The Jyotistoma sacrifice is not performed for accomplishing any human desire. He that seeks to obtain heaven ought to perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice."

This great sacrifice is offered twice every month at the full and change of the moon, and it consists of various parts—principal, subordinate, and those subsidiary to the subordinate. Not only does the whole sacrifice exercise a mysterious and unseen influence, but each of the subordinate and subsidiary parts has its peculiar



efficacy ; and they all combined prepare the soul for a prolonged season of enjoyment in paradise. The "Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha" thus speaks of the efficacy of each of the parts, principal or subordinate : "These, however, the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices, only produce their unseen effect, which is the principal *apurva*, by means of the various minor effects or subordinate *apurvas*, produced by the various subordinate parts of the whole ceremony." . . .

It ought here to be mentioned that a mysterious efficacy is attributed to the mere reading of the Vedas, the chanting of the hymns, the repetition of certain mystic words and syllables, as *om*, etc., and the utterance of certain prayers and imprecations. It is not necessary to carry with us an intelligent appreciation of the varied parts of this most complex ceremony, or to understand the hymns, chants, prayers, and exorcisms connected with it. The bare repetition of them, even when accompanied with an utter failure to comprehend their meaning or keep in view the varied ends they are intended to subserve, is enough to secure some degree, if not the fulness, of the merit promised. A great deal of care is taken to insure correct pronunciation and intonation, but merit is not withheld even where the words are mispronounced and the tones misapplied. A more complete system of ritualism in its worst form it is perhaps impossible to find apart from these records !

But was self-immolation practised in the early times of which the Sutras present so vivid a picture ? The various kinds of religious suicide with which the student of Indian history is most familiar—such as widows burning themselves on the funeral pyres of their deceased husbands, or men drowning themselves in sacred rivers and seas, or burying themselves alive, or throwing

themselves headlong from precipices, or having themselves crushed underneath the wheels of a huge car—were unknown. The only species of self-immolation practised was that exemplified by the Indian devotee Calanus, who accompanied Alexander's army to Babylon, and who, when ripe for immediate translation into heaven, had a funeral pyre made and set on flame, cheerfully mounted it, and had himself burned on it. As has already been said, the Brahmin anxious to secure extraordinary merit divided his life into four parts, devoting the first to studentship, the second to the duties of a householder, the third to those of a hermit, and the fourth and last to those of a mendicant. But before the last act of the drama was played out, he burned himself alive, and passed into glory through a path less tedious than that of disease and death. Suicide was considered in India, as in other lands demoralized by philosophy falsely so called, not merely not censurable, but positively praiseworthy, at least under particular circumstances !

The Purva Mimansa has nothing directly to do with the great subject of the schools, the emancipation of the soul from the bonds of ignorance. It is not, however, wholly unconnected with that blessed state, as the initiatory or preparatory work, without which complete deliverance is unattainable, is the grand theme of its dissertations. A devotee must pass through two distinct stages before the liberation of his ignorance-bound spirit can be an accomplished fact, or the *summum bonum* is realized. These are the *Karma-Kand* and the *Gyan -Kand*, the stage of Duty and the stage of Knowledge, the Department of Works and the Department of Contemplation. The exercises connected with the initiatory stage are set forth in the Mimansa,

while those connected with the higher stage are set forth in the Vedānta, which, therefore, is as decidedly the counterpart of this school as the Yoga is the counterpart of the Sāṅkhya. The reward promised in the Mīmāṃsā to a faithful discharge of the duties enjoined therein is only a temporary season of bliss in paradise followed by a renewed life ; but ultimate emancipation from the thralldom of transmigration must be attained through exercises of a loftier order.

It is desirable, before taking leave of this school, to raise one important question : Has the Mīmāṃsā nothing to do with worship ? It certainly has, the Karma-Kāṇḍ being divided into two subsidiary departments—the Karma-Kāṇḍ exclusively so called, and the Upāsana-Kāṇḍ, Duty and Worship. It is not, however, necessary, according to its teaching, to have a god or a pantheon of gods and goddesses to enforce the one and render the other practicable. Elaborate forms are prescribed, along with prayers, hymns, chants, imprecations, deprecations, incantations, and exorcisms ; and if these are carefully attended to and rightly observed, the preparatory work is completed and the reward promised is insured. The champions of the Mīmāṃsā do not rise up to the level of the progressive scientists of the day, who maintain that no worship is needed besides the performance of one's own duty to society and a calm contemplation of the order of nature. They maintain the paramount necessity of devotional and ritualistic observances ; and they act very wisely in throwing such abstractions as the impersonal God of Hindu Philosophy, and such phantasms as Cosmos and Primal Force, into the background, together with deities who are monsters either of cruelty or vice. How many who believe in a personal God and in His brightest

revelation in Christ Jesus look upon their mill-horse method of going round a cycle of lifeless ceremonies, with no thought beyond their stated return and monotonous observance, as enough to make us happy here, and pave our way to heavenly bliss !

## CHAPTER X.

### THE VEDANTA SYSTEM, OR HINDU PANTHEISM.

Now we come to the last of the systems called orthodox, the Uttara Mimansa, or the Vedanta. The order in which the systems were elaborated, one after another, cannot possibly be set forth ; but the first and last links of the chain may, as has already been said, be fixed with tolerable certainty. The systems began with materialism of the rankest type, and terminated in absolute pantheism. The Sankhya, with its apparent dualism but real materialistic monism, was decidedly the first of the varied forms in which orthodox speculation appeared in ancient India, and its claim to orthodoxy was substantiated by the fact that its champions appealed to the Vedas in support even of its most obnoxious theories. The Yoga system, its counterpart, silenced popular clamor by adding to its admitted entities a god as passive, quiescent, and useless as the soul posited by it. The atomic theory was then propounded by the schools called Analytic, the Naiyayika, and Vaiseshika schools ; and creation was traced, not to the quiescent and useless God, whose existence was admitted by their champions ; not to the human soul, equally quiescent and useless in their estimation, but to an unseen, mysterious force called Adrishta, the accumulated merit and demerit, or the work of all the past stages of existence. The consequence of these schemes of thought was, and could not but be, the prevalence

of a species of scepticism unfavorable, if not avowedly hostile, to the popular faith ; and against this really, if not avowedly, antagonistic force or influence a reaction was brought about by the speculations of Jaimini, the father of resuscitated ritualism.

Indian Philosophy was in its inception and early progress a reaction against ritualism. The simple worship of the forces and agencies of nature in the comparatively pure Vedic age had been supplanted by a cumbersome system of ritualism ; and sacrifices, great and small, each consisting of a regular paraphernalia of ceremonial observances, accompanied with varieties of hymns and chants, imprecations and deprecations, incantations and exorcisms, washings and purifications, and presided over by accredited representatives of a hierarchy almost deified, had taken the place of prayers and songs, rhapsodical indeed, but on the whole natural and impassioned. But mummeries and tomfooleries, however thoroughly systematized and sanctified by religion, could only cast a veil over the important problems of life, but not burke them ; might bury the spirit of inquiry for a time, but could not extinguish it. And, therefore, when this system of externalism appeared in its most obnoxious forms, a reaction was realized, and rationalism made its appearance in forms more or less attractive.

But rationalism is as wild and unmanageable as ritualism, and it developed in India into a series of forms as obnoxious as the types of ritualism from which it had derived its existence. It is very common to laugh at a person who attaches a great deal of importance not only to certain prayers and hymns, but to the manner in which the prayers are said and the hymns are chanted ; who looks upon certain turnings of the face

and postures of the body as peculiarly meritorious, and others as fraught with mischievous consequences ; who regards the proper intonation of certain mystical words and syllables as fitted to send away impure spirits, and bring in those whose presence is a source of strength and consolation ; and who, in a word, converts religion into a scheme of ceremonialism and casuistry, mimicry and masquerade, hollow professions and wrong practices. But it should not be forgotten that our risibility ! is equally stimulated by the absurdities into which those thinkers are betrayed who find it hard to ascribe creation to an intelligent voluntary Being, but exceedingly easy to trace it to blind chance or an inscrutable force ; who throw the Creator into the background, if not into the limbo of non-existence, and at the same time prescribe devotion to a phantom like the genius of humanity, or the spirit of progress, or the shade of liberty, or the beauty of womanhood ; who wipe away the essential distinction between virtue and vice, and then exhort us to be self-sacrificing in obedience to a code of morality framed by selfishness ; and who, like Hindu philosophers, recommend austerity, penance, and ascetic contemplation, while refusing to recognize any being higher than self, and reducing that self to the level of inanimate matter by depriving it of its intelligence and instinctive or volitional activity. If ritualism has its absurdities, rationalism has its also !

Rationalism in India developed into varied grotesque and absurd forms, and its extravagance brought on a reaction against it. This reaction was headed by Jaimini, the founder of the Purva Mimansa school, who strove successfully to draw away public attention from the unsolvable problems of existence, and concentrate it on the practical portions of revelation—the por-

tions in which human duty is pointed out in the clearest terms possible. He revived the age of the Brahmanas, and applied to those hoary documents a system of exegesis which he had elaborated with great care. The question of the origin of the Vedas and their authoritativeness did not engage his attention so thoroughly as the principles involved in their correct interpretation. With unflinching logic he applied his own canons of interpretation to their miscellaneous contents, and succeeded in evolving from them a system of ritualism even more complicated than that from which the rationalism of the Upanishads had been a relief.

But ritualism revived and carried to excess bore its fruit, and rationalism once more made its appearance. It appeared at first in its less repellent forms, and instead of ostensibly or even really striving to overturn the sacred Scriptures, it freely admitted their authoritativeness, and professed unreserved veneration for them. It modestly represented its great work as simple interpretation of its contents, not their modification or revision. Jaimini had applied certain canons of interpretation to the earlier portions of the Vedas, the Mantras, and the Brahmanas ; and these had now to be applied with logical force to the later portion, the Upanishads. The whole of revelation must be accepted and correctly interpreted, not merely a part, or the part suited to our inclinations and tastes. The hymnology and the ritual had been made the subjects of elaborate exegetical dissertations, and thus far a great work had been accomplished. But something remained to be done. The concluding portions of these venerable records had not been analyzed and explained ; and as they, constituting part and parcel of revelation, could not be dispensed with or neglected without a serious



and irreparable loss, somebody must undertake the task of elucidating their contents, as Jaimini had done in the case of the earlier portions.

The great man who undertook this important task, and who is honored and revered as the head of the Vedantic school, was Badarayuna, or Vyas. He is called Veda-Vyas ; and a legend is preserved fitted to show the propriety of his assumption of this title, or ascription of it to him by general consent. He had in a former life made himself ripe for beatitude by austerity and meditation ; but he was sent back to the world to do a work which no other person could do—viz., that of compiling the Vedas, with which his name is inseparably associated. A great many other legends are related in the sacred books of the Hindus illustrative of his greatness and manifold labors. In the Purans he is said to have been an incarnation of Vishnu, a fact which no amount of ingenuity can reconcile to the notion of his having in a former life worked up his way to complete emancipation, and being sent back to perform a work of love when almost in the arms of beatitude ; though Colebrooke sees no difficulty in effecting the reconciliation. If all that is said about him is reliable, he seems to have been the most voluminous writer the country ever saw. He is said to have composed the Mahabharat, written several of the Purans, compiled the Vedas, and indited the Sutras in which the principles of the Vedantic school are set forth. But it is to be observed that the statements which make him the author of such a heterogeneous mass of literature ascribe to him a great deal of versatility indeed, but very little of consistency and of sound sense. It is by no means possible to reconcile to one another the books he is said to have penned, or

to evolve out of them a consistent scheme of thought or principle ; and therefore the supposition that there were several persons of this name, who lived and wrote at different times and under diverse circumstances, is the only one that appears tenable.

The great work of Vyas, with which we have to do in this paper, is the *Saririka* or *Brahma Sutras*. This work consists of four books, each subdivided into four chapters. The entire number of aphorisms thus classified is 555, and the number of topics treated of or sections is 191. In bulk, therefore, it is left behind by the work of Jaimini ; but in the loftiness of its themes and depth of its philosophy it surpasses its rival ; while in logical precision and force both the documents are on a par and equally deserving of the praise bestowed upon the *Mimansa Sutras* by Max Müller.

The *Brahma Sutras*, however, are exceptionally obscure in their phraseology and statements, and scholias upon scholias have been written to elucidate their contents. The greatest name among its ancient scholiasts or commentators is Baudhayana, a title signifying that the bearer of it was a religious devotee entitled to peculiar reverence. But in modern times his exegetical dissertations are rarely consulted, they having been superseded by the works of the celebrated scholiast Sankar Acharya, who lived about seven hundred years after the birth of Christ, and whose comments on the most important of the *Upanishads* and on the *Saririka Sutras* are masterpieces of acute thought and philosophical reasoning.

The first chapter of the first book of the *Sutras*, and four aphorisms of the second were translated by the Rev. K. M. Banerjea, LL.D., some years ago, along with Sankar's comments. It is to be regretted that Dr.

Banerjea, the greatest native scholar in and out of the native church, has not been able to continue this great work of his. A fragment also was translated by Dr. Ballantyne ; but we have failed in our efforts to procure a copy of his translation. Mr. Kunte, of Ahmedabad, has, in his serial, *Saddarsana-Chintanika*, translated all the four chapters of the first book ; but he has, instead of proceeding further, begun the work of translating the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. His comments or notes are very valuable so far as they go, inasmuch as they embody the sentiments, not merely of the school of Sankar Acharya, but of the rival school set up in opposition to it by Ramanuja, who discarded absolute pantheism and maintained the existence of three entities—the ego, the non-ego, and the infinite. These translations we shall lay under contribution in our treatment of the subject, and the copious extracts presented from all the chapters of all the books of this standard work in Colebrooke's celebrated essay on the Vedanta.

In treating of the Vedantic system, as perhaps of every other system of philosophy, a broad line of distinction ought to drawn between its earlier forms and later developments. A system of philosophy appears at first in a crude, undigested form, very likely in a series of unconnected aphorisms or statements. As it makes progress its different parts appear loosely joined or inconsistent with one another, and varieties of questions with reference to its essential truths and outer garment of diction and phraseology are raised by the inquisitive mind. To reconcile apparent and real inconsistencies, to explain obscure statements and lop off excrescences, new theories are formed and new speculations are allowed to run high. And in process of time

new elements of truth are superadded and fresh explanations given ; and the original system appears in a new form, with its inner life matured and even modified, and its outer garment renovated. And therefore the historian of the system in question cannot do justice to it without discriminating between its original principles and later accretions.

It is to be feared that such discretion is not shown by our learned and pious brother, Pandit Nehemiah Goreh, in his excellent work entitled " A Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems." He presents his views of the systems with perspicuity and force, but he scarcely quotes from the original Sūtras or aphorisms in support of his statements. His footnotes are rich in citations, though the body of his work is singularly free from them ; but the books he lays under contribution are as a rule not the original works of the founders of the systems—the Sūtras of Kapila or Patanjali or Gautama or Kanada or Jaimini or Bādarāyana—but later documents, of great authority indeed, but not such as are entitled to the honor ascribed or the importance attached to the original sources of information. This is specially the case in the large portion of his great work devoted to a treatment of the Vedānta system.

The learned Pandit devotes about half of his work to a very able exposition of the principles and errors associated with the Vedānta system. But he does not sustain his views of the system by quotations from the Brahma Sūtras, which are entirely thrown into the shade in his very able disquisitions. He lays under contribution such books as the Vedānta Paribhasa and the Vedānta Sar, and such manuscripts as the Sankshēpa Saririka and Sastra Dipika. His object does

not perhaps require a reference to or analysis of the original Sutras ; but as he advocates a view different from that ordinarily held and presented of Vedantism, it is a pity that his sentiments are not corroborated by quotations from the acknowledged writings of its founder.

The Pandit in the first of the two scholarly pamphlets he has very recently published on "Theism and Christianity" goes so far as to affirm : "First, I must remove a great mistake which is generally made, that of considering Vedantism as identical with pantheism. They are not quite the same." Why ? Because Vedantism attributes a species of existence, called Vyavarika or practical, to the external world. In the first chapter of the third section of this great work, "A Rational Refutation," etc., the section devoted to an analysis of Vedantism and an exposure of the errors associated with it, he treats of the three sorts of existence maintained by the Vedantins, and he quotes in one of his foot-notes the following verse from the Vedanta-Paribhasa to set forth what they are : "Existence is of three sorts—true (*paramarthika*), practical (*vyavarika*), and apparent (*pratibhashika*). True existence is that of Brahma ; practical, that of ether, etc. ; apparent, that of nacrine silver and the like." But the Pandit must admit that these three sorts of existence are nowhere found in the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras, the original documents of the Vedantic system, and that there is no ground for denying that the form of faith unfolded in them is pantheism.

Nay, the Pandit himself admits as much when in the pamphlet alluded to he says : "If any one would say that this phase of Vedantism, which sets forth the theories of Maya, of the falseness of the world, and

different kinds of existence, is not found clearly enunciated in the Upanishads, but is rather a later development, then I would answer, that if you would appeal to that only which seems expressly stated in the Upanishads, you will not mend the matter. For if, according to the literal rendering of their words, Brahma itself has become everything in reality—man, beast, wood, stone, yea, good men as well as most vicious men—then Brahma's omnipotence, omniscience, purity, etc. are changed into feebleness, ignorance, impurity, and even into inanimate substance. And it is, as I said before, to save the Vedanta from this absurdity that the Vedanta doctors explain its teaching by the theories of Maya and different kinds of existence."

In this passage the Pandit virtually yields the point, and admits that Vedantism, as taught in the Upanishads, is pantheism, and implies a real change of the divine into material substance, and the forms or modes in which both appear. Now the Brahma Sutras revive the religion of the Upanishads as thoroughly as the Sutras of Jaimini revive the religion of the other parts of the Vedas, the Mantras, and the Brahmanas. And whatever is predicated of the scheme of thought developed in the Upanishads must of needs be predicated of that unfolded in the Sutras of Badarayana.

We shall develop the system in this paper as it originally stood by quotations from the Saririka Sutras, and reserve our remarks on its later developments for a separate paper, of which we shall make the Vedanta Sar, recently translated by Major Jacob, our text-book.

What ground have we for stating that this is the last of the systems of philosophy called orthodox? In the first place, let it be observed that all the other systems are referred to in the Brahma Sutras and combated.



The Sankhya cosmogony is adopted in its salient features, but varieties of reasons are brought forward to show that its Prakriti or Pradhan could not possibly have been the creator of the universe. In the very first chapter of the first book an attempt is made to prove that the source of existence in its multifarious forms could not possibly have been an unintelligent, unsentient material form, and that the Sankhyas have got their notions simply by perverting the Scriptures. The atomic theory of Kanada is made the subject of many a denunciatory argument, while Jaimini is expressly named in the following aphorism : "The opinion of Jaimini is, The statement that the Supreme Spirit is directly to be worshipped does not conflict (with any text)."

But Badarayuna is also named in Jaimini's Sutras as well as in this. That he is named in his own Sutras the following aphorism will show : "In the opinion of Badarayuna, there are beings above man who have a title to the contemplation of Brahma, because this is possible." On this apparent anomaly Colebrooke makes the following remarks :

"The name of Badarayuna frequently recurs in the Sutras ascribed to him, as does that of Jaimini, the reputed author of the Purna Mimansa, in his. I have already remarked in the preceding essay on the mention of an author by his name, and in the third person, in his own work. It is nothing unusual in the literature or science of the other nations ; but a Hindu commentator will account for it by presuming the actual composition to be that of a disciple recording the words of his teacher."

Badarayuna accepts the six proofs or sources of knowledge admitted in the Purva-Mimansa school—

viz., Perception, Inference, Comparison, Presumption, Revelation, or Testimony and Privation. Revelation, however, is the only proof most thoroughly utilized in his Sutras, and the others are brought forward only to prop up its declarations, his avowed object being to revive the philosophy embodied in it, not to initiate a new scheme of thought. Badarayuna also adopts Jaimini's method of treating of a subject or "topic," which is represented as consisting of five parts—(1) the subject or matter to be explained, (2) the doubt or question concerning it, (3) the plausible solution or *primâ-facie* argument, (4) the answer or demonstrated conclusion and true solution, (5) the pertinence or relevancy and connection."

It is superfluous to say that Badarayuna admits the canonicity and authoritativeness of the Vedas, as Jaimini does. He also adopts Jaimini's doctrine of the eternity of sound and the eternity of the Veda. This is distinctly stated by Colebrooke in the following passage: "In the course of this disquisition the noted question of the eternity of sound, of articulate sound in particular, is mooted and examined. It is a favorite topic in both Mimansas, being intimately connected with that of the eternity of the Veda or revelation acknowledged by them."

But there are aphorisms in which the Veda is expressly traced to the authorship of God or Brahma. The very third aphorism of the first book is a proof of this statement: "Because it is the cause of the Sastra, (or) because the Sastra is its manifesting cause." Sankara in commenting on these words says: "Brahma is the cause of the great Sastra, the Rig Veda, etc., supported by numerous (subsidiary) systems of science; bringing to light, like a lamp, all objects, and being, as



it were, all-knowing. Indeed, of such a Sastra, defined as the Rig Veda, etc., endowed with the quality of all-knowledge, the production cannot be from any other than the omniscient." Again : "What shall I say, then, of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that Great Being, from which Great Being, as the cause, proceeded without effort and as a mere sport, after the manner of the human breath, that mine of all knowledge called Rig Veda, etc., diversified by many varieties of Sakhas, and the source of the classification into *varna* and *asram*, of gods, animals, and men?"

How are these two truths—the eternity of the Veda and its procession from Brahma—to be reconciled? Not, certainly, without very great difficulty. One of the theories regarding the Veda is that it has from all eternity issued from Brahma as a breath, just as light has issued from the sun since the very first moment of his existence as a luminous body. In other words, as breath is inseparable from a living person in this world, as light is inseparable from a luminous body, as fluidity is inseparable from water, so is the Veda inseparable from the Supreme Spirit, as well when in a state of quiescence as when in its creative moods. It is, however, said to issue as an efflation from Brahma when, after a long period of quiescence, it begins to develop into a renewed creation "as a sport." The Sankhya doctrine, that at every renovation of creation the Veda issues like an efflation from Prakriti, is transferred *mutatis mutandis* to the Vedanta school, with perhaps this addition, that during the long periods of divine quiescence, which alternate with periods of creative activity, the sacred volume continues its manifestation as a breath, although unperceived and unappreciated by any rational being. And in this way the doctrine

of its eternity is made to harmonize with that of its procession from the Supreme Spirit. Does not this doctrine tend to remind the Church of its dogma of the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit ?

The sacredness of the *smritis* is also admitted, though many of the statements embodied in them are attacked with unflinching severity. The twenty-third aphorism of the third chapter of the First Book refers to these writings as authorities : " Again, in works called the *smritis* (the same) is found." The Sutras of the foregoing champions of philosophy, or founders of philosophical schools of an orthodox type, are ranked with the *smritis* properly so called. But they are at the same time criticised with the greatest freedom, and condemned as if they were mere human compositions when they appear as a whole or in part worthy of condemnation. Kapila and his followers are referred to with the veneration due to Maharishis or apostolic teachers ; and yet an exterminating crusade is fought by Badarayuna in his Sutras against their opinions and principles. The Yoga Sastra or Patanjali is called " Yoga-smriti," and yet the philosophy with which its practical directions are inseparably associated is made the subject of many a vehement denunciation. The same may be said of the treatment with which Kanada, whose writings are also classed with *smritis*, is favored.

Such treatment of the writings to which the sacred appellation of the *Smritis* is attached by universal consent, proves what we said in our last paper—viz., that tradition is to be accepted only when it agrees with the Scriptures. But when it obviously runs counter to them, or has for its basis a misinterpretation of its express declarations, it ought to be unceremoniously

rejected as a thing of no authority or consequence whatever. This is, we believe, the firm conviction of all sensible men in the Church with reference to the body of tradition it inherits. The traditions of the Church are authoritative only when they agree with the Scriptures; but when they are, in spirit or in letter, not in harmony with or in direct contradiction to the word and the testimony, they should be thrown aside as mere rubbish. But as in the Christian Church there are those who raise the traditions above the Scriptures, there are multitudes in India who throw the Vedas into the background and transfer the homage due to them to the writings called Smritis.

But why are the writings of Kapila, Patanjali, and Kanada regarded as Smritis or sacred traditions, while those of Buddha and others are regarded as heretical? Because the systematists uphold the canonicity or authoritativeness of the Vedas, while Buddha and his followers looked upon them as human compositions—venerable indeed, but of no authority—just as large bodies of professors in the Christian Church look upon the writings of the fathers. Orthodoxy and heterodoxy seem to have consisted in acceptance and rejection of these records as authoritative, rather than of any formulated schemes of doctrine and precept. And the result was that doctrinal errors of the most obnoxious type were promulgated, and irregularities of practice of the most disastrous stamp were legalized by men who ostensibly paid reverence to the Vedas, but secretly undermined their authority. It may perhaps be proved that Buddha and his followers were not entirely free from the meanness and dishonesty associated with such procedure, though as a rule they referred to the Vedas as writings which should be accepted when they agreed

with reason, but rejected when they were out of the boundary line of such agreement.

The object of this philosophy is set forth in the opening aphorism of this book : " Then, therefore, Brahma-inquisitiveness or Brahma-investigation." The Sutras of Jaimini direct our attention to Duty, and throw the Being from whom Duty receives its power to challenge obedience or its obligatory character, into the background. The Sutras of Badarayuna advance a step further and make this being the object of inquiry and investigation. How is this great inquiry or investigation to be conducted ? But before we settle this question we have to set at rest another of a preliminary nature—viz., Who are entitled to the honor of being engaged in so important and glorious an investigation ?

In reply to this question, the first remark to be made is that the Sudras (members of the lowest caste, or rather outcasts) are excluded from the privilege, and that peremptorily and unconditionally. Colebrooke plainly states this : " Not to interrupt the connection of the subjects, I have purposely passed by a digression, or rather several, comprised in two sections of this chapter (third of Book I.), wherein it is inquired whether any besides a regenerate man (a Hindu of the first three tribes) is qualified for theological studies or theognostic attainments ; and the solution of the doubt is that a Sudra, or a man of an inferior tribe, is incompetent, and beings superior to man (the gods of mythology) are qualified."

Nor are all the members of the three higher castes indiscriminately entitled to the privilege of being permitted to carry on this sublime inquiry. The women are looked upon as Sudras, and are excluded as a body ; though solitary examples of learned females being

engaged in such investigation, but not exactly in the prescribed manner, are not wanting. In the Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad a legend is preserved fitted to show that some degree of encouragement was accorded to such women ; but the privilege of being engaged in the inquiry in the approved fashion or prescribed manner is withheld. Yajnavalkya had two wives, Maitreyi and Katyayani, the former "fond of discussing the nature of Brahma," and the latter "wise in the duties of a housewife." Yajnavalkya made up his mind to give up the duties of a householder, and to retire to a forest for the purpose of seeking the right knowledge of Brahma, and calling in his wife Maitreyi expressed his determination to divide his property between his two wives and depart. She inquired if she could "obtain immortality" by wealth. On being assured that she could not, she signified her wish to have that explained to her which might prove to her a stepping-stone to immortality. Her husband was exceedingly pleased with the good sense she evinced, and strove to satisfy her liberal curiosity in a long discourse. But when the discourse was over, Yajnavalkya "went to the forest" alone, she not being considered entitled to the privilege of accompanying him. Women, then, are excluded from this path of inquiry.

Of the male members of the higher castes, those only are encouraged who have proper qualifications, or who have passed through a preliminary course of training and discipline. The candidates for Brahma knowledge must have studied the Vedas under an accredited teacher either in this or in a previous life. They must have performed the ordinary and extraordinary rites, gone through the prescribed devotions and penances, and cleansed their minds from all impurity by avoiding

vice and practising virtue, without any regard to reward, present or prospective. The qualified person is thus described in the Vedanta Sar :

“ The qualified person is one who possesses due intelligence—that is, one who, by reading the Vedas and Vedangas according to rule, either in this life or in a former one, has obtained a general idea of the meaning of the whole ; who, by performing the constant and occasional rites, the penances and devotional exercises, and abstaining from things done with desire of reward and from those forbidden, has got rid of all sin and so thoroughly cleansed his mind, and who is possessed of the four means.”

The four means are thus set forth :

“ The four means (Sadhana) are : (a) discrimination between eternal and non-eternal substances, (b) indifference to the enjoyment of rewards here and hereafter, (c) the possession of quiescence, self-restraint, and (d) desire for release.”

We cannot read what is said in the Sutras and in the Vedanta Sar of these preparatory exercises without being reminded of parallel passages or corresponding injunctions in the Upanishads. Brahma-inquisitiveness is a stage to which man must pass, through Duty-inquisitiveness ; the Uttara Mimansa through the Purva Mimansa ; the teaching of Badarayuna through the teaching of Jaimini. But an attempt is made by the most redoubtable of the champions of the Vedantic school to undo this connection, or to make its philosophy stand on its own legs. Sankara, in his comments on the opening verse of the work, thus speaks of the qualifications needed by the inquirer : “ The study of the Vedas is a general antecedent (qualification). But, then, is the comprehension of prescribed acts here the

special antecedent (qualification) ? By no means ; because even before Duty-inquisitiveness, Brahma-inquisitiveness is possible in one that has studied the Vedanta." This, however, is a later development of the system utterly at war with its earlier indications.

The great inquiry is conducted in these Sutas, and ought therefore to be conducted by every sensible Hindu by a rigid application of the rules of exegesis, framed by Jaimini to the latter portion of the Vedas, the Upanishads. These documents are sifted and analyzed, and the conclusions they are fitted to uphold are stated and supported by appropriate quotations and conclusive arguments. They are, in a word, correctly interpreted, and the untenable nature of the false construction put upon many of their passages and statements by the champions of Sankhya and Vaisheshika Philosophy is set forth ; while apparent contradictions are reconciled and obscurities cleared up. A great portion of the Sarihika Sutas is therefore argumentative. Colebrooke, in his able analysis of its contents, thus sets forth its controversial character : " The second chapter of the second lecture (book) is controversial. The doctrine of the Sankhyas is confuted in the first section, that of the Vaiseshikas in two more, of the Baudhas in as many, of the Jainas in one, of the Pasupatas and Pancharatras likewise in one each. . . . It is remarkable that the Nyaya of Gautama is entirely unnoticed in the text and commentaries of the Vedant Sutas."

It is to be observed that a correct interpretation of the Upanishads cannot be attempted without resorting to the approved weapons of logic. These documents were roughly handled, twisted, and tortured by all classes of thinkers, both orthodox and heterodox, by

friend and foe. They were appealed to, not only by the Sankhyas in support of their apparently dualistic but really materialistic creed, not only by the Vaishe-shikas in support of their theory of various kinds of atoms led into varieties of combinations by an unseen force, but even by the champions of heterodoxy in favor of their anti-Vedic sentiments and theories. We are tempted to quote from the Vedanta Sar a long passage to show how these venerable documents were handled by the sects called heretical, as well as by the orthodox :

“ For example, the very illiterate man says that his son is his self, on account of the text of the Veda (Satpatha Brahmana, 14. 3. 4. 26) : ‘ Self is born as a son ; ’ and because he sees that he has the same love for his son as for himself, and because he finds that if it is well or ill with his son, it is well or ill with himself.

“ A Charvaka says that the gross body is his self ; on account of the text of the Veda (Taithiriya Upanishad, 2. 1) : ‘ This is man as made up of the extract of food ; ’ and because he sees that a man leaving his own son (to burn) departs himself from a burning house, and because of the experience, ‘ I am fat,’ ‘ I am lean.’

“ Another Charvaka says that the organs of sense are his self, on account of the text of the Veda (Chhandogya Upanishad, V. I. 7) : ‘ They, the organs of sense, went to Prajapati and said, (“ Lord, which of us is the chief ? ” He said unto them, “ He is chief among you whose departure makes the body seem worthless”) ; ’ and because in the absence of the organs of sense the functions of the body cease, and because of the experience, ‘ I am blind of one eye,’ ‘ I am deaf.’

“ Another Charvaka says that the vital airs are his



self, on account of the text of the Veda (Taittiriya Upanishad, 2. 2) : 'There is another, an inner self, made of the vital airs,' and because in the absence of the vital airs the organs of sense are inactive, and because of the experience, 'I am hungry,' 'I am thirsty.'

"Another Charvaka says that the mind is his self, on account of the text of the Veda (Taittiriya Upanishad, 2. 3) : 'There is another, inner self, made of the mind,' and because when the mind sleeps the vital airs cease to be, and because of the experience, 'I resolve,' 'I doubt.'

"A Baudha says that intellect is his self, on account of the text of the Veda (Taittiriya, 2. 4) : 'There is another, an inner self, made of cognition,' and because in the absence of an agent an instrument is powerless, and because of the experience, 'I am an agent,' 'I am a patient.'

"The Prabhakara and the Tarkika say that ignorance is their self, on account of the text of the Veda (Taittiriya, 2. 5) : 'There is another, an inner self, made up of bliss,' and because, during sleep, intellect and the rest are merged in ignorance, and because of the experience, 'I am ignorant.'

"The Bhatta says that intelligence associated with ignorance is his self, on account of the text of the Veda (Mandukya Upanishad, 5) : 'Self is a mass of knowledge and comprised of bliss,' and because during sleep there are both the light (of intelligence) and the darkness (of ignorance), and because of the experience, 'Myself I know not.'

"Another Baudha says that nihility is his self, on account of the text of the Veda : 'In the beginning this was a mere nonentity,' and because during sleep

everything disappears, and because of the experience of the man who has just awoke from sleep—an experience in the shape of a reflection on his own non-existence—when he says, ‘ I slept ; during sleep I was not.’ ”

This long extract corroborates what we have so often affirmed, that the Upanishads are the sources not only of Hindu pantheism, but of Hindu Philosophy in all its phases of development. But the Brahma Sutras make it evident that if they were interpreted on fair principles, and if allowance were made for the contradictions in which they abound, they could be legitimately marshalled only in favor of that species of pantheism which presupposes a real change of divine into material substance. The great doctrine the Sutras prove is that Brahma is both the efficient and material cause of the universe. Dr. Mullens objects to the use of the term “ material ” in this connection, on the ground that the substance of the world is after all spiritual and divine ; but he forgets that, according to the teaching of the Upanishads, the divine substance actually becomes matter, and constitutes the world thus changed. Matter in these days is said to be a double-faced entity, because it in particular conditions becomes mind, not merely appears in spiritual forms. According to the writers of the Upanishads, and to Badarayana, who merely revives in the Brahma Sutras the teaching of these records, the divine substance is a double-faced entity, and becomes matter, not merely appears in material forms, in particular conditions. Such being the case, Brahma may properly be called the material cause of the world ; but his efficiency is problematical, as we shall show in the proper place.

How is the great doctrine that Brahma is the material as well as the efficient cause of the world proved in

the Brahma Sutras ? In the first place, by citations from and direct references to many passages in the Upanishads. In the second place, by proving the identity of the elements or other substances here and there represented as creative principles in the Upanishads with the Supreme Spirit. In the third place, by a reproduction of the imagery by which the identity of the universe with the Supreme Spirit is set forth. In the fourth place, by proving the untenableness of the Sankhya and Vaiseshika and other theories of creation. And lastly, by refuting the objections advanced against the pantheistic notion of creation set forth in the Upanishads and revived and defended in the Brahma Sutras.

1. We shall observe this order in our treatment of the subject. In the first place, let us remark that Brahma is set forth as the Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer of the world, in the second aphorism of the work : " From whom the production, etc., of this." Sankar, in his comments upon this verse, cites some of the passages herein referred to. He expressly says that the relation of Brahma as Creator, to the world as the created, is proved neither by the direct testimony of the senses nor by inference, but by the Scripture texts alluded to. Hear what he says : " Had Brahma been an object of sense, it might have been held that this work (the universe) was done by Brahma. But where the work alone (and not its author) is receivable by the senses, it is not possible to determine whether the work was done by Brahma or some other agent. Therefore the Sutra : ' From whom the Production,' etc., is not for setting up Inference. What then ? It is for the illustration of Vedanta texts. But what are the Vedanta texts which are here designed to be illustrated by the Sutra ? ' Bhrigu Varuni resorted to his father

Varuna. Teach me, sir, Brahma'—thus introducing the question, the Veda concludes : ' From whom these entities are produced, by whom the productions subsist, in whom departing they are resolved, inquire of Him. He is Brahma' (Taittiriya). And the specifications of that text, ' From Joy indeed these entities are produced, by Joy the productions subsist, in Joy departing they are resolved ' (Taittiriya). And other texts are also to be illustrated of the same kind relating to the cause, which is verily eternal, pure, intelligent, free, and all-knowing."

According to Sankar, almost every text in this work refers either directly or obliquely to several verses in the Upanishads, and the quotations he presents are so numerous that if they were abstracted from his work its bulk would not be half so repelling as it is. It is enough to give here one more of the almost innumerable verses referred to and cited in the Sutras and their commentaries : " All this universe indeed is Brahma ; from him does it proceed ; into him it is dissolved ; in him it breathes. So let every one adore him calmly." Dr. Monier Williams very appropriately calls this the Vedantist's simple confession of faith.

2. But sometimes the elements, ether, fire, etc., or such substances as life or the individual soul, are separately and individually represented as the creator in the Upanishads. How is the discrepancy to be accounted for ? By a simple recognition of the fact that they are, when set forth as omnific powers, identical with Brahma. The following string of quotations from the Upanishads make this clear : " The omnipotent, omniscient, sentient cause of the universe is essentially happy (Taittiriya). He is the brilliant, golden person seen *within* the solar orb and the human eye (Chhan-

dogya). He is the ethereal element (*akasa*) from which all things proceed, and to which all return (Chhandogya). He is the breath (Prana), in which all beings merge, into which they all rise (Udgitha). He is the light (*dyotish*) which shines in heaven, and in all places, high and low, everywhere throughout the world, and within the human person. He is the breath (Prana) and intelligent self, immortal, undecaying, and happy, with which Indra, in a dialogue with Pratardana, identifies himself (Kaushitaki)."

One of the substances represented as omnific is *Vaiswanara*, which is fire, or, as Mr. Kunte says, the gastric fire. Let us see what is said about this substance in the second chapter of the first book :

"24. Because there is a special sense of ordinary words, the term *Vaiswanara* (signifies the Supreme Spirit).

"25. That, which should be so remembered, would be inference.

"26. If anybody objects that because such descriptions—as he abides inside, and others—lead to the conclusion that he (*Vaiswanara*) is not the Supreme Spirit, then the conclusion is wrong, because the Acharyas state that there is a direct precept that there would be absurdity, and that therefore *Vaiswanara* is the Person (the Supreme Spirit).

"27. Therefore, indeed, any element or god is not the Supreme Spirit (*Vaiswanara*).

"28. The opinion of Jaimini is, The statement, that the Supreme Spirit is directly to be worshipped, does not conflict (with any text).

"29. The opinion of Aswarathya Acharya is, (that a description of a visible form is given) for manifesting (the Supreme Spirit).

“ 30. The opinion of Badiri is, (that the statement that the Supreme Spirit is as big as a span, is made) that his form may be conceived.

“ 31. Jaimini shows that such descriptions are given for showing the perfection of God.”

These verses set forth the obscure manner in which discussions are conducted in this work. The proposition to be proved is that Vaiswanara, which is fire, is no other than the Supreme Spirit. What line of demonstration is adopted? Objections to the correct interpretation are stated and refuted in the first place. The first objection is: Vaiswanara or fire has a visible form, and cannot therefore be the invisible Supreme Spirit. In reply, the proof, which rises from the known to the unknown, the visible to the invisible—viz., inference is utilized. Vaiswanara is the form in which the Supreme Spirit appears. But Vaiswanara, as gastric fire, abides within us; how can it be the Supreme Spirit? The objectors, however, forget that there is direct affirmation in the Veda in favor of the correct interpretation. Mr. Kunte, whose translation of these Sutras is given above, quotes the Upanishad texts connected with them, and one of these runs thus: “That Vaiswanara, who by his light extends the earth and the heavens.” This verse may be represented as “a direct precept” in favor of the interpretation contended for. Besides, any other interpretation involves a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Add to all this the testimony of Maharshis or demigods like Jaimini, Aswarathya, and Badiri, and the conclusion becomes irresistible. They all maintain that sensible images are utilized in Vedic descriptions of Brahma, because human minds fail to comprehend him without their aid. Jaimini in particular maintains that

such descriptions tend to set forth the perfection of the Supreme Spirit, which is both great and small, amorphous and with form, all-knowing and unknowing.

3. The imagery by which the essential identity of the universe with Brahma is set forth in the Upanishads is revived in the Brahma Sutras. Here is a string of images revived : "Him, invariable, the wise contemplate as the source (or cause) of beings. As the spider puts forth and draws in his thread, as plants spring from the earth (and return to it), as hair of the head and body grows from the living man, so does the universe come of the unalterable." . . . Here is another : "As milk changes to curd, and water to ice, so is Brahma variously transformed and diversified without aid of tools or exterior means of any sort. In like manner the spider spins his web out of his substance ; spirits assume various shapes ; cranes propagate without male ; and the lotus proceeds from pond to pond without organs of motion." In many passages Brahma is said to be related to the universe as yarn to cloth, clay to the jar, gold to the bracelet. Some of the images employed indicate a real change of substance, while others merely a change of form.

Though a real change of substance is shown in many passages in which Brahma is described in the Sutras, he is emphatically declared unchangeable in some. Here is one of Colebrooke's extracts from the Sutras, and the comments : "He is described in many passages of the Veda as diversified, and endued with every quality and particular character ; but in other and very numerous texts as without form or quality. The latter only is truly applicable, not the former, nor yet both. He is impassible, unaffected by worldly modifications, as the clear crystal, seemingly colored by the red blos-

som of a *hibiscus*, is not less really pellucid. He does not vary with every disguising form or designation, for all diversity is expressly denied by explicit texts ; and the notion of variableness relative to him is distinctly condemned in some *shakhas* of the Veda."

Here is a contradiction which is even more apparent, in the following extracts presented by Colebrooke : "He is amorphous, for so he is expressly declared to be, but seemingly assuming form, as sunshine or moonlight impinging on any object appears straight or crooked." "The luminous sun, though single, yet reflected in water becomes various, and so does the unborn divine soul by disguise in diverse modes." "The Veda so describes him as entering into and pervading the corporeal shapes by him wrought. He framed bodies, biped and quadruped ; and becoming a bird he passed into those bodies, filling them as their informing spirit."

The last of these extracts embodies a principle by which the passages in which a real change of substance is indicated may be reconciled to those in which the immutability of the divine spirit is set forth with equal distinctness and emphasis. Brahma is the informing spirit or inspiriting soul of all corporeal frames—bodies of bipeds, quadrupeds, and centipeds, and of all material substances. The idea of lifeless matter was scouted in the Vedantic school as thoroughly as it is in the writings of Professor Tyndall, who may be represented as a champion of materialistic pantheism. Every particle of matter is instinct with divine life, and its inspiriting soul never changes, though it appears in endless varieties of combinations. Brahma appears in various bodies and frames, which are evolved out of his substance as the spider's web is evolved out of its sub-



stance; but underneath these infinitely diversified assumed forms he remains unchanged and unchangeable. This explanation, it must be confessed, does not entirely free the descriptions of Brahma given in the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras from the charge of incoherence and contradictoriness.

4. One of the great objects of these Sutras seems to be the explosion of the Sankhya notion that the word Brahma is simply a synonym of the word *Pradhan* or *Prakriti*. The Sankhya philosopher maintains, in other words, that the source of creation in the Upanishads is in reality his Pradhan or Prakriti, though called by a different name, Brahma. The Sutras explode this notion by pointing out the essential difference or distinction between the Brahma of the Veda and the Pradhan of Sankhya Philosophy. The axiom on which they build their argument is that no unsentient and unintelligent substance could possibly be the creator of the world. The Veda attributes creation to a perception of solitariness. The creator perceived his lonesomeness, and said : "I am one ; let me be many." Sankar, in his comments on the fifth aphorism of the book, "Not so, because of observation, it is unheard," says : "Unsentient Pradhan of Sankhya fabrication as the cause of the universe has no place in Vedanta texts." He makes the following observations to show that there was perception or "observation" on the part of the Creator before the commencement of His omnific work :

"Thus commencing with the texts, 'O gentle pupil, this was in the beginning an entity,' 'One without a second,' it is added : 'It observed, "Let me be multiplied, let me be produced," and it "created the right."' In these texts the universe manifested by

names and forms and expressed here by the word *idam* (this) being determined before production to be an existing spirit, its creativeness, in its antecedent state indicated by the word entity, of light and other things *after observation*, is declared. Also in other texts, 'This was in the beginning one (only) spirit. There was nothing else. He observed (saying), Let us create the worlds. He created these worlds.' These declare also a creation after observation."

The Pradhan of the Sankhyas is confessedly un-sentient and unintelligent, and it could not therefore have observed and created. The Sankhyas, however, maintain that knowledge and sentience existed potentially in Pradhan, or in one of the three gunas or qualities of which it consists, and that therefore the possibility of its being the source of creation must even on Vedantic principles be admitted. The Vedantist retorts that ignorance and stolidity also existed potentially in Pradhan, and whatever of science existed in it was neutralized by its nescience. "If," says Sankar, "in the equipoise of the (three) qualities, Pradhan can be called all-knowing, by pleading the capacity for knowledge, inherent in the *sattwa* (attribute), then it may also be called little-knowing, on the plea of the capacity of precluding knowledge inherent in (the other two attributes) *rajas* and *tamas*. Further, the state of *sattwa* without an observant (spirit) is not called knowledge. Nor has unintelligent Pradhan any inherent observantness."

The Vedantist adopts the cosmogony of the Sankhyas in its main features, as will be shown in the next paper ; but he attacks their assumption of a material form as its starting-point with the greatest vehemence. Nor does he spare the atomic theory of Gautama and

Kanada. Many of the arguments arrayed against the former are marshalled against the latter theory, and the conclusion upheld is that of a divine rather than a material substance evolving creation out of itself, consequent on its perception of its own solitariness, and of its determination to multiply itself.

5. The objections to this conclusion raised by the Sankhyas and others are stated and confuted. The first of these is based on the similarity which should, according to Hindu logic, subsist between cause and effect. The argument may be stated thus : An effect must be of a piece with or similar to its material cause ; but there is dissimilarity between the world and Brahma ; therefore Brahma cannot be looked up to as the cause of the world. In reply it is maintained that apparent dissimilarity between a cause and its effect is noticeable in many cases. " Hair and nails, which are insensible, grow from a sensible animal body, and sentient vermin (scorpions, etc.) spring from inanimate sources (cow-dung, etc.)." But the argument, it is added, may be advanced against the Sankhya theory, which brings sentient beings out of an unsentient material form. The atomic theory, or that which brings creation out of a universal void, may be shown as untenable precisely in this way.

Another of the objections advanced hinges on " fruition," which discriminates between the party who enjoys or suffers, and that which is enjoyed or suffered, and which mars thereby the unity of Brahma. The imagery brought forward in reply is that of the sea and the numerous changes on its surface, the earth and its contents and products, and the food eaten and the visible objects into which it is converted. " The sea is one, and not other than its waters ; yet waves, foam,

spray, drops, froth, and other modifications of it differ from each other." Brahma is the sea, and the innumerable souls enjoying or suffering are, together with the sources of their enjoyment and suffering, the changeable currents, waves, froth, and foam. Again : " An effect is not other than its cause. Brahma is single, without a second. He is not separate from the embodied self. He is soul, and the soul is he. Yet he does not do that only which is agreeable and beneficial to self. The same earth exhibits diamonds, rock crystals, red orpiment, etc. ; the same soil produces a diversity of plants, the same food is converted into various excrescences, hairs, nails, etc." Brahma's object in creation is, not self-enjoyment, not self-infliction, but mere " sport" in diversity, self-manifestation in matter and mind, in virtue and vice, joy and sorrow, bondage and liberation !

Again the objectors ask, How could Brahma act without organs of action—hands, feet, etc. ? Creation presupposes action, action presupposes organs ; but as Brahma, a pure spirit, is without these, he cannot properly be represented as a creator and therefore actor. This, in the estimation of some Hindu philosophers, is a great objection, and it was urged against the theory of the Indian atomists. Their reply, alluded to in a foregoing paper, is that Brahma, though bodiless, can assume bodies, and act through the organs attached to them. The Brahma Sutras, however, advance a step further and maintain that Brahma can act without organs. " Brahma is omnipotent, able for every act without organ or instrument." But the old difficulty is here encountered : What motive could Brahma possibly have for creating ? The Vedantist's reply is : " No motive or special purpose need

be assigned for his creation of the universe besides his will."

The most formidable objection and its reply we shall state in Sankar's words, as translated by Monier Williams in his "Indian Wisdom" :

"It may be objected that God is proved not to be the cause of the universe. Why ? From the visible instances of injustice and cruelty. Some he makes happy, as the gods, etc. ; some very miserable, as the brutes, etc. ; and some in a middling condition, as men, etc. Being the author of such an unjust creation, he is proved to be subject to passions like other persons—that is to say, to partiality and prejudice—and therefore his nature is found wanting in spotlessness. And by dispensing pain and ruin He is chargeable with malice and cruelty, deemed culpable even among the wicked. Hence, because of the instances of injustice and cruelty, God cannot be the cause of the universe. To this we reply : Injustice and cruelty cannot be charged upon God. Why ? Because He did not act independently. God, being dependent, creates this world of inequalities. If you ask on what He is dependent, we reply, on merit and demerit. That there should be an unequal creation, dependent on the merit or demerit of the souls created, is no fault of God. As the rain is the common cause of the production of rice and wheat, but the causes of their specific distinctions as rice and wheat are the varying powers of the irrespective seeds, so is God the common cause in the creation of gods, men, and others ; but of the distinctions between gods, men, and others, the causes are the varying works inherent in their respective souls."

The original Sutras commented upon in the words quoted above are thus translated by Dr. Mullens, whose

translation, by the way, is simpler than that of Colebrooke : " Injustice cannot be attributed to Brahma because some are happy, some miserable, and some both. Every one has his lot in the world, according to his merit in a former stage of the universe. So the rain-cloud distributes his rain equally, but the plants vary according to the seed whence they spring" (Brahma Sutras, II. 34-37).

These aphorisms and these comments make it evident that the ultimate source of creation is not the divine will, but some power by which that will is determined, the power of merit or demerit or of work. Why is, then, creation expressly attributed to the will of God, to His perception of His solitariness, and His determination to create ? No explanation can possibly be given of this bit of inconsistency and contradiction, excepting the acknowledged fact that Hindu logicians, like some modern heroes, never scrupled to silence a body of objectors by a recourse to principles inconsistent with others for which they at other times were compelled by their theories to stand up. The Sankhya notion of creation evolved out of a dead substance had to be exploded, and sentience and knowledge and desire and determination were attributed unscrupulously to a Being who was held up as incapable of being influenced by these attributes and predicates.

But after all the universe cannot properly be said to have been created at all ! And this brings us to another objection and reply, which we shall present in Sankar's words, as translated by Monier Williams :

" The Supreme Being existed at the beginning, one without a second. Hence, before the creation there could be no works in dependence on which inequalities might be created. God may be dependent on works

after distinctions are made. But before the creation there could be no works caused by varying instruments, and therefore we ought to find a uniform. We reply : This does not vitiate our doctrine, because *the world is without beginning*. The world being without beginning, nothing can prevent works and unequal creations from continuing in the state of cause and effect, like the seed and its plant."

Here is another flagrant inconsistency. But there is one way of accounting for it. Brahma is uncaused, and has therefore lived from eternity. How ? Either in a state of quiescence, or in a state of activity, or in states of activity alternating with states of quiescence. The first two suppositions are untenable because of the long, long seasons called *kalpas*, each preceded by the consummation of one stage of mundane existence and succeeded by another. Periods of activity alternating with periods of quiescence are, properly speaking, the salient features of the divine existence ; and they have followed one another in succession throughout eternity. Just as the Veda has been breathed out and breathed in by Brahma throughout eternity, the world has been evolved out of his substance and swallowed up in it throughout eternity ; and if he can properly be called the author of the one, he may legitimately be called the creator of the other. But the question arises, By what law is this beginningless and endless series of evolutions and involutions regulated—an inherent law of necessity, or an extraneous force ? If by an inherent law of necessity, all talk of freedom on the part of Brahma is bosh. If by an extraneous force, such as Karma (work), he cannot be the ultimate source of creation !

We reserve our remarks on the theory of bondage

and liberation propounded in these Sutras, as well as on their physiological teaching, for our next paper. Meanwhile we conclude with the remark that the contradictions with which they abound are the inevitable results of the attempt made in them to reconcile varied and conflicting lines of thought. Some scholars incline to the opinions expressed by Mr. Kunte that in the Vedanta Sutras we find the germ of the eclecticism, which was brought to perfection in the Swetaswara Upanishad and the Bhagvada-Gita. It is a matter of fact that the Sankhya cosmogony is adopted, and the Vaisheshika view of work. But all attempts to reconcile these systems to it are repelled with firmness and even contumely. But the author does not seem to have freed himself from the prevailing lines of philosophic thought sufficiently to be able to elaborate a consistent system of pantheism ; and to the homage he paid to established schools is to be attributed the glaring contradictions into which he seems to have been betrayed.



## CHAPTER XI.

### THE MAYA, OR THE ILLUSION THEORY.

THE great teachers in ancient India of the orthodox stamp may be divided into six classes—viz., the Rishis, the Vedavadins, the Parinamavadins, the Sankhyas or Dualists, the Vaiseshikas or Trialists, and the Mayavadins or Illusionists.

The Rishis were shepherd-warriors, who came into the country with their hosts of brave followers, drove the aborigines from some of its fertile provinces, and organized colonial settlements within the precincts of the territory thus vacated. They did not belong to the most advanced branch of the great Aryan family, but they had great natural abilities, which had crowned their schemes of conquest and colonization with brilliant success, and which were called into vigorous play, and sharpened and improved by the dangers by which they found themselves surrounded, and the varied exigencies of nascent communities which they had to meet. Nor did the scenery around their new homes, in vast plains overshadowed by ranges of magnificent mountains, intersected by broad rivers, and surrounded by dense forests, fail to stimulate their natural love of the sublime and the beautiful, and stir up the poetic fervor of their brave, generous natures. And consequently, in the midst of their warlike pursuits, the varied aspirations of their hearts evoked by present necessities, rather than by a calm foresight of future

contingencies, were vented in strains of impassioned poetry and metrical prayer. The hymnology thus elaborated is characterized by archaic simplicity, naturalness, and devotional enthusiasm, but it is lamentably deficient in keenness of insight, depth of knowledge, and breadth of view ; while the puerility characteristic of it as a whole, and the obscenity by which not a small portion of it is vitiated, are blemishes from which it were to be wished it had been free. The Rishis were worshippers of nature, had rites and ceremonies of the simplest kind, and could justly claim some virtues of a rugged but sterling nature ; and their teachings, though below par judged by a modern standard, were fitted to curb the ferocity of growing communities of successful marauders, and raise them to a low stage of civilization—the stage attained by their Iranian brethren.

But simple naturalism gave place in course of time to a complicated system of polytheism, the practical requirements of which could not be met except by an elaborate ritual. Nor could a cumbrous system of ceremonial observances be reduced to practice without a stated and recognized ministry, or rather priesthood. And thus the Vedavadins sprung into existence. The Rishis were poets and priests, as well as warriors and statesmen ; and they supervised and controlled both the secular and spiritual concerns of the new settlements, of which they were recognized chieftains. But when the objects of worship were multiplied, and a complex ceremonial system was elaborated, a division of labor was realized, and a broad line of demarcation was drawn between the functions of the State and the functions of the Church. While kings and statesmen managed the concerns of the State, those of the Church

were left in the hands of a hierarchy, the members of which enjoyed peculiar privileges, and gradually arrogated to themselves all power, temporal as well as spiritual, regal as well as sacerdotal. The result was a mock theocracy, under the blight of which the spirit of inquiry was crushed, poetry vanished into thin air, and nothing remained but an endless round of mummeries and tomfooleries. The age of the Brahmanas was emphatically an age of degrading superstition, priestcraft, and formality ; of spirit crushed, mind enslaved, and the noblest instincts and emotions of the heart paralyzed.

The Vedavadins or the royal-priests began to lose their influence and ascendancy as soon as the spirit of inquiry was aroused by a rationalistic reaction against lifeless externalism ; and the Parinamavadins appeared on the stage to dispute their once unrestricted but now limited sway. The Parinamavadins assumed a modest tone, and professed to do nothing more than simply disclose the esoteric meaning of the hymns, which had been composed and sung by the Rishis, and the ritual, which had been elaborated and reduced to practice by the Vedavadins. They did not ostensibly raise the standard of revolt against current beliefs and superstitions—perhaps they did not mean to do so. Nevertheless they undermined the influence of such beliefs and superstitions by leading public attention, or the attention of the intelligent portion of the public, away from them toward an all-embracing spiritual essence, changed, by a necessitated process of evolution or self-development, into the objects of nature and the phenomena of life. The Parinamavadins are also called Vikarvadins, or the teachers who insisted on a real change of spiritual into material substance in the process of development to which creation is to be traced.

But their scheme of thought, unfolded somewhat incoherently in the Upanishads, had to pass through a prolonged period of warfare waged against it by two, if not several, antagonistic systems of philosophy. The Sankhyas, with their dualism, which denied the existence of God or divine substance altogether, and affirmed that of an ever-active, self-evolving material form and innumerable quiescent souls, maintained a dire struggle with the Parinamavadins, and succeeded in crippling their power and circumscribing their influence for a time. But they themselves had to retreat before the triumphant flag of the Vaiseshikas, who propounded the atomic theory, and courted popular favor by admitting the existence of a quiescent God as well as quiescent souls. The Vaiseshikas succeeded in further undermining the influence of the Parinama theory.

But the Parinamavadins had their triumph restored to them by the ritualism revived and further developed by Jaimini and the Purva-Mimansa school. But their theory had to be remodelled, and the work of reconstruction and renovation was effected by the Mayavadins or the illusionists. It is but fair to add that but for this timely change the system of the Parinamavadins could not have risen to that ascendancy which it has enjoyed for so many cycles of ages in India.

The defects which rendered its reconstruction a necessity ought to be categorically stated and carefully examined before the Maya or illusion theory is treated of and explained.

1. The theory of the Parinamavadins is in antagonism to that monism which both the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras are so obviously intended to uphold. The watchword of these documents is *Ekamevadityam*,

One without a Second ; and the reasonings embodied in them, together with the legendary matter introduced and the illustrative imagery pressed into service, are all fitted to bolster up non-dualism. But the Parinama theory involves dualism, derivative, if not original ; and it therefore runs counter to this, the central or vital principle of Vedantic speculations. It will not avail to say that the dualism we notice in creation is, after all, monism ; that the diverse objects around us, as well as the phenomena of our inner consciousness and life, are evolutes of one primal substance, having originally sprung from it, and being in process of resolution into it. The fact is, that two classes of phenomena, each obviously implying a substrate different from that of the other, exist ; and the conclusion is irresistible that there is at present a dualism, a dualism emanating from monism and sure to terminate in monism, but yet a dualism. The Parinama theory is, therefore, incompatible with or hostile to the root-principle of Vedantism, and it had in consequence to be remodelled.

2. Again, the Parinama theory is inconsistent with the Hindu notion of causality. According to this notion, the effect must be of the same nature with the cause. If the effect is spiritual, the cause must be spiritual ; and if the effect is material, the cause must be material. From spiritual substance material substance cannot be derived. Matter is the very antipodes of Brahma, or the divine essence. Brahma is pure, while matter is impure ; Brahma is intelligent and sentient, while matter is unintelligent and insensible ; Brahma is unchangeable, while matter is mutable. How could matter have possibly sprung from Brahma ? Besides, it ought not to be forgotten that the idea of

impure matter emanating from pure spiritual substance is abhorrent or most offensive to Hindu susceptibilities, and cannot be entertained for a moment. Hence the inconsistency in the reasonings of the Parinamavadins in the Upanishads and the Saririka Sutras ; inconsistency so glaring that some have gone so far as to deny the existence of the theory in these documents.

3. The theory, moreover, is inconsistent with an acknowledged attribute of Brahma. In the Upanishads Brahma is described as impartite (*akhanda*), or without parts. What is meant by this technical term when applied to the Deity ? Major Jacob, in his annotations appended to his excellent translation of the Vedanta Sar, thus discloses its meaning : “ According to the commentator Vrisemhasarasavati, this term (*akhanda*) means ‘ devoid of anything of a like kind or of a different kind, and without internal variety.’ A tree, for example, has the ‘ internal variety ’ of leaves, flowers, and fruit ; it has things ‘ of a like kind ’ in other trees, and things ‘ of a different kind ’ in stones, etc. But Brahma is not so, he being absolute and unchangeable unity.” According, however, to the theory condemned, the variety, resemblance, and dissimilarity from which Brahma is declared free, may justly be predicated of him. The theory had, therefore, to be either abandoned or reconstructed.

4. But the most formidable objection to the theory is its incompatibility with a proper scheme of theodicy. Sin and misery exist in the world, and human life is only a tissue of sighs and groans. What is the cause of this anomalous state of things ? Why did God knowingly allow the ingress of sin, with its interminable train of distress and wretchedness ? Is God omnipotent ? If so, why did He not interpose His all-suffi-

cient and limitless power between sin and the world converted by it into a favored abode of disease and death? Is God omniscient and all-wise? If so, why did He not, while foreseeing the impending danger, adopt judicious measures to avert it? Maintain that sin and misery are realities, and the justice and mercy of God cannot but be impugned. But regard sin and misery as illusions and dreams, and these attributes of God are left intact. A proper system of theodicy is possible only when the Parinama theory is abandoned.

These are some of the reasons assigned for the renovation of the theory of real transformation propounded in the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras. The work of reconstruction was accomplished when their cogency was clearly seen, and the Parinama theory was superseded by the Vivarta or Illusion theory. The small treatise in which this latter theory is unfolded is Vedanta Sar, translated by Dr. Ballantyne years ago, but very recently presented in an excellent translation, with copious notes, by Major Jacob. Of his version we shall avail ourselves in our attempt to set forth the broad features of a doctrine which is one of the queerest this world has seen, but which, though obviously ludicrous, some modern philosophers have not been ashamed to revive.

Vedantism appears in its incipient stage of development in the Upanishads and the Sutras, in which the doctrine of the Upanishads is simply revived, with its approved arguments and stock illustrations. It appears in a state of maturity in the Vedanta Sar, a compendium of Vedanta principles of a much later date. But its latest phasis of development is noticeable in another standard treatise of a still later date, called Vedanta Paribhasa, the contents of which are analyzed in

J Pandit Nehemiah Goreh's able and acute dissertations on Vedantism, in his book already referred to. He presents in his footnotes numerous extracts from this work, and of these we shall avail ourselves. And first of all let us dwell, as the learned Pandit does, on the three sorts of existence posited by the Vedantins of the most modern school.

These three sorts of existence are Paramarthika or True, Vyavaharika or Practical, and Pratibhasika or Apparent. They are thus set forth in the Vedanta-Paribhasa, p. 18 : "Existence is of three sorts—true (paramarthika), practical (Vyavaharika), and apparent (pratibhasika). True existence is that of Brahma ; practical, that of ether, etc. ; apparent, that of nacre, silver and the like." Brahma truly exists, and therefore he is really real ; the world exists practically, but not truly, and therefore it is unreally real ; and nacre, mistaken for silver, or serpent imagined in a rope, has only apparent, deceptive existence, and it is also unreally real. Practical and apparent existence agree in one respect, and differ on three points. They agree in their being both false, though ignorantly imagined real. They differ, inasmuch as apparent existence is now and then mistaken for veritable existence, not constantly as practical existence. Apparent existence, moreover, cannot be the source or centre of practical business, as nacre, mistaken for silver, can never be sold as silver. In the third place, our belief in apparent existence is the result, not of ignorance only, as our belief in practical existence, but of some defects superadded to ignorance, such as distance, etc.

What is practical or, as Professor Banerjea calls it, conventional existence ? Is it simply our assumption of the existence of the world for purposes of business



and pleasure ? Some of our modern philosophers do not believe in an essential distinction between virtue and vice ; but they kindly allow or overlook its recognition by mankind in general for the benefit of society. The moral beliefs of humanity are all myths in their opinion ; but their utility is recognized, and their practical ascendancy is left uninterrupted, that the business of society in its present state of ignorance may go on undisturbed. Do the Vedantins allow the existence of the world only on this principle, or do they maintain that after all it has a sort of existence to which the name practical, in contradistinction to the real, ought to be given ? Pandit Nehemiah Goreh maintains that their practical existence is a sort of existence, an intermediate link, so to speak, between true existence and non-existence. They divide objects into three classes—those which are really real, those which are unreally real, and those which are positive unrealities. Brahma is truly existent, really real ; the world, its creator, souls, etc., are practically existent, but not non-existent, and therefore unreally unreal ; and such figments of the head as “ a hare’s horn,” “ the son of a barren woman,” etc., are non-existent or positive nonentities.

Mr. Goreh represents practical existence, as unfolded by the Vedantin, “ as a combination of two contradictory ideas.” The Pandit’s authorities are, however, enemies, not friends, of the Vedanta system, Parthasarathi Misra and Vijnana Bhikshu, “ writers on the Mimamsa and on the Sankhya, respectively.” The former, Parthasarathi, in his Sastra Dipika, introduces a Vedantic opponent, who speaks thus : “ We do not say that the universe is unreal, since it is established, by perception and other proofs, to exist. Nor do we say that it has true existence, it being falsified by right

apprehension of spirit. The universe cannot, therefore, be described either as true or as unreal." The same controversialist is also represented as saying : " That which never presents itself—as the horn of a hare—is held for unreal ; and that which presents itself, and is never falsified—as the true nature of spirit—is held for true ; and, as for the universe, since it presents itself, and yet is falsified by right apprehension, it is not to be described as true, or yet as unreal."

The other writer, Vijnana Bhikshu, the author of the Sankhya-Pravachana-Bhashya, says, p. 25 : " If it be held that nescience is essentially of two contradictories? But 'should' it be alleged that nescience ought to be pronounced 'essentially of two contradictories,' entity and nonentity, or else to be different from both ; and thus there would be no invalidation thereby—that is, by nescience—of non-duality, the only true (*paramarthika*) state. Such is the case. . . . 'Not so;' for such a thing is unknown." These quotations certainly tend to prove that practical existence is not tantamount to non-existence. And therefore Ignorance or Nescience, which according to the system has practical, not true, existence, is said to be "not describable as existent or non-existent" in the Vedanta Sar.

But from one point of view practical existence appears sheer non-existence. From the point of view of true existence, the objects practically existent appear non-existent; as from the point of view of practical existence, even Brahma, the really and truly existent, appears non-existent. The correct view is obtained by the Vedantin, who occupies an intermediate station between practical and true existence, and who sees on one side objects practically but not really existent, and on the other Brahma, really but not practically existent.

A word about apparent existence, and we shall have done with this portion of our knotty subject. Apparent existence has also, according to Vedantic teaching, a reality in it. When a rope is mistaken for a snake, an apparent snake is really formed. Let us reproduce Mr. Goreh's own words and the proofs he adduces in their support: "Respecting apparent things, the partisans of the Vedanta hold this language: that when a man on seeing nacre takes it for silver, apparent silver is really produced. If silver, I ask, is then really produced, how is this proved to be a misconception? In reply I am told that, if the silver were true or practical, there would be no room to speak of misconception; but since it is neither, but apparent, misconception has place."

Mr. Goreh's proofs are all borrowed from Vedanta-Paribhasa. His first extract is from page 10: "Though by the efforts, however belying, of a misapprehensive person, to obtain possession of an illusory object, such an object is established as existent; yet there is no proof that it, the misapprehension, has reference to an apparent object, as silver, etc., produced at that time. For silver, which is extant elsewhere, may be taken as its object. If this be said, I demur, since that silver elsewhere, not being in contact with an organ of sense, cannot be an object of perception."

This extract is somewhat obscure, but it will become luminous when we look upon the objector as pressing into his service the Naiyayika theory, that when nacre is mistaken for silver the memory is a factor in the production of the mistake. The Vedantin in reply affirms the principle that perception is possible only when there is a contact between the thing perceived and a

percipient organ, and that, therefore, silver not present where the nacre is seen cannot possibly occasion the mistake alluded to.

It is not necessary for us to take notice of Mr. Goreh's other extracts, besides the one in which the process of the formation of apparent silver is set forth. The apparent silver is evolved out of ignorance through the media, so to speak, the "nacreness" of nacre, its "glitter," the impression of silver before seen, and some defect, such as bile, or distance, etc. The Vedantic theory of perception is not less strange than complicated, and it will have to be referred to before the sequel.

Meanwhile let us remark that the recondite disquisition on existence, embodied in books like Vedanta-Paribhasa, is an after-growth, arising from the difficulties with which the illusion theory appeared beset some time after it had been propounded. The Vedanta Sar, the compendium in which that theory is presented in detail, says nothing about the three sorts of existence by which it was rendered consistent with human consciousness. Men cannot be easily led to believe that the universe, which in varieties of ways manifests its existence, is false; and if a conclusion so obviously incompatible with all our instinctive beliefs has to be naturalized, it must be backed by a mass of sophistic reasoning. The Vedantic philosophers recognized such necessity; and they met it by manufacturing a theory of existence which, while it loudly proclaimed the falseness of the world, attributed what may be called a subtle species of existence to it. And besides, this queer theory of existence proved the salvation of the world, inasmuch as it successfully counteracted that tendency to indolence and dereliction which the illusion theory is so eminently fitted to foster and mature.

It must also be admitted that the great champions of the Vedantic system could not emancipate themselves thoroughly from the materialistic speculations of the Sankhya school ; and, therefore, while denying most emphatically the existence of gross matter, they seemed inclined to admit that of tenuous matter or material principles, such as the unperceived principles immediately emanating from Prakriti, according to Sankhya notions. This fact we hope to be able to prove after we have set forth the nature of that ignorance to which creation is traced by the Vedantin.

Now we raise the important question, What is the Illusion theory, by which the Parinama or Vikara theory of the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras was so thoroughly superseded ? This question cannot be rightly answered till another question is raised and set at rest. What is Illusion or Ignorance ? There are three well-known Sanscrit words which are met with in almost every page of every standard work on Vedantic philosophy. These are Ajnana, Ignorance ; Avidya, Nescience ; and Maya, Illusion. These words are interchangeable, or of the same import ; and it is because they are somewhat indiscriminately used—the first for the second, and the second for the third—that uniformity of phraseology is endangered, and mystification is realized. We shall, therefore, make use of the word Ignorance, and avoid the use of the other two synonyms as far as possible.

What is Ignorance ? The third section of the Vedanta Sar thus furnishes the reply :—

“ Illusory attribution is the attributing to the real of that which is unreal, as a snake is imagined in a rope which is not a snake.

“ The ‘ real ’ is Brahma, existence, intelligence, and

joy, without a second. The 'unreal' is the whole mass of unintelligent things, beginning with Ignorance.

"Ignorance, they say, is not describable as existent or non-existent—an entity composed of the three qualities antagonistic to knowledge.

"(Its existence is established) by one's own consciousness of being ignorant, and also by the Veda, (which speaks as) the own power of God, concealed by its emanations'" (Swetaswatara Upanishad).

Ignorance is in this passage called the "unreal" and placed in sharp antithesis to Brahma, who is called the "real." It is, moreover, said to be "unreal," along with the whole mass of unintelligent things which has emanated from it, as a source of existence. But the moment the conjunction is indicated, or the causal relationship between Ignorance as the cause and the universe as the effect, a difficulty arises. How can that which is unreal be a productive cause at all? The causal efficacy of Ignorance being admitted, its unreality must be qualified. It is, therefore, said to be "something not describable as existent and non-existent," having a subtle species of existence, a species of existence which may be described as an intermediate link between existence and non-existence. In these words we may see the doctrine of varieties of existence developed in Vedanta-Paribhasa foreshadowed.

It is also said to be an entity, not a positive unreality, like the horn of a hare or the son of a barren woman. And, moreover, it consists, like Prakriti of the Sankhyas, of three qualities—*sattwa*, the attribute which generates and promotes goodness; *rajas*, that which generates and promotes activity, and *tamas*, or that which leads to indolence and stolidity.

If Ignorance is an entity, eternal, all-diffusive, like

ether, or rather like Prakriti, its dissolution or destruction is impossible. The Hindus maintain, like some modern scientists, that what is eternal is indestructible. Ignorance is eternal, and it is the source of our bondage, which will last as long as its cause lasts. Ignorance being eternal is everlasting, and consequently our bondage, which is co-eternal with it, will last forever. There can, therefore, be no hope of emancipation held forth to alleviate the misery of suffering humanity. But happily Ignorance, though eternal, is annihilable. It is "antagonistic to knowledge," and flees before knowledge as darkness flees before light. What the Sankhyas say about their non-discrimination, as regards its eternity and annihilability, the Vedantists predicate of their Ignorance.

How is the existence of Ignorance proved ? By universal consciousness in the first place. We are all conscious of being Ignorance-bound, and all the varied systems of Indian Philosophy concur in representing man in his unregenerate state as fettered by Ignorance. Its existence, therefore, is universally admitted. Its existence is further proved by revelation.

How does Ignorance manifest itself ? Both as "a collective aggregate" and as "a distributive aggregate." Every soul is, according to the Vedantic system, a synthesis of a particle of Ignorance and a particle of Brahma invariably called Intelligence. Every soul, therefore, represents Ignorance in its distributive form or as a distributive aggregate. The Ignorances attached to the innumerable souls in the world emanated from and are to be reabsorbed in one mass of Ignorance, called "Collective Ignorance." This Collective Ignorance, or totality of Ignorance, is called Iswar or God, the Creator and Preserver and Destroyer

of the world. It is, however, not appropriately called Iswar, for it forms only "the causal body" of this Being. Iswar, like the individual soul, is a synthesis, and consists of the compound of all Ignorances, called Collective Ignorance, and a very large portion of Brahma, the sum total of all the particles of Brahma attached to the innumerable souls in the world. Collective Ignorance is, therefore, his causal body rather than his entire self. Distributive Ignorance is in the same way the "causal body" of the individuated soul, and not its entire self. The relationship between Collective Ignorance and Distributive Ignorance is illustrated in the Vedanta Sar by that subsisting between a "forest" and "the trees" of which it consists, or that between a "lake" and "the waters" of which it consists.

The relationship between Collective and Distributive Ignorances is thus set forth in section four of Vedanta Sar : "As, when regarding a forest as a distributive aggregate composed of trees, there is a perception of its manifoldness, which is also perceived in the case of a lake regarded as a distributive aggregate of waters; so, when viewing Ignorance distributively, we perceive it to be multiplex. As the Veda says, 'Indra, by his supernatural powers, appears multiform' " (Rig Veda, 6, 47, 18).

"Thus, then, a thing is regarded as a collective or distributive aggregate according as it is viewed as a whole or as a collection of parts."

The portion of Brahma associated with Collective Ignorance, or forming the soul of Iswar, is called "the most excellent," and has the qualities of "omniscience, omnipotence, and universal control" attributed to it. It is said to "abound in pure goodness," to be "real



and unreal," "imperceptible, the internal ruler and the cause of the world." It will be shown in the proper place that all these attributes belong, properly speaking, to Collective Ignorance rather than to the portion of Brahma associated with it ; to the causal body rather than the indwelling soul of Iswar.

The very small portion or particle of Brahma associated with Distributive Ignorance, or forming the individual soul, is called "humble," and it "abounds in impure goodness." It has "the qualities of parvipotence and parviscience" attributed to it. Distributive Ignorance is its causal body, "because it is the cause of the making of, etc." The portion of Brahma attached to Collective Ignorance is called its Illuminator. "Omniscience is attributed to him (this portion of Brahma) as the illuminator of the whole of Ignorance. As the Veda says, who knows all (generally), who knows everything (particularly)" (Mundaka i. 1, 3). The portion of Brahma attached to the individual soul, called *Prajna* in contradistinction to Iswara, is parviscient because it illuminates only one Ignorance. "The smallness of its intelligence is owing to its being the illuminator of one Ignorance only." It will be shown that both the collective portion of Brahma and the distributive portion are called Illuminators more by courtesy than owing to any inherent fitness in them to do the work for which they get credit.

There is, moreover, a disengaged portion of Brahma, appropriated neither to Collective Ignorance nor to Distributive Ignorance ; and this is called the Fourth, the absolute, unrelated, unconditioned Brahma. Why this term is applied to him will be shown when the work of creation, or rather self-distribution, performed by Collective Ignorance, is set forth. Meanwhile let us

present a couple of extracts from the fourth section of the book under review in corroboration of our statements :

“Nor is there any difference between Iswara and Prajna, who are associated respectively with these (collective and distributive aggregates of Ignorance), just as there is none between the ether appropriated (*i.e.* the space occupied) by the forest and that appropriated by the trees composing it, or between the sky reflected in the lake and that reflected in its waters. As it is written in the Veda, ‘This is the Lord of all, omniscient, the internal ruler, the source of all, for it is the source and reabsorbent of all creatures ’” (Mandukya Upanishad 6).

“As there is an unappropriated ether, the source of that appropriated by a forest or by its trees, and of that reflected in a lake or its waters, so too there is Intelligence (Brahma) which is not associated with Ignorance, the source of these two Ignorance-associated Intelligences (Iswara and Prajna). It is called the Fourth. As it is written in the Veda, ‘They consider that calm, blissful, secondless one to be the Fourth. That is Soul—that is to be known ’” (Mandukya 7).

Why the unassociated portion of Brahma, the absolute, unrelated entity, is called the Fourth, will become apparent when we have set forth the order of creation according to this system. The creative power resides, in reality, in Ignorance, not in the Brahma portion associated with it. Ignorance has two powers—the power of Concealment and that of Projection.

By its power of envelopment or concealment, Ignorance, though limited, throws a veil over the infinite soul, and completely cuts it off from our view, just as a small bit of cloud sometimes covers the entire disk of

the sun and makes the luminary invisible. On account of this covering or overshadowing Ignorance, the quiescent soul "appears to be an agent and a patient, and to experience pleasure, pain, and other mundane conditions, just as a rope, covered by ignorance as to its real nature, appears to be a snake."

The power of concealment is the enveloping, not the creative power. This last is the power of Projection, and "is such that just as Ignorance, regarding a rope by its own power, raises up the form of a snake, etc., on the rope, which is covered by it ; so Ignorance too, by its own power, raises up, on soul which is covered by it, ether and the whole universe. As it has been said, "The projective power (of Ignorance) can create the world, beginning with subtle bodies, and ending with the terrene orb."

It is to be observed here that Intelligence or Brahma is associated with Ignorance in the work of creation, and represented as the efficient cause. The fourth section of the book concludes with this statement : "Intelligence, associated with Ignorance possessed of these two powers, is, when itself is chiefly considered, the efficient cause ; and when its associate is chiefly considered, is the material cause. Just as a spider, when itself is chiefly considered, is the efficient cause of its web, the effect ; and when its body is chiefly considered, is the material cause of it."

This, however, is one of those statements in the book which are obviously inconsistent with the spirit and letter of all Vedantic teaching—nay, of all Hindu Philosophy. Brahma is described in the latest of the Upanishads, the Swetaswatara Upanishad, as "without parts, devoid of action, tranquil, irreproachable, emotionless." In this very book Brahma is called

“the substrate of all”—that is, of all the creations of Ignorance, but not certainly its associate in creation. Brahma could not possibly have a desire to create, could not possibly have displayed any activity in creation, without neutralizing that perfect quiescence in which all that is characteristic of him is concentrated.

The creative power resides in Ignorance, not in the portion of Brahma associated with it. But it may be said that its juxtaposition or association is needed to lead Ignorance to energize. Why? Is it because it stirs up the creative power latent in Ignorance by a voluntary action? or is it because it makes Ignorance fruitful by emitting unconsciously an automatic influence? The Brahma portion attached to Ignorance could not have led to its energization by a voluntary exertion, because the absolute spirit is, under all circumstances, associated or unassociated, incapable of volition and action. And its proximity is not needed to drive Ignorance to action, because Ignorance is moved by an inherent power to energize or evolve. Ignorance, therefore, is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.

From Ignorance, “attended by its projective power, in which the quality of insensibility (*tamas*) abounds, proceeds ether; from ether, air; from air, heat; from heat, water; and from water, earth.” These are the subtle, rudimentary, or non-quintuplicated elements; and in them “arise the qualities pleasure, pain, and insensibility in the proportion in which they exist in their cause.” From them, when these qualities manifest themselves, spring the subtle or rudimentary bodies, each of which consists of seventeen members—the five organs of sense, the five organs of action, the five vital airs, mind, and intellect. The subtle

body consists of three sheaths—the intellectual or cognitional (*vijnanamayakosa*) sheath, consisting of the organs of sense, the ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose, and intellect ; the mental or sensorial (*manomayakosa*) sheath, consisting of mind and the organs of action, the mouth, hand, foot, excretory and generative organs ; and respiratory (*prana-mayakosa*) sheath, consisting of the five vital airs, respiration, inspiration, flatuousness, expiration, and digestion. The subtle body, consisting of these sheaths, migrates with the soul from one body to another, and is not dissolved till its final liberation and absorption into the universal soul.

These subtle organisms or bodies, brought into existence by the subtle elements, appear both as a collective aggregate and as a distributive aggregate. “Here, too, the totality of subtle bodies, as the seat of one intellect (*i.e.* Sutratma’s), is a collective aggregate, like the forest or the lake ; or as the seat of many intellects (*viz.*, those of individual souls) is a distributive aggregate, like the forest trees and the lake waters.”

The portion of Brahma “associated with the collective aggregate (of subtle bodies) is called Sutratma (thread-soul), Hiranyagarbha, or Prana, because it passes as a thread through all (the subtle frames), and on account of the conceit that it is the five uncompounded elements possessing the faculties of knowing, desire, and activity (*i.e.* that it is the subtle body itself).” And the portion of Brahma “associated with the distributive aggregate of subtle organisms is called Taijasa (the brilliant), because it has the luminous internal organ as its associate.”

The subtle bodies, in their collective and distributive forms, have an “experience” which the gross frames can never have. “These two, the Thread-soul (Su-

tratma) and Taijasa, by means of the subtle modifications of the mind, have experience of subtle objects. As it is said in the Veda, 'Taijasa has fruition of the supersensible.' " It ought to be mentioned here that of the three sheaths of the subtle organism, " the intellectual, being endowed with the faculty of knowing, is an agent ; the mental, having the faculty of desire, is an instrument, and the respiratory, having the faculty of activity, is an effect. "

The unity of the Thread-soul and Taijasa is thus set forth : " There is no difference between the collective and distributive aggregates of the subtle frames, or between Sutratma and Taijasa, who are associated with them, just as there is none between the forest and its trees, or between the space occupied by each, or between the lake and its waters, and the sky reflected in each. "

From subtle elements and subtle bodies let us proceed to those of a grosser kind. The gross elements are evolved out of the subtle ones by a process called quintuplication. It is thus explained : " After dividing each of the five subtle elements, ether and the rest, into two equal parts, and then subdividing each of the first five of the ten moieties into four equal parts, mix those four parts with the others, leaving the undivided second moiety of each. As it has been said, ' After dividing each into two parts, and the first halves again into four parts, by uniting the latter to the second half of each, each contains the five ' ' (Panchadasi, i. 27).

These quintuplicated elements are earth, water, fire, air, and ether. From them " spring, one above the other, the worlds Bhur, Bhuvar, Swar, Mahar, Janas, Tapas, and Satya ; and, one below the other, the nether worlds, called Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasatala, Talatala,

Mahatala, and Patala." They also give birth to "Brahma's egg, the four kinds of gross bodies included in it, and food and drink." These four kinds "are the viviparous, the oviparous, the moisture-engendered, and the germinating.

"The viviparous are those produced from the womb, as man and animals ; the oviparous are those born from eggs, as birds and snakes ; the moisture-engendered are those which spring from moisture, as lice and gnats ; the germinating are those which shoot up from the ground, as creepers and trees."

The gross bodies, like the subtle ones, appear as a collective aggregate and as a distributive aggregate. "In this case, too, the fourfold gross body, viewed as the seat of one (collective) intellect or of many (individual intellects), is a collective aggregate, like a forest or a lake, or a distributive aggregate, like the forest trees or the lake waters." The portion of Brahma associated to the collective gross body is called *vaiśwanara* (the spirit of humanity) or meat ; "(the former) because of the conceit that it is in the whole of humanity, and (the latter) because it appears in various forms. The portion of Brahma associated to each distributed body is called *visva*, because, without abandoning the conceit of the subtle body, it enters into all gross bodies." The gross body in its collective and distributive form is called the nutrimentitious (*anna-mayakosa*) sheath, "on account of the changes of food (which go on within it and build it up)."

It is time to refer in detail to the divisions and subdivisions of Brahma in creation. The Deity is, in the first place, divided into two main portions, one left in its original state of absolute, unconditioned existence, and the other appropriated to Ignorance, which has

three qualities. This portion of Brahma has various titles, being called Brahma with qualities, Brahma adulterate, illusion-associated Brahma, illusive Brahma. This portion of Brahma is divided into innumerable particles appropriated to the innumerable objects of creation. A portion of it is attached to the collective or universal subtle body, and through it appropriated to all varieties of subtle bodies and the subtle elements called *Tanmatras*. Another portion is attached to the collective or universal gross body, and appropriated through it to all varieties of gross bodies, and the gross elements and their products, the seven upper and the seven nether worlds. Brahma therefore is found in four different states, which are thus indicated by Major Jacob :

“Firstly, with a causal body, composed of Ignorance or Illusion, which in the aggregate is Iswar or God, and distributively, individual souls or Prajna. It is likened to a state of dreamless sleep.

“Secondly, with a subtle body, composed of the five organs of sense and of action, mind, intellect, and the five vital airs, seventeen in all. This, in the aggregate, is called Hiranyagarbha, or the Thread-soul, and in the distributive state, Taijasa. It is likened to a state of dream.

“Thirdly, with a gross body, composed of the compounded elements. Viewed in the aggregate, it is called Vaiswanara, and distributively, Viswa. It is likened to the waking state.

“A fourth state is that of the unassociated pure Brahma, who is technically styled the Fourth.”

But these divisions and subdivisions of Brahma into innumerable parts, associated to various spheres of existence and various classes of objects, subtle and gross,



cannot but suggest the idea of dualism. How is the integrity of monism to be maintained in the teeth of descriptions so obviously at war with it? To understand this it is necessary to comprehend the Vedantic notion of "illusory attribution" and its "withdrawal." Of the former we have the following definition in Section 3: "Illusory attribution is the attributing to the real of that which is unreal, as a snake is imagined in a rope which is not a snake." The meaning is obvious. Brahma is *real*, absolute, unconditioned, unrelated existence, without consciousness, without feeling, without qualities. But in all ordinary descriptions of Brahma certain attributes and operations are attributed to him. He is represented as omnipotent and omniscient, as creator and preserver, as associated to various spheres of existence and various classes of objects, as enslaved by and emancipated from ignorance. But the representations by which he is set forth as conditioned and related, determined by qualities, states, and acts, are all "false," knowingly resorted to by the learned for the purpose of making the absolute intelligible to the unlearned.

The pupil who has qualified himself for Brahma lore and found the accredited teacher, is not expected to grasp the idea of the absolute all at once. He must advance, step by step, from the related to the non-related, from the conditioned to the unconditioned, from the phenomenal to the real. And therefore, in accommodation to his inferior capacities, descriptions are resorted to such as lead him to look upon the absolute Brahma as a being conditioned and related. But when his understanding power is expanded, the illusory attribution is gradually withdrawn, and the unconditioned is finally set forth in his original, immutable

state of absolute existence. It is therefore said in Section 2 : "That teacher, with great kindness, instructs him by the method of illusory attribution (*adhyaropa*), followed by its withdrawal (*apavada*)."

On this process of instruction Pandit Goreh makes the following remarks : "Then, an objector may urge, the efficient causativity and material causativity of the spider both appertain to its body ; for the internal organ is called the subtle body, and it must therefore be regarded as body ; and, this being the case, why is a distinction taken between the spider and its body, and the former called efficient cause, and the latter material cause (of its web) ? My reply is that, in the passage of the Vedanta Sar under discussion, the exoteric notion is adopted. For when the Vedantins speak of the origin of the world, for instance, they do not believe its origin to be true. This mode of expression they call false imputation. It consists in holding for true that which is false, in accommodation to the intelligence of the uninitiated. At a further stage of instruction, when the time has arrived for propounding the esoteric view, the false imputation is gainsaid, and this gainsaying is termed rescission."

The divisions and subdivisions of Brahma set forth in the Vedanta Sar, together with what is said about his association with ignorance and the ignorance-imagined creation, are examples of false attribution ; and all that is needed to make Brahma intelligible in its original essence is its "withdrawal." Section 7 shows how this gradual withdrawal takes place, and the Absolute set forth in his original state :

"The 'withdrawal' (*apavada*) is the assertion that the whole of the unreal, beginning with Ignorance, which is an illusory effect of the Real, is nothing but

the Real ; just as a snake, which is the illusory effect of a rope, is nothing whatsoever but the rope.

"It has been said, 'An actual change of form is called *Vikara*, while a merely apparent change of form is called *Vivartta*.' This shall now be illustrated.

"The whole of the four classes of gross bodies constituting the seat of enjoyment, food and drink necessary for their use; the fourteen worlds, Bhur and the rest, the repository of these, and Brahma's egg, which is the receptacle of all these worlds—all these are nothing more than the quintuplicated elements of which they are made.

"The quintuplicated elements, with sound and the objects of sense, and the subtle bodies—all these are nothing more than the non-quintuplicated elements of which they are made.

"The non-quintuplicated elements, with the qualities of goodness and the rest, in the inverse order of their production, are nothing more than Ignorance-associated Intelligence, which is their material cause.

"Ignorance, and Intelligence associated with it, constituting Iswara, etc., are nothing more than Brahma, the Fourth, the unassociated Intelligence, which forms their substrate."

By this process of false imputation or illusory attribution and its withdrawal, the meaning of the great Vedantic watchword, *Tat Twam Asi*, That art Thou, is made manifest. The word "that" in this mystic sentence embraces the first Vedantic triad—viz., Collective aggregate of Ignorance, Intelligence associated with it, called Iswar or God, and represented as possessed of such divine attributes as omnipotence, omniscience, etc., and unassociated, unrelated Intelligence destitute of qualities. Of this triad the first two

members, Collective Ignorance and Intelligence associated with it, owe their existence to illusory attribution, and have therefore no real existence. The word "that" therefore means absolute, unrelated Brahma, which really exists, and is the substrate of all that exists—viz., of Ignorance and the Brahma-portion associated with it. The word "thou" in this great sentence embraces the second Vedantic triad—viz., Ignorance in its distributive aggregate, the Brahma-portion or Intelligence associated with it, called Prajna, and represented as possessed of parviscience, parvipotence, etc., and the portion not thus associated, or associated at all. The first two members of this triad owe their existence to false imputation, and are therefore really non-existent. These being thrown out of calculation, what is left is pure, unassociated Brahma. The sentence, then, resolves itself into this : Brahma is Brahma. Therefore the words inscribed on the banner of Vedantism are : BRAHMA SATYAM JAGAN MITHYA JIVA BRAHMAIVA NAAPARA (BRAHMA IS TRUE, THE WORLD IS FALSE, THE SOUL IS BRAHMA AND NOTHING ELSE).

Mr. Goreh proves clearly and indisputably that according to Vedantic principles the very existence of Brahma cannot be proved. The cosmological or teleological argument is the great argument by which the Hindu philosopher proves the existence of God ; and this argument cannot be arrayed in favor of divine existence, according to Vedantic principles. The existence of the world must be presupposed before that of God can be deduced as a corollary from it. But Vedantism represents the world as non-existent, a mere illusion, an unreality, a nonentity. The very foundation, therefore, of the teleological argument is undermined. But Brahma, it may be said, is the illumina-

tor, and enables the internal organ or the inner sensory to perceive and cognize ; and the teleological argument may be based upon its operations, if not upon the phenomena of nature. But Brahma is called the illuminator or creator by courtesy only ; by false imputation rather than with a due regard to truth. Besides, the internal organ itself is an illusion, and all its operations are illusions !

But Ignorance exists both in a collective and in a distributive capacity. May not the teleological argument be made to rest on it ? But Ignorance itself is ignorantly imagined, and therefore false. Ignorance certainly cannot be regarded as a material substance of extreme tenuity, all-diffusive and all-embracing ; for it is emphatically said to be different from the Prakriti of the Sankhya school. Nor can Ignorance be regarded as a spiritual substance, for by hypothesis spiritual substance, apart from Brahma, called Intelligence, does not and cannot exist. It has what Dr. Banerjea calls "conventional existence," which is, as he says, tantamount to non-existence.

The conclusion, then, to which we are brought is that, as nothing exists but Brahma, the great teleological argument has not a peg to hang on in the Vedantic system. The other arguments in favor of the existence of God—those based on our intuitive convictions, our sense of responsibility, and our moral nature in general—share its fate. The only argument the Vedantin can utilize is based on what he calls "testimony" or revelation. But, after all, revelation is an illusion, and therefore nothing in the shape of a reason can possibly be assigned for his unequivocal statements regarding the existence of Brahma.

Let it also be noted that Brahma, as described in the

standard documents of the Maya school, if not of all Vedantic schools, is a nonentity. Brahma is without attributes, both material and moral. When he is described as having extension and other material properties, the description is merely conventional, provisionally resorted to for the purpose of explaining his unrelated and unqualified being. Again, when spiritual powers and dispositions are attributed to him, the attribution is illusory, and must be withdrawn before a proper idea of his existence can be formed. He is therefore destitute of both material and moral attributes. He is neither matter nor mind—an inconceivable phantom, an illusion, a nonentity. Vedantism is equivalent to the absolute nihilism of Buddha and his followers !

A brief reference to the Vedantic theory of bondage and emancipation is enough to bring us to the conclusion of our discourse. The cause of the bondage of the soul is, as in all the schools, Ignorance, which leads to desire, work, and the long chain of transmigration. Ignorance, by its encompassing and projecting power, conceals "the Secondless, Indivisible Brahma" from the view of the soul, breeds an idea of its difference from the Being with which it is identical, generates a desire to secure pleasure and avoid pain, and leads to works which must bear their fruits in an almost interminable series of births and deaths. And therefore to ensure liberation, all that is necessary is to destroy ignorance or supersede it by right knowledge. The devotee must not only comprehend the meaning of the sentence "That art Thou," but understand its counterpart, "I am Brahma." He must notice the illusory character of all that appears to exist, or all that is besides the absolute spirit, and thereby be in a position to say, "I

am Brahma, the unchanging, pure, intelligent, free, undecaying, supreme joy, eternal, secondless."

How is such self-knowledge to be attained? To acquire that right knowledge which is a stepping-stone to liberation "it is necessary to practise (a) hearing (*śravaṇa*), (b) consideration (*manana*), (c) profound contemplation (*nīdīdhyāsana*), and (d) meditation (*śamadhī*)."

"*Hearing* is the ascertaining of the drift of all the Vedantic writings regarding the secondless Reality."

"*Consideration* is unceasing reflection on the secondless Reality, which has been heard of in conjunction with arguments in support of the Vedānta."

"*Profound contemplation* is the continuance of ideas consistent with the secondless Reality, to the exclusion of the notion of body and such-like things, which are inconsistent (with Him)."

"*Meditation* is of two kinds—viz., (1) with recognition of subject and object (*śavikalpaka*), and (2) without such recognition (*virvīkalpaka*)."

Here we have the "seeded" and the "seedless" meditation of Yoga Philosophy, the meditation in which the triad of subject, object, and thought are recognized as different entities, and that in which they are merged into a unity. The means to the attainment of the latter, enumerated in Chapter XIII. of the Vedānta Sār, are the eight accessories of Yoga—viz., "(1) Forbearance (*yama*); (2) Religious observances (*niyama*); (3) Religious postures (*āsana*); (4) Regulation of breath (*prāṇāyama*); (5) Restraint of the organs of sense (*pratyāhara*); (6) Fixed attention (*dharana*); (7) Contemplation (*dhyāna*); (8) Meditation (*śamadhī*)."

The hindrances to such meditation, or "the meditation without recognition of subject and object," are not

exactly those enumerated in the Yoga Sastra. They are :

- “ 1. Mental Inactivity (*laya*).
- “ 2. Distraction (*vikshepa*).
- “ 3. Passion (*kashaya*), and
- “ 4. The tasting of enjoyment (*rasaswada*).”

The first of these obstacles may strike us as strange in a system which makes mental inactivity its goal. But the explanation removes the difficulty : “ ‘ Mental inactivity ’ is the drowsiness of the modification of the internal organ while not resting on the secondless Reality.” When the obstacles are removed, and discriminative knowledge followed by perfect quiescence *in*, not apart from, the secondless Brahma is attained, the state of the soul is called *jivanmukti*, which is, being interpreted, “ liberated, but still living.” The devotee in this state is in a manner petrified, though alive. He moves not, being “ as (the flame of) a lamp standing in a sheltered spot”; he sees not, hears not, thinks not, breathes not as ordinary mortals do. “ Though he has eyes, he is as though he had them not ; though he has ears, he is as though he had them not ; though he has a mind, he is as one without a mind ; though he has vital airs, he is as though he had them not.” Being alive, he cannot but see, but he “ sees not duality, or, if seeing it, regards it as non-duality ;” and when he acts he “ is free from (the results of) actions.” He is above responsibility, and all distinctions, even those between virtue and vice, purity and impurity, neatness and shabbiness, etc., vanish before him into thin air. “ If he who knows the secondless Reality may act as he likes, what difference is there between the knowers of truth and dogs in respect of eating impure food ? Except the fact of knowing



Brahma, there is no difference ; the one knows the Self, the other (the dog) does not."

Such is the goal of the system ! The Paramhansa, or the Knower of Brahma, feeding as swine upon filth and living as swine without self-consciousness, thought, perception of physical and moral beauty, recognition of distinction between good and bad ; without taste, refinement, sublimity of thought, elevation of feeling, holiness of purpose, and grandeur of aspiration, left not even to the guidance of instinct, and reserved for a state of annihilation in a Being destitute of intelligence and volition, as well as of material properties, and therefore a nonentity !

This system has proved a refuge of lies to many a hardened sinner. The perplexed minds which have found shelter in its solution of the problems of existence are few indeed ; but the number of the wicked hearts which have been composed to sleep by the opiate of its false hopes is incalculable. The astute politician, whose past life is a record only of malversation and successful intrigue ; the tyrant, whose progress in life has been marked by violence and wanton cruelty ; the rake, whom a course of unblushing licentiousness has brought to the verge of a premature grave ; the man steeped in the vice of intoxication and determined not to abandon ; the villain, the ruffian, the criminal, the cunning cheat and the daring rogue, and the false friend and the sneaking hypocrite—what a balm to the seared but not deadened consciences of these, and others as bad as they, in a system which assures them that all their fears arising from their recognition of moral distinctions are groundless, and that perfect beatitude will be their reward if they can only bring themselves to the conclusion that there is no difference between God and

man, virtue and vice, cleanliness and filth, heaven and hell ! Nowhere has the system been so universally tried as in India, and its results here are fitted to lead any candid observer to re-echo the statement—PAN-THEISM IS PANDIABOLISM.

## CHAPTER XII.

### THE HINDU AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY CONTRASTED.

A good deal of morbid sentimentalism is arrayed in behalf of what is called the ancient civilization of India. An attempt is made to give prominence to and speak in terms of praise of the commendable features of national life and the excellences of individual character it has fostered ; and thus far a work, not merely unobjectionable but positively useful, is accomplished. But when an argument is based on these admirable elements of an effete civilization in favor of its perpetuation, or against its supersession by a higher and a healthier civilization, a move in a direction on the whole right is transformed into a drag on genuine progress. The civilization of the country, though embalmed amid sacred recollections, is *dead* ; and it is as impossible to make it live as a plastic, formative power as it is to convert the dead language with which it is intimately associated into a living tongue !

It is very easy to say that Western and Eastern civilizations ought to help each other by an unrestricted interchange of beauty and glory, the one being ready to adopt and incorporate with its substance the peculiar excellences of the other, and both being ready to co-operate in the great work of raising fallen nationalities and degraded peoples. But the two forces refuse to march alongside of each other, raised above petty jealousies and unseemly antagonisms. The stronger over-

comes the feebler, and evinces an irresistible tendency to reign alone and unrivalled. The law of the survival of the fittest reigns here as elsewhere ! Those who have carefully watched the progress Western civilization has made in the country will never hesitate to admit that no compromise is possible between it and the decrepit civilization it has had to encounter ; and that, if its superstructure is to be raised at all, it is to be reared on the ruins of its rival !

But Western civilization is by no means faultless, and therefore the fatality in favor of its triumphant march and ultimate ascendancy cannot be contemplated with unmixed satisfaction. And it were to be wished that its progress had not been ensured till it had been completely shorn of its objectionable features. But this is not the case with the heaven-bestowed religion with which the very best elements of that civilization are intimately and indissolubly associated. Christianity cannot amalgamate with the religions of the country, and if it is at all to rear its superstructure on Hindu soil, it will be on the ruins of the Hindu religion and the others by which its sway has been for ages and is now being curtailed.

Christianity represents a philosophy—a philosophy not methodically developed, not entrenched behind a network of definitions, propositions, and syllogisms, but sublime and deep nevertheless, suited to man's condition in life, and in accord with his common-sense and highest reason. Between this philosophy and that enshrined in Sanscrit literature there is very little indeed that is common, while in all essential features the one is the antipodes of the other. How is a compromise possible ? A lasting peace or even a temporary truce ? A compromise may be effected, a peace nego-

tiated, between the dead civilization of Asia and the living civilization of Europe, between languages dead and gone and those which are full of life and vigor. But a compromise between a God-given and a man-invented religion, a philosophy true and a philosophy falsely so called, is monstrous, and should be deprecated.

But is there not an indissoluble connection between ancient and modern philosophy? Yes; there is that sort of connection between the one and the other which exists between the parent and his offspring, between the cause and its effect, between the producing power and the thing produced. Modern philosophy, falsely so called, is the child of ancient philosophy, and differs from it in external drapery rather than in any feature of an essential character. Christianity does not ally itself to the self-sufficient philosophy which in these days is reviving some, if not all, of the aberrations of ancient thought. And therefore a compromise between the varied types of ancient and modern speculation does not indicate any approach on the part of Christian philosophy toward a reconciliation at once unnatural and irrational.

It is our intention in this paper to set forth the difference or rather the contrast between the vital doctrines of Christian philosophy and those of Hindu Philosophy. But before we do so it is desirable to offer a remark or two on the ingenious way in which the sombre character of Hindu Philosophy is explained. Hindu Philosophy is Pessimism. It begins with a recognition of human sorrow, goes out in vain in quest of a proper remedy, and ultimately arrives at annihilation as the goal where human misery terminates only in the extinction of life. Even Schopenhauer does not speak of the phenomena of life in terms more lugubrious than

those which form the prominent features of the phraseology and nomenclature of philosophy in our country. How is its gloomy character explained ?

According to Max Müller the Greek intellect was the very antipodes of the Hindu intellect. The Greek was sensuous, of a volatile temperament, alive to the varied charms of the world of the eye, and the ear, and absorbed in its occupations and pleasures. His intellect was vivacious, but not profound ; ready to catch the significance that lies on the surface of things, but unable to apprehend the deep meaning that underlies it ; while his earth-born impulses drove him toward the present business of life and its ephemeral enjoyments. He therefore distinguished himself as a man of business, a statesman, an orator, a dramatist, an artist, a son of Mars, or a devotee of pleasure ; and he failed to unfold and expound the deep meaning of the universe or the recondite truths of philosophy. The Hindu, on the contrary, was highly intellectual, insensible to external charms, and averse to the grovelling realities of sense and the commonplace incidents of life. His intellect was deep, and led him to penetrate instinctively beneath the surface of external nature, and to bring out the jewels of profound truth hidden in its inmost recesses ; while his feelings, chastened by domineering intellectualism, tended to draw him away from the busy scenes of life, with its monotonous round of occupations and pleasures. And therefore he failed to distinguish himself on the busy theatre of worldly success and worldly renown, and succeeded only as an ascetic thinker and recluse philosopher. This contrast can be very beautifully drawn out from universals to particulars, from the region of magnificent generalizations to that of petty details. There are, however, some facts

incompatible with the assumption of such a sharp antithesis between the intellect of ancient Greece and ancient India. It is a matter of fact that the generality of people in India were, as they are now, as thoroughly immersed in the avocations and pleasures of life as the generality of people in Greece ; while in that favored cradle of taste and artistic beauty schools of philosophy were not wanting wherein the deep problems of life were as earnestly and as fruitlessly pondered and analyzed as in India. The peculiarly gloomy type of Indian Philosophy cannot be satisfactorily explained by a reference solely to the intellectual differences pointed out by scholars like Max Müller.

Nor will the specious theory propounded in Buckle's "History of Civilization in England" of itself account for the peculiar type of intellectual development noticeable in Hindu Philosophy. Buckle traces all the ethnological peculiarities by which one race is distinguished from the others to the omnipotent influence of physical causes ; and, according to him, food, soil, climate, and general aspects of nature are enough to explain the idiosyncrasy of Hindu Philosophy, especially as it was elaborated in a country and at a time where and when man had not learned to modify nature, and was therefore irresistibly propelled by its laws and forces. Our Aryan ancestor had in the country a rich soil, and much labor was not needed on his part to make it yield enough for his sustenance. He was, moreover, temperate and abstemious ; and his diet, being simple and spare, combined with the enervating influences of a tropical climate in making him indolent and sluggish, prone to fruitless meditation, and averse to the stirring incidents of an active and busy life. Nor were the general aspects of nature in the plains

fitted to magnetize his intellect, during especially the time justly called the season of universal lassitude and languor. This beautiful theory might be adopted but for one serious objection, besides the one which nullifies Max Müller's representation of the opposite tendencies of the Greek and Hindu intellect. It is a matter of fact that these identical physical causes did not prevent the Rishis of the Rig Veda times and their followers from leading a life very much like that of the ancient Greeks, and in marked contrast to that of the philosophers whose excogitations assumed so gloomy a form. It may be said that the physical causes enumerated by Buckle had not produced their legitimate fruits among the Aryans of Rig Veda times, who, having come from a colder climate, retained that mental activity and bodily vigor which were impaired gradually under the tropical heat of our country. But it must not be forgotten that this era of vaunted purity was long enough to give the climate a fine opportunity of displaying its disastrous power in deteriorated physique and enfeebled intellect, the interval between the composition of the earlier hymns and later ones being admittedly no less than a period of three hundred years. It should, moreover, be borne in mind that the Brahmana period, almost equally long, and separated from it by an interval of at least two hundred years, presents the same picture of devotion to sensuous enjoyment which we find depicted in the Rig Veda.

The truth is, no single theory cut and dried can of itself satisfactorily explain the peculiar bent of the Hindu intellect, and the sombre type of the philosophy to which it gave birth. A variety of conditions tended to give the one its introspective character and the other its dark color. Food and climate had their appreci-



able influence, but they did not constitute the sole cause of the unique effect. The theocracy established by our Aryan ancestors, so obviously fitted to lead to political inaction by burking independence of thought and freedom of speech in matters affecting the interests even of this life, combined, with the absence of that spirit of scientific inquiry which the ancient world rarely if ever saw evoked in its vigor and enthusiasm, to breed in the Indian philosopher his habit of morbid introspection, and give his speculations a gloomy character. His intellect was too lofty to allow him to rest content, as common minds do, with the petty concerns of life ; and as he was driven away from its nobler objects and ambitions by the very constitution of the society of which he was an integral part, he had to fall back upon himself for the exercise of those powers of which the world around him refused to make a proper use. He made himself the subject of his study and meditation, and the gloominess he saw within himself was by an easy transition transferred to the picture he drew of human life and the conclusions he based thereon. The Greek philosopher, who had a grand theatre of activity opened for him in a healthier political atmosphere, looked *out of himself*, and made happiness the object of his search ; while the Hindu philosopher, cut off from such stirring scenes, looked *within himself*, and made extinction of pain the object of his life and thought. His philosophy was emphatically *esoteric*, or *subjective*, while that of his Greek brother was on the whole *exoteric*, or *objective*.

To return to the great object of this paper—to show that in all important features the philosophy we have been trying patiently to unfold is the very antipodes, not of ancient Greek philosophy, which was its repro-

duction in some respects and its counterpart in others ; not of the boasted modern philosophy, in which almost all its important doctrines are revived and presented in fresh garments, but of the philosophy of the New Testament. This antithesis or antagonism will be manifest if we take into consideration its descriptions of (1) God, (2) Creation, (3) Providence, (4) Man, (5) his Duty in Life, (6) the Source of his Present Degradation, (7) his Salvation, and (8) the Prospect before him.

1. To begin with God. According to Hindu Philosophy, God is a nonentity. One, the very first of its six orthodox schools, declares Him non-existent, and opposes a series of arguments, ingenious though inconclusive, to those brought forward by common-sense to prove His existence. The other schools, however, thought fit to abandon its attitude of rank atheism, and substitute for its appalling negation a Being wrapped up in grandiloquent phraseology, but destitute of any quality fitted to determine it or discriminate it from nothing. God, when kindly allowed to exist, is without power, without intelligence, without feeling, without material properties and spiritual attributes, or, to speak philosophically, without power, without qualities, and without relations. He is the Pure Being of some schools of Greek philosophy ; but as, according to no less a philosopher than Hegel, *Pure Being equals nothing*, He is a nonentity. Ancient philosophy labored, not only in India, but in all famous centres of speculative thought, to reduce God to nothing ; and such phrases as "the Eternal Void," "the Everlasting Night," etc., were most ingeniously invented to set forth His real nothingness under a cloud of high-sounding words. And modern philosophers are simply following their example in their attempts to maintain the

nothingness of God behind an array of imposing technicalities. According to them, God is the Absolute and the Unconditioned. If these technical expressions mean anything, they represent God as Pure Being and nothing more—that subtle, impalpable nonentity which defies every attempt to determine it or give it something like a definite shape. God again is the Infinite, and as such He fills all states and pervades all conditions. He cannot be existent, for were He so He would be out of the condition of non-existence. He cannot be omnipotent, for if He were so He would not fill the state of parvipotence. He cannot be perfect, for imperfection is a condition He must pervade as well as perfection. This miserable Being, hanging between life and death, power and weakness, moral excellency and moral turpitude, indeterminate, undefinable, out of relation to all things, yet the fountain of creation, is the God of modern philosophy. Better by far the idol of the semi-civilized man, which represents some hero of a bygone age, who to a host of vices added at least a few virtues ! Better by far the fetich of the savage, which is in his opinion instinct with life and armed with power, and which when propitiated is believed able to protect the worshipper from some tangible danger or calamity !

The God of the Bible is not such a Being. He is not an inscrutable force, a nondescript power of natural selection, a mass of potentialities, a blind, self-evolving principle acting under an iron necessity immanent in or foreign to it. He is a Person, intelligent, voluntary, infinite in power, wisdom, and holiness. He pervades creation, and is at the same time above it, immanent and transcendent, intramundane and extramundane. He is not merely the Creator and Upholder,

but the Ruler and Governor of the universe. He loves and hates—loves order, harmony, righteousness ; hates disorder, disharmony, and unrighteousness. He has not, therefore, that sentimental weakness which unfits a ruler for the sterner elements of his vocation. The consistency of the Bible picture of God, drawn by different hands in different places and at different times, under endless varieties of circumstances, and presented in diversified modes—now in a series of providential dealings, then in denunciations of an appalling nature, and anon in exhortations and appeals which are fitted to melt the hardest heart or bedew the driest eye—is a standing miracle ; while prophetic announcements of what God is to do combine with narratives of what God has done in upholding that perfect character of severity and tenderness which nature, through its beneficent and destructive agencies, gives to its Author.

We do not wish here to insist on that crowning revelation of God which is the characteristic glory of our holy religion, His revelation in Christ Jesus, in whom He is brought down to the level of our comprehension more than in natural phenomena and providential dealings, and in whom therefore He is presented in the only form in which it is possible for us to know, love, and serve Him. Nor do we wish to dwell upon His great work, in which both the sterner and milder features of the divine character are brought into bold relief, and which therefore is pre-eminently fitted to discourage sin, and at the same time encourage the sinner to come where pardon, peace, and joy are held in reserve for him.

2. Let us next contrast the notion of creation embodied in Hindu Philosophy with that presented in the Bible. There is no such thing as the *ex-nihilo* theory

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of creation within the compass of Hindu literature in general, or philosophy in particular. The maxim *navastunovastusiddhi*, which is the Sanscrit version of *ex nihilo nihil fit*, underlies, runs through, or permeates all the grotesque cosmogonies associated with it. The Sankhya school assumes a self-evolving material principle called Prakriti, and evolves creation out of its trinitarian substance. The Yoga school adds God to its categories, but the being whose existence is postulated is a nonentity, and has consequently nothing to do with the creation, preservation, and destruction of the world, all which operations are left exactly where the Sankhya school leaves them, hanging on the potentialities of its primordial principle. The Logical schools have a God equally passive and quiescent, equally devoid of power, quality, and relation ; while the origination and preservation of the universe are left in the hands of a mysterious and irresistible force called Adrishta, which has atoms of various kinds as its working material. And these four schools concur with one another in maintaining the pre-existence of souls and rendering them useless appendages by forcing them out of all power, quality, and relation. The Mimansa throws all questions of a recondite character into the background, and seems to maintain the eternity of the world along with the Vedas ; while to its champions it is a matter of perfect indifference whether God exists or not. And finally, the Vedantic system in its earlier forms evolves creation out of the substance of God, modified according to its exigencies, and in its later forms represents the whole universe as a gigantic dream.

In marked contrast to all this, the Bible represents God as the Creator of the world, of its substance as

well as of its form, as the Personal, Intelligent, and Voluntary Agent who brought entity out of nonentity, things that appear out of nothing, not as the Architect who builded up the universe out of pre-existing materials. The Bible does not compel us to oppose the modern theory of evolution; but according to it the process begins with an act of creation thoroughly *ex nihilo*, and progresses in a line, not uninterrupted by fresh acts of direct intervention, under the guidance of infinite wisdom, backed by unlimited power and infinite goodness. The idea of creation, or something brought out of nothing, is as distasteful to modern scientists as it was to our ancient philosophers; and that because it is inconceivable. But it is forgotten that the theory of spontaneous generation, or of life coming out of dead matter, or that of thought springing out of slime, is equally inconceivable. And if we have to swallow the one theory, we may as well swallow the other!

3. God, according to Hindu Philosophy, is a non-entity, and therefore cannot rule or provide for the exigencies of life. He is in the same predicament with an idol of stone—nay, decidedly worse off. The idol of stone has eyes, but it sees not; ears, but it hears not; a nose, but it smells not; but it consists of some material of which a proper use may be made. But the God of philosophy is a phantom, and has no existence beyond the compass of an imagination prone to frivolity, though not destitute of creative power. How is it possible for Him to govern, to control the laws of the material world, guide human volitions, and regulate the complicated machinery of life? He is therefore very properly thrust into the background; and a material form such as Prakriti, or metaphysical phantasms such

as Karma or work, Maya or illusion, are posited to regulate the evolutions of providence. Modern philosophers have not been slow to follow the example, and such fantastic creations of a prurient imagination as Natural Selection, Kosmos, Moral Order, Thought, Idea, etc., have been pressed into service, clothed with gubernatorial powers, and placed at the head of the economy of providence. The scientist substitutes his immutable laws for these intangible chimeras ; but he does not see that, apart from a moving or a regulating power, they are as chimerical as the subtlest phantasy conceived or invented by the spirit of metaphysical refinement or generalization.

God, according to the Bible, is the Author of Creation and the God of Providence. Nor is His government general, confined to operations and events which are invested with peculiar importance and glory by human beings. His government is minute, particular, or individual, and it comprehends all material movements, from those of the largest heavenly bodies the advancing light of which has not yet reached our globe, down to those of a mote scarcely visible in a bright ray of light, and all events, from the political convulsions by which great empires are shaken to their centres, or sanguinary wars by which their boundary lines are extended, down to the pettiest occurrences of the most prosaic of lives—the life say of a shoeblack or a chimney-sweep. “Are there not two sparrows sold for a farthing ? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered.” Some theistic philosophers are willing to allow a sort of general government of the world and its concerns by God, but they revolt from the idea of representing Him as condescending enough

to take an interest in the dry details of every-day life, or in local idiosyncrasies and individual peculiarities. These persons, however, forget that, as great things are often evolved out of little things, there can be no government at all unless the *minutiæ* of life are included, and that our petty distinctions between great and small are not recognized in heaven. Alexander Vinet refers, in one of his very suggestive discourses, to an event in the life of our Lord eminently fitted to show that Heaven takes special notice of many things passed over by us as uninteresting and useless. While His disciples were wrapped in admiration of the great buildings of Jerusalem and its magnificent temple, together with multitudes of rich and well-to-do people passing to and fro in processions more or less pompous, His eyes were fixed on the poor widow who cast into the treasury of the Lord all her living !

4. Let us now advert to the picture of man as presented in Hindu Philosophy and that presented in the Bible. Man, according to Hindu Philosophy, is either a lump of matter, or a particle of the divinity, or a mere dream. His dualistic nature is admitted apparently in the Naturalistic and Logical schools ; but the soul to which his body is attached is devoid, like the God generally admitted as existent by their champions, of power and quality, and really, if not apparently, thrown out of all relation to things heavenly as well as earthly. The soul is doubtless said to be related to the body or to nature in general through its material organ, the mind, and is represented as witness of its sufferings and ruler of its movements. But such representation is meaningless, as its ability to see and rule is emphatically denied ; and it is moreover neutralized by counter-representations, which make it the passive and unfeel-



ing recipient of impressions made upon the mind by mischievous Prakriti, both pleasurable and painful. But may not its proximity to nature, such as makes it seem active and impressionable when it in reality is thoroughly passive and impassible, suggest the idea of relation ? But its proximity to nature, after having been posited and made the basis of many a weighty conclusion, is emphatically denied. Both its entanglement and emancipation are declared fictitious, not real ! The soul, therefore, being set aside, all that remains of man is the body, a lump of matter moved by a law over which he has no control whatever. The Vedantic school converts this lump into a particle of the essence of the divinity, or one of its modes. The question, How the infinite becomes the finite ? is not categorically stated and perspicuously treated of ; but the theory of self-diremption is in a somewhat clumsy manner elaborated in the later documents of the system. That the infinite is modified in all its infinitude, now into a material form and then into a spirit, may be the import of some passages at least in the Upanishads and the Brahma Sutras ; but later expositions of Vedantism ascribe to the deity an almost endless divisibility, by virtue of which one portion remains absolute and unrelated, and others are endlessly divided and subdivided into the innumerable realities of life, both material and spiritual. But the dualism or rather multiplicity involved in such endless emissions and modifications of the divine substance is obviated by the Maya, or Illusion Theory, which represents everything, spiritual or material, as unreal besides God—the real unity mistaken for variety. According to this last refinement of speculative thought, man is an illusion, or an unreal mode of divine existence !

But whatever man is—a modification of the infinite in its entirety, a particle of the divine essence, or an illusion—he is not essentially different from the brute that perisheth, or even from inanimate matter. According to Hindu Philosophy in its later manifestations, the inferior animals have souls as well as man, and the precedence the lord of creation might legitimately claim is the superiority of degree rather than of kind. He is, moreover, not generically different from particles of matter, as each of these either is or has a particle of the universal soul latent in it. Nowhere is the modern theory of continuity carried to such perfection as in India !

Man, according to the Scriptures, is the crowning apex of the pyramid of creation in this nether sphere. He is *dualistic*, consisting of body and soul, indissolubly or all but indissolubly united. Some Christian philosophers maintain that the body and the soul united in man form a third substance, a *tertium quid* ; but though this theory may justly be represented as suggesting a chemical fusion inconceivable, the sharp lines of distinction by which the one is separated from the other are by no means sanctioned by the Scripture representations of man. According to these, man is a dualism, the relation between his body and soul being permanent, and involving interpenetration and constant interaction ; and the current belief in a Hades peopled with disembodied spirits needs, in the opinion of some eminent Christian philosophers, correction. Man is intelligent, and his intelligence is not either a particle or a mode of the Divine Intelligence. There are even among Christians habits of thought and expression to which, when not properly explained, serious exceptions may be taken. The relation, for instance, between a

cause and effect has been, it is to be feared, pressed too far by some Christian writers in its parallelism to that subsisting between God and the universe. It is affirmed that, as the effect must be potentially in the cause, intelligence and free agency in man must potentially exist in God. But it is not perceived that such language tends to make human intelligence and will, in all their weakness and perversity, simply modes of the unerring intelligence and the absolutely uncontrolled and uncontrollable will of God ; and that, as divine attributes are inseparable from the divine essence, an identity is established between the nature of God and the nature of man. We Christians believe in a sort of anthropomorphism, not in pantheistic unity between God and man ; and the Christian position is that man was created in the image of God—that is, clothed with intelligence, power, and free agency similar to but not identical with these elements of the divine nature. We have by anticipation already stated that man is a free agent, and as such a first cause, capable of setting in motion lines of second causes within certain limits and under certain conditions. But is his free agency absolute and uncontrolled ? Some Christian theologians maintain that his will is absolutely free, while others admit some degree of control, not only in the region of action, but in that of volition also. But happily they all concur in maintaining that man is responsible for his thoughts, words, and deeds, even when they are placed under the control of God and are made subservient to the grand purposes of His government. Christianity upholds divine sovereignty and human responsibility without pointing out the line in which these two apparent contradictions or, to adopt a well-known Kantian phrase, antinomies, meet.

5. We now come to man's duty in life. Representations of this embodied in Hindu Philosophy are low, and fitted to demoralize him. His aim, according to them, is personal and selfish—his own deliverance from pain. The Hindu philosopher is pre-eminently subjective, but his views of pain are characterized by an objectivity inconsistent with the general tenor of his philosophy. Among the varieties of power from which deliverance is described as desirable and necessary, those of an external character—viz., pains of the body resulting from impurity, disease, and death, or from the inclemencies of the weather, or from the malignant influences of evil stars, or from the cruelty of demons and hobgoblins—occupy the most prominent place ; while the excruciating mental sufferings attendant on sinful dispositions and vile passions are rarely, if at all, referred to. The great Buddha attributed the awful amount of suffering noticeable on the surface of the globe to birth, old age, disease, and death ; and the grossness of conception he displayed on this head is characteristic of Hindu Philosophy in general. It was, in short, derived from one of its systems, and gave its color and complexion to those elaborated after that reformer's death. Be this as it may, the aim of the Hindu philosopher is essentially selfish : his own deliverance from pain in its varieties of ghastly forms. That of the Greek philosopher was by no means higher, his *summum bonum* being happiness. An aim so selfish cannot but lead a man to concentrate his attention upon his own self, to be self-centred and self-absorbed. Under its influence he makes self the centre of his thoughts, feelings, and desires, and all his schemes and projects revolve around it as their pivot or pole. Is it possible for a person to be thus absorbed in self without being de-

graded and debased, enfeebled in mind and vitiated in soul ?

Man's duty in life is, according to the Bible, to glorify God, his Maker, Preserver, Ruler, and Redeemer. Christianity requires him to renounce and mortify self, and make God the centre of his thoughts and feelings, the goal of his plans and projects, the end, in a word, of his existence. Self-deliverance, self-improvement, or self-glorification is not to be made the aim of life, though these blessings are sure to crown his efforts to serve God with a singleness of eye to His glory. He is delivered from sorrow, exalted and glorified, not because he seeks with all his heart his own beatification, but because his life is unreservedly devoted to the adoration and service of Him by whom he has been redeemed. Nay, in proportion as his mind is withdrawn from selfish aims and purposes and set "on things above," his sorrow of heart disappears, his thought becomes exalted, his feelings purified, and his soul made instinct with an abiding sense of peace, triumph, and gladness. The true philosophy of happiness is with him, and him alone. Happiness flies the more it is sought, and the Greek philosopher who eagerly pursued it as the sole business of life found it receding from his grasp in proportion as it was run after, and was ultimately covered with disappointment and shame, as the alchemist in the Middle Ages in his search after the philosopher's stone or the elixir of life ! This was also true of the Hindu philosopher, whose pains multiplied in proportion as he sought deliverance from them, and who therefore was forced to make self-annihilation, in the literal sense of the term, his *summum bonum*. The Christian, however, by following the principle "not enjoyment and not sorrow," does succeed, in a

pre-eminent degree, in securing the one and fleeing from the other.

But how is man to glorify God ? By properly and conscientiously doing his work, not certainly by fleeing from the world. His work will become manifest if we take into consideration the position he occupies in this nether creation. He is, in the first place, a king, and as such he is to subdue the world, to people it, to develop its resources, and to make all within his power subservient to the varied purposes of life, the higher as well as the lower. He is, in the second place, a Prophet, and as such he is to observe, reason, inquire, and investigate, and in this way to rise from the varied objects of nature around him and the events of providence to their correct ideas in the mind of God—the eternal repertory of truth in all its entirety and glory. As a Prophet man is to acquire and spread knowledge, and thereby to benefit the world and his own self. And in the third place, man is a Priest, and as such he is to bring all the precious things in his possession, and his own self as an offering to God, to be under His direction utilized in promoting the highest welfare of the world at large. This threefold duty presupposes a standing revelation and perpetual guidance on the part of God, and the full development of every side of his nature on the part of man ; and it enables him to display, in what may be called the outgoings of his life, a beautiful union of piety with activity, devotion with philanthropy, the sublimity of contemplative retirement with the enthusiasm of practical humanitarianism. Man, therefore, glorifies God by making every force within and without him do its appointed work, and so prove conducive to the adornment of the inanimate and the enjoyment of the sentient creation.

6. But in the case of man the *quid est* is by no means the *quid oportet*. In his present condition he neither occupies the lofty position intended for him, nor performs the duty intrusted to him. He is obviously degraded very far below his *natural* station and vocation, despised by the meanest of those over whom he is appointed to rule, debased by error, enslaved by prejudice, brutalized by passion, and dragged into the lowest depths of shame and misery by a downward tendency, which has, in consequence of an anomalous state of things introduced by his own folly, grown with his growth, strengthened with his strength, and become almost omnipotent and irresistible. One cannot look at his present condition even cursorily without raising the question, What is the cause of his not merely obvious but most obtrusive degradation? Ignorance, says the Hindu philosopher; and his reply would not be far from truth if by ignorance he meant ignorance of God. Sin debases and ruins us by darkening our views of God, and thereby leading us to commit the twofold error of withholding confidence from Him and placing it in our own selves. The history of the fall illustrates the way in which moral apostasy in man is initiated and consummated. Adam was induced to believe that the only restriction by which his freedom of action was curtailed was a hardship, not a blessing; and he most foolishly threw off all allegiance to a Being who had resorted to a mean artifice to check his rise to a proper level, became his own master and guide, and grievously misdirected all the energies of his complex nature. Ignorance may be represented as the cause of man's present degradation and misery; and if the Hindu philosopher had, in his theory of ignorance, any reference to the repulsive views of God entertained by man-

kind in general, much might be said in favor of his position. But by ignorance he meant not ignorance of God, but ignorance either of the difference between the soul and non-soul, or of the essential identity of the ego, non-ego, and the infinite—that is, ignorance in either case of what is a palpable untruth, an ignorance which is bliss indeed ! The Greek philosopher, especially of the Socratic school, also traced human depravity to the same cause—to ignorance of Duty, Moral Beauty, and subtle moral distinctions ; to ignorance of the path of justice to be trodden, and the path of injustice to be avoided. But he failed to perceive, amid the cobwebs of his subtleties and refinements, that knowledge of duty is not in this life always associated with the power to perform it ; and that, when not supplemented by grace from on high, it is neither a restraint to vice nor an incentive to virtue. The moral life of the philosophers of antiquity in general was, alas ! a proof that the knowledge of virtue is but too often accompanied in this world with the practice of vice !

The Christian traces human degradation and misery to a deliberate and wilful transgression of a known law of God. Adam, the progenitor of the human race, became the author of sin by an act of disobedience deliberately committed ; and his sin has, by what may be called incessant self-propagation, plunged into misery all his descendants, one alone excepted, because preternaturally introduced into the all but endless chain of life. The Christian believes in original sin ; and science, after having laughed at it for centuries, finds it convenient now to uphold his belief to maintain the credit of its all-embracing theory of evolution and continuity. The Christian, moreover, believes that inherited sin is in every man of mature understanding



aggravated by wilful transgression, and that, there being no one that sinneth not, all flesh is guilty before God. "There is none righteous, no, not one. There is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable ; there is none that doeth good, no, not one." This sad picture is justified by every-day experience, and it sets forth the essence of sin as well as its dire consequences. The essence of sin is godlessness, of which even the man who fulfils the duty of social life faithfully and passes for a man of probity and benevolence is as guilty as the licentious wretch who has not what a brilliant writer calls "a rag of reputation." Ignorance of God, recoil from Him, distrust in His all-embracing goodness, aversion to what is good, proneness to what is evil, unrighteousness and unprofitableness, are all consequences of sin, which therefore is the parent of all the degradation and misery which we see heaped up in the world.

Sin makes us miserable in two different ways. It in the first place separates us from God, the source of life, light, and joy ; from that dependence without which liberty is but license ; from that cheerful submission without which our will becomes stubborn and intractable ; that communion without which the soul is bereft of its genuine enjoyment, and that grace without which true progress is an impossibility. It then darkens our understandings, vitiates our affections and passions, and proves thereby a source of ineffable restlessness and torment to our own selves, and to all around us. For, though its seat is the heart, it is perpetually issuing out in putrid streams of corruption in our life and conversation. The springs and fountains of life within are vitiated by it, and its outgoings cannot but partake of the corrup-

tion. The history of the world is the history of sin incarnated in words and deeds ; and if the history of the human heart could be written, it would be the history of sin in its original form, in its naked ghastliness. Wilberforce's argument, that the existence and universality of sin may be proved by the same sort of argument which led Newton to his discovery of the law of gravitation, has not so much stress laid upon it in these days as it deserves. All nature combines with all history to prove the universality of sin, its early development, and its controlling power ; and it is the height of unphilosophical temerity to deny its existence in the teeth of the universal ruin around us, or to speak of it in sentimental terms as " virtue in the making."

7. Now we come to the plan of salvation embodied in Hindu Philosophy. That salvation is, in the first place, not universal. It does not embrace in its broad sweep all races, nations, languages, and tongues, or overleap all geographical, ethnological, social, and chronological landmarks. Nor is this salvation the common property of the Hindu nation at large. It is, even within the narrow bounds of our own country, the monopoly of the few, not the heritage of the many. From it, as has already been indicated, all orders of society below the sacerdotal are mercilessly excluded. It is true that Kapila, the father of Hindu Philosophy, did strive to include in his scheme distinguished applicants from the lower orders, and even select members of the weaker sex ; but his example, though backed by the mighty reform of Buddha, was not followed ; and the exclusiveness by which philosophical salvation had been characterized became stereotyped. Again, the female sex in almost all its entirety is excluded from this salvation. Half the population of the country,

therefore, and the greater portion by far of the remaining half, must pine away under the sweeping ban of exclusion. A sort of inferior salvation, with some temporal and temporary advantages, is reserved for them ; and the hope of their rise in a future birth to the dignity of the priesthood, and therefore a share in the privilege of final emancipation, is held out. But their immediate exclusion is protected by a series of iron rules which nothing can break or even relax. But even of the Brahmin caste the majority are debarred from this grand boon. Only those Brahmins who have fitted themselves by a long and painful process of preparation, have successively performed the duties of the student and the householder, may aspire to the blessed exercises which result in emancipation. The narrowing process almost brings the privilege down to a point ! Need we say that the Christian salvation is for all mankind, who are invited to accept of it *just as they are* ?

The way in which philosophic salvation is attained is a way of thorns and briers, the rugged path of asceticism. Separation from family life or family entanglements, as the expression is ; retirement to a forest, fasting, mortification, and penance practised for many a long year ; and, above all, self-oblivious meditation—these are the weapons of war, and the victory is literal annihilation of self. There is no harm in making one's own self the subject of one's meditation, provided the object is the ascertainment of truth. From the particular ego within we are led by subjective or introspective meditation to the Universal Ego without, from created intelligence to the primal intelligence, from the will of limited potency to the will of unlimited power. But such progress from the finite to the infinite is not

the object of the Hindu philosopher. His object is to kill the varied states of the mind, thought, feeling, and volition ; to paralyze the nerves and muscles of the body, and deaden consciousness by sheer inaction. But before this state of the positive death of the body and the mind is attained, the devotee is raised above the polarities of nature, and he cannot in consequence be affected by heat and cold, light and darkness, storm and calm. The instincts of his æsthetic nature are extinguished, and he sees no difference between beauty and ugliness, proportion and disproportion of form, harmonious and heterogeneous mixture of colors. His moral nature is extinguished, and he is raised above moral distinctions, virtue and wisdom being to him in no way different from vice and folly. It is a relief that he does not continue long in this state, and that absolute death comes apace to swallow up and remove from the possibility of doing mischief a mind so completely separated from its legitimate functions !

The salvation offered by Christianity is not dependent on our righteousness. Our vows and prayers, our devotions and meditations, our penances and mortifications cannot buy it. In its germinal state it is a gift bestowed upon us freely the moment we accept Christ as our Saviour by faith, and in its advanced stages it is matured and perfected by the spiritual nourishment we obtain by simply "looking unto Jesus." The theory of gratuitous salvation is a peculiarity of our religion, and appears to be the soundest philosophy, when we consider man's utter helplessness in spiritual matters, his inability to make an atonement for his past sins and transgressions, and effect within himself that radical change without which religion is a sham and an illusion ; his inability, in a word, to make amends for past

follies, to shun the bad and cleave to the good. The history of the world, of philosophy and religion, proves to a demonstration that man can neither find God by wisdom nor save himself by work. Supernatural revelation and supernatural help are needed from Alpha to Omega to enable man to know, love, and serve God ; and our heaven-bestowed religion embodies the one and shows the way in which the other is obtained and availed of.

The present result of this salvation, so gratuitously bestowed and so mercifully matured and perfected, is the complete development of man, or his development as far as possible under present circumstances. The result of Hindu salvation is not the subordination of his lower nature to the higher, not the evolution under proper culture of an exalted character, with varied excellences harmoniously blended, but the absolute extinction of his inner and outer nature. Greek philosophy oscillated between sensationalism and intellectualism ; and its aim was, under the guidance of the Sophists, the extinction of intellectual life and the exclusive sway of sensibility ; and under the guidance of the philosophers of the Socratic school a reversal of this process—the death of feeling and the exclusive sway of thought. Greek philosophy was, with reference to this and other matters, onesided, while Hindu Philosophy may be described as *no-sided*. Christianity recognizes the undesirability and the absolute impracticability of the Hindu ideal, and holds an even balance between sensationalism and intellectualism. Asceticism has prevailed in the Church, and has by no means been an unmixed evil, its aim being not the extinction of human nature, but the due subordination of its lower to its higher element. But it must not be forgotten that

asceticism was brought into the Church by heathen philosophy, and it has never appeared but in apparent disharmony with the genius of Christianity. The Christian principle is the development of *all* the elements of the complex nature of man, and we fully accept Buckle's *dictum*, that if the religious nature of man were exclusively developed and the other elements thrown out of culture, the result would be a monk or a saint, but not a complete man. Man has varieties of instincts which may be repressed, but which cannot possibly be extinguished. These are love of property, love of comfort, love of society, love of esteem, love of beauty, love of knowledge. Human nature being diseased to the very core, it may be desirable under peculiar circumstances to suppress a few of these instincts, just as it is desirable in cases of bodily malady to abstain from proper food. And God may call upon us to hold a few of them in abeyance for the public weal ; but it ought never to be forgotten that they are all God-given and heaven-implanted, and therefore sacred and inviolable. Properly cultivated and developed, they are sources of pleasure and improvement, as when ill-cultured and misdirected they occasion unutterable agony. Christianity does not stand up for their annihilation, but for their proper culture and development. Christianity therefore is not ascetic, nor anti-social, nor anti-economical, nor communistic, nor subversive of order either in human nature or in human society. It is the only religion that has encouraged and fostered culture of the broadest stamp—culture spiritual, intellectual, and æsthetic, culture of piety and humanity in their highest forms. The philosophy of the world extinguishes either the religious nature of man, or his longing after the infinite, or his social nature, or that principle of

benevolence to which the amenities and charities of life are to be traced. But Christianity unfolds both these apparently antagonistic elements of his nature ; and in the character matured under its influence we have the enthusiasm of humanity now so much talked of, *plus* the enthusiasm of piety now thrown into the background !

8. And lastly we come to the prospect before man, first, according to Hindu Philosophy, and afterward according to Christianity. The prospect according to Hindu Philosophy is *annihilation* ! The soul, when freed from bondage by mortifications and penances, isolation and meditation, loses its being as a drop in the ocean, either in the one physical or in the one spiritual substance of the universe. The Greek philosopher did not always point to a better goal. Socrates, not to speak of the schools that preceded him, did at times speak of beatific abode with the gods in a better world as the crowning reward of virtuous life ; but his disciple, Plato, oscillated between materialism and pantheism ; and his followers, the Neo-Platonists, held up the theory of an eternal substance of a spiritual nature engaged in the agreeable work of disgorging and gorging world after world in endless succession !

The Gospel has brought life and immortality to light. Christian salvation has results which are proximate and results which are ultimate—a present and a prospective efficacy. Under its auspices, if we are allowed the expression, a new life is begun here, and matured under varieties of conditions, each eminently fitted to retard its development ; but it is not, it cannot be perfected on this side the grave. But its perfection will be realized, under circumstances more propitious, in a better and more durable world. Heavenly

bliss is described in the Bible by images and symbols, which, though not gross and debasing as those in the Koran, are more or less material ; and these have given birth to some grave misapprehensions in the Church and some foolish objections out of it. Christianity is represented as an incentive to the dominant selfishness of our nature, and the Christian is held up as one who serves God and practises virtue solely with a view to the glittering prize or crown placed before him. His own aggrandizement, if not in this world, at least in the world to come, is his paramount motive—his own deliverance from the troubles of this life, his own happiness, his own glorification. This objection is perhaps not groundless when advanced against the gross views of heaven entertained by ill-informed Christians, but it is ludicrously groundless when brought against the sublime views presented, though in a material garb, in the New Testament. The crown held up as the great reward of piety and virtue in the other world is a crown of righteousness, the crown which sets forth the immutable righteousness of God and the completed righteousness of the beatified man : *the perfection of his nature and the happiness proceeding necessarily from it*, not material comfort and pleasure. He looks away from himself in this life, and is happy in proportion as he serves God with a singleness of eye to His glory ; his happiness in heaven will proceed from the same source—service rendered to God with all the powers of a perfected nature, and without the hindrances of this life. Unselfish love to God begun here and perfected in heaven—such is the source of the happiness Christians experience here, and of that they look forward to as their reward.

Men are consciously and unconsciously assimilated in



character to the gods they worship. Augustine in his Confessions sets forth the principle in these well-known words : " Terence introduces a profligate young man, justifying his lewdness by the example of Jove, while he beholds on the wall a picture of Jupiter and Danaë, and excites himself to lust as by divine intuition : ' Shall he, who shakes heaven with his thunder, do these things, and may not I, a poor mortal, do the same ? ' " The vices current in the country are in nine instances out of ten *fac similes* of the vices of the gods and goddesses adored by our countrymen. The worshippers of Krishna become as a rule licentious; of Mahadeva, smokers of intoxicating drugs ; of Kali, blood-thirsty Thugs. From this law of assimilation the philosopher is not excluded. The object of his worship, or rather contemplation, is a Being without power, quality, and relation, a magnificent Nothing ; and it is no wonder that he should by a painful process of mortification endeavor to reduce himself to nothing by extinguishing his consciousness, thought, feeling, and muscular energy. That he does not succeed is no fault of his. He wishes and strives to be like his god, and his present aim as well as his future prospect is annihilation. The Christian also tries to be like the object of his worship—the Lord Jesus Christ—and he daily grows in piety, humility, meekness, and benevolence ; and the prospect before him is perfection in these and other kindred virtues. Is it necessary to say that while Hindu Philosophy is Pessimism Christian philosophy is Optimism in the highest sense of the term ?

A word ought to be said under this head about what Christian salvation has in reserve for the body. No mercy was shown, no quarter given the human body in the schools, generally speaking, of ancient philosophy,

in our own or in foreign countries. It was described as the seat of corruption and impurity, and its purification was placed beyond the confines of possibility. Matter and sin could not, according to approved philosophical maxims, be dissociated from each other any more than breath and physical life ; and the only way in which the soul can be saved from sin is by its complete deliverance from material claims. So irreclaimably impure is matter, that God was thrown out of direct relation to it that He might not be contaminated by its inherent and inalienable corruption. The Hindus made an emergent Deity the *nexus* between God and creation, and the Neo-Platonists held the doctrine of the transcendence of God at the expense of His immanence, making a primal potency, the idea of ideas, the intermediate link of connection. The mystics of the Middle Ages adopted the notion, and in our time Swedenborg recognized in Christ the *nexus* between God and the universe. Christianity, however, sets forth the original purity if not the absolute impeccability of the body, and offers it a share in its salvation. The body is involved in the consequences of sin, and has become the abode of deformity, disease, and death ; but its deliverance from these fatal results and its ultimate glorification are insured. The whole man sins, the whole man is involved in the dire consequences of sin, the whole man is delivered from these, and the whole man is glorified—such is the glorious fruit of the scheme of salvation revealed in the Gospel.

In conclusion let us ask, Is an amalgamation between Hindu and Christian philosophy possible ? The question is almost as absurd as the other, Is an amalgamation between darkness and light possible ? A God without power, quality, and relation amalgamated with

a God with power, quality, and relation ! A man with a perfectly quiescent soul, thoughtless, passionless, involuntary, with a man with a soul endowed with thought, emotion, and volition ! The idea of enthrallment occasioned by sin, with the idea of enthrallment occasioned by failure to recognize the essential distinction between soul and non-soul ! The idea of gratuitous salvation, with the idea of salvation wrought by a painful process of penance and meditation ! Life in an utterably more glorious stage of existence, with the frightful void of absolute annihilation ! The reconciliation is impossible, and the less people talk of it the better !

The history of the Church is full of warnings against any attempt on our part to allow our doctrine to be in the slightest degree influenced and modified by human philosophy. The experiment was unhappily tried in the Church not long after the days of the apostles, and the result is known. Justin Martyr in the Sub-Apostolic, and Tertullian and Origen in the Post-Apostolic times incorporated a little of their philosophy with the pure theology of the New Testament, and ages elapsed before the Church was emancipated from the influence of the heterogeneous mixture. Asceticism crept into the Church and tinctured its theology and practical morality ; and it was not till science had discovered the correct principles of hygiene, sanitation, political economy, and social science that its fetters began to be broken and shaken off. Perhaps they have not been entirely cast off yet ; but the day is not far off when the influence of an asceticism imported from schools of false philosophy and self-righteous Pharisaism will not be felt, at least to an appreciable degree. Science has in various ways benefited the Church. It has dis-

enthralled it from many wrong notions and erroneous interpretations of revealed truth, and it is destined to be a potent antidote to those gloomy ideas of morality which have placed Christianity in antagonism to the spirit of broad and comprehensive progress it has fostered. False science and false Christianity are antagonistic to each other, the object of the one being the adornment of our temporal life to the exclusion of that to which it is a stepping-stone, and that of the other being the maintenance of the interests of the soul at the expense of those of the body.

Christianity successfully points out the path of true felicity in this life, as well as in that which is to come. In its work of renovating man it begins with humility, perfect self-distrust, and perfect self-abnegation. It sets forth the feebleness, the utter inadequacy of our own resources, so far as our spiritual emancipation and elevation are concerned, and it leads us to look aloft for that help which we cannot possibly derive from our own selves. It begets faith in us, and leads us eagerly to avail ourselves of the revelation which God has made of Himself and our duty to Him, and of the plenitude of help He has promised on condition of simple reliance on His goodness and might. It invites the soul to God, and the soul has freely communicated to it that life of love and beneficence of which He is the fountain. Nor are faith and love the only source of felicity opened up in the tempest-tossed heart. Hope is also generated which raises him above temporal mists and clouds, and exultingly grasps the inheritance which is incorruptible and undefiled, and which fadeth not away. Without this lively hope our joy cannot be complete. Trials and temptations will cross our path, and imperfections cling to us till the last moment

of our earthly life. One of the great Fathers of the Church said very justly : " This is the only perfection of men—to know themselves imperfect." And holy men have in every age been conscious of imperfection and impurity in proportion to the nearness attained by them to God and heavenly things. Such consciousness, growing as years roll on, will, in addition to the inevitable trials of life, be a source of sorrow and depression to the godly soul in the midst of its earnest endeavors to serve God. Something is needed to sustain it amid the fluctuations of the inner and the vicissitudes of the outer man ; something to prove a counterpart to that intense longing for perfection which the very best men are the most conscious of. Christianity, with the most complete knowledge of the deepest yearnings of the heart, supplies this something—a hope which will survive the crash of our earthly feelings, and end only in fruition. The path of humility, faith, love, hope is the path of pleasantness and peace pointed out by our holy religion ; while the path of self-sufficiency, self-dependence, self-deception, and self-destruction is that which philosophy points its finger to !

## SUPPLEMENT.

### HINDU ECLECTICISM.

ONE of the trials incident to missionary life in a semi-civilized country like India has scarcely had due prominence given it. The Indian missionary lives, like his brother worker in less civilized heathen lands, in what the late good Bishop Thompson very appropriately called "a moral pest-house;" and he has difficulties of a general character, arising out of human nature, current systems of belief, defective intellectual culture, a low type of morality, and various other sources, to grapple with. But he has some peculiar trials, and these begin as soon as he begins his conscientious preparation for his work. He has to study languages which, whatever might be said by the champions of philology of their affinity to his, are to him a jargon to be mastered with immense trouble. He has, moreover, to master a literature which is barren and uninteresting, a philosophy which bewilders rather than strengthens the mind, a mythology which is a tissue of puerility and obscenity, and systems of religious belief so corrupt that their ascendancy is the best proof that can be given of the Scripture doctrine of human depravity. Is it a wonder that, in the teeth of such a formidable mass of useless reading, a few missionaries have proved recreant and taken to work less troublesome and apparently more productive?

The idea deserves expansion. Quiet and systematic study is a pleasure of the most refined if not the sublimest stamp, to a minister of the Gospel in a Christian land. His mind literally feasts and fattens on the graces of genuine poetry, the facts of reliable history, the verities of true science, and the truths of sound philosophy ; and even when he has, in the due discharge of his duty, to master current systems of error, he finds them embodied, as a rule, in readable books, or propounded with some regard to approved rules of taste in composition and logic in reasoning. His reading is not only pleasant but profitable, and the more thoroughly he gives himself to it the more thoroughly he expands his mind and broadens his sympathies. His brother worker in the vineyard of the Lord in Hindustan is very differently circumstanced in this as in many other respects. Study is to him a painful rather than a pleasurable duty, and the result is often a burdened rather than an invigorated mind, a bewildered rather than an expanded intellect. The trouble he has to take in mastering foreign languages and making them his own is not without profit, is amply repaid by accessions of intellectual vigor, such as linguistic study is invariably accompanied with and followed by. But whatever study he applies himself to after having done this preliminary work is a wearisome task. If he wishes to study poetry, and through it to obtain an insight into the manners and customs of the people he has to deal with, he has to fight his way not only through extravagances of an exceedingly vicious style of composition, but through a heap of epigrams, anagrams, chronograms, and stuff such as his soul abhorreth. If history attracts him, he has, in order to glean a few sporadic facts of at best doubtful

historical value, to wade neck-deep through the rubbish of mythology and fable. If philosophy is his forte, a tremendous mass of verbosity and logomachy, of sophisms and quibbles, before which those embodied in the wildest speculations of the Middle Ages are as specimens of correct reasoning, is before him ; while he can scarcely get a correct idea of the many-sided and hoary religion he has to understand, face, and overcome, except after being literally lost in the dreary wastes of an unnaturally developed and corrupt literature.

But what, it may be asked, has the missionary to do with such literature and such philosophy ? He has to preach Jesus Christ and Him crucified, and his business is to fit himself by rapidly picking up a foreign tongue for this work of paramount importance. Such assertions have been more than once ventured by men who, while earnestly engaged in doing good among a nominally Christian people, find time to elaborate beautiful theories on the best method of carrying on evangelistic work among the heathen. That the simple story of Jesus Christ and Him crucified is, after all, the truth on which the regeneration of Christian and non-Christian lands, as well as that of individual souls, must ultimately hang, no sane Christian will venture to deny. This story, ever fresh, is inherently fitted to touch the dead heart into life and infuse vigor and vitality into effete nationalities and paralyzed civilizations. But a great deal of rubbish has to be removed, especially in heathen lands like our own, ere its legitimate consequences can be realized ; and a patient and persistent study of false religions, and the complicated systems of false philosophy indissolubly associated with them, enables the missionary to throw



out of the way those heaps of prejudices and errors which make it impossible for the simple story of the cross to reach and influence the heart. The theorists who think that modes of operation which have been successful among nominal Christians must needs be successful among the heathen, brought up amid time-hallowed systems of theology and philosophy, falsely so called, have only to migrate from the one department of work to the other to be convinced of their error, and forced to exclaim, with redoubled vehemence, "Old Adam is too strong for young Melancthon !"

One of the many ancient books fitted to illustrate the peculiar trial to which attention has been called is the "Bhagavad Gita," the precious book which may justly be represented as the fountain-head of Hindu eclecticism besides the Suaredasware Upanishad. The missionary can scarcely maintain any intercourse with the reading classes in India without hearing the work eulogized and extolled in the most extravagant terms possible. It embodies the loftiest flights of the sublime philosophy of Asia, and presents the cream, so to speak, of Hindu morality and Hindu religion. It is replete with doctrines which stand unrivalled in sublimity and grandeur, truths of a transcendental order set off by sentiments of an elevated type, and precepts which, if generally reduced to practice, would convert this sin-stricken world into a veritable paradise. As regards its style, human tongue can scarcely describe its beauty and loftiness, while the man must be a consummate dullard who fails to see that it is a masterpiece of correct reasoning as well as a model of composition. The missionary, moreover, finds these testimonials indorsed by learned orientalists, who, as a class, have the knack of perceiving



beauty where ordinary mortals see nothing but deformity, excellency of arrangement and cogency of reasoning where others see nothing but confusion worse confounded. With bright anticipations—anticipations generated by recommendations both indigenous and foreign—he opens the book and enthusiastically begins its perusal, and lo ! his disappointment commences. Instead of an elegant style, he finds extravagances of diction from which even the worshippers of Dr. Johnson in his own country would recoil in horror. He sees incoherence rather than logical consistency, confusion rather than lucidness of thought, naked sophisms instead of convincing arguments, and crude notions and jarring sentiments agglomerated into a philosophy of the most heterogeneous and the wildest character, while the harsh transitions, incongruous metaphors, and tiresome repetitions he has to wade through would justify even a prostrating fit of homesickness on his part.

One must one's own self read this book in the original, or a literal, verbatim translation of it, such as Thompson's, which will be our itinerary or guide-book in our research into its contents, to be convinced of the soundness of these remarks. We do not expect the general reader—we mean the reader who has not made Oriental literature his specialty—to indorse our criticism or to extend to the toil-worn foreign missionary the sympathy we have always felt for him ; and we are afraid that our self-imposed task of setting forth the contents of this time-hallowed book may, after all, be thankless. But we must correct an error carefully tended and nourished by a class of philosophers in America who are striving to naturalize the belief that the fundamental ideas of all religions are alike, and that an attempt

to set up one religion on the ruins of others is unjust as well as uncalled for. And we therefore raise the question, What is Hindu eclecticism? The proper answer to this question is furnished by the Theology, Anthropology, Soteriology, and Eschatology of the "Bhagavad Gita." Let us call attention to these departments of the book, or rather to the contents of the book, which, though presented in promiscuous heaps, without much regard to the advantages of a luminous, concatenated arrangement, may, by a not unnatural application of the laws of analysis, be classed under these heads.

To a correct appreciation of its teaching under these heads some account of the work itself, its origin, its relative position in Hindu literature, and its influence in the development of religious life in our country is a *sine qua non*.

Some preliminary remarks of a somewhat historical character will therefore be first made. The "Bhagavad Gita," or the Song of Bhagavad or Krishna, one of the nine incarnations of Vishnu, appears in the "Mahabharat" as one of its multitudinous and grotesque episodes, one of those almost innumerable legendary tales to which, along with those enshrined in the "Ramayana," the peculiar excellences and defects of our national character are to be traced. It presents, in poetical language, a philosophical dialogue between Arjun, the most estimable of the characters depicted in that epic, and the above-named god, Krishna, who, in the form of man, acts in the humble capacity of his charioteer. The origin of this dialogue, or rather monologue, as Arjun appears more as a hearer than as a speaker, is set forth with poetic coloring and exaggeration. Arjun sees before him the two hostile branches

of the tribe to which he himself belongs—that is, his own relatives and kinsmen—in battle array facing each other, and ready to plunge in dire conflict, and the sight sends a chill of horror into a heart distinguished alike by courage and tenderness. He is unnerved, his limbs become palsied, the hairs on his body stand on end, the blood of his heart is curdled, his head becomes dizzy, and the great consecrated bow in his right hand drops down as if from an arm suddenly struck with paralysis. He is unwilling to fight, to further schemes of self-aggrandizement by slaughtering his own kinsmen in cruel, fratricidal war, or to wade through the blood of his own relations to the unsubstantial and ephemeral glory of an earthly throne. He recognizes divine nature beneath the humble exterior of his charioteer, and anxiously inquires if, under the circumstances, he is not justified in retiring from the field before the clang of trumpets and the clash of arms make retreat on his part dishonorable and cowardly. This question and others, which as his mind grasps one new truth after another he puts one by one, draw out of the divine interlocutor a series of discourses which, besides nerving him for the approaching conflict, open the eyes of his mind to a variety of mystic truths regarding his own personality, that of the being he is privileged to question, and the real, occult nature of the inanimate world around him. The immediate result of the conversation is a great change in his convictions. He sees truth both absolute and relative, shakes off his temporary weakness, rushes into close encounters, sweeps everything before him, and maintains, amid scenes of carnage and desolation, the character of a brave, all-conquering, but at the same time noble-minded and generous warrior.

But though mixed up in popular belief with the "Mahabharat," and presented ordinarily as an incident of its great plot, it bears unmistakable marks of a much later origin. It is, in the first place, replete with references, both direct and incidental, to the varied schools of philosophy which flourished in India long after the stirring scenes of its Heroic Age had been enacted. The Sankhya philosophy is frequently referred to by name, and the author's predilection for or adherence to its fanciful cosmogony is discovered in unmistakable terms. The Yoga philosophy is the subject of a number of direct as well as oblique allusions, and its doctrine of emancipation consequent on hermit solitude, meditation and penance stands out in bold relief from its pages. And, lastly, the uncompromising pantheism of the Vedant, which is also named, is the underlying basis of all its characteristic thoughts and ideas. Again, the "Bhagavad Gita" sets forth the caste system, not in the crude, embryonic state in which it appears in the "Mahabharat," but in the matured, fully developed state in which it appears in the Institutes of Menu, our national legislator, whose caste regulations have ruled India for ages untold. The essential difference between the four primal castes is herein dwelt upon with marked emphasis, and the duties devolved upon each, and carried down by the law of heredity from father to son, are particularized in such a manner that its composition posterior to the age of the compilation of the Institutes, and consequently to that of the "Mahabharat," appears to be a certainty. And, lastly, the Krishna cultus, with its mystic notions of Bhakti or faith, is the most characteristic feature of this philosophico-religious treatise; and no one with even a superficial knowledge of the history of Hin-

duism will venture to call in question the comparatively recent origin of this worship. When these chronological data are put together, the conclusion at which orientalists like Monier Williams have arrived—namely, that the book was written about the second century of the Christian era, or about the time when Greek eclecticism flourished at Alexandria—will appear irresistible.

The state of things which led to its composition by an unknown author, its ascription to the learned, versatile author of the “Mahabharat,” and its incorporation with that long epic, may be guessed rather than ascertained by proper investigation. The philosophical systems which had been elaborated and matured in the schools had popularized an ideal of piety which, though incompatible apparently with the business of life, has always proved peculiarly attractive to the Hindu mind, if not to the human mind in general. Intense contemplation in solitude, resulting in complete mastery over self, stoic indifference to the occurrences of life, painful or pleasurable, extinction of desire, holy calm, and imperturbable quiescence—such had been the standard of piety set up by the philosophical speculations of the varied schools of thought, of which the eclecticism of the “Gita” may justly be represented as an offshoot. And the more its excellence had been appreciated the more had a distaste for the avocations of life been created and a rush toward hermit solitude realized. Nor had the morbid hankering after the enjoyment of undisturbed meditation in sequestered places been confined to the higher orders of society, to the sacerdotal and military castes; it had come down from the apex  
✓ to the very base of the social pyramid, and the industrious trader and even the vile serf had separated them-

selves from useful and indispensable toil, and swelled the ranks of devotees drawn away from the turmoil of busy life to the repose of serene contemplation. The social machinery, worked by the forces emanating from the caste system, had been unhinged, and a reaction against the results of philosophical speculation was needed to secure its or their harmonious operation. That reaction was initiated by the eclecticism of the "Gita," which not merely restated with emphasis the divine origin of the caste system, but made the duties enjoined by it essential to salvation. But the author of this ancient treatise, whoever he was, could not emancipate himself from the influences either of the philosophical speculations which he tried to work up into a composite system, or of the ideal of piety popularized thereby. And so he vibrates between conflicting sentiments, and ultimately upholds what at first he seems determined to oppose and counteract. The eclecticism of the "Gita," like every other syncretistic movement, either in the history of philosophy or that of religion, proved a failure ; but some of the ideas it popularized have continued to influence Hindu society ever since the period of its composition.. Its attempt to work heterogeneous systems of philosophic thought into a homogeneous whole is scarcely appreciated, even among people who would exhaust the vocabulary of praise in speaking of its literary merit and ethical purity and excellence. But its attempt to uphold the caste system and make the duties enjoined by it stepping-stones to the higher degrees of perfection attained only by quiet meditation in sequestered places, has proved a grand success, as we shall have an opportunity of showing. But the real excellence of some of the principles to which it has given currency cannot screen

it from the charge of a lack of earnestness or laxity of principle which makes its speculations incoherent and its conclusions unsatisfactory. The lax accommodating spirit of compromise, the evil star, so to speak, of all systems of eclecticism, from the oldest of those which flourished in times of yore down to that which was recently transferred wholesale from Boston to Calcutta, is at once the most characteristic and culpable feature of this philosophico-religious treatise.

Having brought our notice of the state of things to which the composition of the "Bhagavad Gita" is to be traced to a close, we are at liberty to call attention to

I. Its THEOLOGY. The theology of the "Gita" is not merely tintured with, but is nothing more or less than the absolute pantheism of the Vedant. The difference is not to be traced in the creed of the systems, which, in its important features, is one and the same, but in the manner in which this creed seems to have been arrived at. The Vedant arrived at its unmitigated pantheism through the pathway of judicious rejection, while the "Gita" arrived at the same goal through the pathway of a somewhat unnatural though dexterously effected amalgamation. The Vedant came to its grand idea of unity of substance by rejecting two of the three entities held by three of the foregoing schools of philosophic thought, while the "Gita" came to its grand idea of unity by merging these three entities into one substance. To explain this, a little reference to the foregoing schools of philosophy, or rather to the principles inculcated in these schools, is necessary. Let us begin with the Sankhya system of Kapila, which is chronologically, perhaps, the first of the six systems into which philosophical speculation



developed in India about five or six centuries before the birth of Christ. This system, apparently if not really, is dualistic, and it admits the eternal co-existence of two entities, the primordial, self-evolving form, called Prakriti, and the human soul, Purush. The primordial form, or nature in its original essence, passes through varied processes of evolution, gives birth to intelligence, egoism, the elements, both subtle and gross, the senses, and the powers of action, and finally the mind, called the eleventh organ, through which it entraps the soul, eternal and pure, and makes it miserable by begetting in it desire and aversion, such as necessarily lead to action. This system explains the phenomena of creation on thoroughly atheistic principles ; and its rampant atheism led to its condemnation among a people more thoroughly religious than even the Athenians, whose fervor in religious matters was eulogized by the Apostle of the Gentiles. It was therefore supplanted by the theistic Sankhya of Patanjali, who to the two admitted entities of his atheistic predecessor added another entity, namely, God. This triadism was upheld by the two Logical schools which eventually followed the Sankhya schools in the pathway of philosophical investigation ; but, though fitted to satisfy the religious longings and aspirations of the Hindu heart, it was too complex to satisfy the generalizing tendency of the Hindu mind. And so it was made to shrink into monism under the auspices of the Vedantic school, which retained God and cast overboard the other two entities associated with Him. But the pantheism of the "Gita" is not elaborated in this way. The "Gita" admits the existence of the three entities of the Sankhya philosophy of the theistic type, and of the Logical schools. The divine

interlocutor, Krishna, dilates in the fifteenth chapter, as in many other places, on his identity with the world at large, but at the same time calls attention to the existence of two entities beside or rather in himself. Here are the words :

“ And I alone am known to be by all the Vedas, and I am the composer of the Vedant, and also the interpreter of the Vedas. These two spirits exist in the world, the divisible and also the indivisible. The divisible is every living being. The indivisible is said to be that which pervades all. But there is another, the highest spirit, designated by the name of the Supreme Soul, which, as the imperishable master, penetrates and sustains the triple world. Since I surpass the divisible and am higher than the indivisible, I am, therefore, celebrated in the world and in the Vedas as the highest Person.”

This extract shows how the triadism of the theistic Sankhya is made to consist with the monism of the Vedant. The divisible spirit is the essence of the soul, dwelling in the Supreme Spirit as his better or superior portion, and individualized in man—the individuated soul being but a portion of this element of divinity. The indivisible spirit is the Prakriti of former schools, or essence of matter, which forms the inferior part of the divine nature, and which appears in varied forms in the objects of nature around us. These two entities which Vedantism casts overboard are merged in the all-embracing divine nature by the author of the “ Gita,” according to whom the Supreme Soul is a compound of the essence of all individuated souls and the essence of all material phenomena. The Supreme Spirit is represented as evolving the world out of his inferior element, and the souls of men out of his superior element. The

union, therefore, effected in the "Gita" is exactly similar to the union between the tiger and the lamb when the latter was in the former !

Pantheism thus elaborated is the theology of this philosophico-religious dialogue or monologue ; and innumerable are the passages in which the divine interlocutor, Krishna, represents himself as the original, essential, all-embracing, all-pervading Deity. The sublimest type of egoism with which even pantheism familiarizes us are tame in comparison with that which characterizes his discourses concerning his own mystic personality. All the figures and images by which the essential identity of the Creator with the creation is set forth in the sacred books of the Hindus, and which, moreover, give a peculiarly imposing aspect to their voluminous literature, are heaped upon him in these discourses. He represents himself as the luminous element of the sun and moon, the heat of the fire, the brilliance of the flame, the light of lights, and the radiance of all radiant objects. He represents himself as the sound of ether, the fragrance of the earth, the everlasting seed of existing things, the life of all living things, the father, mother, husband, forefather, sustainer, friend, and lord of the world. According to Monier Williams's somewhat free version, he concludes his description of his own all-pervading personality, or rather essence, with these words :

. . . "I am its (world's) way and refuge,  
 Its habitation and receptacle.  
 I am its witness. I am victory  
 And energy ; I watch the universe  
 With eyes and face in all directions turned.  
 I dwell as wisdom in the heart of all ;  
 I am the goodness of the good ; I am  
 Beginning, middle, end, eternal time,

The birth and death of all. I am the symbol A  
Among the characters. I have created all  
Out of one portion of myself."

This passage, so decidedly instinct with lofty egoism, gives prominence to the second of the fundamental ideas of the system of theology propounded in this book. It ought to be borne in mind that the "Bhagavad Gita" embodies an attempt not merely to reconcile jarring schools of philosophic thought, but to effect a union between philosophy and popular mythology. And so, on the system of absolute pantheism evolved out of the dissertations of the schools, we see grafted the theory of incarnation, propounded and illustrated in popular mythology. The speaker is not an ordinary emanation from the Deity, but the Deity himself in the form of man, and he calls himself not only *Adhyatma*, the Supreme Soul; *Adhibhuta*, the Supreme Existence; *Adhidaivata*, the Supreme God; but *Adhiyajna*, the Supreme Sacrifice. The Hindu doctrine of the cyclic incarnation of Vishnu, the second person of the Hindu triad, is clearly set forth, and the object of these periodic manifestations of the Deity is mentioned, namely, "to establish righteousness." The divine interlocutor not merely represents himself as an incarnation of God, not merely refers to his past incarnation, not merely dwells on the great object to accomplish which he comes down periodically in various forms from on high, but, at Arjun's special request, appears in his "celestial form" (Monier Williams's translation) :

"Endowed with countless mouths and countless eyes,  
With countless faces turned to every quarter,  
With ornaments and wreaths and robes divine,  
With heavenly fragrance and celestial weapons,

It was as if the firmament were filled,  
All in an instant, with a thousand suns  
Blazing with dazzling lustre ; so beheld he  
The glories of the universe collected  
In the one person of the God of gods."

The last two lines are eminently fitted to correct the mistakes into which Mr. Thompson has fallen, of assuming that the personality of the Godhead is clearly set forth in the "Gita." God is certainly spoken of in many places as a person endowed with attributes generally ascribed to the Deity, and even moved by infinite compassion to come down, in various forms, to establish righteousness ; but the personality ascribed to God is merely a collection of the "glories of the universe." A consistent, coherent system of theology cannot possibly be evolved out of the jarring sentiments brought into one focus in the "Gita," any more than a homogeneous body of speculative divinity or practical religion can be evolved out of the vaunted eclecticism of the nineteenth century—the eclecticism, we mean, which has been distilled from the writings of Theodore Parker at Calcutta, if not transferred wholesale. But the theology embodied therein settles down, after appearing in varied forms, into that pantheism which assumes the existence of an all-pervading substance rather than of an intelligent voluntary agent, as the foundation of existence in all its diversified aspects or modes.

II. The Anthropology of the "Gita" is in keeping with its theology, and, like it, vibrates between the transcendental notions of the schools and the coarse ideas embedded in popular mythology and religion. Man is represented as a union of body and soul, the former a portion of the indivisible material essence in the Deity, and the latter a portion of his higher nature, the spirit-

ual essence. The dualistic nature of man is set forth in the following extract (Chapter XIII.):

“This body, O Son of Kunti, is called Kshetra. Those who know the truth of things call that which knows this (Kshetra) Kshetrajna (knower of the body). And know, also, that I am the Kshetrajna in all Kshetras, Bharat. That which is the knowledge of the Kshetra and Kshetrajna is considered by me spiritual knowledge. The great elements, the egoism, the intellect, and also the principle of life and the eleven organs and the five objects of sense—desire, aversion, happiness and unhappiness, multiplicity of condition, reflection, resolution—(all) this is briefly denominated Kshetra with its passions.”

Place this in juxtaposition with the following quotation from Chapter XV.:

“An eternal portion of me only, having assumed life in this world of life, attracts the mind and the five senses, which belong to nature. Whatever body the Sovereign Spirit enters or quits, it is connected with it by snatching those senses from nature, even as the breeze snatches perfumes from their very bed. This spirit approaches the objects of sense by presiding over the ear, the eye, the touch, the taste, and the smell, and also over the mind. The foolish do not perceive it when it quits the body, nor when it remains (in it), nor when actuated by the qualities it enjoys (the world). But those who have the eyes of knowledge do perceive it.”

These two extracts set forth the author's predilection for and belief in the cosmogony of the Sankhya school, and his anxiety to infuse therein the pantheism of the Vedant, as Vedantic philosophers themselves did less conspicuously. Indeed, the author does nothing more or less than transfer wholesale the cosmogony of

the former school and substitute for its self-evolving material principle, Prakriti, the self-evolving spiritual substance of the latter school. The process of evolution remains the same, intelligence giving birth to egoism or consciousness, and through it to the subtle elements, namely, sound, feel, color, sapidity, and odor ; and the five organs of action, namely, the larynx, hands, feet, and the excretory and generative organs. And, lastly, the mind or the eleventh organ is created, and all the evils of life are realized through its ceaseless and malignant activity. The ultimate power of this series is, however, not the primordial form of materialism, but the spiritual substance of pantheism, with its consciousness and varied mental powers potentially, if not actually, present in it. This spiritual substance, it must be borne in mind, appears in the "Gita" embodied as a rule in an all-embracing infinite personality with a two-fold nature, the inferior element manifested in the various modes of material existence, and the superior in those of spiritual life.

But how does the theory of cyclic incarnation, or of a series of incarnations culminating in Krishna, the divine interlocutor, consist with this view of pantheistic thought ? Are we to suppose that the modern theory of incarnation, that we mean which makes the Lord Jesus Christ the crowning point of a graduated scale of incarnations, was anticipated in India about two millenniums ago ? We have no doubt but that it was, though the theory does not appear stated with logical precision either in this book or any other work on Hindu Philosophy and Hindu religion. How little has modern rationalism added to the results philosophical speculation displayed in ancient times ! The theology of the "Gita" renders the essential unity of the human race

a logical necessity or an inevitable logical sequence. If all men are portions of the Deity, both as regards their bodies and as regards their souls, whatever difference we may notice among them must be a difference of degree, not a difference of kind—quantitative, not qualitative. This irresistible conclusion is, however, evaded by the author. He is a Brahman as well as a philosopher, and one of his main objects in the composition and circulation of this philosophico-religious treatise is to uphold the caste system in its fully developed form at all hazards. And so he cheerfully sacrifices logical consistency at the altar of the social god, whose ascendancy must be re-established after the temporary confusion created by philosophical speculation. And he unhesitatingly maintains the essential difference between the recognized castes. The following passage shows that the division of labor introduced by that system is dependent, according to our author, on original propensities rather than on the mere accident of education :

“The offices of Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Sudras, O harasser of thy foes ! are distributed according to the qualities which predominate in the dispositions of each. Tranquillity, continence, mortification, purity, patience, and also rectitude, spiritual knowledge, and spiritual discernment, belief in the existence of another world, comprise the office of a Brahman, sprung from his disposition. Valor, glory, strength, firmness, ability in warfare, and also keeping one’s ground, liberality, and a lordly character, are the office of a Kshatriya, sprung from his disposition. Agriculture, herding of kine, and commerce are the office of a Vaishya, sprung from his disposition. Servitude is the peculiar office of a Sudra, sprung from his



disposition. Each man who is satisfied with his office attains perfection."—Chapter XVII.

III. The last line brings us to the Soteriology of the "Gita," a subject of paramount importance, inasmuch as we see reflected in it the notions of salvation now current among our countrymen. The soteriology of the "Gita" appears at first sight to have been a reaction against that of the schools, the jarring theories of which it endeavored to weld into a homogeneous whole. The watchword of the schools was *quiescence*, but that of the "Gita" seems to have been *action*. The schools systematically opposed action, and represented it as the source of all our trouble. According to their teaching attachment to the world breeds desire, and desire breeds action, and action breeds merit or demerit, and merit or demerit brings in its train reward or punishment and a fresh transmigration, and all the evils associated with it. Action, therefore, with its antecedents and consequents, should be annihilated or superseded by meditative stillness and quiescence, ere the vexed spirit can be liberated from the thralldom of transmigration and merged into the material or divine essence as a drop in the ocean. The schools were certainly at loggerheads with one another on many of the fundamental questions of theology and science, but they were unanimous in denouncing action and upholding passive contemplation as essential to salvation, in the Hindu sense of the term—that is, absorption into the Deity. Moreover, this doctrine of the schools was by no means received by the people at large as a beautiful theory to be revolved in the mind for a few minutes and then quietly shelved. On the contrary, earnest souls from all ranks of society succumbed to its fascinating influence, separated themselves from needed

work, betook themselves to hermit solitude, and wasted their energies in indolent meditation. To remedy this growing evil the "Gita" appeared, with its watch-word *action*, opposed to the passiveness and quiescence of the schools ; and the arguments by which it sustains its position are eminently fitted to influence for good even the contemplative Hindu, who looks forward to annihilation in the Deity as the *summum bonum*. Action, the "Gita" maintains, is inevitable. The devotee must breathe, his blood must circulate, the varied portions of his body must discharge their functions to enable him to give himself to that quiet and contemplative life which has such an irresistible charm for him. Moreover, he must eat and drink a little in order to sustain life, and this means action. Action, then, being inevitable, to denounce it as the cause of all our sorrows and discomforts, and attempt its extinction, is not true philosophy.

✓ | But action, the schools maintain, is fructescent, and must bear its fruit either in reward or in punishment, and thereby prolong the chain of transmigrations. The author of the "Gita" admits that action is fructescent, but he maintains that it is not invariably so. When action is performed with a view to rewards or punishments—that is, when action is performed with interested motives, it bears fruit, prolongs the chain of transmigrations, and perpetuates the misery of existence. But when action is performed without any regard to consequences its effect is salvation, not prolonged enthrallment. Not action in general, but action with interested motives, action from selfish desires and selfish aims, ought to be denounced. The necessity of action being admitted, the question arises, What course is action to take ? Or, in other words, What

are men to do to be saved from the misery of prolonged existence? The "Gita," in reply to this important question, does not give an uncertain sound. Men are to perform the duties of their castes, nothing more and nothing less. The track chalked out for a man by the rules and regulations of his caste is to him the path of righteousness and salvation; and on it he is safe, it being absolutely impossible for him to go wrong while treading it patiently and perseveringly. "It is better to perform one's own duty, even though it be devoid of excellence, than another's duty well. He who fulfils the office obligated by his own nature does not incur sin. One should not reject the duty to which one is born, even if it be associated with error, for all (human) undertakings are involved in error, as fire is by smoke."

But the soteriology of the book, like its theology and its anthropology, is involved inextricably in confusion, because the author, while determined to give prominence to some principles of a practical stamp, seems to have been unable to free himself from the fascinating influence of the ideal of piety held up by the schools—the devotee seated cross-legged or standing still and immovable beneath the outstretched branches of a shady tree, with his eyes fixed on the tip of his nose, his breath regulated according to fixed rules, his mind concentrated on one theme or object of contemplation, his passions and appetites not merely controlled but extinguished, his desires and aspirations subsiding into a holy calm, the serenity of his soul making him impassible or indifferent to hunger and thirst, heat and cold, pleasure and pain, and his entire self, separated from its accidental surroundings, merged into the Deity. No Hindu thinker, in the days of our author, however broad

might be his thoughts, could contemplate this picture of tranquil meditation without being instinctively led to recognize its immense superiority to the bustle and turmoil of an active life. And so the author of the "Gita," like the great Buddha himself, after flying from it for a moment, swung back to it with redoubled momentum. And its theory of salvation is the theory to which universal homage is paid in Hindustan to-day—the theory, we mean, which makes an inferior degree of salvation hang on karmayoga, or the devotion of works, while salvation in the fullest sense of the term is only attainable through the pathway of gyan-yoga, or the devotion of knowledge or hermit solitude and concentrated meditation.

IV. The Eschatology of the book need not detain us long. The Hindu doctrine of transmigration, with its ascending and descending series of animated bodies, innumerable births and deaths, terminating, after the slow cycle of ages innumerable, in absorption in the Deity, is the basis in all its speculations on this subject. It, however, recognizes one principle which should not be passed over unnoticed—namely, that a man's condition in the world to come is determined by his meditations rather than action in this life.

"He who, remembering me at the moment of death, quits the body and comes forth, enters my nature, there is no doubt about that. Or again, whatever nature he thinks on when he abandons the body at the last, to that only does he go, O son of Kunti ! having been always conformed to that nature. Therefore think of me at all times and fight."

It is impossible to enumerate the superstitions to which this and other passages of the sort have given birth, or the various expedients adopted to direct the

thoughts of the dying Hindu to the incarnation of Vishnu, who is the principal interlocutor in this dialogue. The Hindu father of the Vaishnav sect, or the sect which upholds the worship of Vishnu in preference to that of any other god, to that either of Brahma, the first, or Maheshwar, the third person in the Hindu triad, gives names to his male children, such as may in the hour of death recall the Deity to his mind ; or he writes some of his hundred and eight names on his sacred garments and on his arms and on the palms of his hands, that his eyes may fall on them and bring up associations fitted to pave his way to heaven before they are closed forever. The immoral principle that man, however bad his life has been, will enter heaven if at the moment of his death he repeats the name of Vishnu, is a legitimate deduction from such a passage, though perhaps the author and his compeers did not foresee the wrong use which has been made in subsequent ages of their unguarded statements !

We confess we do not rise from the perusal of this time-hallowed and extravagantly venerated book with a very high opinion of its contents. The devotee who, amid the enlightenment of the nineteenth century, represents God as the life of every living thing, from man down to the meanest worm, and the aggregate of all forces, mechanical, chemical, electric, and magnetic, as the sum total, in short, of all forms of life and all material agencies, may be in raptures when speaking of its teachings. The self-styled anthropologist, who throws overboard the supernatural element in Christianity, and represents it as a development of or an outgrowth from pre-existing religious ideas, may see in it a grand stepping-stone to the rapid progress made

in subsequent ages in religion and morals. But we are ordinary mortals, with no pompous titles, and we cannot help representing its general teaching, theological and moral, as on the whole pernicious, even while we are not backward in recognizing the excellence of a few truths and principles scattered up and down among its miscellaneous contents. We have no hesitation whatever in affirming that this and other books of the sort have, on the whole, been so many drags on rather than incentives to the progress of the world in religion and morals, and we fearlessly oppose this bold assertion to the sentimental talk which is unhappily gaining ground even in the churches of Christendom.











